This is really two books. Chapters 1-6 are more closely tied to scientific literature, while chapters 7-12 are much more opinion driven and markedly less rigorous (that does not make them less valuable--only different). Part I is why I read the book and is, I think, where its value added lies. My comments refer to Part I. Note that Peck is a prolific ecologist who, as far as I can tell, is respected in the scientific community and has published peer-reviewed research there (on some type of fly?).
Part I consists of 6 essays--which I think have been published elsewhere in some form--in which Peck walks through some key concepts from biology and ecology--primarily relating to evolution--and makes connections between those concepts and theology generally or LDS theology specifically. In short, Peck wants to reconcile mainstream science on evolution with theology. I found much of the discussion useful for furthering my understanding of some key scientific principles and methods, though I suspect there are other books that would more directly provide that benefit. I was intrigued by his attempts to link these principles to theology.
Chapter 1 sets up the rest of the chapters by embracing and endorsing the value of science. This is refreshing; it also gave me some suspicion that the author intends the book to be read in a Straussian way. By the end of the book I was semi-convinced that he did not, in fact, intend a Straussian reading, but that just heightened the tension between chapter 1 and the rest of the book.
Chapter 3 was my favorite. Peck brings in some insights from evolution models. I appreciated Peck’s comments on models generally and, in particular, on randomness and selection in model environments. I think his view can be summarized as: millions of years of evolution from an initial basic life form to present humans are the mechanism used for creation. I think this view implies bigger problems for LDS theology than for Christian theology generally due to LDS views on the specific nature of deity (i.e., anthropomorphic). Peck confronts this issue with a discussion of how models of evolution, even with all their randomness, can easily be constructed to generate similar outcomes in separate simulations, even after 4 billion years, so the present form of humans could be foreseen and even intended at time 0—even without intervention along the way. As evidence, he points to the evolution of similar animals in different places, like the marsupial and non-marsupial saber-toothed tigers. Therefore, he reasons, deity could have set in motion evolution with the expectation that humanoids, similar in form to deity, would be the result. One problem with the argument is evident to anyone who has watched Star Trek: even humanoids from different planets that have evolved similarly, down to height, number of limbs, and the location of the brain, will look quite different. To be blunt: in a theophany incident, human observers will immediately note differences between themselves and, say, a reptilian humanoid; and this is to say nothing of the unlikeliness of such independently evolved humanoids truly being the same species in a technical sense (ok, so that seems to work in Star Trek… moving on). And there are other holes in the argument. In this chapter, Peck also takes a swing at solving the problem of evil inherent in evolutionary views of deity’s methods (i.e., creation through evolution means, quite precisely, purposely killing billions or trillions or more sentient beings to allow the natural selection to work; see page 68). I am not convinced. But I really enjoyed reading this chapter and think it does serve much of its purpose of providing a framework for attempting to reconcile these issues—for those who want to do so.
There are times in the book where I think he takes the models too literally; chapter 5 is particularly notable for this. In a modeling environment, the modeler must necessarily define the entirety of the design space (which, in the case of models of evolution, is defined by environment plus traits relevant for selection, in vague terms, I think). This is necessary for modeling but it does not in any way imply that the implications of the models are fully dependent on the closed and predetermined nature of the state space. Peck criticizes materialist arguments about evolution on the grounds that they take the design space for granted, that the design space is entirely predetermined, and that therefore the materialism of Dawkins and others is "entirely deterministic" (120). He therefore likens ontological materialism to dogmatic creationism since both, in his view, preclude a role for "niche creation" and creativity in evolution more generally. This made little sense to me. Yes, in models one must define a state space ahead of time. That does not mean that "ontological materialism" rests on a predetermined design space. The design space is endogenous! And the stochastic processes governing mutation, etc., while necessarily parametric in model settings, in reality should probably be thought of as Mandelbrotian or Knightian (I think those are the appropriate terms—wildly nonparametric is the point). It’s just a model, and its approximate truthfulness is not dependent on parametric restrictions.
Ultimately the elephant in the room is that key definers and authorities within LDS theology have made detailed, explicit statements rejecting the views Peck articulates. The author gives these little mind and hand waves them away as “non-canonical,” which of course is not meaningful in LDS context anyway. He is quite candid about the necessity of discarding literalism for making any reconciliation but, at least in this book, makes no attempt to wrestle with the implications of that approach. But this book does not solve the dilemmas that one might want it to solve. That said, I thoroughly enjoyed reading it and will probably read it again, particularly chapter 3.