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Williams-Ford Texas A&M University Military History Series #79
Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon
War is waged not only on battlefields. In the mid-1980s a high-stakes political struggle to redesign the relationships among the president, secretary of defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and warfighting commanders in the field resulted in the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. Author James R. Locher III played a key role in the congressional effort to repair a dysfunctional military whose interservice squabbling had cost American taxpayers billions of dollars and put the lives of thousands of servicemen and women at risk. Victory on this front helped make possible the military successes the United States has enjoyed since the passage of the bill and to prepare it for the challenges it must still face.Victory on the Potomac provides the first detailed history of how Congress unified the Pentagon and does so with the benefit of an insider's view. In a fast-paced account that reads like a novel, Locher follows the bill through congressional committee to final passage, making clear that the process is neither abstract nor automatic. His vivid descriptions bring to life the amazing cast of this real-life drama, from the straight-shooting chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Barry Goldwater, to the peevishly stubborn secretary of defense, Caspear Weinberger.Locher's analysis of political maneuvering and bureaucratic infighting will fascinate anyone who has an interest in how government works, and his understanding of the stakes in military reorganization will make clear why this legislative victory meant so much to American military capability.
524 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2002
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Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
December 7, 2019
I received this a birthday present and thought it would be an interesting to read this about this major defense reform legislation in the Goldwater-Nichols Act. However, I must say for a book written by a legislative aid and a former defense insider; and edited by a major university press the number of typos and grammatical errors in this book is depressing. These errors, detract from what should be a very interesting and enlightening story on how this legislation was passed.
Beyond that the author seems to make a point that the whole reason the Department of the Defense lost every war since the Korean conflict was because of the inability to operate jointly. He attempts to describe that the JCS wasn't unified during WW2 and their inability to get anything done probably extended the war because of poor management by this organization. However, this view of the history of the US military actions seems very simplistic and fails to account for the lack of understanding the historical constraints or even historical failures of organizations outside of what a unified command structure that Goldwater-Nichols obtained. After the long history lesson, we roll into the 1980s and the election of Ronald Reagan and General David C. Jones who was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs at the time when the legislation was being proposed. That General Jones went around the SecDef Weinberger and the President to try and get this legislation passed. The author then goes on to say that nearly everything from the fiasco of Lebanon to the mistakes made during the Grenada invasion were because the military forces were unified or joint in any way shape or form. As well the author argues that the service secretaries, in particular he reserves a whole chapter on the US Navy and John Lehman's reluctance to stand behind the idea of Goldwater-Nichols as being a major stumbling block. That even number of years passed seemed to have watered down the major intent of the legislation. After which the author seems to say, that the success of Desert Shield/Storm/Sabre proves his points. All while hand-waving away the fiasco that was Operation Just Cause (ie invasion of Panama in '89) and the fiasco that was Somalia in '92. As well the book stops the clock in the year 2000. Without mentioning how the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq should be viewed thru the use of Goldwater-Nichols driving the jointness bus for those wars.
My biggest issue with this book beyond the typos and grammar errors; is the lack of the author to show historically where a unified service system like was was proposed during the drafting of the legislation. There are historical examples of unified command headquarters, whether we are talking the Prussians just prior to WW1 or even the experiences of the British/Commonwealth nations post WW1 and post WW2 where due to budgetary reasons they unified all of the services under one command structure. That explaining how these organizations worked or didn't work. Let alone compare or contrast with what the intent of the US legislation was compared to the other nations. Instead the constant drum beat seems to have been that the services needed to be unified and they needed to be unified even if they were dragged kicking and screaming into this scheme. The why appears to be so that we could win wars again.
As well, the author doesn't seem to address that two other major elephants in the room that is with officer promotion and education pipelines. Since the passing of the legislation it appears that officer and senior enlisted promotions have only shrank and the potential for growth of a person at a certain pay grade in a career is being rushed thru now a days so individuals can hit certain wickets on certain times to meet the intent of the legislation so that we have folks on equal footing with the other services. As well, the author seems to do nothing to address the outrageous growth of the procurement system costs to have everything developed jointly. To the point that we are seeing massive budgetary cost over-runs and excessive lead times for new tech to arrive that is already obsolete by the time it has entered the services inventory in good quantities.
The book is a good starting point for the history of how the legislation was passed and one person, who was intimately involved with its drafting and passage, view of the needs for this legislation. Yet, it doesn't feel effective in answering the larger why it was needed, a good postmortem of what success with DoD operations was, and I really think it needed a section on what if any reforms to the legislation is required as we have seen changes to the world and DoD operations post legislation.
Beyond that the author seems to make a point that the whole reason the Department of the Defense lost every war since the Korean conflict was because of the inability to operate jointly. He attempts to describe that the JCS wasn't unified during WW2 and their inability to get anything done probably extended the war because of poor management by this organization. However, this view of the history of the US military actions seems very simplistic and fails to account for the lack of understanding the historical constraints or even historical failures of organizations outside of what a unified command structure that Goldwater-Nichols obtained. After the long history lesson, we roll into the 1980s and the election of Ronald Reagan and General David C. Jones who was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs at the time when the legislation was being proposed. That General Jones went around the SecDef Weinberger and the President to try and get this legislation passed. The author then goes on to say that nearly everything from the fiasco of Lebanon to the mistakes made during the Grenada invasion were because the military forces were unified or joint in any way shape or form. As well the author argues that the service secretaries, in particular he reserves a whole chapter on the US Navy and John Lehman's reluctance to stand behind the idea of Goldwater-Nichols as being a major stumbling block. That even number of years passed seemed to have watered down the major intent of the legislation. After which the author seems to say, that the success of Desert Shield/Storm/Sabre proves his points. All while hand-waving away the fiasco that was Operation Just Cause (ie invasion of Panama in '89) and the fiasco that was Somalia in '92. As well the book stops the clock in the year 2000. Without mentioning how the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq should be viewed thru the use of Goldwater-Nichols driving the jointness bus for those wars.
My biggest issue with this book beyond the typos and grammar errors; is the lack of the author to show historically where a unified service system like was was proposed during the drafting of the legislation. There are historical examples of unified command headquarters, whether we are talking the Prussians just prior to WW1 or even the experiences of the British/Commonwealth nations post WW1 and post WW2 where due to budgetary reasons they unified all of the services under one command structure. That explaining how these organizations worked or didn't work. Let alone compare or contrast with what the intent of the US legislation was compared to the other nations. Instead the constant drum beat seems to have been that the services needed to be unified and they needed to be unified even if they were dragged kicking and screaming into this scheme. The why appears to be so that we could win wars again.
As well, the author doesn't seem to address that two other major elephants in the room that is with officer promotion and education pipelines. Since the passing of the legislation it appears that officer and senior enlisted promotions have only shrank and the potential for growth of a person at a certain pay grade in a career is being rushed thru now a days so individuals can hit certain wickets on certain times to meet the intent of the legislation so that we have folks on equal footing with the other services. As well, the author seems to do nothing to address the outrageous growth of the procurement system costs to have everything developed jointly. To the point that we are seeing massive budgetary cost over-runs and excessive lead times for new tech to arrive that is already obsolete by the time it has entered the services inventory in good quantities.
The book is a good starting point for the history of how the legislation was passed and one person, who was intimately involved with its drafting and passage, view of the needs for this legislation. Yet, it doesn't feel effective in answering the larger why it was needed, a good postmortem of what success with DoD operations was, and I really think it needed a section on what if any reforms to the legislation is required as we have seen changes to the world and DoD operations post legislation.
September 26, 2019
Victory on the Potomac is a must read for any Political, Defense, or Military member. The in-depth analysis / timeline provided by the lead staffer, James R. Locher III, was the most intimate reflection of a process that took over four years yielding one of the most revolutionary pieces of legislation for DoD reform. Mr. Locher takes us through the herculean undertaking of remediating the DoD and statutory responsibilities for SECDEF, CJCS, creation of the Vice-Chairman, Service Chiefs, and Combatant Commanders that had plagued convoluted chains of command and service parochialism inhibiting joint / national security success. Events like Beirut and Grenada were at the forefront and focal points to enable such a reform and it was said, “Goldwater-Nichols was the watershed event for the military since the second World War.” Also, from a staunch opponent, “it will go down in history as a major contribution to the nation’s security.” –General John Wickham, 1995, almost a decade after the universal passing (19-0) through the SASC.
Senator Goldwater and Nunn took what seemed an unsurmountable undertaking and through grit and determination fought, not only service chiefs, but back-door politics throughout the DoD. This was an eye-opening read that allowed me to better understand not only the endstate, but what it took for the US government to get to its present position. It was unfortunate to see the USMC and USN somewhat problematic throughout as opponents to its passing even in light of Grenada and Beirut where terrible events resulted in the loss of human lives articulating a requirement for reform only to be met with overwhelming opposition by the Commandant at the time.
This book allowed for great reflection as a US service member, and I spent a great deal of time throughout thinking what I would do if I was in such a position today as a service chief, if my opposition to such an act would be as vehement.
I can think of no better work to thoroughly study yielding revolutionary reform throughout our government with such grand changes to include reforming the JCS to include a Vice-Chairman. Since 1986, I think it important to note the DoD is not perfect by any means but operations such as the Gulf War under the Command of General Schwarzkopf show how fruitful and how focused this undertaking was on generating military readiness in support of national defense.
5/5—one of the most educational works I’ve read.
Senator Goldwater and Nunn took what seemed an unsurmountable undertaking and through grit and determination fought, not only service chiefs, but back-door politics throughout the DoD. This was an eye-opening read that allowed me to better understand not only the endstate, but what it took for the US government to get to its present position. It was unfortunate to see the USMC and USN somewhat problematic throughout as opponents to its passing even in light of Grenada and Beirut where terrible events resulted in the loss of human lives articulating a requirement for reform only to be met with overwhelming opposition by the Commandant at the time.
This book allowed for great reflection as a US service member, and I spent a great deal of time throughout thinking what I would do if I was in such a position today as a service chief, if my opposition to such an act would be as vehement.
I can think of no better work to thoroughly study yielding revolutionary reform throughout our government with such grand changes to include reforming the JCS to include a Vice-Chairman. Since 1986, I think it important to note the DoD is not perfect by any means but operations such as the Gulf War under the Command of General Schwarzkopf show how fruitful and how focused this undertaking was on generating military readiness in support of national defense.
5/5—one of the most educational works I’ve read.
November 20, 2025
The definitive account of an important legislative milestone in the history and organization of the US military.
November 9, 2007
Fantastic case study of Congress in action. Without tooting his own horn too much, Locher presents a great first person account of how the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA) became law and made the US stronger. This amazing achievement occurred despite a bitter Navy, a stone-walling Secretary of Defense (Weinberger), and a non-committal President (Reagan). Due to a strong bi-partisan relationship between Senators Nunn and Goldwater (among many others in Congress), this needed piece of legislation became law. Locher tells the story from his perspective as a staffer for the Senate Armed Services Committee. So perhaps the House side is a little less than thorough. Locher also points out the negative aspects of all those who opposed GNA. Still, Locher is fairer than most people when they are fully committed to a seriously important change in law. Most interesting to me was reading how ineffective Weinberger was as SecDef. He was so unwilling to negotiate that he became largely irrelevant and he missed out on any number of opportunities to have a serious impact on GNA. Locher would probably be the first to say that GNA did not fix all of the problems with the military regarding cooperation in taking on serious missions, but GNA has certainly helped.
Along with Showdown at Gucci Gulch and The System, this is one of three great policy process case studies. Most importantly, it shows how Congress can have a strong influence on the military, foreign policy, and America's national security - even in areas that are normally considered to be the president's prerogative.
Along with Showdown at Gucci Gulch and The System, this is one of three great policy process case studies. Most importantly, it shows how Congress can have a strong influence on the military, foreign policy, and America's national security - even in areas that are normally considered to be the president's prerogative.
March 11, 2013
Good read and background on Joint, Goldwater-Nichols, Service interests, and institutional change. Found the following criteria/metrics useful and interesting:
1. Authority for change
2. Culpability for results
3. Timing
4. Representation (Joint/Combined/Bipartisan)
5. Understand threats and defense (so you can develop your counter-attack/approach)
6. Personality matters (character, intelligence, charisma)
7. Possible/likely compromise
I like the idea of inculcating bullet-catchers so that you get your opponent/opposition focused on areas you care less about (willing to compromise) and they miss what you think matters.
1. Authority for change
2. Culpability for results
3. Timing
4. Representation (Joint/Combined/Bipartisan)
5. Understand threats and defense (so you can develop your counter-attack/approach)
6. Personality matters (character, intelligence, charisma)
7. Possible/likely compromise
I like the idea of inculcating bullet-catchers so that you get your opponent/opposition focused on areas you care less about (willing to compromise) and they miss what you think matters.
October 26, 2015
I'm embarrassed to admit how long this book remained unread on my shelf. Turns out that preparing to move into the Pentagon as a Congressional liaison is good motivation for finally picking it up. In a word, this book is outstanding. Depending on which side of the river one is on, it's a playbook for either slow rolling Congress or busting the defense bureaucracy. I plan to keep it on my desk in the C-ring and, I suspect, referencing often in the months ahead.
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews