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ویتگنشتاین در تبعید
نویسنده کتاب حاضر میگوید: «این کتاب تلاش من برای نگریستن به ابعاد مهمی از کار لودویگ ویتگنشتاین (۱۸۸۹-۱۹۵۱) در نسبت با زندگی او و طرز تلقیاش از خویش است، تلاشی نه برای پوشش دادن جملگی ابعاد زندگی یا کار او، بلکه برای دیدن راههایی که این دو با هم میخوانند.»
روز یکشنبه ششم اکتبر ۱۹۲۹، لودویگ ویتگنشتاین در یکی از اتاقهایش در کیمبریج، از خواب آشفتهای پرید. با رمز ساده الفبای معکوسش نوشت: ناتوان از فکر، افکار کابوس وار و تکراری. سپس با الفبای روشن خوابش را ثبت کرد، خوابی راجع به استیصال از مشاجره بر سر تلاش نومیدانه برای تعمیر دستگاهی که یک بار تنظیمش کرده بود. او شرح خواب را چنین پایان برد: فکر کردم مجبورم با کسانی زندگی کنم که نمیتوانم خودم را حالیشان کنم. این فکری است که در واقع اغلب اوقات دارم. در عین حال احساس میکنم عیب از خودم است.
ویتگنشتاین بعد از تلاشی مختصر و تاحدی سرسری برای تعبیر این خواب، رمزنویسی خود را دوباره از سر گرفت و نوشت: حال در اینجا، خودم را خیلی بیگانه احساس میکنم. کاملاً متکی به خود.
کتاب حاضر اولین اثر مستقل جیمز کلاگ، ویتگنشتاینپژوه و استاد فلسفه در دانشگاه ویرجینیا است.
روز یکشنبه ششم اکتبر ۱۹۲۹، لودویگ ویتگنشتاین در یکی از اتاقهایش در کیمبریج، از خواب آشفتهای پرید. با رمز ساده الفبای معکوسش نوشت: ناتوان از فکر، افکار کابوس وار و تکراری. سپس با الفبای روشن خوابش را ثبت کرد، خوابی راجع به استیصال از مشاجره بر سر تلاش نومیدانه برای تعمیر دستگاهی که یک بار تنظیمش کرده بود. او شرح خواب را چنین پایان برد: فکر کردم مجبورم با کسانی زندگی کنم که نمیتوانم خودم را حالیشان کنم. این فکری است که در واقع اغلب اوقات دارم. در عین حال احساس میکنم عیب از خودم است.
ویتگنشتاین بعد از تلاشی مختصر و تاحدی سرسری برای تعبیر این خواب، رمزنویسی خود را دوباره از سر گرفت و نوشت: حال در اینجا، خودم را خیلی بیگانه احساس میکنم. کاملاً متکی به خود.
کتاب حاضر اولین اثر مستقل جیمز کلاگ، ویتگنشتاینپژوه و استاد فلسفه در دانشگاه ویرجینیا است.
424 pages, Paperback
First published December 22, 2010
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Displaying 1 - 13 of 13 reviews
January 8, 2011
This is obviously my own book. It was just released, and I read through for typos. But it is also an excellent book!
June 21, 2011
I was meaning to write this book review on Father's Day (seeing as how my dad wrote it), but I didn't get around to it so today will have to do.
My dad is a philosophy professor specializing in Wittgenstein. Although he (my dad) and I are pretty close, and have talked about a lot of philosophical things, we've never talked about Wittgenstein--and consequently I knew very little about him (Wittgenstein) before reading this book. I'm not sure how to explain this, except to say that neither of us ever brought it up. I guess I never knew how to approach it.
One consequence of all that is that I didn't have a lot of background info on W before reading this book, and I think I probably would have gotten more out of it if I did. That said, WiE has enough background that it's pretty easy to follow along even as a novice.
It took me a while to get into the book, and I only really clicked with it at one of the last chapters, "Das erlosende wort". This phrase, in German, means something like "the liberating word" or "the redeeming word" (though my dad largely leaves the adjective in the German). The phrase refers to W's insistence that it is important to know (or perhaps "have a feel for" is a better word) when to stop--to stop pressing the issue, to stop following the chain of reasons, to stop investigating causes, etc. The erlosende word is that which allows one to stop. This, my dad argues, is an element of W's temperament, and closely related to his feeling of being an exile from an earlier era. Indeed it does not seem to fit at all with our culture, which is what makes it such an interesting point to try to take seriously.
On some level, it is obvious that it is necessary to stop at some point, if only to avoid infinite regress. You can't define every word without eventual circularity; geometry has to start with axioms; when continually pressed by a toddler you must finally say "because I said so!" But while most modern people would agree to the existence of this logical bound, there is very little evidence in modern civilization of people electing to stop. Although my dad doesn't use this terminology, my feeling was that W sees this as an abdication of responsibility, even evidence of a lack of character. To pursue logical or causal chains without limit is, implicitly, to presume that there is inexhaustible value in such pursuit, and/or to delegate that judgment to someone else. Again, my dad does not make these references, but I see W's position as having an affinity with Alasdair MacIntyre and Jacques Ellul--the former's argument that morality loses its foundation without a telos (i.e. a place where reasons stop), the latter's discussion of how means have subdued ends in the modern world. I think that MacIntyre and Ellul may also have been people who felt like exiles--and that, to some extent, I am--and that perhaps my dad is as well.
One related and extremely interesting issue that my dad takes up is whether knowledge itself (as opposed to the ab-use of knowledge) can ever be harmful. (It is not obvious to me that it is necessary to prove this in order to favor not automatically pursuing knowledge, but it would certainly be sufficient.) The examples he gives are that a dying man may be better off not knowing he is dying (because of the extra stress it would cause him); that knowledge of evil may lead to loss of innocence; and that learning of unattainable possibilities may increase dissatisfaction. I kept thinking about this, and I think there are some interesting possibilities he didn't explore.
There is, for example, a broad class of examples in which gaining knowledge decreases wonder (which I will take as an axiomatic good). These could perhaps be classified with "loss of innocence," but not in the sense that my dad mentions. For instance, when I was little and we were stopped in traffic at a red light, my dad would suddenly say, "CHANGE!" and gesture, wizard-like, at the light--and it would turn green a second later. I was completely baffled and tickled by this until I figured out that he was just looking at the orthogonal light. Similar cases would include learning the dominant strategy in a simple game such as tic-tac-toe, and of course learning that Santa Claus is really your parents. I don't mean to say that the lost wonder has infinite value--there are certainly cases where it is counterbalanced by gains--but simply that it is not a priori obvious that the gains will outweigh the losses in every case.
I also want to problematize the declared distinction between "knowledge" and "use of knowledge," in two ways. First, I think the deck is unfairly stacked in favor of knowledge in this question because it is so natural for us to think of the benefits of knowledge in terms of its uses. However, we are stipulating that we are only allowed to consider non-use costs of knowledge, so we should also consider only its non-use values. And what are those? As with its costs, they always end up seeming pretty fuzzy--some vague pleasure-of-knowing is about all I can think of. Second, I do not think that the distinction between knowledge and its use is always a clear one when it comes to humans. As one example, I used to have a music blog. When I was writing it, I assiduously avoided installing software that would allow me to see how many people were reading it. I did that because I did not want to take on the cares and stresses of thinking about how big my audience was. Someone could argue that there would be no harm in my knowing the size of my audience; the harm would only be in my worrying about it--I could just choose not to! I think we are all used to the sense in which knowledge and its application are not objectively separable in such an ideal way.
My dad is a philosophy professor specializing in Wittgenstein. Although he (my dad) and I are pretty close, and have talked about a lot of philosophical things, we've never talked about Wittgenstein--and consequently I knew very little about him (Wittgenstein) before reading this book. I'm not sure how to explain this, except to say that neither of us ever brought it up. I guess I never knew how to approach it.
One consequence of all that is that I didn't have a lot of background info on W before reading this book, and I think I probably would have gotten more out of it if I did. That said, WiE has enough background that it's pretty easy to follow along even as a novice.
It took me a while to get into the book, and I only really clicked with it at one of the last chapters, "Das erlosende wort". This phrase, in German, means something like "the liberating word" or "the redeeming word" (though my dad largely leaves the adjective in the German). The phrase refers to W's insistence that it is important to know (or perhaps "have a feel for" is a better word) when to stop--to stop pressing the issue, to stop following the chain of reasons, to stop investigating causes, etc. The erlosende word is that which allows one to stop. This, my dad argues, is an element of W's temperament, and closely related to his feeling of being an exile from an earlier era. Indeed it does not seem to fit at all with our culture, which is what makes it such an interesting point to try to take seriously.
On some level, it is obvious that it is necessary to stop at some point, if only to avoid infinite regress. You can't define every word without eventual circularity; geometry has to start with axioms; when continually pressed by a toddler you must finally say "because I said so!" But while most modern people would agree to the existence of this logical bound, there is very little evidence in modern civilization of people electing to stop. Although my dad doesn't use this terminology, my feeling was that W sees this as an abdication of responsibility, even evidence of a lack of character. To pursue logical or causal chains without limit is, implicitly, to presume that there is inexhaustible value in such pursuit, and/or to delegate that judgment to someone else. Again, my dad does not make these references, but I see W's position as having an affinity with Alasdair MacIntyre and Jacques Ellul--the former's argument that morality loses its foundation without a telos (i.e. a place where reasons stop), the latter's discussion of how means have subdued ends in the modern world. I think that MacIntyre and Ellul may also have been people who felt like exiles--and that, to some extent, I am--and that perhaps my dad is as well.
One related and extremely interesting issue that my dad takes up is whether knowledge itself (as opposed to the ab-use of knowledge) can ever be harmful. (It is not obvious to me that it is necessary to prove this in order to favor not automatically pursuing knowledge, but it would certainly be sufficient.) The examples he gives are that a dying man may be better off not knowing he is dying (because of the extra stress it would cause him); that knowledge of evil may lead to loss of innocence; and that learning of unattainable possibilities may increase dissatisfaction. I kept thinking about this, and I think there are some interesting possibilities he didn't explore.
There is, for example, a broad class of examples in which gaining knowledge decreases wonder (which I will take as an axiomatic good). These could perhaps be classified with "loss of innocence," but not in the sense that my dad mentions. For instance, when I was little and we were stopped in traffic at a red light, my dad would suddenly say, "CHANGE!" and gesture, wizard-like, at the light--and it would turn green a second later. I was completely baffled and tickled by this until I figured out that he was just looking at the orthogonal light. Similar cases would include learning the dominant strategy in a simple game such as tic-tac-toe, and of course learning that Santa Claus is really your parents. I don't mean to say that the lost wonder has infinite value--there are certainly cases where it is counterbalanced by gains--but simply that it is not a priori obvious that the gains will outweigh the losses in every case.
I also want to problematize the declared distinction between "knowledge" and "use of knowledge," in two ways. First, I think the deck is unfairly stacked in favor of knowledge in this question because it is so natural for us to think of the benefits of knowledge in terms of its uses. However, we are stipulating that we are only allowed to consider non-use costs of knowledge, so we should also consider only its non-use values. And what are those? As with its costs, they always end up seeming pretty fuzzy--some vague pleasure-of-knowing is about all I can think of. Second, I do not think that the distinction between knowledge and its use is always a clear one when it comes to humans. As one example, I used to have a music blog. When I was writing it, I assiduously avoided installing software that would allow me to see how many people were reading it. I did that because I did not want to take on the cares and stresses of thinking about how big my audience was. Someone could argue that there would be no harm in my knowing the size of my audience; the harm would only be in my worrying about it--I could just choose not to! I think we are all used to the sense in which knowledge and its application are not objectively separable in such an ideal way.
August 8, 2023
I am not sure that using the Exile metaphor was a bright idea by Klagge. That it is a metaphor I think is clear. Wittgenstein has lived abroad for most of his life. But as Klagge himself says exile means being forced to live in another country and longing to go home. And this is just not true in the case of Wittgenstein. So it is a metaphor and of course one could argue that even his days as a school teacher in Austria were a kind of exile. And one could say (and Klagge does say) that Wittgenstein lived in a time that was not his own. He belonged to a different time and culture. (As described by Toulmin and Janik). But even if this were true what does it mean for his philosophy?
Wittgenstein always complained (or if he was not complaining he at least stated it as a fact) that people do not understand him. And it was not, as he insists, a question of language. Klagge makes a lot of fuss about this. But what does it mean? Would Brahms have understood the Tractatus, if Wittgenstein could have lived in the time he belonged to?
It is right, there is a continuity of Wittgenstein’s complaining to be misunderstood. But I think that there is a world of a difference between the not-understanding of the Tractatus and the not-understanding of the thoughts of the PU. In case of the Tractatus Wittgenstein thought that people must have thought along his lines to understand it. Maybe, but there is certainly a lot of technical and historical background necessary to even understand the problems he was tackling with. Whereas in the PU you need no previous knowledge just a willingness to follow Wittgenstein.
So right after a more or less biographical chapter on Wittgenstein’s complaint Klagge follows with a discussion on the philosophical problem of understanding – on the Wittgenstein way of treating the problem. And this is excellent. But also very difficult. (This is not an introduction to Wittgenstein!)
The best I can say about a book on philosophy: You want to immediately stop reading the book and discuss the contents with the writer – and maybe a couple of other people as well. So Klagge says that he is uncomfortable with the famous assertion that if a Lion could speak we would not understand him. I must confess I always took that for granted. Different forms of life and all that. But what does it actually mean? How would we know that a lion speaks if we cannot understand him? If you find yourself in China you would assume that the noises people make there are language. But on the other hand we attach the label language even to the dancing of bees. That is we know that a “dance“ means that there is food to be found at a certain location. This is how information gets communicated. So in what sense can we say we do not understand bees? We do. And presumably we would understand lions.
And I think it is important to see that the failure to understand Wittgenstein is not a principal problem in the sense that we cannot know what goes on his mind. On the contrary. If there is one thing that is totally clear it is that Wittgenstein did not think a private language was possible and thus no such thing as a private understanding. So, if it is true that we do not understand it is because he did not manage to make himself understood.
Klagge quotes Wordsworth:
“Every author, as far as he is great and at the same time original , has had the task of creating the taste by which he is to be enjoyed: so it has been, so will it continue to be.” (109)
Now, Klagge thinks it is the job of the exile to make the audience to appreciate (and thus(?) understand) what he has to offer – not the job if the audience. (Right, but why exile, why not genius?) Wittgenstein was aware of this: “someone who teaches philosophy nowadays gives his pupils foods, not because they are to his taste, but in order to change his taste.” (p. 110)
And, of course, in a way Wittgenstein has failed. As he himself said he had probably only managed to establish a kind of jargon used by his disciples. And so it is no wonder, that his influence has vanished in the 21st century (the topic of the last chapter).
Klagge closes the book with a quote from a contemporary (well, it is a quote from 1989) philosopher, J. Kim, about the Myth of Nonreductive Materailism which is indeed shocking. It is as if Wittgenstein had never existed. And I am always amazed when reading a current book on consciousness for example, that Wittgenstein is never even mentioned.
There is a lot of highly interesting stuff in this book. E.g. on what he calls the Insulation thesis: Science is not relevant to the solution of Philosophical questions. Or Wittgenstein’s “erlösendes Wort”. Also about his famous last words. Where we are supposed to belief he had have a wonderful life. (Is it a reference to the Capra film?)
Like I said, you want to read Wittgenstein and you want to think about what he said you want to discuss it and (something Klagge keeps in mind) ask yourself whether it is true. Or at least helpful.
And a final word, Klagge really made use of Wittgenstein’s oeuvre. Although he talks about a tiny aspect of Wittgenstein’s philosophy (no Tractatus at all) he lists 62(!) works by Wittgenstein in his bibliography.
Wittgenstein always complained (or if he was not complaining he at least stated it as a fact) that people do not understand him. And it was not, as he insists, a question of language. Klagge makes a lot of fuss about this. But what does it mean? Would Brahms have understood the Tractatus, if Wittgenstein could have lived in the time he belonged to?
It is right, there is a continuity of Wittgenstein’s complaining to be misunderstood. But I think that there is a world of a difference between the not-understanding of the Tractatus and the not-understanding of the thoughts of the PU. In case of the Tractatus Wittgenstein thought that people must have thought along his lines to understand it. Maybe, but there is certainly a lot of technical and historical background necessary to even understand the problems he was tackling with. Whereas in the PU you need no previous knowledge just a willingness to follow Wittgenstein.
So right after a more or less biographical chapter on Wittgenstein’s complaint Klagge follows with a discussion on the philosophical problem of understanding – on the Wittgenstein way of treating the problem. And this is excellent. But also very difficult. (This is not an introduction to Wittgenstein!)
The best I can say about a book on philosophy: You want to immediately stop reading the book and discuss the contents with the writer – and maybe a couple of other people as well. So Klagge says that he is uncomfortable with the famous assertion that if a Lion could speak we would not understand him. I must confess I always took that for granted. Different forms of life and all that. But what does it actually mean? How would we know that a lion speaks if we cannot understand him? If you find yourself in China you would assume that the noises people make there are language. But on the other hand we attach the label language even to the dancing of bees. That is we know that a “dance“ means that there is food to be found at a certain location. This is how information gets communicated. So in what sense can we say we do not understand bees? We do. And presumably we would understand lions.
And I think it is important to see that the failure to understand Wittgenstein is not a principal problem in the sense that we cannot know what goes on his mind. On the contrary. If there is one thing that is totally clear it is that Wittgenstein did not think a private language was possible and thus no such thing as a private understanding. So, if it is true that we do not understand it is because he did not manage to make himself understood.
Klagge quotes Wordsworth:
“Every author, as far as he is great and at the same time original , has had the task of creating the taste by which he is to be enjoyed: so it has been, so will it continue to be.” (109)
Now, Klagge thinks it is the job of the exile to make the audience to appreciate (and thus(?) understand) what he has to offer – not the job if the audience. (Right, but why exile, why not genius?) Wittgenstein was aware of this: “someone who teaches philosophy nowadays gives his pupils foods, not because they are to his taste, but in order to change his taste.” (p. 110)
And, of course, in a way Wittgenstein has failed. As he himself said he had probably only managed to establish a kind of jargon used by his disciples. And so it is no wonder, that his influence has vanished in the 21st century (the topic of the last chapter).
Klagge closes the book with a quote from a contemporary (well, it is a quote from 1989) philosopher, J. Kim, about the Myth of Nonreductive Materailism which is indeed shocking. It is as if Wittgenstein had never existed. And I am always amazed when reading a current book on consciousness for example, that Wittgenstein is never even mentioned.
There is a lot of highly interesting stuff in this book. E.g. on what he calls the Insulation thesis: Science is not relevant to the solution of Philosophical questions. Or Wittgenstein’s “erlösendes Wort”. Also about his famous last words. Where we are supposed to belief he had have a wonderful life. (Is it a reference to the Capra film?)
Like I said, you want to read Wittgenstein and you want to think about what he said you want to discuss it and (something Klagge keeps in mind) ask yourself whether it is true. Or at least helpful.
And a final word, Klagge really made use of Wittgenstein’s oeuvre. Although he talks about a tiny aspect of Wittgenstein’s philosophy (no Tractatus at all) he lists 62(!) works by Wittgenstein in his bibliography.
July 1, 2018
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کتاب «ویتگنشتاین در تبعید» اولین اثر مستقل جیمز سی کلاگ، ویتگنشتاینپژوه و استاد فلسفه در دانشگاه ویرجینیاتک است. در این کتاب نویسنده از منظری تازه به ویتگنشتاین و اندیشههای وی نظر افکنده است به باور وی تبعید ویتگنشتاین در کشورهای مختلف فقط جغرافیای نیست بلکه وی هیچگاه با قرن بیستم احساس نزدیکی و الفت نکرده است. نویسنده کتاب که یکی از برجستهترین ویتگنشتاینپژوهان جهان است که در این اثر موضوعات زیادی را از دید این فیلسوف برجسته مورد تحلیل قرار داد
کتاب «ویتگنشتاین در تبعید» اولین اثر مستقل جیمز سی کلاگ، ویتگنشتاینپژوه و استاد فلسفه در دانشگاه ویرجینیاتک است. در این کتاب نویسنده از منظری تازه به ویتگنشتاین و اندیشههای وی نظر افکنده است به باور وی تبعید ویتگنشتاین در کشورهای مختلف فقط جغرافیای نیست بلکه وی هیچگاه با قرن بیستم احساس نزدیکی و الفت نکرده است. نویسنده کتاب که یکی از برجستهترین ویتگنشتاینپژوهان جهان است که در این اثر موضوعات زیادی را از دید این فیلسوف برجسته مورد تحلیل قرار داد
April 11, 2013
Klagge explores Wittgenstein's philosophy and life in light of the notion that Wittgenstein felt like he was born at the wrong time. The basic notions this book employs can be found in Ray Monk's biography The Duty of Genius. If you're interested in learning about Wittgenstein, especially his ideas on certainty and his belief that nobody would understand his philosophy, I'd recommend this book. Firstly, though, I'd recommend reading Monk's biography, so as to give one a greater purview of Wittgenstein.
July 31, 2014
As a general rule, I do not give top rating for secondary literature. But really liked this little book. It was a nice balance between biography and philosophy. The author discussed a couple of my own philosophical preoccupations these days: exile, cultural alienation, the reductionism of crude materialists. It's also very accessible to anyone -- not just to dem dang academic philosopher types.
February 9, 2013
A smart not too technical (for non philosophers) look at the last centuries most enigmatic thinker. Living in norway myself now, was particularly enjoyable to read of Wittgenstein's time in this far north outpost.
December 12, 2015
If you are a non-specialist who may read only one book on Wittgenstein this is a good choice. It provides an excellent interweaving of biography into a richer explanation of W's philosophy.
April 8, 2018
I'd like to like this book more. The idea of understanding a philosopher's work by understanding the philosopher himself is appealing. But here, I just don't think that the theme of Wittgenstein as "exile" helped to deepen my understanding of Wittgenstein's work significantly.
Klagge treats Wittgenstein's status as an "exile" from different angles. Wittgenstein was always physically and psychologically at some distance from his surroundings, both places and people. He spent much of his intellectual career in Cambridge, and interspersed reclusive stays in Norway that seemed to function as personal and philosophical retreats.
On a cultural scale, Klagge brings to bear Spengler's distinction between "culture" and "civilization", with "culture" being (more or less) the true flowering of an era, with vibrant, life-giving institutions. "Civilization" is its aftermath, like the denouement of a culture, going through the motions it has set in place but lacking the vibrant, fertile spirit of the culture. The West is, in Spengler's treatment in The Decline of the West, in this stage of "civilization". Klagge, though, says that Wittgenstein himself was out of step with this Spenglerian progression, a man from the age of Western "culture" tossed into the age of Western "civilization," consistently at odds with the decline around him.
Klagge's theme of exile does seem to fit Wittgenstein. As a person, his behavior seemed socially askew and difficult to understand. His philosophical work is remarkably difficult to understand -- difficult in a way so different from, for example, his contemporary, Heidegger. The difficulty with Heidegger is apparent -- the vocabulary of his early writings, the tortured syntax (in German or in translation), the odd figurative language of his later writings. But Wittgenstein writes in ordinary words, with ordinary syntax, but testing our ability to nevertheless think about things from fresh and new angles, shucking off the familiar tendencies of our understanding. Both are alien challenges to our understanding, but Wittgenstein's sometimes is the more challenging because of its apparent ordinariness -- he speaks our language, but he does it so differently.
All of that is to say that, yes, maybe Wittgenstein can be profitably seen as an "exile". But that's not especially new. In fact, most historically significant philosophers can be seen that way -- out of step, thinking differently, and doing so in a way that is historically fertile. The "Owl of Minerva" in Hegel's image, coming along after an age to capture it clearly in philosophical view, is actually relatively rare (and maybe not so interesting) by comparison to the philosophers who, like Descartes, Kant, Nietzsche, and Wittgenstein, point the way to a new direction.
Separately from the theme of "exile", Klagge presents some broad interpretations of Wittgenstein's thinking that I found intriguing and helpful. Here are a couple of examples:
- the role of "persuasion" in philosophical argument. The modern philosophical tradition idealizes rational, objection-proof arguments, but Wittgenstein often suggests that what he is trying to do is to persuade us, offering us a chance to redirect our thinking into a new channel, not because the new one can be proven through step by step argument to be superior or to answer the questions the old one failed at, but only because it will give us a fresh perspective from which we can see things we didn't see before.
- the friction between scientific discoveries that transform our understanding of concepts and our common-sense or folk understanding of those same concepts. In some cases, e.g., the disease once called "consumption", the scientific discovery eliminates or transforms the folk understanding -- it is clearly a progress of understanding and displaces the old with the new. In others, e.g., discoveries about everyday concepts like "beliefs" and "decisions", it isn't so clear that discoveries in neuroscience will displace older, common-sense understandings. We still rely on those common-sense understandings to live our lives, find each other responsible for our actions, and regulate social life. The discussion points to a bigger point about the role of scientific understanding in our culture, and maybe how we ought to think skeptically about its sometimes avowed superiority to other ways of understanding ourselves and our lives.
All in all, reading Klagge's book did move my understanding of Wittgenstein along. I just can't attribute it to his theme of Wittgenstein as "exile."
Klagge treats Wittgenstein's status as an "exile" from different angles. Wittgenstein was always physically and psychologically at some distance from his surroundings, both places and people. He spent much of his intellectual career in Cambridge, and interspersed reclusive stays in Norway that seemed to function as personal and philosophical retreats.
On a cultural scale, Klagge brings to bear Spengler's distinction between "culture" and "civilization", with "culture" being (more or less) the true flowering of an era, with vibrant, life-giving institutions. "Civilization" is its aftermath, like the denouement of a culture, going through the motions it has set in place but lacking the vibrant, fertile spirit of the culture. The West is, in Spengler's treatment in The Decline of the West, in this stage of "civilization". Klagge, though, says that Wittgenstein himself was out of step with this Spenglerian progression, a man from the age of Western "culture" tossed into the age of Western "civilization," consistently at odds with the decline around him.
Klagge's theme of exile does seem to fit Wittgenstein. As a person, his behavior seemed socially askew and difficult to understand. His philosophical work is remarkably difficult to understand -- difficult in a way so different from, for example, his contemporary, Heidegger. The difficulty with Heidegger is apparent -- the vocabulary of his early writings, the tortured syntax (in German or in translation), the odd figurative language of his later writings. But Wittgenstein writes in ordinary words, with ordinary syntax, but testing our ability to nevertheless think about things from fresh and new angles, shucking off the familiar tendencies of our understanding. Both are alien challenges to our understanding, but Wittgenstein's sometimes is the more challenging because of its apparent ordinariness -- he speaks our language, but he does it so differently.
All of that is to say that, yes, maybe Wittgenstein can be profitably seen as an "exile". But that's not especially new. In fact, most historically significant philosophers can be seen that way -- out of step, thinking differently, and doing so in a way that is historically fertile. The "Owl of Minerva" in Hegel's image, coming along after an age to capture it clearly in philosophical view, is actually relatively rare (and maybe not so interesting) by comparison to the philosophers who, like Descartes, Kant, Nietzsche, and Wittgenstein, point the way to a new direction.
Separately from the theme of "exile", Klagge presents some broad interpretations of Wittgenstein's thinking that I found intriguing and helpful. Here are a couple of examples:
- the role of "persuasion" in philosophical argument. The modern philosophical tradition idealizes rational, objection-proof arguments, but Wittgenstein often suggests that what he is trying to do is to persuade us, offering us a chance to redirect our thinking into a new channel, not because the new one can be proven through step by step argument to be superior or to answer the questions the old one failed at, but only because it will give us a fresh perspective from which we can see things we didn't see before.
- the friction between scientific discoveries that transform our understanding of concepts and our common-sense or folk understanding of those same concepts. In some cases, e.g., the disease once called "consumption", the scientific discovery eliminates or transforms the folk understanding -- it is clearly a progress of understanding and displaces the old with the new. In others, e.g., discoveries about everyday concepts like "beliefs" and "decisions", it isn't so clear that discoveries in neuroscience will displace older, common-sense understandings. We still rely on those common-sense understandings to live our lives, find each other responsible for our actions, and regulate social life. The discussion points to a bigger point about the role of scientific understanding in our culture, and maybe how we ought to think skeptically about its sometimes avowed superiority to other ways of understanding ourselves and our lives.
All in all, reading Klagge's book did move my understanding of Wittgenstein along. I just can't attribute it to his theme of Wittgenstein as "exile."
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August 12, 2025لودویگ ویتگنشتاین که موسیقی معنابخشِ زندگیاش بود و برخلاف موسیقیِ مدرن موسیقیِ کلاسیک را میستود (کلاگ، ۱۳۹۴: ۸۱-۳۸۹-۳۹۰)، همجنسگرایی بود که در بیستودوم سپتامبر ۱۹۳۷ طی یادداشتی اذعان داشت که در ماه حاضر با دوست صمیمیاش، فرانسیس اسکینر، دو یا سهبار خوابیده است (همان: ۲۴۳).
بنابر آنچه یکی از ویتگنشتاینپژوهان، دکتر جیمز کِلاگ، در کتاب ارزشمند «ویتگنشتاین در تبعید» یادآور شده است، علاقۀ نسبتاً وسواسگونهای به کتاب اناجیل به زبان ساده اثر تولستوی داشت و معتقد بود که حقیقتاً این کتاب او را زنده نگه داشته است (همان: ۵۸). چنانکه برتراند راسل نیز بر این باور بود که ویتگنشتاین در احساسات عرفانی فرو رفته است و باآنکه میپنداشت آدم دینداری نیست، درعینحال نمیتوانست به مسائل از چشمانداز دینی ننگرد (همان: ۳۲۸).
از مشهورترین و مهمترین آثار ویتگنشتاین،که خواندن آن را ورود به کشوری غریب دانستهاند و فهم آن را دشوار شمردهاند، کتاب «رسالۀ منطقی - فلسفی» و «پژوهشهای فلسفی» است. رسالۀ منطقی - فلسفی یا تراکتاتوس که ویتگنشتاین فهم آن را دشوار و حتی غیرممکن خوانده است (همان: ۵۰-۵۱-۱۳۴-۱۳۵)، در زمان حیات نویسنده و در سال ۱۹۲۱ در اوراقی مختصر نزدیک به هفتاد صفحه به چاپ رسید.
موضوع محوری تراکتاتوس زبان است و ویتگنشتاینِ متقدّم بر آن باور بوده است که واژهها باآنکه معنای معیّنی دارند، ساختار منطقی زیرین خود را پنهان میکنند و گاهی غیرقابل بیان هستند (همان: ۲۶۶-۳۰۹). لذا هرگونه سخنی دربارۀ امور فراواقعی از قبیل اخلاق و دین و هنر بیمعنا خواهد بود. و از اینروست که ویتگنشتاین این کتاب خود را با این جمله به پایان میرساند:
«دربارۀ چیزی که نمیتوان از آن حرف زد، باید ساکت ماند».
کتاب دیگر لودویگ ویتگنشتاین که دو سال پس از مرگ او، در حدود دویستوسی صفحه منتشر شد، پژوهشهای فلسفی نام دارد. اثری که برخلاف تراکتاتوس، تقریباً مفصّل و دارای جملاتی بلند است. نظر ویتگنشتاین در پژوهشهای فلسفی با نظر او در رسالۀ منطقی - فلسفی متفاوت است و حتی برخی از آرای پیشین خود را رد میکند. او در کتاب پژوهشهای فلسفی متذکر شده است که واژهها معانی مختلفی دارند و ضمن اینکه هیچچیز را پنهان نمیکنند، معمولاً بیانشدنی و قابلانتقال هستند (همان: ۲۶۶-۳۱۰). و بر همین اساس است که شیوۀ کسانی را که گزارههای دینی را به سیاق گزارههای علمی میسنجند و دربارۀ آنها داوری میکنند، بیمعنا میخواند.
منبع:
_ کلاگ، جیمز سی، ۱۳۹۴، ویتگنشتاین در تبعید، ترجمه احسان سنایی اردکانی، تهران، ققنوس.
April 6, 2013
An easy to read book considering Wittgenstein's philosophy from the point of view of exile - not just exile in terms of place, but also in terms of time and culture. That there is such a connection is hard to doubt: Wittgenstein never lived in one place long, was deeply antithetical to what he considered the spirit of his age and thought that a philosopher should be "a citizen of no community". In fact the point is so obvious that I can't help feeling Klagge makes a meal of it, treating basic facts as if they were surprising insights.
At the same time, however, he sells Wittgenstein short when it comes to the cultural implications of his philosophy. I found the discussion of the private language argument and its impact on reductive theories about so-called "folk psychology" particularly poor. It seemed to me that Klagge simply hadn't gotten to the heart of what Wittgenstein was saying.
In some ways this is surprising, as Klagge is a professional philosopher who has specialized in Wittgenstein's work for over twenty years. At the same time, however, he is an American philosopher who seems (judging by some of his comments) to be steeped in America's post-Quinean philosophical tradition. I suspect that has got in his way more than he realises.
All in all, then, a missed opportunity. Nonetheless, Klagge should at least be given credit for raising some important issues even if his answers are wide of the mark. (And if that's not damning with faint praise then I don't know what is.)
At the same time, however, he sells Wittgenstein short when it comes to the cultural implications of his philosophy. I found the discussion of the private language argument and its impact on reductive theories about so-called "folk psychology" particularly poor. It seemed to me that Klagge simply hadn't gotten to the heart of what Wittgenstein was saying.
In some ways this is surprising, as Klagge is a professional philosopher who has specialized in Wittgenstein's work for over twenty years. At the same time, however, he is an American philosopher who seems (judging by some of his comments) to be steeped in America's post-Quinean philosophical tradition. I suspect that has got in his way more than he realises.
All in all, then, a missed opportunity. Nonetheless, Klagge should at least be given credit for raising some important issues even if his answers are wide of the mark. (And if that's not damning with faint praise then I don't know what is.)
June 8, 2020
A decent introduction to Wittgenstein's thought. Although it can go much deeper in terms of the discussion on private language & certainty, this combination of biographical & philosophical investigation of Wittgenstein offers a useful narrative frame.
Upon completing a bunch of other books on Wittgenstein, this monograph is surprisingly concise & intriguing.
Upon completing a bunch of other books on Wittgenstein, this monograph is surprisingly concise & intriguing.
July 19, 2022
I read this in conjunction with reading the Philosophical Investigations. The author provides informative commentary on aspects of Wittgenstein's unique approach to philosophy.
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