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The Future of Strategy
Strategy is not a modern invention. It is an essential and enduring feature of human history that is here to stay. In this original essay, Colin S. Gray, world-renowned scholar of strategic thought, discusses the meaning of strategy and its importance for politicians and the military as a means of achieving desired outcomes in complex, uncertain conditions.
Drawing on a wide range of examples from the Great Peloponnesian War to the Second World War, Vietnam, and the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, Gray ably shows how great military thinkers of the past and present have acted strategically in their various ideological, political, geographical and cultural contexts. Looking to the future, he argues that strategy will continue to provide a vital tool-kit for survival and security, but that the global threat posed by nuclear weapons remains an on-going challenge without obvious practical solutions. As Gray boldy asserts, there is no promised land ahead, only hard and dangerous times that will require us to master the theory and practice of strategy to secure our own future.
Drawing on a wide range of examples from the Great Peloponnesian War to the Second World War, Vietnam, and the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, Gray ably shows how great military thinkers of the past and present have acted strategically in their various ideological, political, geographical and cultural contexts. Looking to the future, he argues that strategy will continue to provide a vital tool-kit for survival and security, but that the global threat posed by nuclear weapons remains an on-going challenge without obvious practical solutions. As Gray boldy asserts, there is no promised land ahead, only hard and dangerous times that will require us to master the theory and practice of strategy to secure our own future.
156 pages, Kindle Edition
First published May 18, 2015
57 people are currently reading
551 people want to read
About the author
Colin S. Gray
96 books73 followersColin S. Gray was a British-American strategic thinker and professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, where he was the director of the Centre for Strategic Studies. In addition, he was a Senior Associate to the National Institute for Public Policy.
Gray was educated at the University of Manchester and the University of Oxford. He worked at the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Hudson Institute, before founding the National Institute for Public Policy in Washington, D.C. He also served as a defense adviser both to the British and U.S. governments. Gray served from 1982 until 1987 in the Reagan Administration's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament. Furthermore, he taught at the University of Hull, the University of Lancaster, York University, Toronto and University of British Columbia. Gray published 23 books on military history and strategic studies, as well as numerous articles.
Gray was educated at the University of Manchester and the University of Oxford. He worked at the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Hudson Institute, before founding the National Institute for Public Policy in Washington, D.C. He also served as a defense adviser both to the British and U.S. governments. Gray served from 1982 until 1987 in the Reagan Administration's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament. Furthermore, he taught at the University of Hull, the University of Lancaster, York University, Toronto and University of British Columbia. Gray published 23 books on military history and strategic studies, as well as numerous articles.
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June 4, 2020
At the end of a distinguished career, professors sometimes write ‘a history of my field and its future’. This can be a fascinating and vital genre. At its best it engages the public, distils decades of learning and directly engages the most important issues of the day. At worst, these books do little more than summarise an author’s past thoughts (see Henry Kissinger’s World Order). Colin S. Gray’s The Future of Strategy walks both sides of this divide, but the effort, for author and reader alike is worth the toil.
Clarity of focus is one of Gray’s enduring strengths as an analyst. He is one of most relentless brushclearers in the field. He consistently tries to strip empirical reality back to its most base generalizable theory. In just 117 pages he has boiled down his life’s work to a few key themes: the need for a general theory of strategy, the universality of strategic practice and the ahistoric challenge of nuclear weapons.
Gray’s focus on developing theory is important in a field which often takes its claim to intellectual rigour as self-evident. Too often has the romantic allure of change (technology, ideas) and influence (providing analysis those in charge want to hear) caused theory to be left behind. That said, readers without the wider context of his work could question if a little too much brush has been cleared in this book, leaving a field slightly too barren for fertile development.
The heart of The Future of Strategy is the claim that strategy has a future. Gray believes his discipline will endure because he views strategic practice as a universal part of human experience. He brushes apart the objection that the word ‘strategy’ was only used in its modern context from the 1770s onwards. Instead Gray insists the practice of strategy — namely the search for security, the setting of policy via politics and the aligning Ends, Ways and Means to achieve this— is found in all times and places. While this claim is asserted more than demonstrated, I strongly agree.
To deny strategy had existence before we had a word for it, would be to suggest our ancestors had no capacity to think in terms of cause and effect. Or any desire to use violence or the threat of violence to achieve political aims. Yet such themes are vibrant in the works of ancient Generals such as Thucydides and Julius Caesar. A sceptic could put this down to modern translation error but that still does not explain the feints, deceptions and coordination of action found within the pages of these classics. War has never been merely politics by other means. But nor has war just been war. It is always undertaken for an objective beyond its own boundaries, and that aim is almost always a political one.
It may well be that earlier eras understood the calculations of strategy very differently, but I wouldn’t assume a universal approach exists even today. Groups who are deeply motivated by religion may consider their prayers and faithfulness a strategic act. A practice that can help swing the chance of battle in their favour through God’s protection. By comparison Chinese or French armies do not see any value in prayer as a way to improve their chances on the battlefield.
As has been widely remarked, despite its universal practice, formal scholarship of strategy remains a largely anglo-american practice. What is interesting is just how significant the anglo part of the field still is. Of the handful of truly world-class strategic writers, you’ll find three British authors. Hew Strachan, Lawrence Freedman and Colin S. Gray. And that sidelines the doyen of the field, the now retired Sir Michael Howard. This concentration is remarkable for a country seen as in decline, unable or unwilling to use force (the recent vote to join the campaign against ISIS notwithstanding). It may be this is a random occurrence or perhaps the last generation of significance, but with UK strategists like Theo Farrelly and Emile Simpson still early in their careers, the long term influence of British strategic thinking seems assured.
There is however a downside to this cultural continuity as Gray recognises. In one of the most fascinating sections, he argues ‘We strategists have tended to stick more or less closely to what can best, if unflatteringly, be seen as a tribalist tendency…we discover only a modest cannon of classic and more popular texts’. This is not unusual, but where other fields like Philosophy begin their discussion with Plato, Kant, and Nietzsche, strategic studies almost seems to find its end within the pages of Thucydides, Mahan and especially Clausewitz. As if nothing beyond these good books is needed to interpret modern events. Gray challenges this with his desire to build new theory, though even he still makes sure to pay homage to the ‘masters’.
The Future of Strategy may not be the deepest or most original work in the field or even of Gray’s prodigious output. But I still found myself underlining lines on nearly every second page. Old thoughts were put in clear and direct ways, perfect for citing later. Thus, as a stocktaking effort if nothing else, there is a great value in reflective assessments from those who have achieved so much for so long. We should therefore be thankful when today’s giants take a moment to pause and clear some space on their shoulders. So the next generation may stand firmly atop, and look afresh towards the distant horizons.
Clarity of focus is one of Gray’s enduring strengths as an analyst. He is one of most relentless brushclearers in the field. He consistently tries to strip empirical reality back to its most base generalizable theory. In just 117 pages he has boiled down his life’s work to a few key themes: the need for a general theory of strategy, the universality of strategic practice and the ahistoric challenge of nuclear weapons.
Gray’s focus on developing theory is important in a field which often takes its claim to intellectual rigour as self-evident. Too often has the romantic allure of change (technology, ideas) and influence (providing analysis those in charge want to hear) caused theory to be left behind. That said, readers without the wider context of his work could question if a little too much brush has been cleared in this book, leaving a field slightly too barren for fertile development.
The heart of The Future of Strategy is the claim that strategy has a future. Gray believes his discipline will endure because he views strategic practice as a universal part of human experience. He brushes apart the objection that the word ‘strategy’ was only used in its modern context from the 1770s onwards. Instead Gray insists the practice of strategy — namely the search for security, the setting of policy via politics and the aligning Ends, Ways and Means to achieve this— is found in all times and places. While this claim is asserted more than demonstrated, I strongly agree.
To deny strategy had existence before we had a word for it, would be to suggest our ancestors had no capacity to think in terms of cause and effect. Or any desire to use violence or the threat of violence to achieve political aims. Yet such themes are vibrant in the works of ancient Generals such as Thucydides and Julius Caesar. A sceptic could put this down to modern translation error but that still does not explain the feints, deceptions and coordination of action found within the pages of these classics. War has never been merely politics by other means. But nor has war just been war. It is always undertaken for an objective beyond its own boundaries, and that aim is almost always a political one.
It may well be that earlier eras understood the calculations of strategy very differently, but I wouldn’t assume a universal approach exists even today. Groups who are deeply motivated by religion may consider their prayers and faithfulness a strategic act. A practice that can help swing the chance of battle in their favour through God’s protection. By comparison Chinese or French armies do not see any value in prayer as a way to improve their chances on the battlefield.
As has been widely remarked, despite its universal practice, formal scholarship of strategy remains a largely anglo-american practice. What is interesting is just how significant the anglo part of the field still is. Of the handful of truly world-class strategic writers, you’ll find three British authors. Hew Strachan, Lawrence Freedman and Colin S. Gray. And that sidelines the doyen of the field, the now retired Sir Michael Howard. This concentration is remarkable for a country seen as in decline, unable or unwilling to use force (the recent vote to join the campaign against ISIS notwithstanding). It may be this is a random occurrence or perhaps the last generation of significance, but with UK strategists like Theo Farrelly and Emile Simpson still early in their careers, the long term influence of British strategic thinking seems assured.
There is however a downside to this cultural continuity as Gray recognises. In one of the most fascinating sections, he argues ‘We strategists have tended to stick more or less closely to what can best, if unflatteringly, be seen as a tribalist tendency…we discover only a modest cannon of classic and more popular texts’. This is not unusual, but where other fields like Philosophy begin their discussion with Plato, Kant, and Nietzsche, strategic studies almost seems to find its end within the pages of Thucydides, Mahan and especially Clausewitz. As if nothing beyond these good books is needed to interpret modern events. Gray challenges this with his desire to build new theory, though even he still makes sure to pay homage to the ‘masters’.
The Future of Strategy may not be the deepest or most original work in the field or even of Gray’s prodigious output. But I still found myself underlining lines on nearly every second page. Old thoughts were put in clear and direct ways, perfect for citing later. Thus, as a stocktaking effort if nothing else, there is a great value in reflective assessments from those who have achieved so much for so long. We should therefore be thankful when today’s giants take a moment to pause and clear some space on their shoulders. So the next generation may stand firmly atop, and look afresh towards the distant horizons.
April 16, 2019
Nothing revolutionary here. Strategy is important, it's inherent in human behavior, and it will continue in the future - barring nuclear war. It is a bit of a hard slog for ~120 pages, but worth reading. Gray is a titan in the field and I think the book is rewarding in terms of seeing a master practicing his profession.
November 17, 2025
This is awfully written. Only made it 6% of the way through before I could no longer stand its tone and nothingness. Stopped at this sentence:
"The benefit to belief in the unity of strategic experience through all of history is that it has to mean that all historical strategic experience comprises potential evidence about the same subject."
I.e., "Learn from the past" but in an unnecessarily complex sentence to hide that it's saying nothing useful.
Life's too short to waste on books like this.
"The benefit to belief in the unity of strategic experience through all of history is that it has to mean that all historical strategic experience comprises potential evidence about the same subject."
I.e., "Learn from the past" but in an unnecessarily complex sentence to hide that it's saying nothing useful.
Life's too short to waste on books like this.
January 23, 2016
This book is about as useful as a book arguing that humans breathe air and will continue to do so. Don't waste your time.
August 29, 2017
I picked up this book because I saw that it was on a recommended read list by General Mattis. I was pretty excited to picked it up and that the author, Colin Gray, is a respected voice in the discipline of strategic studies. However, about 2/3 into the book, I realized (sadly) that Mr. Gray may be a pillar within his academic community, but I must have picked up the worst book he wrote.
I patiently endured the smug, condescending British-American comments about how strategic studies are seldom understood. I stumbled my way through his thicket of prose only to find myself in a broad opening of...nothing. I figured that I was mistaken and pressed on diligently with the hopes that I would be rewarded with some pearls of wisdom for my efforts. However, as the scenery began to look more and more familiar - covering the same ground several times with little variation- I soon understood that it wasn't me who was lost- it was the author.
Regrettably, I must have discovered Colin Gray past his prime. I had gone all that way and now I've lost interest and doubt that I'll regain desires to visit 'strategy' town anytime soon. There were some interesting things in there but I don't even think I'll bother sharing them. Instead I'll share some gripes about what the author wrote. (Perhaps that will be more cathartic...)
- "Strategy is more difficult to devise and execute than are policy, operations and tactics..." (I am sure that there are lots of people who would argue with such a statement).
- [Strategy is timeless]. (This concept is repeated throughout the book, often multiple times on the same page- we get it).
- "Because every war is unique, it is imprudent to assume that ‘one size fits all’ in tactical military competence. One size typically does not fit many cases of conflict." (Hell, anyone could have told you that).
- "But, the long record of warfare shows overwhelming evidence of the unpredictable consequences of unexpected military events." (You don't say...)
- "On the level of theory, Clausewitz unquestionably was correct, and what he wrote should be heeded with respect." (Did I mention Gray is a total Clausewitz groupie who thinks he is as infallible as the Pope?)
Okay, I think I feel better. I think we have all learned a lesson here: Don't read the work of a man who is past his prime...and (something) (something) strategy is timeless.
September 11, 2020
I bet I would have a totally different appreciation for this book if I had any prior knowledge or experience with Strategic Studies and specifically with Gray's prior work. This book is filled with jargon and at times is almost unparseable. It's filled with tautologies and ironic claims of clarity.
The basic argument is that Strategy (capitalized, singular) is a theory and refers to the relationship between (Political) Ends, (Strategic) Ways and (Military) Means. He adds also Assumptions as a key fourth element. Theres also an argument about how Strategy can never actually be actioned, instead brought to fruition by tactics (i.e. military action). The overall argument is that Strategy as conceived thus is omnipresent, not just going back to 1770. How do we know? Because Gray has defined something and asserts that its always true.
At the same time, Gray says that polities may not implement Strategy or may have bad Strategy. Which implies that maybe Strategy is not omnipresent?
All that being said, as a new person to this genre/corpus, I learned a lot. There were hints of insight sprinkled throughout, enough that this book deserves 3.5/4 stars. Theres good discussion of nuclear strategy (essentially, given multiple parties with nukes, including potentially insane political actors, there are no sane political Ends that would allow for nuclear tactics, but there are insane political Ends that would allow for nuclear use, which then requires that there are no sane political Ends that would allow for giving up nukes).
See also my highlights and notes
The basic argument is that Strategy (capitalized, singular) is a theory and refers to the relationship between (Political) Ends, (Strategic) Ways and (Military) Means. He adds also Assumptions as a key fourth element. Theres also an argument about how Strategy can never actually be actioned, instead brought to fruition by tactics (i.e. military action). The overall argument is that Strategy as conceived thus is omnipresent, not just going back to 1770. How do we know? Because Gray has defined something and asserts that its always true.
At the same time, Gray says that polities may not implement Strategy or may have bad Strategy. Which implies that maybe Strategy is not omnipresent?
All that being said, as a new person to this genre/corpus, I learned a lot. There were hints of insight sprinkled throughout, enough that this book deserves 3.5/4 stars. Theres good discussion of nuclear strategy (essentially, given multiple parties with nukes, including potentially insane political actors, there are no sane political Ends that would allow for nuclear tactics, but there are insane political Ends that would allow for nuclear use, which then requires that there are no sane political Ends that would allow for giving up nukes).
See also my highlights and notes
April 1, 2022
A bit of a dense book, generally very good for high level military strategy, but there are a few tracts of dubiously cited assumptions about the very nature of strategy. Particularly the distinction between military and civilian spheres to me appears as a phantom, as such distinctions are not so rigid as to be defined as strategy/not strategy.
Particularly, his fundamental rules seem rather hodgepodge, and even repeat conceptually in a couple of places when explicitly stated. I think his admiration for a sort of mutable form of perennial strategic thought, and subsequent appreciation for ancient views on this, is spot on.
However, this seems to me to be a great contradiction, while simultaneously disavowing any sort of interpretation of strategy beyond the explicit military means, especially considering measures of economic or cultural strife. Such distinctions are constructed by polities or power groups - and theoretically one could have either a situation where military and civilian are completely subsumed in larger political drama (total war) or polities which are inherently militarist, or a myriad of other forms where military strategy has no distinction from civilian strategy.
Particularly, his fundamental rules seem rather hodgepodge, and even repeat conceptually in a couple of places when explicitly stated. I think his admiration for a sort of mutable form of perennial strategic thought, and subsequent appreciation for ancient views on this, is spot on.
However, this seems to me to be a great contradiction, while simultaneously disavowing any sort of interpretation of strategy beyond the explicit military means, especially considering measures of economic or cultural strife. Such distinctions are constructed by polities or power groups - and theoretically one could have either a situation where military and civilian are completely subsumed in larger political drama (total war) or polities which are inherently militarist, or a myriad of other forms where military strategy has no distinction from civilian strategy.
February 10, 2019
Rambling Strategy
A man rambles long enough to justify a “full” book- In reality the same theory is repeated over and over
Bottom line - Strategy is the way to accomplish political goals - it has been that way in the past and nothing will change - that’s the whole book
I am not sure why General Mattis includes this on his reading list - it is def one of the weaker recommndations
A man rambles long enough to justify a “full” book- In reality the same theory is repeated over and over
Bottom line - Strategy is the way to accomplish political goals - it has been that way in the past and nothing will change - that’s the whole book
I am not sure why General Mattis includes this on his reading list - it is def one of the weaker recommndations
January 27, 2019
Readable even for a lay audience (like your humble reviewer) and brimming with potential applications outside of the military world. Gray offers a clausewitzian conception of strategy as a 'bridge' between political aims and operational realities.
July 23, 2017
It was a good book, but dragged a little bit.
August 12, 2017
Reading only because of the theorist
Essential only to understand the broader thoughts of Gray. Leaves ample space for further debate on strategy and its implications.
Essential only to understand the broader thoughts of Gray. Leaves ample space for further debate on strategy and its implications.
November 12, 2017
Good primer on the importance of military strategy. Worthy read by one of the foremost strategists out there today.
January 4, 2018
This is one of the best books I have read on strategy. Clear, concise and to the point.
March 7, 2020
Great primer to 2500 years of thought
The book is on James Mattis’ short list of military officer readings. 150 insightful pages with plenty of references for future exploration.
The book is on James Mattis’ short list of military officer readings. 150 insightful pages with plenty of references for future exploration.
March 17, 2021
Nothing particularly new or insightful. Pretty self-indulgent essay by a longtime professor of strategy. Not sure how it made it onto a professional reading list but I'd recommend skipping it.
August 1, 2021
Awesome
May 8, 2023
A good bite-sized entry-level book for students of strategic studies/international relations
October 22, 2023
Colin Gray is the man!
February 24, 2019
I bought The Future of Strategy off Amazon because General Mattis referenced it during his address at the 2017 AUSA Annual Meeting in Washington D.C and he listed it as one of his favorite books.
The book provides a strong framework to what strategy is. Something I enjoyed as the term "strategy" has become a buzzword thrown around casually in different industries.
Though the paragraphs are dense, long, and could be better organized, The Future of Strategy contains a lot of good information that helps define what strategy is. Being a student of military history, and specifically grand strategy, the definition of strategy is something I have grappled with a lot and Gray does a good job of defining the term.
The book provides a strong framework to what strategy is. Something I enjoyed as the term "strategy" has become a buzzword thrown around casually in different industries.
Though the paragraphs are dense, long, and could be better organized, The Future of Strategy contains a lot of good information that helps define what strategy is. Being a student of military history, and specifically grand strategy, the definition of strategy is something I have grappled with a lot and Gray does a good job of defining the term.
January 1, 2016
I realized at about page 20 that I was not nearly well read enough to get everything out of this book that it has to offer. Gray in "The Future of Strategy" takes on the task of explaining what "strategy" is, where it's been, and where it's going. "Strategy" is a word which is thrown around incessantly, but a word which very few people seem to have a firm definition for.
The author says in the introduction that he hoped to keep this text "brief and clear", while he certainly succeeded on the first count (the book is just over 100 pages), on the second count I believe the author fell short. The way in which Gray writes is distinctly academic, and quite dense even by academic standards.
The scholarship of this work is excellent. While it is quite dense, it is also quite short, easily tackled in an afternoon. Despite much of the content going over my head I am better for having read it. This is a book which I will re-visit in six months or a year, and I'm sure that it will have more to offer on the second reading.
The author says in the introduction that he hoped to keep this text "brief and clear", while he certainly succeeded on the first count (the book is just over 100 pages), on the second count I believe the author fell short. The way in which Gray writes is distinctly academic, and quite dense even by academic standards.
The scholarship of this work is excellent. While it is quite dense, it is also quite short, easily tackled in an afternoon. Despite much of the content going over my head I am better for having read it. This is a book which I will re-visit in six months or a year, and I'm sure that it will have more to offer on the second reading.
January 20, 2017
I am a big fan of Colin Gray, but this is least of his books, I think. While there is much wisdom here, it is overly repetitive and occasionally opaque in its language. It reads as though a grad student with a great 20 page article were advised to expand it for publication as a book next week. I would instead steer readers to his other 4- and 5-star works, such as Explorations in Strategy, The Strategy Bridge, and Another Bloody Century, to name a few.
March 25, 2016
A good primer on Strategy and it presents a useful 'general theory of strategy'. The writing can be a bit inaccessible at times.
Page 52 for Afghanistan vets.
Page 52 for Afghanistan vets.
Currently reading
October 26, 2017Good content, terrible writing. Big words... do not a compelling read make.
Displaying 1 - 24 of 24 reviews