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The Soviet Century
The USSR may no longer exist, but its history remains highly relevant—perhaps today more so than ever. Yet it is a history which for a long time proved impossible to write, not simply due to the lack of accessible documentation, but also because it lay at the heart of an ideological confrontation which obscured the reality of the Soviet regime.
In The Soviet Century, Moshe Lewin traces this history in all its complexity, drawing widely upon archive material previously unavailable. Highlighting key factors such as demography, economics, culture and political repression, Lewin guides us through the inner workings of a system which is still barely understood. In the process he overturns widely held beliefs about the USSR’s leaders, the State-Party system and the Soviet bureaucracy, the “tentacled octopus” which held the real power.
Departing from a simple linear history, The Soviet Century takes in all the continuities and ruptures that led, via a complex route, from the founding revolution of October 1917 to the final collapse of the late 1980s and early 1990s, passing through the Stalinist dictatorship and the impossible reforms of the Khrushchev years.
In The Soviet Century, Moshe Lewin traces this history in all its complexity, drawing widely upon archive material previously unavailable. Highlighting key factors such as demography, economics, culture and political repression, Lewin guides us through the inner workings of a system which is still barely understood. In the process he overturns widely held beliefs about the USSR’s leaders, the State-Party system and the Soviet bureaucracy, the “tentacled octopus” which held the real power.
Departing from a simple linear history, The Soviet Century takes in all the continuities and ruptures that led, via a complex route, from the founding revolution of October 1917 to the final collapse of the late 1980s and early 1990s, passing through the Stalinist dictatorship and the impossible reforms of the Khrushchev years.
432 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2005
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February 24, 2022
موشه لووین نویسنده یهودی متولد لهستان در کتاب سخت خوان ، سنگین و پر حجم قرن شوروی نگاهی دقیق به درون و جامعه شوروی انداخته ، او کار چندانی با وقایع خارجی ، جنگ داخلی و یا نقش شوروی در جنگ دوم و سپس جنگ سرد نداشته ، آنچه برای نویسنده اهمیت داشته و در این کتاب به آن پرداخته مردم و جامعه روسیه بوده است .
در ابتدا باید گفت که فرض نویسنده بر این بوده که خواننده کتاب دانشی بیشتر از پایه از تاریخ و جامعه روسیه داشته ، از این رو کتاب آقای لووین چندان مناسب کسانی مانند من که آگاهی و آشنایی اندکی با مفاهیم اساسی همانند مارکسیسم و کمونیسم دارند نیست .
لووین کتاب خود را با شروع اختلاف میان لنین و استالین بر سر نحوه اداره جمهوری های شوروی شروع کرده ، اگرچه که پیش از آن اندکی اختلاف لنین با ژولیوس مارتوف و گئورگی پلخانف و نحوه انشعاب و جدا شدن منشویک ها و بلشویک ها را هم بیان کرده است .
بیشترین حجم کتاب مربوط به استالین و دوران اوست ، اما نویسنده قصدی برای نشان دادن تصویری کلیشه ای و مرسوم از استالین ندارد ، به نظراو استالین بیشتر محصول زمانه شوروی بوده است . از نگاه لووین روسیه قرن بیستم را به عنوان قدرتی اروپایی اما ویران و عقب مانده با اکثریت مطلق روستایی شروع کرد اما روند صنعتی شدن در دوران استالین روسها را شهر نشین کرد ، زنان که در روستاها مشغول فرزند آوری بودند در شهرها در تمامی رشته ها و زمینه ها پیشرفت کردند ، خدمات بهداشتی در دوران او گسترش یافت و طول عمر روسها بیشتر شد ، رشد سیستم آموزشی همراه با احداث پرشتاب و پر تعداد کارخانه ها و مجتمع های صنعتی ، سبب به وجود آمدن طبقه کارگری شد که بیشتر از قبل به امکانات دسترسی داشتند ، با وجود پاکسازی های گسترده ، سرکوب و خفقان بی سابقه استالین که با شیوه لنین و دیکتاتوری حزب او کاملا در تضاد بود ، در پایان زمان استالین ، روسها قدرتی صنعتی بودند که نیمی از اروپا در دست آنها بود .
آقای لووین تلاش کرده به خواننده نشان دهد که شوروی را تنها با استالین ، گولاک ها و جنگ سرد نباید شناخت ، به همین گونه شوروی آنگونه که رونالد ریگان گفته بود امپراتوری شیطان نبوده و جنبه شیطانی یا شر آن با مرگ استالین به پایان رسیده اما نویسنده نتوانسته تفاوت میان دوران خروشچف و استالین را آشکار بیان کند ، خروشچف کتاب او تنها یک اصلاح گر و منتقد دوران استالین بوده که در پایان هم نتوانسته اقدامات تاثیرگذاری انجام دهد ، به همین ترتیب لووین در شرح دوران رکود برژنف هم چندان تلاشی نکرده . برژنف تنها غولی بوده که تن به تغییرات نداده اگرچه در دوران او و به لطف ثروت افسانه ای و منابع طبیعی ، سطح رفاه اندکی بالا رفت اما این به معنی رشد اقتصادی شوروی نبوده .
یکی دیگر از مفاهیمی که نویسنده تلاش کرده در جهت تفاوت میان دوران قبل و پس از استالین آنرا شرح دهد پلیس مخفی یا ک گ ب و رئیس معروف آن یوری آندره پوف بوده ، آشکار است که ک گ ب با مدیریت جمعی روشنفکر و کتاب خوان به هیچ عنوان قابل مقایسه با ن ک و د بریا نبوده ، اما جهان عموما ک گ ب را بیشتر به عنوان یک دستگاه سرکوبگر به یاد می آورد تا ن ک ود را ، حال آنکه سیاست های ک گ ب بیشتر مبنای پیش گیری داشته تا مجازات .
همدلی نویسنده با آندره پوف آشکارا در کتاب به چشم می خورد ، به نظر می رسد لووین همانند محمد حسنین هیکل در کتاب معروف دیداری دوباره با تاریخ نگاهی مثبت به رئیس فرهیخته و کتابخوان ک گ ب داشته است اما اصلاحات پر شمار آندره پوف به علت فوت او تنها روی کاغذ ماند و هیچ وقت اجرا نشد . او تنها توانست با حمایت از گورباچف زمینه را برای انتقال قدرت به او فراهم آورد .
پایان اتحاد جماهیر شوروی را همه می دانیم ، اقتصادی بیمار با یک بوروکراسی در حال شکوفایی ،افزایش تعداد افراد تحصیل کرده و صاحب صلاحیت که رژیم به دلیل ناتوانی از تحمل استعدادهای مستقل آن ها را کنار می گذاشت به همراه افزایش امتیازات بوروکراتیک در حالی که عملکرد رژیم در حال بدتر شدن بود مجموعه ای از دلایل آنچه نویسنده ترکیبی جادویی برای فروپاشی سیستم خوانده است .
کتاب قرن شوروی در حالی به انتها می رسد که نویسنده با انبوه اطلاعات جزیی وشاید نه چندان مفید که ارائه کرده تسلط خود را بر موضوع اگرچه نشان داده اما او نتوانسته پدیده شوروی را به صورت کامل و جامع بررسی کند . شاید بزرگترین بخشی که نویسنده نادیده گرفته سیاست خارجی شوروی و به همین طور اثربخشی شوروی و نظام آن از تحولات جهان باشد ، از نگاه نویسنده گویا سیاست خارجی شوروی اثری بر زندگی و جامعه مردمان آن نگذاشته است .
در پایان باید گفت سخت خوان بودن کتاب ، انبوه آمار و اطلاعات و شاید تنها بررسی اوضاع داخلی کشور ، سبب شده که قرن شوروی موشه لووین برای همگان قابل فهم و چندان مفید نباشد .
در ابتدا باید گفت که فرض نویسنده بر این بوده که خواننده کتاب دانشی بیشتر از پایه از تاریخ و جامعه روسیه داشته ، از این رو کتاب آقای لووین چندان مناسب کسانی مانند من که آگاهی و آشنایی اندکی با مفاهیم اساسی همانند مارکسیسم و کمونیسم دارند نیست .
لووین کتاب خود را با شروع اختلاف میان لنین و استالین بر سر نحوه اداره جمهوری های شوروی شروع کرده ، اگرچه که پیش از آن اندکی اختلاف لنین با ژولیوس مارتوف و گئورگی پلخانف و نحوه انشعاب و جدا شدن منشویک ها و بلشویک ها را هم بیان کرده است .
بیشترین حجم کتاب مربوط به استالین و دوران اوست ، اما نویسنده قصدی برای نشان دادن تصویری کلیشه ای و مرسوم از استالین ندارد ، به نظراو استالین بیشتر محصول زمانه شوروی بوده است . از نگاه لووین روسیه قرن بیستم را به عنوان قدرتی اروپایی اما ویران و عقب مانده با اکثریت مطلق روستایی شروع کرد اما روند صنعتی شدن در دوران استالین روسها را شهر نشین کرد ، زنان که در روستاها مشغول فرزند آوری بودند در شهرها در تمامی رشته ها و زمینه ها پیشرفت کردند ، خدمات بهداشتی در دوران او گسترش یافت و طول عمر روسها بیشتر شد ، رشد سیستم آموزشی همراه با احداث پرشتاب و پر تعداد کارخانه ها و مجتمع های صنعتی ، سبب به وجود آمدن طبقه کارگری شد که بیشتر از قبل به امکانات دسترسی داشتند ، با وجود پاکسازی های گسترده ، سرکوب و خفقان بی سابقه استالین که با شیوه لنین و دیکتاتوری حزب او کاملا در تضاد بود ، در پایان زمان استالین ، روسها قدرتی صنعتی بودند که نیمی از اروپا در دست آنها بود .
آقای لووین تلاش کرده به خواننده نشان دهد که شوروی را تنها با استالین ، گولاک ها و جنگ سرد نباید شناخت ، به همین گونه شوروی آنگونه که رونالد ریگان گفته بود امپراتوری شیطان نبوده و جنبه شیطانی یا شر آن با مرگ استالین به پایان رسیده اما نویسنده نتوانسته تفاوت میان دوران خروشچف و استالین را آشکار بیان کند ، خروشچف کتاب او تنها یک اصلاح گر و منتقد دوران استالین بوده که در پایان هم نتوانسته اقدامات تاثیرگذاری انجام دهد ، به همین ترتیب لووین در شرح دوران رکود برژنف هم چندان تلاشی نکرده . برژنف تنها غولی بوده که تن به تغییرات نداده اگرچه در دوران او و به لطف ثروت افسانه ای و منابع طبیعی ، سطح رفاه اندکی بالا رفت اما این به معنی رشد اقتصادی شوروی نبوده .
یکی دیگر از مفاهیمی که نویسنده تلاش کرده در جهت تفاوت میان دوران قبل و پس از استالین آنرا شرح دهد پلیس مخفی یا ک گ ب و رئیس معروف آن یوری آندره پوف بوده ، آشکار است که ک گ ب با مدیریت جمعی روشنفکر و کتاب خوان به هیچ عنوان قابل مقایسه با ن ک و د بریا نبوده ، اما جهان عموما ک گ ب را بیشتر به عنوان یک دستگاه سرکوبگر به یاد می آورد تا ن ک ود را ، حال آنکه سیاست های ک گ ب بیشتر مبنای پیش گیری داشته تا مجازات .
همدلی نویسنده با آندره پوف آشکارا در کتاب به چشم می خورد ، به نظر می رسد لووین همانند محمد حسنین هیکل در کتاب معروف دیداری دوباره با تاریخ نگاهی مثبت به رئیس فرهیخته و کتابخوان ک گ ب داشته است اما اصلاحات پر شمار آندره پوف به علت فوت او تنها روی کاغذ ماند و هیچ وقت اجرا نشد . او تنها توانست با حمایت از گورباچف زمینه را برای انتقال قدرت به او فراهم آورد .
پایان اتحاد جماهیر شوروی را همه می دانیم ، اقتصادی بیمار با یک بوروکراسی در حال شکوفایی ،افزایش تعداد افراد تحصیل کرده و صاحب صلاحیت که رژیم به دلیل ناتوانی از تحمل استعدادهای مستقل آن ها را کنار می گذاشت به همراه افزایش امتیازات بوروکراتیک در حالی که عملکرد رژیم در حال بدتر شدن بود مجموعه ای از دلایل آنچه نویسنده ترکیبی جادویی برای فروپاشی سیستم خوانده است .
کتاب قرن شوروی در حالی به انتها می رسد که نویسنده با انبوه اطلاعات جزیی وشاید نه چندان مفید که ارائه کرده تسلط خود را بر موضوع اگرچه نشان داده اما او نتوانسته پدیده شوروی را به صورت کامل و جامع بررسی کند . شاید بزرگترین بخشی که نویسنده نادیده گرفته سیاست خارجی شوروی و به همین طور اثربخشی شوروی و نظام آن از تحولات جهان باشد ، از نگاه نویسنده گویا سیاست خارجی شوروی اثری بر زندگی و جامعه مردمان آن نگذاشته است .
در پایان باید گفت سخت خوان بودن کتاب ، انبوه آمار و اطلاعات و شاید تنها بررسی اوضاع داخلی کشور ، سبب شده که قرن شوروی موشه لووین برای همگان قابل فهم و چندان مفید نباشد .
August 21, 2015
This isn't a book for beginners. There's an assumption that the reader has a certain level of knowledge about the Soviet Union, which I do not possess, so it was heavy going for me but very much worth the effort.
Lewin's main focus is on institutions. The Party, the Ministries, the trade unions and how the bureaucracy rapidly grew in importance until it, and not the General Secretary or the Politburo, came to run the state. Using a wealth of new records and data Lewin shows that even under the shadow of Stalin's seemingly absolute power, the bureaucracy had begun to wield an enormous amount of influence. Collectively, of course, any individual member could still fall victim to Stalin's paranoia (and ironically the NKVD, which carried out most of Stalin's bloody handiwork, was also one of the institutions that was hardest hit). It might sound boring, but it isn't. Lewin is an engaging writer and his enthusiasm for the subject is quite endearing. Despite the statistics and demographic data, the story Lewin tells is fairly easy to track – that of an idealistic political party that is systematically stripped of power by Stalin, and then absorbed wholesale by government bureaucracy until it is unable to provide the direction or leadership that the country desperately needed when it entered a period of stagnation and eventual collapse. It's easy to say “it's all Stalin's fault”, but Lewin actually shows how the cracks first appeared in the 30s, and how Stalin's purges ensured there was no one with the independent authority to try and fix them, and that by the time Krushchev seized power and began an immediate “de-Stalinisation” of the state, it was too late.
Lewin's other concern is in differentiating Stalinism from other, very different, stages of Soviet history. Kruschev's reforms may have largely failed, but his immediate move to begin dismantling of the key aspects of Stalinism succeeded. Political repression may have remained a part of Soviet policy but mass terror never returned, and the infamous gulag system disappeared entirely by the late 50's. One of the interesting details Lewin uncovered was the seemingly widespread policy of “prohylaxis”, wherein the KGB would identify dissidents and, instead of arresting them, throwing them in prison or simply shooting them in the head, would essentially give them a stern talking to and a warning to cut it out. While still obviously oppressive, this policy, which Andropov, the secretly liberal KGB chief in the 60's and 70's was apparently a big proponent of, is a pretty far cry from the menacing reputation the KGB had in the West, and is massively different from the arbitrary way the NKVD operated under Stalin.
I'll definitely give this a reread at some point when I'm more knowledgeable on Soviet history. In conclusion, for the U.S.S.R the 20th century was truly... a Soviet Century. Or was it??
Lewin's main focus is on institutions. The Party, the Ministries, the trade unions and how the bureaucracy rapidly grew in importance until it, and not the General Secretary or the Politburo, came to run the state. Using a wealth of new records and data Lewin shows that even under the shadow of Stalin's seemingly absolute power, the bureaucracy had begun to wield an enormous amount of influence. Collectively, of course, any individual member could still fall victim to Stalin's paranoia (and ironically the NKVD, which carried out most of Stalin's bloody handiwork, was also one of the institutions that was hardest hit). It might sound boring, but it isn't. Lewin is an engaging writer and his enthusiasm for the subject is quite endearing. Despite the statistics and demographic data, the story Lewin tells is fairly easy to track – that of an idealistic political party that is systematically stripped of power by Stalin, and then absorbed wholesale by government bureaucracy until it is unable to provide the direction or leadership that the country desperately needed when it entered a period of stagnation and eventual collapse. It's easy to say “it's all Stalin's fault”, but Lewin actually shows how the cracks first appeared in the 30s, and how Stalin's purges ensured there was no one with the independent authority to try and fix them, and that by the time Krushchev seized power and began an immediate “de-Stalinisation” of the state, it was too late.
Lewin's other concern is in differentiating Stalinism from other, very different, stages of Soviet history. Kruschev's reforms may have largely failed, but his immediate move to begin dismantling of the key aspects of Stalinism succeeded. Political repression may have remained a part of Soviet policy but mass terror never returned, and the infamous gulag system disappeared entirely by the late 50's. One of the interesting details Lewin uncovered was the seemingly widespread policy of “prohylaxis”, wherein the KGB would identify dissidents and, instead of arresting them, throwing them in prison or simply shooting them in the head, would essentially give them a stern talking to and a warning to cut it out. While still obviously oppressive, this policy, which Andropov, the secretly liberal KGB chief in the 60's and 70's was apparently a big proponent of, is a pretty far cry from the menacing reputation the KGB had in the West, and is massively different from the arbitrary way the NKVD operated under Stalin.
I'll definitely give this a reread at some point when I'm more knowledgeable on Soviet history. In conclusion, for the U.S.S.R the 20th century was truly... a Soviet Century. Or was it??
February 6, 2017
Part of this year's Russian Revolution centenary read (VERSO runs a whole awesome series! Check: versobooks.com)
Total must read in fact. In the word's of Eric fucking Hobsbawm: "His reflections on the Soviet Century are an important contribution to emancipating Soviet history from the ideological heritage of the last century and should be essential reading for all who wish to understand it."
Nothing to add, really.
(Ok, a little: Russian archive and a massive wealth of administrative data and statistics based deep dives into the intricacies of Stalin's paranoid and murderous bureaucracy of the 1930s and 40s; Khrushchev's de-Stalinization and state and party apparatus governance reform processes post 1953, the establishment and rise of the KGB under Andropov, dissidents and political opening in the 70s and 80s, Gorbachev and, well, the rest is history.
The final part of the book analyses the development from about Lenin's 'What is to be done' / the failed Revolution in 1905 to Gorbachev within the broader historical context beyond the usual partisan glorifications or broad-brush rejection of anything Soviet.
Total must read in fact. In the word's of Eric fucking Hobsbawm: "His reflections on the Soviet Century are an important contribution to emancipating Soviet history from the ideological heritage of the last century and should be essential reading for all who wish to understand it."
Nothing to add, really.
(Ok, a little: Russian archive and a massive wealth of administrative data and statistics based deep dives into the intricacies of Stalin's paranoid and murderous bureaucracy of the 1930s and 40s; Khrushchev's de-Stalinization and state and party apparatus governance reform processes post 1953, the establishment and rise of the KGB under Andropov, dissidents and political opening in the 70s and 80s, Gorbachev and, well, the rest is history.
The final part of the book analyses the development from about Lenin's 'What is to be done' / the failed Revolution in 1905 to Gorbachev within the broader historical context beyond the usual partisan glorifications or broad-brush rejection of anything Soviet.
January 13, 2024
I think that I have to start this review with a disclaimer: I am not a Stalinist, and by no means am I defending Stalin. That said, I found that some of the criticisms that Lewin presents are good and factual, while some are purely polemical, and I was left wondering why this book is recommended on Reddit as a guide to understanding the Soviet government. I will give the most egregious example of the polemical anti-Stalin rhetoric. On page 33, Lewin writes:
I was pretty surprised that there's no citation of this speech since all the writings and speeches of Stalin are published somewhere. If it's a quote from an archive, I would still expect a citation. But this quote also stands out because Lewin extrapolates a lot from Stalin's character traits from it. It's mentioned over and over again, so I decided to try and find it myself. Fortunately, as I speak Russian, I tried to google something akin to "speech Stalin Sverdlov Party University 1924." As it turns out, it's not a speech, but a series of lectures called "Foundations of Leninism" that Stalin gave at the aforementioned university in 1924. These lectures do not contain the said quote. If it's from memoirs, why not mention who wrote the memoir or whatever the source might be? How should the reader verify that the quote even exists if it's ungoogleable and basically impossible to verify?
Lewin writes this in the preface:
Why, then, are a lot of characterizations of Stalin not sourced? Why is Stalin attributed a quote that potentially doesn't exist? It's baffling to me that citations are that weak in a source recommended by academics. There are loads of instances where Lewin says something like "Historians seem agreed," "In a very gloomy letter," and "In a handwritten note" without attribution of the source.
All that said, the statistical work is solid, and if I were writing this book, I would stick to the criticisms of institutions and the actually verified crimes that the Soviet regime committed, rather than indicting the personal character of Stalin over and over again.
One conclusion that Lewin comes to, which I think is valuable and should be paid attention to, is the rise of nationalist rhetoric. The consequences of those policies are still visible in modern Russia.
2024: Edited for grammar
This becomes clearer if we refer to one of his later declarations to ‘future cadres’, students at the Sverdlov Party University. Here he basically explained that ‘for us, objective difficulties do not exist. The only problem is cadres. If things are not progressing, or if they go wrong, the cause is not to be sought in any objective conditions: it is the fault of the cadres’.
The real enemies were objective limitations (which Stalin declared non-existed 'for us' in 1924)[...]
I was pretty surprised that there's no citation of this speech since all the writings and speeches of Stalin are published somewhere. If it's a quote from an archive, I would still expect a citation. But this quote also stands out because Lewin extrapolates a lot from Stalin's character traits from it. It's mentioned over and over again, so I decided to try and find it myself. Fortunately, as I speak Russian, I tried to google something akin to "speech Stalin Sverdlov Party University 1924." As it turns out, it's not a speech, but a series of lectures called "Foundations of Leninism" that Stalin gave at the aforementioned university in 1924. These lectures do not contain the said quote. If it's from memoirs, why not mention who wrote the memoir or whatever the source might be? How should the reader verify that the quote even exists if it's ungoogleable and basically impossible to verify?
Lewin writes this in the preface:
Here reliance on new materials – archives, memoirs, autobiographies or documentary publications – is an objective in itself
Why, then, are a lot of characterizations of Stalin not sourced? Why is Stalin attributed a quote that potentially doesn't exist? It's baffling to me that citations are that weak in a source recommended by academics. There are loads of instances where Lewin says something like "Historians seem agreed," "In a very gloomy letter," and "In a handwritten note" without attribution of the source.
All that said, the statistical work is solid, and if I were writing this book, I would stick to the criticisms of institutions and the actually verified crimes that the Soviet regime committed, rather than indicting the personal character of Stalin over and over again.
One conclusion that Lewin comes to, which I think is valuable and should be paid attention to, is the rise of nationalist rhetoric. The consequences of those policies are still visible in modern Russia.
2024: Edited for grammar
April 6, 2023
One of the great contradictions of the Soviet system was that its most terrifying moments of excess generated within itself its most exceptional periods of dynamism, while the latent humanism of the system pushed it towards stagnation and decline. The horrific force of Stalinism, under pressure from existential external threats, replicated in Russia the equivalent of the entire British 19th century in little more than a decade. The five year plans succeeded in stamping entire industries out of the ground and turned a country without electricity into one that produced enough tanks to push back Hitler’s blitzkrieg. This was followed by a reconstruction effort that turned thousands of square miles of depopulated wreckage into a space age superpower within another short decade.
The illegality and arbitrary violence of the Stalin era prompted a horrified backlash within the ruling echelons of the Soviet leadership themselves. The post-Stalin administration took great risks in dismantling the entire complex of forced labour and political terror that had aggregated since the 1930s, and initiated the regime’s final successful programme of internal reform and renewal. However, the radicalism which the system required to heal itself was met with intransigence and hostility by an exhausted generation of administrators. Many had witnessed and survived too much change and were unwilling to countenance any more. Conversely, the conspicuous failure of the reforms to go anywhere near far enough to fix the scale of the deformities within the system disappointed the aspirations of new, better educated generations of Soviet citizens.
Increasingly, the system which had turned a vast rural, semi-feudal empire into a modern industrial powerhouse transformed itself into a great engine of wastefulness, buying its citizens off with the promise of an easy, quiet life in exchange for their tacit consent. ‘We pretend to work and they pretend to pay us’ became the defining feature of the stagnation which set in during 1970s. Utilising cutting edge research and analysis, Moshe Lewin reveals that the Soviet leadership were often completely aware of the problems that beset them, but, having discarded the tools of mass coercion, were completely incapable of responding effectively. As the great machine of the planned economy began to wind down in the second half of the 20th century, the people operating it were unable to do anything other than manage its decline. The Soviet Union possessed vast reserves of resources in areas with no surplus labour to exploit them, while at the same time maintained huge levels of overstaffing and in areas with massive labour surpluses, leading to plummeting productivity.
The inefficient (from a capitalist perspective) elements of the system were an important part of the social safety blanket for the wider population. The de-facto welfarist elements of the productive system were therefore held firmly in place by the most conservative elements of the apparatus. These conservatives were often themselves former Stalinists who were happy to accept ossification as the price of stability and social peace. When the next wave of political reform finally came with perestroika in the mid 1980s, it lifted the lid not on the potential for violent revolution, but on the dead air a moribund social contract.
Moshe Lewin’s book is a detailed survey of the way in which the Soviet state actually functioned, constructed from detailed and original analysis of the Soviet archives. It is sharply critical of a system in which there was much to be critical of, but cautions against becoming carried away by ideological condemnation. Lewin shows the way in which the hand dealt to the Soviet apparatus constrained their every choice. He emphasises the incredible robustness of a regime built under such unfavourable conditions. The Soviet Century is therefore an incredibly ambitious effort at myth busting, challenging ideological assumptions about what the Soviet system apparently was, and forwarding exactingly researched exposition on what it actually was. In particular it shows how the state and social structure morphed and changed dramatically throughout its history, and rejects any historical approach which attempts to project the Stalinist period backwards to 1917 and forwards to 1991.
This book, however, presumes an extensive pre-existing knowledge of the history of the Russian Revolution, the Stalinist 1930s, the Second World War and the Cold War. Lewin sheds light on so many hitherto unknown aspects of the history, he simply doesn't bother to repeat such things as are already fairly common knowledge from a historians perspective - a problem if you are not a historian! A reader looking for a colourful ‘big picture’ description of the Soviet project may well find this book a boring, baffling history of Russian bureaucracy. The most intriguing and exciting elements of The Soviet Century will only be apparent to people with an already good knowledge of the Soviet century.
The dialectic identified by Lewin is between the Stalinist apparatus, which he considers fundamentally different from the original Bolshevik state, counterposed with the stop/start reformism of Khrushchev-Brezhnev-Andropov era, upon which ‘history weighed like a nightmare’. In terms of the actual text, this approach means that we find ourselves plunged into the hallucinatory world of High Stalinism from the outset, and only encounter any substantial analysis of Lenin and the founding of the Soviet state 300 or so pages into the book!
Also missing from The Soviet Century is any information at all on one of the most significant elements of the system’s history, i.e. its impact on the outside world and international relations. Of the revolutionary Comintern era in the time of European revolution, to the role the Soviet Union played in the anti-colonial revolutions of the 60s and 70s, we learn nothing. This is a history of the Soviet Union as it might have been seen through the eyes of an apparatchik in some Moscow ministry, not through the eyes of the outside world.
While Moshe Lewin’s The Soviet Century is an impressive scholarly intervention, it is not the epic, emotive history it appears to be. Approach with caution.
The illegality and arbitrary violence of the Stalin era prompted a horrified backlash within the ruling echelons of the Soviet leadership themselves. The post-Stalin administration took great risks in dismantling the entire complex of forced labour and political terror that had aggregated since the 1930s, and initiated the regime’s final successful programme of internal reform and renewal. However, the radicalism which the system required to heal itself was met with intransigence and hostility by an exhausted generation of administrators. Many had witnessed and survived too much change and were unwilling to countenance any more. Conversely, the conspicuous failure of the reforms to go anywhere near far enough to fix the scale of the deformities within the system disappointed the aspirations of new, better educated generations of Soviet citizens.
Increasingly, the system which had turned a vast rural, semi-feudal empire into a modern industrial powerhouse transformed itself into a great engine of wastefulness, buying its citizens off with the promise of an easy, quiet life in exchange for their tacit consent. ‘We pretend to work and they pretend to pay us’ became the defining feature of the stagnation which set in during 1970s. Utilising cutting edge research and analysis, Moshe Lewin reveals that the Soviet leadership were often completely aware of the problems that beset them, but, having discarded the tools of mass coercion, were completely incapable of responding effectively. As the great machine of the planned economy began to wind down in the second half of the 20th century, the people operating it were unable to do anything other than manage its decline. The Soviet Union possessed vast reserves of resources in areas with no surplus labour to exploit them, while at the same time maintained huge levels of overstaffing and in areas with massive labour surpluses, leading to plummeting productivity.
The inefficient (from a capitalist perspective) elements of the system were an important part of the social safety blanket for the wider population. The de-facto welfarist elements of the productive system were therefore held firmly in place by the most conservative elements of the apparatus. These conservatives were often themselves former Stalinists who were happy to accept ossification as the price of stability and social peace. When the next wave of political reform finally came with perestroika in the mid 1980s, it lifted the lid not on the potential for violent revolution, but on the dead air a moribund social contract.
Moshe Lewin’s book is a detailed survey of the way in which the Soviet state actually functioned, constructed from detailed and original analysis of the Soviet archives. It is sharply critical of a system in which there was much to be critical of, but cautions against becoming carried away by ideological condemnation. Lewin shows the way in which the hand dealt to the Soviet apparatus constrained their every choice. He emphasises the incredible robustness of a regime built under such unfavourable conditions. The Soviet Century is therefore an incredibly ambitious effort at myth busting, challenging ideological assumptions about what the Soviet system apparently was, and forwarding exactingly researched exposition on what it actually was. In particular it shows how the state and social structure morphed and changed dramatically throughout its history, and rejects any historical approach which attempts to project the Stalinist period backwards to 1917 and forwards to 1991.
This book, however, presumes an extensive pre-existing knowledge of the history of the Russian Revolution, the Stalinist 1930s, the Second World War and the Cold War. Lewin sheds light on so many hitherto unknown aspects of the history, he simply doesn't bother to repeat such things as are already fairly common knowledge from a historians perspective - a problem if you are not a historian! A reader looking for a colourful ‘big picture’ description of the Soviet project may well find this book a boring, baffling history of Russian bureaucracy. The most intriguing and exciting elements of The Soviet Century will only be apparent to people with an already good knowledge of the Soviet century.
The dialectic identified by Lewin is between the Stalinist apparatus, which he considers fundamentally different from the original Bolshevik state, counterposed with the stop/start reformism of Khrushchev-Brezhnev-Andropov era, upon which ‘history weighed like a nightmare’. In terms of the actual text, this approach means that we find ourselves plunged into the hallucinatory world of High Stalinism from the outset, and only encounter any substantial analysis of Lenin and the founding of the Soviet state 300 or so pages into the book!
Also missing from The Soviet Century is any information at all on one of the most significant elements of the system’s history, i.e. its impact on the outside world and international relations. Of the revolutionary Comintern era in the time of European revolution, to the role the Soviet Union played in the anti-colonial revolutions of the 60s and 70s, we learn nothing. This is a history of the Soviet Union as it might have been seen through the eyes of an apparatchik in some Moscow ministry, not through the eyes of the outside world.
While Moshe Lewin’s The Soviet Century is an impressive scholarly intervention, it is not the epic, emotive history it appears to be. Approach with caution.
June 9, 2017
Essential to understanding the socio-economic dynamics of Stalinism, Post-Stalinism, and the bureaucratic apparatus around the party and state. His evenhanded analysis and objectivity is a breath of fresh air in a field dominated by the cold-warriors of the previous generation. He does not dismiss the effects of Stalin's purges & the economics behind NKVD gulags, he instead notes their hollowing of Soviet institutions and de-politization of the CPSU, rather than arguing that the USSR was nothing more than a puppet for Stalin, he notes the complex and selfish bureaucracy. This book is a fascinating glimpse into a world that has been obscured by a lack of archival information and ideological competition.
This book is a great base to examine what Socialism truly means. Does it only mean state control of resources, a single proletarian party, or the other multitude of characteristics that defined the USSR from 1924-1991? Lewin brings forth these difficult questions with archival material to lend us a deeper understanding of the crisis of volunteerism/substitutionism and how depolitization can strangle any form of Socialism in its cradle. It also reveals that only through study of the history of the USSR can we move beyond the many existential crisis of Stalinism and create a world that is dynamic and free of exploitation.
This book is a great base to examine what Socialism truly means. Does it only mean state control of resources, a single proletarian party, or the other multitude of characteristics that defined the USSR from 1924-1991? Lewin brings forth these difficult questions with archival material to lend us a deeper understanding of the crisis of volunteerism/substitutionism and how depolitization can strangle any form of Socialism in its cradle. It also reveals that only through study of the history of the USSR can we move beyond the many existential crisis of Stalinism and create a world that is dynamic and free of exploitation.
July 1, 2018
Great book for those who already know the basic facts of Soviet history; for introductory histories I would consider looking elsewhere.
Brilliant 'broad-strokes' account of the Soviet Union; each part is better than the last. If you're like me and have read several books on the Stalin era already (Fitzpatrick, Getty, etc.), then Part One will likely not contain anything surprising. I found the next two parts of the book much more interesting, especially Part Three. Lewin's account of the party bureaucracy, economic stagnation, and the transformation of Soviet politics is both eye-opening and entertaining. I disagree with some of the conclusions and would image that Dr. Lewin and I would diverge on a number of political questions, but I highly recommend this book nonetheless.
Brilliant 'broad-strokes' account of the Soviet Union; each part is better than the last. If you're like me and have read several books on the Stalin era already (Fitzpatrick, Getty, etc.), then Part One will likely not contain anything surprising. I found the next two parts of the book much more interesting, especially Part Three. Lewin's account of the party bureaucracy, economic stagnation, and the transformation of Soviet politics is both eye-opening and entertaining. I disagree with some of the conclusions and would image that Dr. Lewin and I would diverge on a number of political questions, but I highly recommend this book nonetheless.
November 30, 2020
Although this book can be a bit dry, I found the overall presentation of his arguments very compelling. He gives one of the most measured overviews Stalinism I have read, in addition to providing an explanation for the shape that the state later took that shows a clear trajectory to its current form.
October 6, 2023
Sosyalist dünya görüşüne sahip olan birisi olarak aslında kendi içimde ilahlastirdigim bir Sovyetler imgesini neden yıkıldığıni da açıklayacak şekilde eleştirel bir bakış açısı sunan bir kitap . Tavsiye ederim .
February 18, 2024
"Ahistoricism is a very common error and the gravest fault of all, because human action does not occur in a void; it is not a deus ex machina." That opener alone is an invaluable piece of wisdom making this book worth cracking open. It distills the need for a contextual and material historiography against narrative-building and gap-filling driven by blind ideological faith.
I came across this book by accident at a non-lending library. I recognized the author's name from references in the Cosmopod podcast, which is one of the most impressively well-researched and dense history podcasts on this society that I've ever heard. They emphasize a similar point repeatedly (that's the key to learning, after all!): Whatever we say about the actions or motives of a particular individual needs to be situated so that we understand what frames and enables their actions. History is not reducible to biography.
The overarching point will be familiar to readers of this history: Development is distorted by less-than-ideal conditions, opening opportunities for bureaucracy to entrench itself and seize the reins of a mass political project until it's ultimately hijacked and morphed into the most brutally crony-driven of "crony capitalism".
There's a heavy focus on the Brezhnev era, but the fact that the brief glimpse at Andropov's unfortunately short-lived tenure meshes so well with the account in Socialism Betrayed: Behind the Collapse of the Soviet Union effectively further corroborates its account of the problems and lacklustre solutions in the waning years of the Eastern Bloc. The pernicious influence of the black market, and why and how it grew, is also touched on at some deserved length.
Raised but not satisfactorily answered (to be fair, I'm not sure it has been anywhere) is the ultimate defining challenge: How does a backward economy subject from its outset to economic hostility and encirclement, and further one which structurally requires the whole population be mobilized, make the shift from rallying large-scale extensive development toward more "capital-intensive" development to advance itself industrially and technologically, avoiding stagnation?
As Moshe Lewin concludes, it's easier to judge in hindsight and this history, while fraught, is not a barren desert to be dismissed as empty of lessons for today. While he doesn't go into more than hints about the kleptocratic nature of Russian capitalism, it's clear he sees more worth drawing hope from in their history than their present. Exactly what that means for now is left open.
I'll try to update and share further thoughts here when I can.
I came across this book by accident at a non-lending library. I recognized the author's name from references in the Cosmopod podcast, which is one of the most impressively well-researched and dense history podcasts on this society that I've ever heard. They emphasize a similar point repeatedly (that's the key to learning, after all!): Whatever we say about the actions or motives of a particular individual needs to be situated so that we understand what frames and enables their actions. History is not reducible to biography.
The overarching point will be familiar to readers of this history: Development is distorted by less-than-ideal conditions, opening opportunities for bureaucracy to entrench itself and seize the reins of a mass political project until it's ultimately hijacked and morphed into the most brutally crony-driven of "crony capitalism".
There's a heavy focus on the Brezhnev era, but the fact that the brief glimpse at Andropov's unfortunately short-lived tenure meshes so well with the account in Socialism Betrayed: Behind the Collapse of the Soviet Union effectively further corroborates its account of the problems and lacklustre solutions in the waning years of the Eastern Bloc. The pernicious influence of the black market, and why and how it grew, is also touched on at some deserved length.
Raised but not satisfactorily answered (to be fair, I'm not sure it has been anywhere) is the ultimate defining challenge: How does a backward economy subject from its outset to economic hostility and encirclement, and further one which structurally requires the whole population be mobilized, make the shift from rallying large-scale extensive development toward more "capital-intensive" development to advance itself industrially and technologically, avoiding stagnation?
As Moshe Lewin concludes, it's easier to judge in hindsight and this history, while fraught, is not a barren desert to be dismissed as empty of lessons for today. While he doesn't go into more than hints about the kleptocratic nature of Russian capitalism, it's clear he sees more worth drawing hope from in their history than their present. Exactly what that means for now is left open.
I'll try to update and share further thoughts here when I can.
September 2, 2020
It is basically a sort of crititique of Stalinism and its reflects on the Soviet history. However, ı think authoritarianism is more than Stalin and his rule. His reign is a result not a reason. So, it needs to delve into a deep philosophical and sociological investigation so as to understand why Stalinism is a result...
March 26, 2023
The Soviet Century is an interesting analysis of the Soviet Union focusing on the parallel evolution of the bolshevik party and the state bureaucracy. I find his rejection of the ideologically based "stalinization" and "gulagization" of Soviet history, and his handling of the USSR on its own premises to be commendable. He is not afraid to demonstrate the positive progress of the Soviet system, nor does he shy from the repression and corruption.
In Lewin (and Lenin)'s perspective, the bolshevik party was in danger of losing its identity and being consumed if it got too involved in bureaucratic administration following the end of the civil war. Rapid urbanization and mass growth in administrative infrastructure, coupled with the large influx of uneducated party members without any strong attachment to the revolutionary struggle, was a powerful social process that undermined the position of the party.
Lewin views stalinism and the great purges as an attempt to curtail and control the budding power of the bureaucracy, but also demonstrates that the destruction of old bolshevik party culture hollowed-out the power of the party as policy-makers. Khrushchev attempted to reverse stalinism and combat the bureaucratization of the state, but was unable to restore the status of the party, and was eventually ousted by an alliance of bureaucrats. His attempts at administrative reforms were quickly undone. What followed was a slow decline where the administrative apparatus in effect seized power over the state, the general secretary becoming a figurehead without real power.
Lewin refers to many policy-documents, discussions and reports made on the order of the central government that displays full awareness of the developing structural and economic problems of the state, starting in the 60's. But the party-core was incapable of forcing through changes, and the bureaucracy unwilling to undermine its own influence and interests. The party had become the junior party in negotiations over budgets, staffing and reform, and always had to compromise in face of bureaucratic resistance. This led to the seeming paradox of a stagnating economy and a booming bureaucracy. Without powerful state intervention, parallel economies and networks of supply were allowed to flourish, becoming tightly intervowen with the official ministeries and shielded from disciplinary action from above. In the end the entire system was becoming privatized from within.
An interesting read, would recommend for a very different perspective on the USSR.
In Lewin (and Lenin)'s perspective, the bolshevik party was in danger of losing its identity and being consumed if it got too involved in bureaucratic administration following the end of the civil war. Rapid urbanization and mass growth in administrative infrastructure, coupled with the large influx of uneducated party members without any strong attachment to the revolutionary struggle, was a powerful social process that undermined the position of the party.
Lewin views stalinism and the great purges as an attempt to curtail and control the budding power of the bureaucracy, but also demonstrates that the destruction of old bolshevik party culture hollowed-out the power of the party as policy-makers. Khrushchev attempted to reverse stalinism and combat the bureaucratization of the state, but was unable to restore the status of the party, and was eventually ousted by an alliance of bureaucrats. His attempts at administrative reforms were quickly undone. What followed was a slow decline where the administrative apparatus in effect seized power over the state, the general secretary becoming a figurehead without real power.
Lewin refers to many policy-documents, discussions and reports made on the order of the central government that displays full awareness of the developing structural and economic problems of the state, starting in the 60's. But the party-core was incapable of forcing through changes, and the bureaucracy unwilling to undermine its own influence and interests. The party had become the junior party in negotiations over budgets, staffing and reform, and always had to compromise in face of bureaucratic resistance. This led to the seeming paradox of a stagnating economy and a booming bureaucracy. Without powerful state intervention, parallel economies and networks of supply were allowed to flourish, becoming tightly intervowen with the official ministeries and shielded from disciplinary action from above. In the end the entire system was becoming privatized from within.
An interesting read, would recommend for a very different perspective on the USSR.
November 6, 2019
It’s hard for people’s reaction to the USSR not to become a Rorschach test. A centuries worth of fighting it out in the public sphere has ingrained rigid perceptions about what the USSR was. Lewin’s book is not a place to begin if you’re unfamiliar with these legendary, intimidating arguments. Thankfully, this is probably the first book I’ve read on this subject that effectively cuts through all of this. It’s dense, but very insightful.
For me, one revelatory aspect was the tension between party and the state bureaucracy. The neutering of the party meant there was no democratic force that could counter the emerging and powerful bureaucracy. As a consequence there was no alternate power structure to debate necessary but difficult reforms, effectively meaning new ideas had to make their way though a bureaucracy which had developed an obsessive centralism and hierarchy. Not a conducive environment for the risky and bold ideas the USSR would come to cry out for. Lewin gives plenty of evidence to suggest people within the system did understand the need for reforms (even several leaders), and did table them to politicians and bureaucrats. However, these were internal critiques with little force to back them up, which meant internal critics were pissing in the wind.
Without putting the birth of this system into historical context, the whole Soviet endeavour can appear as just a bunch of naive, bumbling stuff ups. Thankfully Lewin lays out the historical context of the revolution well. Regardless of your political leanings, the fact that Russia in 1917 was in a complete mess is indisputable. What some don’t want to acknowledge is that liberal, democratic, capitalism was not on the table at this point. The fact that the Bolsheviks (well, most of them) realised this, and attempted to change course, deviating from the formulaic marxism many have accused them off, doesn’t make it easier to stomach the eventual cruelty of what was to come. Lewin deals pretty well with that. He clearly differentiates the Stalinist period from the several other period in the USSR’s history.
We’ll never stop debating the USSR, but at least Lewin’s book gives you a firm grasp of the thing.
For me, one revelatory aspect was the tension between party and the state bureaucracy. The neutering of the party meant there was no democratic force that could counter the emerging and powerful bureaucracy. As a consequence there was no alternate power structure to debate necessary but difficult reforms, effectively meaning new ideas had to make their way though a bureaucracy which had developed an obsessive centralism and hierarchy. Not a conducive environment for the risky and bold ideas the USSR would come to cry out for. Lewin gives plenty of evidence to suggest people within the system did understand the need for reforms (even several leaders), and did table them to politicians and bureaucrats. However, these were internal critiques with little force to back them up, which meant internal critics were pissing in the wind.
Without putting the birth of this system into historical context, the whole Soviet endeavour can appear as just a bunch of naive, bumbling stuff ups. Thankfully Lewin lays out the historical context of the revolution well. Regardless of your political leanings, the fact that Russia in 1917 was in a complete mess is indisputable. What some don’t want to acknowledge is that liberal, democratic, capitalism was not on the table at this point. The fact that the Bolsheviks (well, most of them) realised this, and attempted to change course, deviating from the formulaic marxism many have accused them off, doesn’t make it easier to stomach the eventual cruelty of what was to come. Lewin deals pretty well with that. He clearly differentiates the Stalinist period from the several other period in the USSR’s history.
We’ll never stop debating the USSR, but at least Lewin’s book gives you a firm grasp of the thing.
September 5, 2017
Stopped at page 105
December 12, 2021
Thinly veiled anti-Stalin polemic that takes his supposed worst excesses as truths. Really feels like he had a bet with someone that he could use the word "veritable" over 100 times in a book
September 5, 2024
I started reading this book after reading "the gulag archipelago," to get a better understanding of how the Soviet system actually worked. What I got was the most in-depth analysis of the Soviet Union's inner workings. If you want a critical yet unprejudiced look at how the Soviet union was run, then I can personally recommend this book. You will not be disappointed.
A thing of note, this book is almost solely focused on bureaucracy and politics of the Soviet Union.
A thing of note, this book is almost solely focused on bureaucracy and politics of the Soviet Union.
May 13, 2021
La verdad que bastante instructivo, tratando de ser justo con la realidad de la URSS sin ser especialmente marxista el señor que escribe.
Tiene mi bendición, aunque mi criterio sea inutil
Tiene mi bendición, aunque mi criterio sea inutil
December 30, 2024
I need mooooore 🫢
June 28, 2017
A very sophisticated and nuanced view of certain topical aspects of Stalinism and neo-stalinism.
October 19, 2025
Essential to understand what the USSR was, what historical contexts it emerged from, what pressures from outside and below shaped it and how the system evolved through several quite distinct phases: war communism, NEP, Stalinism, de-Stalinization, Brezhnevism, stagnation, reform (glasnost and perestroika) and collapse. Andropov and his ambitions was a surprising revelation for me, but also in general that entire chapter in the book that talks about the 'reformers'.
The book seeks a nice balance between leadership and social life, showing how bureaucrats, managers and party officials on the one hand responded to daily realities and how the average citizens lived and participated in rapid historic changes that plunged an agrarian country into a superpower. The work nicely draws on archival documents, statistics and prior historiographical currents to paint a dynamic picture sharply in contrast to popular stereotypes. A little bit difficult to get through with the extent and depth of information, but worth it in the end.
The book seeks a nice balance between leadership and social life, showing how bureaucrats, managers and party officials on the one hand responded to daily realities and how the average citizens lived and participated in rapid historic changes that plunged an agrarian country into a superpower. The work nicely draws on archival documents, statistics and prior historiographical currents to paint a dynamic picture sharply in contrast to popular stereotypes. A little bit difficult to get through with the extent and depth of information, but worth it in the end.
December 21, 2017
Review of Moshe Lewin’s “The Soviet Century”
My overall assessment of this book is that the author tries so hard to be free of anti-communist clichés, that he winds up saying little, analytically, and misses connections among the particularities he presents. He is empiricist to a fault. This statement on pages 274-275 summarizes his approach: “We are not going to play the role of counsel for the prosecution or for the defense. Any historical study deserving of the name strives to state what was the case. Where is something positive – progress – it should emerge clearly; and where there is a pathology (history of full of them), it too should emerge.” All well and good, but rather distant. I’ll now a few additional reflections.
A. By starting in the mid-1920s, he mostly bypasses the “origins of Stalinism” debates, i.e. questions on the continuities or disjuncture between the character the 1917 Revolution and the early years of the regime that emerged, and what came later.
B. Lewin is no apologist for Stalinism. He reports the body count, the level of imprisonments and exile, the arbitrary application of state power, without flinching.
C. He focuses a lot on the Party- who were its cadres, how were they recruited, to what extent they were veterans of the Revolution and the Civil War, when the terror turned on it. His sympathies are with the Old Bolsheviks, the idealists. They began to be pushed aside in the initial Five-Year Plans, and then were decimated in the terror of the late 1930s. He is sensitive to the erosion of the Bolshevik culture of intraparty debate, but not to the erosion of debate beyond the limits of the Party.
D. The question which he wrestles with at length, of whether the state was controlled by the party or the party became a tool of the managerial strata of the institutions owned by the state (which is to say, all institutions of any significance in the entire country) seems to have an urgency for Lewin that he cannot convince the reader (at least this reader) merit such urgency.
E. He describes the inefficiency and corruption throughout, even of the post-Stalinist era. But for almost the entire narrative he does not clearly connect the inefficiency and corruption to the lack of democracy. Only in the very last pages is there any glimmer of this. Bottom line is that the Soviet Union became a top-down, hierarchical society, unresponsive to popular will; and that the lack of dynamism, the corruption, the inertia, can all be rooted in the anti-democratic nature of the regime. Lewin does an excellent job portraying this domain by domain, at a micro level. But he is reluctant to connect his own dots, to clearly state how this impacted the larger trajectory.
My overall assessment of this book is that the author tries so hard to be free of anti-communist clichés, that he winds up saying little, analytically, and misses connections among the particularities he presents. He is empiricist to a fault. This statement on pages 274-275 summarizes his approach: “We are not going to play the role of counsel for the prosecution or for the defense. Any historical study deserving of the name strives to state what was the case. Where is something positive – progress – it should emerge clearly; and where there is a pathology (history of full of them), it too should emerge.” All well and good, but rather distant. I’ll now a few additional reflections.
A. By starting in the mid-1920s, he mostly bypasses the “origins of Stalinism” debates, i.e. questions on the continuities or disjuncture between the character the 1917 Revolution and the early years of the regime that emerged, and what came later.
B. Lewin is no apologist for Stalinism. He reports the body count, the level of imprisonments and exile, the arbitrary application of state power, without flinching.
C. He focuses a lot on the Party- who were its cadres, how were they recruited, to what extent they were veterans of the Revolution and the Civil War, when the terror turned on it. His sympathies are with the Old Bolsheviks, the idealists. They began to be pushed aside in the initial Five-Year Plans, and then were decimated in the terror of the late 1930s. He is sensitive to the erosion of the Bolshevik culture of intraparty debate, but not to the erosion of debate beyond the limits of the Party.
D. The question which he wrestles with at length, of whether the state was controlled by the party or the party became a tool of the managerial strata of the institutions owned by the state (which is to say, all institutions of any significance in the entire country) seems to have an urgency for Lewin that he cannot convince the reader (at least this reader) merit such urgency.
E. He describes the inefficiency and corruption throughout, even of the post-Stalinist era. But for almost the entire narrative he does not clearly connect the inefficiency and corruption to the lack of democracy. Only in the very last pages is there any glimmer of this. Bottom line is that the Soviet Union became a top-down, hierarchical society, unresponsive to popular will; and that the lack of dynamism, the corruption, the inertia, can all be rooted in the anti-democratic nature of the regime. Lewin does an excellent job portraying this domain by domain, at a micro level. But he is reluctant to connect his own dots, to clearly state how this impacted the larger trajectory.
January 29, 2025
dit was een pittige kluif, en er valt zoveel stof uit te halen dat ik mij geen lange review zie schrijven (want waar zelfs te beginnen?). de Sovjetgeschiedenis is aaneengeregen van rode draden en tegelijk gedurfde pogingen om die rode draden door te knippen zonder de basisinsteek te verliezen. eerder dan 75 jaar lang het monolithische "kwade imperium" te zijn geweest dat er het Westen van de USSR maakte, waren er stromingen die het land in verschillende richtingen trokken: stagnatie vs hervormingen, repressie vs rehabilitatie, partijmacht vs persoonlijke macht vs bureaucratenmacht.
het tegenwerk slaagde op sommige vlakken (zoals de ontmanteling van de Gulag en de progressievere arbeidswetten na Stalin) maar was vaak too little too late, zeker gezien de tegenwerking van zelfbedienende elites. langzaam maar zeker werd het land het slachtoffer van zijn structurele misvormingen. inefficiëntie door de logge manier van plannen, acute arbeidstekorten, een bureaucratie die zoveel macht en rijkdom naar zich toetrok dat ze een laag van "proto-kapitalisten" begon te vormen (wat hun naadloze transitie naar de oligarchen onder Jeltsin verklaart), verlamming van elk betekenisvol politiek leven, een gigantische schaduweconomie als reactie op dat alles... het feit dat er vanaf de jaren '60 al Sovjet-economen en -sociologen waren die waarschuwden voor een nakend fiasco, is in het licht van de geschiedenis pijnlijk.
twee bedenkingen. één: Lewin gaat ver in het benadrukken van ideologische discontinuïteit tussen Lenin en Stalin. té ver? misschien, maar hij maakt er wel een sterk argument voor en plaatst terechte vraagtekens bij het gangbare één-pot-nat-narratief. twee: er is een soort onevenwicht in de periodes die het boek al dan niet bespreekt. het is logisch dat Chroesjtjev meer aandacht krijgt dan Brezjnev aangezien die laatste een periode van economische en ideologische verdorring overzag, en ook dat Lewin geen ruimte overhad om de internationale politiek te bekijken. maar waarom zo weinig over de eindjaren onder Gorbatsjov? doordat deel 2 en 3 daar voortdurend naar "opbouwen" blijf je uiteindelijk op je honger zitten om te begrijpen wat nu echt de triggers waren van de ineenstorting, al begrijp je de factoren die ernaar leidden (zie boven).
het tegenwerk slaagde op sommige vlakken (zoals de ontmanteling van de Gulag en de progressievere arbeidswetten na Stalin) maar was vaak too little too late, zeker gezien de tegenwerking van zelfbedienende elites. langzaam maar zeker werd het land het slachtoffer van zijn structurele misvormingen. inefficiëntie door de logge manier van plannen, acute arbeidstekorten, een bureaucratie die zoveel macht en rijkdom naar zich toetrok dat ze een laag van "proto-kapitalisten" begon te vormen (wat hun naadloze transitie naar de oligarchen onder Jeltsin verklaart), verlamming van elk betekenisvol politiek leven, een gigantische schaduweconomie als reactie op dat alles... het feit dat er vanaf de jaren '60 al Sovjet-economen en -sociologen waren die waarschuwden voor een nakend fiasco, is in het licht van de geschiedenis pijnlijk.
twee bedenkingen. één: Lewin gaat ver in het benadrukken van ideologische discontinuïteit tussen Lenin en Stalin. té ver? misschien, maar hij maakt er wel een sterk argument voor en plaatst terechte vraagtekens bij het gangbare één-pot-nat-narratief. twee: er is een soort onevenwicht in de periodes die het boek al dan niet bespreekt. het is logisch dat Chroesjtjev meer aandacht krijgt dan Brezjnev aangezien die laatste een periode van economische en ideologische verdorring overzag, en ook dat Lewin geen ruimte overhad om de internationale politiek te bekijken. maar waarom zo weinig over de eindjaren onder Gorbatsjov? doordat deel 2 en 3 daar voortdurend naar "opbouwen" blijf je uiteindelijk op je honger zitten om te begrijpen wat nu echt de triggers waren van de ineenstorting, al begrijp je de factoren die ernaar leidden (zie boven).
May 25, 2017
Moshe Lewin's great tome, The Soviet Century, is about neither the people of the Soviet Union nor the ideologies that drove them. Instead, it is a book about the institutions of the USSR, from before the start of Stalin's rule through to its collapse. The book is not written chronologically, but rather split into three parts: one about the Soviet Union under Stalin, one about the country from the 1960s on, and one situating it in historical context.
This is a dense book, which is part of the reason it took me so long to finish - at times it truly is difficult to slog through. At other times, however, it provides a fascinating insight into the inner workings of the Soviet Union. Lewin ultimately concludes that in the post-Stalin era, the USSR was what he terms "bureaucratic-absolutist." "In the Soviet case," he writes, "it was the bureacracy which, in the final analysis, collectively acquired undivided and unchallenged power." Indeed, the book explores numerous moments in which particular individuals saw the flaws in the Soviet system and sought to engage in much-needed reform, but who were ultimately stymied by the conservative nature of the system and the total power of the bureaucracy.
If you have a solid grip on Soviet history, then this would be an illuminating read. Lewin, a long-time scholar of Soviet history, presumes that the reader has this prior knowledge going in. I think I might have digested it better had my knowledge of the Soviet Union's history been more expansive, but I nonetheless remain fascinated by a number of gems in the book, from insightful portraits into individual administrators to the in-depth descriptions of the Soviet Union's labor shortages and its administrative bumbling.
Lewin also seeks to engage purely with the history of the Soviet Union, and regularly castigates partisan historians on both sides - though he reserves a particular portion of his epilogue for excoriating the notion of "anti-communist history" as an ideology masquerading as genuine scholarship.
All in all, this is a balanced and complex book, and well worth the read.
This is a dense book, which is part of the reason it took me so long to finish - at times it truly is difficult to slog through. At other times, however, it provides a fascinating insight into the inner workings of the Soviet Union. Lewin ultimately concludes that in the post-Stalin era, the USSR was what he terms "bureaucratic-absolutist." "In the Soviet case," he writes, "it was the bureacracy which, in the final analysis, collectively acquired undivided and unchallenged power." Indeed, the book explores numerous moments in which particular individuals saw the flaws in the Soviet system and sought to engage in much-needed reform, but who were ultimately stymied by the conservative nature of the system and the total power of the bureaucracy.
If you have a solid grip on Soviet history, then this would be an illuminating read. Lewin, a long-time scholar of Soviet history, presumes that the reader has this prior knowledge going in. I think I might have digested it better had my knowledge of the Soviet Union's history been more expansive, but I nonetheless remain fascinated by a number of gems in the book, from insightful portraits into individual administrators to the in-depth descriptions of the Soviet Union's labor shortages and its administrative bumbling.
Lewin also seeks to engage purely with the history of the Soviet Union, and regularly castigates partisan historians on both sides - though he reserves a particular portion of his epilogue for excoriating the notion of "anti-communist history" as an ideology masquerading as genuine scholarship.
All in all, this is a balanced and complex book, and well worth the read.
December 19, 2017
Moshe Lewin's 'The Soviet Century' is a critical and crucial study of the understudied and mis-understood, often deliberately, USSR as it changed overtime. Lewin's over all political position appears to be to save Lenin's, if not the early Bolshevik government's, legacy from Stalin and Stalinism. This book doesn't focus on Lenin, but Lewin clearly wants to say that Lenin's final testament was a statement that the Bolshevik government could have gone in a different direction more open, less oppressive than occurred under Stalin's dictatorship.
The book is separated into three sections: section one focuses on understanding the Stalinist period, section two covers the 1960s (or post-Stalin developments), and section three preforms some general overall assessments of the USSR. The power of section one is that it doesn't focus on Stalin the dictator, but the development of Stalinism and the functioning of government under his rule. Lewin's rejection of Stalinism, but sympathy towards Lenin and communism puts him in this interesting position. Lewin openly deals with the reality of Stalin's dictatorial and oppressive government, but rejects the effort of those who for the purpose of spreading pro-western/capitalist exaggerate the numbers.
Section two does crucial work in seperating the Stalin era from the post-Stalin era that shows some development including the dismantling of the Gulag prison system, increased leniency of the criminal code, reduction of overall prisoner numbers, and other hopeful shifts that are tempered by debates from the liberal and conservative elements of society. The final section likewise covers various shifts through the whole system and covers their positive and negative elements that contributes to an overall more robust understanding of the USSR outside of straw man representations.
The over all book is compelling, but also difficult for a new reader who is trying to understand some of the broad points of the USSR system and its shifts over time. Lewin's various chapters are dense, yet short and consumable, but do require some perquisite knowledge.
The book is separated into three sections: section one focuses on understanding the Stalinist period, section two covers the 1960s (or post-Stalin developments), and section three preforms some general overall assessments of the USSR. The power of section one is that it doesn't focus on Stalin the dictator, but the development of Stalinism and the functioning of government under his rule. Lewin's rejection of Stalinism, but sympathy towards Lenin and communism puts him in this interesting position. Lewin openly deals with the reality of Stalin's dictatorial and oppressive government, but rejects the effort of those who for the purpose of spreading pro-western/capitalist exaggerate the numbers.
Section two does crucial work in seperating the Stalin era from the post-Stalin era that shows some development including the dismantling of the Gulag prison system, increased leniency of the criminal code, reduction of overall prisoner numbers, and other hopeful shifts that are tempered by debates from the liberal and conservative elements of society. The final section likewise covers various shifts through the whole system and covers their positive and negative elements that contributes to an overall more robust understanding of the USSR outside of straw man representations.
The over all book is compelling, but also difficult for a new reader who is trying to understand some of the broad points of the USSR system and its shifts over time. Lewin's various chapters are dense, yet short and consumable, but do require some perquisite knowledge.
December 1, 2020
WOW! This was one heavy, dense book on Soviet economics, which is not for the casual reader. It started out as more of a historical account of how Bolshevik-ism transformed into the Soviet system that was well known during the middle part of the 20th Century. However, it seemed too often to get lost in the weeds of specificity.
I really do have to commend Moshe Lewin for providing an accurate and not demonizing the USSR in his book, The Soviet Century, however you clearly saw his acrimony for Stalin in many of the opening chapters. Lewin only lived in the USSR for a few years during WWII before returning to Poland and emigrating to France. So while he didn't see first-hand most of the Stalin-ism atrocities, he did focus heavily on them during the first half of Soviet Century.
However, during the second half, he explored economic reform and social reforms by Khrushchev and the subsequent backslides by Brezhnev and how these pull-and-tugs affected the Soviet Society. This is where the account deviated from a historical account into specific aspects of Soviet Society. I suppose I was hoping for more history and got muddled down by VERY heavy economics.
All-in-all a good read for me because I am deeply interested in Russian History, but this is not for a casual history reader.
I really do have to commend Moshe Lewin for providing an accurate and not demonizing the USSR in his book, The Soviet Century, however you clearly saw his acrimony for Stalin in many of the opening chapters. Lewin only lived in the USSR for a few years during WWII before returning to Poland and emigrating to France. So while he didn't see first-hand most of the Stalin-ism atrocities, he did focus heavily on them during the first half of Soviet Century.
However, during the second half, he explored economic reform and social reforms by Khrushchev and the subsequent backslides by Brezhnev and how these pull-and-tugs affected the Soviet Society. This is where the account deviated from a historical account into specific aspects of Soviet Society. I suppose I was hoping for more history and got muddled down by VERY heavy economics.
All-in-all a good read for me because I am deeply interested in Russian History, but this is not for a casual history reader.
January 1, 2020
Update 1/1/2020: Upon reflecting on my 2019 reading, I decided that this book stuck with me. I bumped the rating up from a 3 to a 4.
Original review: One needs to read this with a fair foundation in the outlines of Soviet history. This book expands understanding of that history by considering declassified materials from Soviet historical archives. And ultimately it is a description of the evolution of the state bureaucracy through the several periods of political leadership.
At times it is dense with statistical read-outs that would have been better communicated with charts or graphs with accompanying commentary. Additionally, I found the writing style to be overly complex, parenthetical, and oddly self-referential.
Weaknesses aside, I believe I did gain information that helps me understand why the Soviet system failed. I also am now able to better refute lame arguments that socialism is bad because COMMUNISISM and THE SOVIET UNION! Hint: the Soviet Union was never socialist and actually never really claimed to be.
So I was glad to have read it. I wish it had been written better.
Original review: One needs to read this with a fair foundation in the outlines of Soviet history. This book expands understanding of that history by considering declassified materials from Soviet historical archives. And ultimately it is a description of the evolution of the state bureaucracy through the several periods of political leadership.
At times it is dense with statistical read-outs that would have been better communicated with charts or graphs with accompanying commentary. Additionally, I found the writing style to be overly complex, parenthetical, and oddly self-referential.
Weaknesses aside, I believe I did gain information that helps me understand why the Soviet system failed. I also am now able to better refute lame arguments that socialism is bad because COMMUNISISM and THE SOVIET UNION! Hint: the Soviet Union was never socialist and actually never really claimed to be.
So I was glad to have read it. I wish it had been written better.
April 24, 2021
There is some really great analysis in here but holy shit there is no excuse for this book to be structured in such a confounding way
July 22, 2024
A very informative, but difficult, analysis of the Soviet regime in the USSR.
It's not a linear history, but starts out with the Stalin era, and doesn't get around to examining the ideology of Lenin and the origins of the Soviet state until later on in the book. It also presumes that the reader already has an extensive knowledge of the Soviet system.
Those who want an introductory, "big picture" history of the Soviet Union should look for something else.
It's not a linear history, but starts out with the Stalin era, and doesn't get around to examining the ideology of Lenin and the origins of the Soviet state until later on in the book. It also presumes that the reader already has an extensive knowledge of the Soviet system.
Those who want an introductory, "big picture" history of the Soviet Union should look for something else.
October 2, 2020
The book is good. However, the book is inundated with statistics and my mind is not capable of remembering such numerical facts. Despite that, the author gave a detailed account of how Stalin became who he is and also the real image of the Soviet Union through a statistical account.
February 7, 2017
One of the best-written book that I have read in the last time. I loved the style and way to tell the story, 100% recommendable.
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