What do you think?
Rate this book
P. A. Stolypin: The Search for Stability in Late Imperial Russia
This is the first comprehensive biography in any language of Russia’s leading statesman in the period following the Revolution of 1905. Prime Minister and Minister of Internal Affairs from 1906 to 1911 (when he was assassinated), P. A. Stolypin aroused deep passions among his contemporaries as well as subsequent historians.
In the twilight of Nicholas II’s reign he was virtually the only man who seemed to have a clear notion of how to reform the socioeconomic and political system of the empire. His efforts in that direction—in agriculture, local administration, religious freedom, social legislation, the legal system—were radically new departures for the Russian state. His detractors disdained him as a power-hungry, coldhearted politician who was unscrupulous in pursuing his own career and would use any means to restore the tsarist autocracy following the frightening turbulence of 1905. Stolypin’s admirers, however, argued that he was a man of vision who pursued policies that would have transformed the country into a modern state with social and political institutions comparable to those of the West.
Lenin’s celebrated denunciation of Stolypin as “hangman-in-chief” set the tone for official Soviet work on his career. In the West, some historians and émigré writers, most notably Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, erred in the opposite direction. By contrast, this book—on the basis of extensive Russian archival documentation only recently available to historians—seeks to provide a balanced portrait of Stolypin that encompasses the complex, even divergent, impulses that motivated him.
Although Stolypin did not shrink from the use of force to stamp out unrest, he lamented the shedding of blood and much preferred nonviolent means to curb the opposition. In foreign affairs, he was uncompromising in his insistence that Russia should avoid entanglements that could lead to military conflict. To be sure, he was deeply committed to monarchical rule, but he did not consider it advisable to abolish the elected legislature or to deprive it of its authority. Stolypin’s program, a blend of reformism, authoritarianism, and nationalism, was more likely than any other to lead Russia toward social and political stability. But Tsar Nicholas II, his entourage, and ultra-conservatives could not bring themselves to yield a portion of their privileges and prerogatives in return for a reduced, though still significant, role in a changed Russia. They succeeded in undermining the Prime Minister’s attempts at fundamental reform and thus scuttled Imperial Russia’s last such attempt before its demise.
In the twilight of Nicholas II’s reign he was virtually the only man who seemed to have a clear notion of how to reform the socioeconomic and political system of the empire. His efforts in that direction—in agriculture, local administration, religious freedom, social legislation, the legal system—were radically new departures for the Russian state. His detractors disdained him as a power-hungry, coldhearted politician who was unscrupulous in pursuing his own career and would use any means to restore the tsarist autocracy following the frightening turbulence of 1905. Stolypin’s admirers, however, argued that he was a man of vision who pursued policies that would have transformed the country into a modern state with social and political institutions comparable to those of the West.
Lenin’s celebrated denunciation of Stolypin as “hangman-in-chief” set the tone for official Soviet work on his career. In the West, some historians and émigré writers, most notably Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, erred in the opposite direction. By contrast, this book—on the basis of extensive Russian archival documentation only recently available to historians—seeks to provide a balanced portrait of Stolypin that encompasses the complex, even divergent, impulses that motivated him.
Although Stolypin did not shrink from the use of force to stamp out unrest, he lamented the shedding of blood and much preferred nonviolent means to curb the opposition. In foreign affairs, he was uncompromising in his insistence that Russia should avoid entanglements that could lead to military conflict. To be sure, he was deeply committed to monarchical rule, but he did not consider it advisable to abolish the elected legislature or to deprive it of its authority. Stolypin’s program, a blend of reformism, authoritarianism, and nationalism, was more likely than any other to lead Russia toward social and political stability. But Tsar Nicholas II, his entourage, and ultra-conservatives could not bring themselves to yield a portion of their privileges and prerogatives in return for a reduced, though still significant, role in a changed Russia. They succeeded in undermining the Prime Minister’s attempts at fundamental reform and thus scuttled Imperial Russia’s last such attempt before its demise.
497 pages, Paperback
First published December 1, 2000
3 people are currently reading
86 people want to read
About the author
Abraham Ascher
22 books5 followersAbraham Ascher is Distinguished emeritus Professor of History at the Graduate School of the city University of New York. A highly respected scholar, he is the recipient of numerous awards, and the author of seven books and over thirty articles.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
May 11, 2016
Stolypin was the last great statesman of Imperial Russia. He was, more than anybody else, the man who steadied the ship and put down the revolution of 1905. After that, he was made prime minister, and had an ambitious reform agenda, including private land ownership by peasants, new schools, better treatment of minorities, and more. Unfortunately, very little of it came to pass. The Czar was opposed to any reform, and both the right and left in the Duma distrusted Stolypin. It's impressive the man did as much as he did, but it wasn't enough.
The main impression I got from the book was that the late-Czarist leadership was almost totally unable to assert itself on behalf of any positive agenda. The aristocracy was more concerned with personal feuds than with government. The Czar had a kitchen cabinet of advisors, separate from the cabinet, who turned out to be mostly family and sycophants. It was the kind of crowd where Rasputin wasn't so out of place. As a result, the elite was almost totally unable to to unite around any agenda, and so very little got done. The police and military were more or less able to restore order, in peacetime, but there just wasn't enough commitment to the nation to see it through hard times.
As a book, I was a bit disappointed. I wanted to hear more about how he put down the revolution and could have dealt with less detail about political turmoil in the Duma. The second half was a bit hard-going as a reader; there's a limit to how much attention I can pay to the political conflicts over rearranging the deck-chairs on the sinking ship of state.
The main impression I got from the book was that the late-Czarist leadership was almost totally unable to assert itself on behalf of any positive agenda. The aristocracy was more concerned with personal feuds than with government. The Czar had a kitchen cabinet of advisors, separate from the cabinet, who turned out to be mostly family and sycophants. It was the kind of crowd where Rasputin wasn't so out of place. As a result, the elite was almost totally unable to to unite around any agenda, and so very little got done. The police and military were more or less able to restore order, in peacetime, but there just wasn't enough commitment to the nation to see it through hard times.
As a book, I was a bit disappointed. I wanted to hear more about how he put down the revolution and could have dealt with less detail about political turmoil in the Duma. The second half was a bit hard-going as a reader; there's a limit to how much attention I can pay to the political conflicts over rearranging the deck-chairs on the sinking ship of state.
October 15, 2024
It is important to read biographies of men who "failed" and lived in the twilight of an age. I admire the courage and perseverance of Stolypin and see his slip-ups in 1911 that led to inevitable rejection by the tsar. Like great men like Lincoln and Julius Caesar who were assassinated I wonder how things would have turned out differently but I struggle to see how he could have pulled it off. A couple takeaways:
1. Complexity will breed error - Russia was a highly complex country
2. reform that offends both conservatives and liberals ends in failure - Stolypin defeated liberalism but lost to the conservatives
I gave the book 3 stars because it is incredibly detailed and difficult to follow if you are not familiar with Russian history from 1905-1911. Also the author did not proceed chronologically so I had trouble following the order of events.
1. Complexity will breed error - Russia was a highly complex country
2. reform that offends both conservatives and liberals ends in failure - Stolypin defeated liberalism but lost to the conservatives
I gave the book 3 stars because it is incredibly detailed and difficult to follow if you are not familiar with Russian history from 1905-1911. Also the author did not proceed chronologically so I had trouble following the order of events.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews