The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War

The Peloponnesian War #1

by Donald Kagan

The first volume of Donald Kagan's acclaimed four-volume history of the Peloponnesian War offers a new evaluation of the origins and causes of the conflict, based on evidence produced by modern scholarship and on a careful reconsideration of the ancient texts. He focuses his study on the question: Was the war inevitable, or could it have been avoided?

Kagan takes issue with Thucydides' view that the war was inevitable, that the rise of the Athenian Empire in a world with an existing rival power made a clash between the two a certainty. Asserting instead that the origin of the war "cannot, without serious distortion, be treated in isolation from the internal history of the states involved," Kagan traces the connections between domestic politics, constitutional organization, and foreign affairs. He further examines the evidence to see what decisions were made that led to war, at each point asking whether a different decision would have been possible.

Genres: History, Nonfiction, Ancient History, Classics, Greece, Military History, War

440 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1969

About the author

Donald Kagan (May 1, 1932 – August 6, 2021) was a Lithuanian-born American historian and classicist at Yale University specializing in ancient Greece. He formerly taught in the Department of History at Cornell University. Kagan was considered among the foremost American scholars of Greek history and is notable for his four-volume history of the Peloponnesian War.

Reviews

[Kevin · Rating 5 out of 5]

I friggin loved this quartet of books. Took about a year to read all four. I actually was quite annoyed that two of his sources were written ONLY in German -- I mean literally, there are NO translations. I contacted Prof. Kagan and he told me "It took me 30 years to write the books. I'm sure you can learn German in less time." Hilarious.

[James Murphy · Rating 4 out of 5]

I'm revisiting Donald Kagan's 4-volume history of the Peloponnesian War this year. In my experience this is the best modern history of the war and one which I consider wise in its understanding and analysis of the various currents driving the war and of ways in which study of it can be used today. His insight into the past and how it always abuts the present is full-bodied. A primary source for the war is, of course, Thucydides, who stated one of his reasons for writing his history was to show how events or situations tend to repeat themselves. Or, perhaps more correctly, how human nature and motivations keep reoccurring. I realize that part of my fascination with these distant events in the Aegean stems from interest in exactly that, parallels reflecting the same quest for empire and national competition, political ambition, savage collateral consequences for the populations, tragic and abject defeat, and triumphs as seen in our own more recent history. And Kagan is able to brilliantly make clear those ancient political and military circumstances by illustrating similar ones from modern history. A bonus in reading the book I'd forgotten is how well Kagan can write. Murky, twisted events of a war between 431 and 404 BC are uncomplicated by his supple prose and by his sure grasp of the source material. It seems an extravagance to say that history can excite. But Kagan's history of the Peloponnesian War is exciting as well as being an indispensible work on the subject. This is page-turning history.

[Marks54 · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is the first volume of Kagan's four volume history of the Peloponnesian War. In this series, Kagan paints the most complete picture possible of the long war by starting with Thucydides and Herodotus and others and then expanding on the basis of any other available sources. This fills in lots of detail for those who want more context to the story as told by Thucydides. This is really helpful for this long war, which was a veritable world war in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean for nearly 30 years.

It is well written and easy to follow and filled with lots of information and explanation, although it also has far more details on the evidence and current scholarship than nonspecialists will ever need. Thucydides set the standard for most of the history that came afterwards and this series is a good way to come to appreciate it. The first volume is the background to the outbreak of hostilities between Athens and Sparta. Subsequent volumes pick up with the Archidamean War, the truce/peace of Nicias, the Sicilian Expedition, and the final naval war prior to the defeat of Athens,

Kagan has a shorter one volume version of the series. I would recommend reading Thucydides before reading this.

[Eleutheria A.cl · Rating 5 out of 5]

So far so good and it actually takes me longer than I thought to finish it but it is honestly worth every minute. I'm sure Kagan is more than a historian for he must be a detective as well(✪ω✪). I just can't get enough on how this book nails and cracks the omissions and unsatisfied points on Thucydides' explanation on the cause of Peloponnesian War and forages all the available information to reconstruct an increasingly detailed picture to approach carefully and critically on what was actually going on back then by tirelessly deduction and recheck. It sounds like an ordinary scholar technique but he is a heck of a Sherlock Holmes for historians. *fan mode*

Speaking of technique (roughly, not too seriously), it's likely that there is a clear Hermeneutic circle in his approach, and the way he achieving his conclusion works so much alike making a broad dialogue with the past. This book seems to pay particular attention to the living experiences mentioned by Wilhelm Dilthey when doing this study, which means, in this case, how all the singular events and individual decisions (e.g. Megara Decree, Pericles' refusal of Melesippus' last embassy visiting) are connected with the whole situation, together with the interpreter's current background (e.g. all those scholar essay hunt), then out of such "nexus" meaningfulness can be manifested, explanation can be possible, and conclusion can be considered. But just a nexus is not enough, the separating and contemplating between historical reality to be reconstructed (re-stepped into) and the artistic elaboration of historical reality of Thucydides hinted the spirit of Martin Heidegger. It's hardly surprising bcs anyway hermeneutics is just fundamental in humanities studies.

As he concludes, if for solid historical truth, Thucydides' "truest cause" of PW should not be the one readers of progeny looking for. But! No! (This is my favorite part!) This book is not trying to accuse Thucydides being deceiving or his writing being untrue but actually admiring his way of dealing history and pointed out why he did that and how in fact modern readers should approach him:

"Thucydides stood on the edge of philosophy."

me: *hyped*

Thus Thucydides is not lying but his truth is not the truth of solid physical end but transcendental philosophical end.

"His work is not intended only for the present, but as a "possession forever." Assuming the essential stability of human nature in the political realm, he tried to establish what amount almost to laws of political behavior... Thucydides wanted to describe and analyze the impersonal forces that operate in human society. A future Themistocles or a Pericles would have the wisdom to use the laws or principles that emerge from that analysis to guide his political actions."

Thus in the last paragraphs, a brief compare is made between Thucydides and Herodotus, concluding that the latter being more a "modern" historian for:

Herodotus loves the phenomena in themselves; he is chiefly concerned with composing an interesting and honest narrative. He also wants to suggest some general truths, but that purpose is secondary. Thucydides has a different purpose. The phenomena and the narrative are not ends in themselves, but means whereby the historian can illustrate general truths.

Idk but...in vino veritas, in aqua sanitas, right? And I think this phrase speaks a lot on the different concentrations of Thucydides and Herodotus already. As for both of these kinds of devotions, C.G Jung talked enough in his writing on the psychological types, the part on the introvert and the extrovert, where he explored Schiller and Goethe as two typical examples, which in fact echoes perfectly in this situation. Herodotus is viewed as a more modern one bcs we lived in an age of water anyway (and health matters *shrug*), for the firing truth had descended into the cooling liquid (Jung *rolling eyes*: you stop it).

Anyway, The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War is so great. Just read it!!

p.s: One more point, idk it's just me or the conflict between Sparta, Athens and Corinth looks so much alike the hostile and disastrous competition between Hera, Athena and Aphrodite over the Apple of Discord? Considering those goddesses' relation to these three cities, it just so ...myth lives human and....wow. (Jung *rolling eyes*: told you so)

[Carlos Wang · Rating 4 out of 5]

前陣子，習大大在某外交場合提到了“修昔底德陷阱”這個詞，有一段時間還以為也即將《舊制度與大革命》那樣掀起一陣浪潮，可惜雷聲大雨點小。不過，除了徐松岩先生新注解了《伯羅奔尼撒戰爭史》外，華東師範也推出了Donald Kagan的名作《伯羅奔尼撒戰爭的爆發》。

這本書想討論的正是那句詞：“修昔底德陷阱”，簡單來說，指一個新崛起的大國，必然要挑戰現存的霸權，而霸權也將不得不回應這個威脅，最終引發戰爭。Kagan認為，修昔底德在他的著作中，對於戰爭爆發的原因之解釋，就套用了前述的說法，主張雅典跟斯巴達必將一戰，而這也是他想挑戰的論點。

Kagan仔細的分析了兩個陣營的內外局勢，戰爭爆發前的各個互動及衝突，他認為，雖然雅典跟斯巴達都存在著“鷹派、鴿派”的對立，但在事實上，雙方都沒發生過同時存在鷹派主政的時候，而且兩邊的人民也都有認知到戰爭爆發的嚴重性。特別是在伯里克利的時代，雅典其實是相當克制跟收斂，只想跟斯巴達各自守著自己的帝國。諷刺的地方在於，引發戰爭的反而是科林斯及雙方陣營的小國衝突，再加上伯里克利對於斯巴達政局的誤判，還有他太過“深謀遠慮”，判定終究難免一戰，於是把立場僵化，徹底放棄了任何和平的可能，最終將希臘推向深淵。

看到此處，想起了前一本看的《夢遊者》及其所述的一戰前後的歐洲政局，不由得感慨萬千，難怪像《軟實力》的作者奈伊，會在自己編的國關教科書直接把《伯羅奔尼撒戰爭》放在開場白。事實上，希臘兩大陣營雅典跟斯巴達已經向我們這些後人展現了許多外交上的經典案例，可惜吾人完全沒有記取任何教訓。英德法俄未必真的非要一戰不可，但他們卻在外交上屢屢失誤，最終騎虎難下。Kagan引用了修昔底德記述的，斯巴達最後一次派使者梅勒希普斯去跟雅典交涉失敗後，在離開時說的名言：「今天將是希臘人災難的開始。」近兩千年後，格雷也講出類似的話語，何其不幸！

但話又說回來，慶幸的是至少這本書已經被引進，而且Kagan另外一本《伯羅奔尼撒戰爭》也將中譯出版，修昔底德想說的教訓華文界越來越多機會可以認識。


另外，Kagan的這本著作運用了很多考古資料，也引用了許多同行的觀點，不論是贊同還是駁斥，都可以感受到作者學識淵博，慧眼獨具，而且見解透徹。同時他也分析了修昔底德及其著作。他認為，修昔底德雖然是最早“具科學態度”的治史，但他在自己的作品中，也還是巧妙的利用了對於事件的強調跟忽略等手法，引導讀者陷入其觀點而不自知。或許這才是“修昔底德陷阱”的真意？

本書譯筆流暢，值得嘉獎。缺點是全書沒有一幅地圖，讀者要自己準備，算是編輯的缺失。

[Ben Adams · Rating 5 out of 5]

If you’re looking for information on the Peloponnesian War, Kagan’s work is the only place you need to look. His exhaustive engagement with other scholars, complete mastery of the ancient sources, and thought provoking assertions regarding the causes of the war all combine to create a masterclass on the subject.

Not to be read lightly, this is a scholarly undertaking that may seem a bit dry to most readers, but to the enthusiast, this is a treasure.

[Joshua Clark · Rating 5 out of 5]

A thoroughly enjoying presentation of the factors leading to the Peloponnesian War. Though disagreeing with Thucydides' masterful analysis, Kagan does this with humility but also great erudition. Its been said in the past that Kagan has an overt pro-Athenian bias; whilst this may be true, his case is certainly laid out with a decent analysis of the facts. This book is also written well in terms of readability and engagement.

An all round a brilliant read!

[Sean O'Hara · Rating 4 out of 5]

Kagan's tetralogy is still undoubtedly the most comprehensive study of the Peloponnesian War in English, but it's far from flawless. He is clearly biased in favor of Athens, and Pericles in particular. At one point he compares Pericles to FDR, but truly he seems more like one of those democratic reformers who come to power in South America or Africa and seem to be doing a good job, but over time they begin to believe that only they can keep the country on course, and eventually they start undermining the very democracy they built. Towards the end of this first volume, Pericles comes across as an old man clinging to power past his prime, but Kagan continues to treat him as the brilliant leader who drove out Cimon thirty years earlier. Kagan continues to find reasons why Pericles' decisions should be read as good, or at least defensible policy, even as he leads Athens towards a bloody war.

[Ivan Soto · Rating 4 out of 5]

Great scholarship!

[Bryan Batson · Rating 4 out of 5]

Good read. Excellent assessment of Thucydides' argument about the inevitability of the Peloponnesian War. Great assessment of the manner in which states wield power.

[Paul · Rating 4 out of 5]

Not always the lightest of reads but a thorough exploration of the Peloponnesian War that wreaked havoc on the Greek world of the time.

9/10

[Matt Kangas]

Fascinating, but challenging if you have little knowledge of ancient Greece

[Birju · Rating 4 out of 5]

hard to follow at some times, but a very concise account of the reason of the war, looking at not only the War of 431, but also the first Peloponnesian war

[Tobias · Rating 4 out of 5]

Mid Diplomat's Dictionary update.

I feel very vindicated that my judgement — the Athenian embassy really blewed the whole thing — is seconded by actual career diplomats. Not to mention they were not there for settling disputes over Potidaea or Corcyra. So basically they are a bunch of blundering amateurs.

D. Kagan should really sit down, pour himself a hot cup of STFU juice and learn Kissinger's product formula of deterrence. To paraphrase Jeffrey Sachs, the neocons love to latch on the one time when diplomacy and compromise failed (the lead up to WWII) but conveniently forget that most of the other times, throughout history, across culture, despite ideological differences, compromise when done well would deliver peace.

Deterrence requires a combination of power, the will to use it, and the assessment of these by the potential aggressor. Moreover, deterrence is a product of those factors and not a sum. If any one of them is zero, deterrence fails.

— Henry A. Kissinger, 1960

———————————————————————

Post Hasebroek update:

I'm really bothered by how Donald Kagan downplayed the importance and excessive cruelty of Megarian Decree. If it weren't clear that this Decree caused a double-whammy on Megara's economy (liquidity squeeze and grain embargo) when this book was first published, it should be clear as glass when Kagan finished the 2nd installment (1974) since similar thing happened to Salvador Allende's Chile.

And don't tell me D. Kagan didn't know Hasebroek's work. I came to know Hasebroek's Staat Und Handel Im Alten Griechenland. Untersuchungen Zur Antiken Wirtschaftsgeschichte via a footnote of D. Kagan in this very volume.

An apologist of Pericles might argue that given how primitive Hellenistic understanding of economics was, we shouldn't pile the all blame on Pericles. Yeah, true. But there's a difference between that and pretending these unintended consequences NEVER HAPPENED. Like what D. Kagan did. Am I surprised that this self-deception now runs rampant in contemporary neocons? *gasps* Oh I'm so, SO shocked.

There is a quote that sticked with me for over a decade, from the first history book in English I read, to the effect of "the goal of the study of history is the proper allocation of guilt among various parties". D. Kagan did the exact opposite of that. What an own-goal.

———————————————————————

The jury's still out on this one. I understand that Donald Kagan spent 30 years on this quartet and (worthy) historians tend to improve throughout volumns. Despite glaring red flags like presentism, bias towards Athens, a fundamental lacking of understanding in military ways of thinking, and sometimes outright misinterpretation of texts, I will withhold my judgement. It's really a ballsy move for Donald Kagan to distort what Plato said in Gorgias while giving out the exact paragraph of what he's distorting in P106 of this book. Did he not assume that there will be readers checking the footnotes?

Friends, readers, history-lovers, lend me your ears. I come to praise Kagan, not to bury him.

Reading this, a lot of what current USA admin's behaviors started to make sense. Leo Strauss got a lot of bad rep for being the ringleader of neoconservatism which led to the rise of Paul Wolfowitz, Victoria Nuland et. al., but one has to admit that there is a certain finesse in Leo Strauss' strategy. Strauss dunks on Nietzsche all the time yet his line of thinking is often Nietzschean — which, in turn, makes his discontent towards Machiavelli somewhat ambivalent, perhaps Machiavello. Strauss knows how to guide the reader's understanding of texts to serve his purpose[1]. In Xenophontic terms, Strauss is a master of husbandry.

Such finesse was pretty much discounted in the next gen of his followers, of which Donald Kagan is one member. The ability to see beyond text, the ability to discern the excuse and the excused, the ability to detect a Tocquevillian corpse, was very much lost to the time. Kagan displayed a distinguished favoritism towards Athens, and I'm 50% certain that's because Athens was calling itself "democratic" just like USA in 1969, when this book was published. As for what Athens was really doing: depriving fellow city-states in Delian League of economic sovereignty by denying them their right to forge their own currency, depriving them of their freedom to choose their own diplomatic policy, disarming, in a way, fellow city-states — well, that all be damned because Athens called itself "democracy". And to what extent did NATO's structure mimic the Delian League during its founding, or to what extent Donald Kagan depict Delian League in a way that glorifies NATO by concentrating on their similarities — that would probably be an insoluble question to which the answer matters far less than the question. A similar question, where the answer matters far less than the extence of the question itself, is this:

To what extent the Cold War mentality created "Thucydides trap", through a Cold War interpretation of Thucydides, put forward by Donald Kagan and Graham Allison and others, whose whole validity lies in the fact that it went through the savoir game of power-truth (read: academic publishing) because of the financial interest (e.g. "Defense budget") it could leverage?

Or, in plain English, was the "Thucydides trap" just a glorified military-industrialfinancial complex thirst trap for US congress? [2]

C'mon. One can presentism better than this. I wonder if Benedetto Croce would phrase his "all history is contemporary history" in harsher terms, if he came to realize that this whole "Thucydides trap" historiography is used to justify pushing the world closer to a nuclear arms exchange.

The evil that men do, lives after them. The good is oft' interred with their bones. And so it was with Strauss. Strauss' disdain for putting texts into their historical — let alone materialist — context nested in Donald Kagan: not once, NOT EVEN ONCE, did Donald Kagan look into the logistics issue, especially on the Spartan side, in this volumn. I flipped my sh*t out when I learned that Athens didn't really have food security because they mainly imported grain from ... region nowadays known as Ukraine or "part of Russia" or contested region only in Chapter 11. If you are going to write a war history you don't bury such critical information in the middle of the book. You just don't. This thing should be forefront, chapter 1 page 1 material. The amateurism of Donald Kagan also manifested during his interpretation of Archidamus' speech.

是故智者之虑，必杂于利害，杂于利而务可信也，杂于害而患可解也。
Hence the sage must weight both the benefit and the risk in his consideration simultaneously. The outlook of the benefit will motivate people to push things forward. The prediction of possible risks will help people to diffuse it.

— Sun Tzu the Art of War (512 BCE)

When Archidamus was talking about potential harm and the worst case scenario of opening up the second Peloponnesian War with Athens, he wasn't being dovish, as Donald Kagan understood. He was being textbook. Perhaps one can excuse this (mis)interpretation because Classical Greece is vastly different from us culturally — which is a historicism excuse that Leo Strauss would hate (lol whatever he's dead). However, this is not the case with Donald Kagan. Donald Kagan deemed the Athenian diplomat a "smart" one because he was taking a strong stance like USA's deterrence against USSR, which to him is the reason why the world was not in another World War like UK-France against Nazi Germany. The soft-speaking of UK and France didn't stop Nazi Germany not because soft-speaking is an impotent strategy, as Donald Kagan puts it, but because A2/AD must be based on credible track record of military might. Absense of such might, soft-speaking would sound like silent whimpering and strong stance would sound like loud barking from a chihuahua, both merely blowing hot air. And did Athens establish such a credible track record? Just one chapter ago Donald Kagan forecasted Pericles' brilliant strategy against Macedonia: instead of combining forces to secure a swift and overwhelming victory, he diffused them and dragged the battle out to his own disadvantage.[3] This is the kind of "strategy" that Carl von Clausewitz will whip one's head over and over again with "don't you f*cking dare". Donald Kagan's judgement on military matters are, in USAF's new vocabulary, a mixture of "really?" and "interesting behavior".

The qualification of Donald Kagan as an interpreter of military actions comes into serious question for me. I wonder if he gets to improve in later volumns.

The flaws that nested in Donald Kagan are now doing a full chestburster in contemporary neocons. Blind to logistics risks in Ukraine back then, blind to logistics issues in Ukraine right now. Blind faith in "strong stance" back then, "no reverse gear" right now. And taking ideologies at face value, without discerning how power is really distributed under a certain "ideology", without following the money, without questioning the structural reasons and inequalities outside what's artificially defined as "politics"? I have tiny violin for Robert Kagan, Donald Kagan's son. When Donald Kagan willfully distorted Plato, he was clearly acting out of defense mechanism because Plato shrewdly dissected the cause of war further than Donald Kagan's ideology could handle: Plato stated that there's a certain ethical shortfall in the citizens of Athens. "Democracy" amongst the morally flawed — imagine all the implications! Same defense mechanism is harder at work in contemporary neocons, one of which Victoria Nuland, Donald Kagan's daughter in law. The way her face aged is all one needs to justify Oscar Wilde's "It is only shallow people who do not judge by appearances."

O judgement thou art fled to brutish beasts, and men have lost their reason!

Bear with me. My heart is in the coffin, there with Thucydides. And I must pause till it comes back to me.

__________________________


Footnotes:

[1] This, btw, cannot be understood through passive reading or bystanding. One couldn't feel the dynamics between the text and the perusor, and the freedom such dynamics ensues, unless one practices some perusing oneself.

[2] The financialization of US industry is a whole philosophical can of worm on its own, which I won't open in this supposedly juries-out review. Stock buybacks, loosening regulations, lobbying and all that jazz.

[3] Such "strategy" is called 添油战术 in Chinese and I have yet to find an accurate translation of this phrase. If someone knows please leave a comment.

[Michael Bennett · Rating 4 out of 5]

Clear, engaging, and forceful. Kagan's style is easy to follow, though this is not a straightforward history. Kagan is trying to prove his own thesis about the outbreak of the war, and positions his argument against other theses that were apparently in vogue in the 50's. The problem is that Kagan must certainly be wrong.

Primarily, he argues that Thucydides was wrong in suggesting that the war was inevitable, and other historians are wrong in suggesting that Athenian economic imperialists instigated a conflict to maintain their profits. Instead, he argues, a series of missteps and miscalculations by both the Athenians and the shadowy Spartan "war party" allowed what should have been a limited confrontation between Athens and Corinth to descend into a panhellenic catastrophe.

But Kagan's argument is undercut by his obsession with Pericles. To Kagan, Pericles is the ultimate Greek hero; steadily guiding the democracy through expansion, and in the end, the only person who could have led Athens through the war. In criticizing a strawman--that Athenian expansion in the years immediately leading up to the war prompted Spartan aggression--Kagan ignores that Pericles himself was the primary architect of the imperial strategy which directly led to an extractive empire , widespread resentment, and resistance by force. Kagan persuasively argues that the Empire was not actively expanding in the 430s. But by then it was too late.

Moreover, he is unable to explain away Pericles's obvious strategic errors. The brutal repression of Potidea was, to Kagan, a minor mistake. The Megarian decree--which most people, according to Thucydides, believed to be the primary cause of the war--was an overreaction. The haughty tone of the emissaries to the Spartan assembly was perhaps overdone. Kagan never accepts the obvious truth--Pericles provoked Sparta to the point where not even the pro-Athenian faction could hold back the charge of war.

To me, the weakest of all arguments is that everything would have been defused if the Corinthians simply conceded to arbitration following its war with Corcyra. I recall as well in Kagan's enjoyable Yale course on Greek History a focus on this uniquely Periclean innovation. Yet Kagan never cites even a single example of an arbitration being successfully employed in the 5th century, and whatever resolution there might have been would have done nothing to alleviate what Thucydides himself pointed out: Sparta's hegemony was undoubtedly threatened by an Athens grown powerful in size, wealth, and prestige.

Nevertheless, Kagan is at least upfront when he is providing his own opinion. I look forward to reading the later books in the series, as long as I can keep in mind that this is just one perspective on the conflict.

[James Spencer · Rating 4 out of 5]

In this book, Kagan presents the first of a four volume academic study of the war between Athens and its empire and Sparta and its allies in the late 5th century BCE . As the title makes clear this book is about the origins of that war and as such I was not expecting to find it as fascinating as it was at least to me, not because those origins are in themselves so interesting but rather because of the scholarship that has gone into elucidating the reasons for the war. As Kagan points out, if any conceivable issue in the area of classical studies can be disputed, it has been. Here, the primary source is of course Thucydides who stated in his history of the war that it was caused by Sparta's fear of Athenian power and that the war was essential inevitable. Kagan disagrees and makes a strong argument for a complex theory that puts the blame for the war, which he concludes was not inevitable, on Corinth. In making his argument, Kagan presents the conclusions of authors who disagree with him, giving what appears at least to be a fair rendition of those authors bases for their opinions. He does so in an entertaining manner which leaves nothing of the academy behind. I look forward to reading the rest of the set.

[Fernando Barriga · Rating 5 out of 5]

"Thucydides began to write a history of the war between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians because he expected that it would be <>".
This book has a wide range, and establishes why the Peloponnesian war was fought and whether it was inevitable. Its lecture provides an excellently documented investigation of inter-state relations throughout the Pentecontaetia. It is persuasively and agreeably written, and a most valuable guide for anyone seeking not only to understand the origins of the Peloponnesian war, but also to understand the reasons for modern conflicts and to reflect on whether the conditions for war have really changed since the times of Thucydides.

[Victor Whitman · Rating 4 out of 5]

I thought I knew something about the Peloponnesian War before I read this. It is clearly written and convincing, and discusses in depth the run-up to the war far beyond what is covered in general textbooks. You'll probably want to take this on after reading a general history of Greece. Really, though, this is going to be essential reading for anybody that wants to understand the long conflict between Sparta and Athens. It is the first of four volumes. I would recommend reading the first book of Thucydides prior to starting Kagan. The best edition of Thucydides is The Landmark Thucydides, which provides maps and commentary.

[Binston Birchill · Rating 5 out of 5]

Not only does Donald Kagan have a masterly grasp of the inner workings of the Peloponnesian War but the man can also write history in an incredibly gripping manner. This isn’t a work for the uninitiated, for that I would suggest his book titled The Peloponnesian War. This is a work deconstructing ancient and modern writings on the origins of the war. He puts forth his opinions of where others (most notably Thucydides) have gone wrong and why he thinks the war was not inevitable. A very compelling read for anyone looking for further analysis on the origins of The Great Peloponnesian War.

[William Whalen · Rating 4 out of 5]

Kagan has written a thorough analysis of the First Peloponnesian War and the events leading to the Second. The reason for only 4 stars is answered by the following question. Where in Blue Blazes are the maps? Not a one is included. Now, I know that Kagan wrote this for a more scholarly audience but does this mean we are expected to have committed ancient Greek geography to memory. With the importance of where each city state lies in relation to each other, this is not a minor omission. Fortunately, upon starting volume two, I have found maps present.

[Bruno Contreras · Rating 4 out of 5]

I'll be sincere and say that I enjoyed almost 95 % of this book. It has a wonderful prose and the narrative is very easy to follow -- granted I am not new to the historical periodo covered by the book which is roughly the Pentekontaetia, os the 50 yrs between the Persian and the Peloponnesian War.
The 5 % I didn't enjoy was the author going on about the supposedly agressiveness of the Soviet Union post-WWII and other bits of squaredness -- like when he plainly ignores his own country's involvement in the Vietnam War which was raging by the time he published this (1969).

[gustavo Inacio ferreira assis · Rating 5 out of 5]

Fact-focus and extremely well researched.

I bought Thucydides book a while ago but I know that the translations have the biases of their author so I came a cross Donald kagan’s books go deep inside Thucydides account and fact checking with other sources and different takes from other authors, this book caught my interest I believe, because it is very well detailed and goes deeper than a simple translation of Thucydides. Great work. Thank you

[Carmen C. · Rating 5 out of 5]

I didn't expect to enjoy this first book in Kaplan's quartet of books as much as I did, but here we are. The book was surprisingly thrilling and very compelling, I really enjoyed reading his account of the lead up to the Peloponnesian War.

[Κάλι Γαβριά · Rating 2 out of 5]

It's not very detailed as I expected and the book lacks in many significant points!

[Fay · Rating 3 out of 5]

So basically, they broke up and had one hell of a divorce.

Stubborn people were in charge and very sly in their slight of hand. Wars were raged on principle rather than actual necessity.

[Anna · Rating 2 out of 5]

did i just read a book on the cold war by accident or something

[Jake Stillwell · Rating 4 out of 5]

Accessible account that grapples with how history is told (or invented) and whether it is more instructive to consider the causes of *this* war or of War, writ large.

[Jason · Rating 5 out of 5]

A good read to uncover the seeds of conflict that can be, and usually, are lost to contemporaries and historians alike

[Turgut · Rating 5 out of 5]

Better than Thucydides.