What do you think?
Rate this book
The Engine of Reason, The Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain
A new picture of the mind is emerging, and explanations now exist for what has so long seemed mysterious. This real understanding of how the biological brain works -- of how we work -- has generated a mood of excitement that is shared in a half-dozen intersecting disciplines. Philosopher Paul Churchland, who is widely known as a gifted teacher and expository writer, explains these scientific developments in a simple, authoritative, and pictorial fashion. He not only opens the door into the ongoing research of the neurobiological and connectionist communities but goes further, probing the social and moral dimensions of recent experimental results that assign consciousness to all but the very simplest forms of animals.In a fast-paced, entertaining narrative, replete with examples and numerous explanatory illustrations, Churchland brings together an exceptionally broad range of intellectual issues. He summarizes new results from neuroscience and recent work with artificial neural networks that together suggest a unified set of answers to questions about how the brain actually works; how it sustains a thinking, feeling, dreaming self; and how it sustains a self-conscious person.Churchland first explains the science -- the powerful role of vector coding in sensory representation and pattern recognition, artificial neural networks that imitate parts of the brain, recurrent networks, neural representation of the social world, and diagnostic technologies and therapies for the brain in trouble. He then explores the far-reaching consequences of the current neurocomputational understanding of mind for our philosophical convictions, and for our social, moral, legal, medical, and personal lives.Churchland's wry wit and skillful teaching style are evident throughout. He introduces the remarkable representational power of a single human brain, for instance, via a captivating brain/World-Trade-Tower TV screen analogy. "Who can be watching this pixilated show?" Churchland queries; the answer is a provocative "no one." And he has included a folded stereoscopic viewer, attached to the inside back cover of the book, that readers can use to participate directly in several revealing experiments concerning stereo vision.A Bradford Book
344 pages, Paperback
First published June 1, 1995
7 people are currently reading
620 people want to read
About the author
Paul M. Churchland
18 books64 followersPaul Churchland is a philosopher noted for his studies in neurophilosophy and the philosophy of mind. He is currently a Professor at the University of California, San Diego, where he holds the Valtz Chair of Philosophy. Churchland holds a joint appointment with the Cognitive Science Faculty and the Institute for Neural Computation. He earned his Ph.D. from the University of Pittsburgh in 1969 under the direction of Wilfrid Sellars. Churchland is the husband of philosopher Patricia Churchland, and the father of two children.
Churchland began his professional career as an instructor at the University of Pittsburgh in 1969; he also lectured at the University of Toronto from 1967-69. In 1969, Churchland took a position at the University of Manitoba, where he would teach for fifteen years: as an assistant professor (69 - 74) and associate professor (74 - 79), and then as a full professor from 1979 - 1984. Professor Churchland joined the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton University in 1982, staying as a member until 1983. He joined the faculty at the University of California, San Diego in 1983, serving as Department Chair from 1986 - 1990.
Churchland has supervised a number of PhD students, including P.D. Magnus (now at the University at Albany) and Philip Brey (now at the University of Twente).
Along with his wife, Churchland is a major proponent of eliminative materialism, which claims that everyday mental concepts such as beliefs, feelings and desires are theoretical constructs without coherent definition; hence we should not expect such concepts to be a necessary part of a scientific understanding of the brain. Just as a modern understanding of science has no need for concepts such as luck or witchcraft to explain the world, Churchland argues that a future neuroscience is likely to have no need for "beliefs" or "feelings" to explain the mind. Instead, the use of objective phenomena such as neurons and their interaction should suffice. He points out that the history of science has seen many previous concepts discarded, such as phlogiston, caloric, the luminiferous ether, and vital forces.
Churchland began his professional career as an instructor at the University of Pittsburgh in 1969; he also lectured at the University of Toronto from 1967-69. In 1969, Churchland took a position at the University of Manitoba, where he would teach for fifteen years: as an assistant professor (69 - 74) and associate professor (74 - 79), and then as a full professor from 1979 - 1984. Professor Churchland joined the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton University in 1982, staying as a member until 1983. He joined the faculty at the University of California, San Diego in 1983, serving as Department Chair from 1986 - 1990.
Churchland has supervised a number of PhD students, including P.D. Magnus (now at the University at Albany) and Philip Brey (now at the University of Twente).
Along with his wife, Churchland is a major proponent of eliminative materialism, which claims that everyday mental concepts such as beliefs, feelings and desires are theoretical constructs without coherent definition; hence we should not expect such concepts to be a necessary part of a scientific understanding of the brain. Just as a modern understanding of science has no need for concepts such as luck or witchcraft to explain the world, Churchland argues that a future neuroscience is likely to have no need for "beliefs" or "feelings" to explain the mind. Instead, the use of objective phenomena such as neurons and their interaction should suffice. He points out that the history of science has seen many previous concepts discarded, such as phlogiston, caloric, the luminiferous ether, and vital forces.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews
September 22, 2009
In calculus, one can find the area under any curve by filling it with rectangles, and then making the rectangles smaller and smaller until there is no space left unfilled. In neurophilosophy, one can explain any phenomenon of consciousness by describing neurological functioning, and then making the description more and more detailed until there is nothing left to explain.
This is the agenda of Paul Churchland and neurophilosophy, and I am not sure if he succeeds because there is nothing left to explain, or because he has worn me out with the exercise. His descriptions are beautifully complicated, and they are not just inventive or ingenious, but rather thoroughly methodical and soundly scientific. The question is whether they really address the philosophical problems.
Much of what he does seems to be mathematical modeling, which would be theoretical neurology more than descriptive or empirical neurology. He starts with the model of parallel distributed processing (PDP) such as a computer might do, although most computers work on the basis of serial processing. In PDP one starts with a variety of digitalized input (which could be sensory) and through a process of self-correction and refinement one arrives at digital output which is the completion of a cognitive task. For example, one can take input from the optic nerves, run it through PDP, and come out with “Yes, a square.” Obviously, I am glossing over many details.
But the technique is strong enough to account for progressively more complicated cognitive tasks: recognition of shapes, letters, colors, tastes, sounds, words, faces, emotional expressions, grammatical patterns, social situations in time, etc., etc. After a point, one wonders if there really is anything left to the life of the mind that cannot be accounted for in this way.
Churchland identifies the three knottiest problems of reducing consciousness to neural processing as 1.) meaning or semantic content (Can PDP do more than manipulate symbols?), 2.) mathematics (Can PDP do math as humans do, including Kurt Godel?), and 3.) the old problem of sense-qualia (Can PDP see red?). He makes an energetic charge on each of these problems, discussing the research with PDP which would suggest progress in addressing them. He himself acknowledges no final conclusions on these questions, but the efforts being marshaled to answer them are formidable.
This book feels like the textbook for a new science, a new paradigm for neurology. The logical development is exciting. In the past, when I studied neurology, it has been like studying a map of Afghanistan. But in this book I see a technique for using PDP laid out, with its consequences, which is similar to other epiphanies in science, such as encountering Euclid’s geometry, or chemical bonds, or plate tectonics, for the first time. I am grateful for the experience.
Yet on a gut level I resist the effort to reduce or eliminate the mind, even in a theoretical sense. Churchland himself occasionally speaks of the self or the soul in an informal sense, but as distinct from the mind. I can’t help but feel that it is with the mind that we understand the universe (including neurology). It is the mind that finds the orderliness in chaos, and sums it up in general principles. How then can the mind explain itself away, like the Cheshire cat disappearing and leaving only its smile? How can one use wonderful resources to explain away those wonderful resources? One can, perhaps, explain everything except the explainer.
This is the agenda of Paul Churchland and neurophilosophy, and I am not sure if he succeeds because there is nothing left to explain, or because he has worn me out with the exercise. His descriptions are beautifully complicated, and they are not just inventive or ingenious, but rather thoroughly methodical and soundly scientific. The question is whether they really address the philosophical problems.
Much of what he does seems to be mathematical modeling, which would be theoretical neurology more than descriptive or empirical neurology. He starts with the model of parallel distributed processing (PDP) such as a computer might do, although most computers work on the basis of serial processing. In PDP one starts with a variety of digitalized input (which could be sensory) and through a process of self-correction and refinement one arrives at digital output which is the completion of a cognitive task. For example, one can take input from the optic nerves, run it through PDP, and come out with “Yes, a square.” Obviously, I am glossing over many details.
But the technique is strong enough to account for progressively more complicated cognitive tasks: recognition of shapes, letters, colors, tastes, sounds, words, faces, emotional expressions, grammatical patterns, social situations in time, etc., etc. After a point, one wonders if there really is anything left to the life of the mind that cannot be accounted for in this way.
Churchland identifies the three knottiest problems of reducing consciousness to neural processing as 1.) meaning or semantic content (Can PDP do more than manipulate symbols?), 2.) mathematics (Can PDP do math as humans do, including Kurt Godel?), and 3.) the old problem of sense-qualia (Can PDP see red?). He makes an energetic charge on each of these problems, discussing the research with PDP which would suggest progress in addressing them. He himself acknowledges no final conclusions on these questions, but the efforts being marshaled to answer them are formidable.
This book feels like the textbook for a new science, a new paradigm for neurology. The logical development is exciting. In the past, when I studied neurology, it has been like studying a map of Afghanistan. But in this book I see a technique for using PDP laid out, with its consequences, which is similar to other epiphanies in science, such as encountering Euclid’s geometry, or chemical bonds, or plate tectonics, for the first time. I am grateful for the experience.
Yet on a gut level I resist the effort to reduce or eliminate the mind, even in a theoretical sense. Churchland himself occasionally speaks of the self or the soul in an informal sense, but as distinct from the mind. I can’t help but feel that it is with the mind that we understand the universe (including neurology). It is the mind that finds the orderliness in chaos, and sums it up in general principles. How then can the mind explain itself away, like the Cheshire cat disappearing and leaving only its smile? How can one use wonderful resources to explain away those wonderful resources? One can, perhaps, explain everything except the explainer.
November 19, 2012
Churchland's Engine of Reason is dated, and that's too bad, because I actually think it is one of his more well written pieces, probably even more than Plato's Camera [which I gave 5-stars]. The problem is that the change of material in neuroscience and cognitive science make it hard for writing to stay current for very long now; that's not Churchland's fault, but the way that he structures the book makes it far easier for the content to become obsolete, compared to contemporaries like Dan Dennett.
I think that what should be said is that one of the reasons that Engine of Reason has become dated is part of what makes it great as a piece of philosophy: it is current and in touch with the scientific literature that surrounds it. [That isn't to say that other philosophers aren't, but many are more hesitant to bombard readers with scientific content.] Churchland is unabashed about his knowledge of the contemporary literature in the science and, as a result, the book feels almost more like something that would be written for an interdisciplinary audience attempting to talk about the neurosciences than anything in philosophy. This is one thing that I absolutely love about Churchland.
The major criticism that will get tossed at Churchland will come down that same line: This doesn't feel like philosophy. That's true. Of course, if you some of the content of the book, you start to understand why. This book is a part of a conversation in philosophy of mind that happened around the time of the publishing, where philosophers raised concerns about the invocation of traditional intuitive concepts that seemed totally inviable for moving the discussion forward, because the concepts themselves were either incoherent, not meaningful, or not supported by the science. Churchland was largely responsible for championing the view that the terms that don't seem to be doing work should take a backseat to the things that can. That is a fight that Churchland seems to have won in the technical literature.
Paul Churchland's influence on contemporary philosophy, often as the far wing of a spectrum of people concerned with the ability to talk about consciousness in strictly neural terms, is hard to minimize. He has had a major impact as a philosopher of science, generally, and is one of the best ways into a scientifically literate philosophy of mind. Churchland's attempt to understand a broad array of topics in the field is something that should be admired, and his attempt to bring that technical knowledge into the conversation is something that he shares only with the best in professional philosophy of mind.
There are some issues that I take with the literature that don't seem to have gone away from Churchland's writing. He's always very neurocentric. He is incredibly interested in the metaphor of digital computation while acknowledging that the brain is clearly an analogue entity. He limits himself a lot through the use of that approach, which has become something of a standard for him.
I do think that for those looking to seriously pursue philosophy of mind, this is a must-read at some point, largely because it fleshes out some of his points about the use of vectors and why they matter. However, I think that Plato's Camera is something to be taken a little more heavily, as it is far more developed in terms of the ideas in philosophy of mind. Also, this really isn't for those just looking for a casual introduction; make sure you have some familiarity with the literature before diving into any of Paul Churchland's work.
I think that what should be said is that one of the reasons that Engine of Reason has become dated is part of what makes it great as a piece of philosophy: it is current and in touch with the scientific literature that surrounds it. [That isn't to say that other philosophers aren't, but many are more hesitant to bombard readers with scientific content.] Churchland is unabashed about his knowledge of the contemporary literature in the science and, as a result, the book feels almost more like something that would be written for an interdisciplinary audience attempting to talk about the neurosciences than anything in philosophy. This is one thing that I absolutely love about Churchland.
The major criticism that will get tossed at Churchland will come down that same line: This doesn't feel like philosophy. That's true. Of course, if you some of the content of the book, you start to understand why. This book is a part of a conversation in philosophy of mind that happened around the time of the publishing, where philosophers raised concerns about the invocation of traditional intuitive concepts that seemed totally inviable for moving the discussion forward, because the concepts themselves were either incoherent, not meaningful, or not supported by the science. Churchland was largely responsible for championing the view that the terms that don't seem to be doing work should take a backseat to the things that can. That is a fight that Churchland seems to have won in the technical literature.
Paul Churchland's influence on contemporary philosophy, often as the far wing of a spectrum of people concerned with the ability to talk about consciousness in strictly neural terms, is hard to minimize. He has had a major impact as a philosopher of science, generally, and is one of the best ways into a scientifically literate philosophy of mind. Churchland's attempt to understand a broad array of topics in the field is something that should be admired, and his attempt to bring that technical knowledge into the conversation is something that he shares only with the best in professional philosophy of mind.
There are some issues that I take with the literature that don't seem to have gone away from Churchland's writing. He's always very neurocentric. He is incredibly interested in the metaphor of digital computation while acknowledging that the brain is clearly an analogue entity. He limits himself a lot through the use of that approach, which has become something of a standard for him.
I do think that for those looking to seriously pursue philosophy of mind, this is a must-read at some point, largely because it fleshes out some of his points about the use of vectors and why they matter. However, I think that Plato's Camera is something to be taken a little more heavily, as it is far more developed in terms of the ideas in philosophy of mind. Also, this really isn't for those just looking for a casual introduction; make sure you have some familiarity with the literature before diving into any of Paul Churchland's work.
September 13, 2009
The title of the book, "The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul," provides promise. Churchland's subtitle, "A Philosophical Journey into the Soul," entices further. But the first two-thirds of his book is heavily technical and difficult. His "philosophical journey" in the latter part of the book is only marginally easier to digest. Churchland's intent to tie our cognition to others in the animal kingdom is good. Also good is his argument that we sense the world in terms of multi-sensory "pictures" (gestalts?), which he states is fundamentally different and far richer than can be expressed through serial, sequential processing (language). For example, morality-based rules and principles limit the way we experience good and bad in the world. On the subject of morality, Churchland dismisses the moral skeptic's question, "Why should I be moral?" with a surprisingly simplified response, saying that such a question is like asking a fish why it should learn to swim. Churchland says we should be moral to be "a successful moral agent," thus skipping over the eons-long debate about what it means to be moral. He adds in his last paragraph that we should "make mutual love a deeper and more widespread human achievement." That's easier said than done, and the pertinent question is the underlying affective mechanics that promote that objective or promote deviation from it. That gets into the business of whether our souls are "good" or "bad" and how this pushes the use of the brain and reason one way and not another. Churchland equates reason with the soul, but these should not be conflated. Understanding the biological mechanisms of brain function is a good thing. That part is the engine of reason. But reason doesn't function without an energy source. Caring one way or another is the business of the soul, and this book seems to be more about reason than the soul.
February 10, 2010
I've never been disappointed by anything either of the Churchland's have to say. I think my only real criticisms of this book have to do with how long ago it was written. 15 years in the field of neuroscience is like a century in many other sciences. Much of Paul Churchland's speculations regarding how different brain subsystems function have been researched in the years since this book was written. fMRI and MEG are only briefly mentioned in the last few pages!
The one criticism I have that doesn't revolve around the text being dated has to do with his faith in neural networks/vector coding to explain all there is to know about consciousness. I am certainly no dualist, but there remains a currently intractable problem regarding how these networks can substantiate meaning and subjective experience. These questions will remain out of the reach of neuroscience if we look to answer them solely through the neuronal firing underlying human consciousness and behavior.
In general though I applaud Churchland's method of explaining everything from sensory representations to moral behavior through vector coding and pattern recognition. I'll probably check out his newer work, Neurophilosophy at Work to see what an updated Paul Churchland has to say about this same subject!
The one criticism I have that doesn't revolve around the text being dated has to do with his faith in neural networks/vector coding to explain all there is to know about consciousness. I am certainly no dualist, but there remains a currently intractable problem regarding how these networks can substantiate meaning and subjective experience. These questions will remain out of the reach of neuroscience if we look to answer them solely through the neuronal firing underlying human consciousness and behavior.
In general though I applaud Churchland's method of explaining everything from sensory representations to moral behavior through vector coding and pattern recognition. I'll probably check out his newer work, Neurophilosophy at Work to see what an updated Paul Churchland has to say about this same subject!
August 22, 2024
AN EXPLORATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES FOR US OF THE NEW NEUROSCIENCE
Paul Churchland (born 1942) is Professor Emeritus at UC San Diego; he has written many other books such as 'A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science,' 'Matter and Consciousness: A Contemporary Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind,' etc.
He wrote in the Preface to this 1995 book, "How does the brain work? How does it sustain a thinking, feeling, dreaming self? How does it sustain a self-conscious PERSON? New results from neuroscience ... suggest a unified set of answers to these questions... The aim of this book is ... twofold. First, to make those scientific developments available... to the general reading public. And second, to begin to explore the philosophical, social, and personal consequences they are likely to have for all of us." (Pg. xi)
He states, "It is of course possible that mental states do have nonphysical features. And it remains possible that one's autoconnected epistemic pathways are precisely what detect them... These ideas are certainly not impossible. Quite the contrary. But their credentials as default assumptions have now evaporated. The mere existence of autoconnected epistemic pathways, which almost every creature possesses, should no longer even suggest the existence of nonphysical features. If they do exist, it is the burden of some other argument to spotlight them... [but] even if such nonphysical features were to exist, why should one's autoconnected pathways pay any attention to them? Those pathways are themselves entirely physical. How could they interact with any nonphysical goings-on?" (Pg. 200)
He critiques John Searle: "Why, one might ask, is Searle so confident in his conviction that the qualitative features of his sensations cannot be physical in nature? His explanation is that one has direct and unmediated knowledge of the character of one's own sensations. In the case of physical things, he says, there is a legitimate distinction between appearance and reality. But in the case of the mental, the distinction disappears; it cannot be drawn; here, within the mind, the appearance IS the reality and vice versa. One cannot be wrong about the nature of the contents of one's own mind. This doctrine about the infallibility of introspection is familiar to contemporary philosophers, as a hangover from an earlier and more ignorant time. It has by now been so thoroughly discredited that it is plain curious to find a philosopher of Searle's prominence still clinging to it." (Pg. 205)
He admits, "Can such a systematic reduction ever illuminate the mind? Can we reconstruct all known MENTAL phenomena in neurodynamical terms? Not at the moment, we can't. Not by a long shot. But is there reason to believe that it could happen? Is it a prospect worthy of our systemic pursuit?" (Pg. 211) He later adds, "Could an electronic machine be conscious? It rather looks that way. Will it happen soon? Probably not, although small steps will continue to be taken." (Pg. 252)
He states, "Consciousness... is primarily a BIOLOGICAL phenomenon rather than a social one. The social institution of language has nothing to do with the genesis of consciousness." (Pg. 269) He notes, "Language has led to a profound transformation in the CONTENTS of human consciousness... But the phenomenon, consciousness itself, is a commodity we share with much of the animal kingdom. On the best evidence and theory currently available, the higher animals are just as conscious as we are." (Pg. 271)
This is an excellent summation of Churchland's positions, as well as an exploration into many other areas he has not previously mentioned, (e.g., religion, on pages 291-292).
Paul Churchland (born 1942) is Professor Emeritus at UC San Diego; he has written many other books such as 'A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science,' 'Matter and Consciousness: A Contemporary Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind,' etc.
He wrote in the Preface to this 1995 book, "How does the brain work? How does it sustain a thinking, feeling, dreaming self? How does it sustain a self-conscious PERSON? New results from neuroscience ... suggest a unified set of answers to these questions... The aim of this book is ... twofold. First, to make those scientific developments available... to the general reading public. And second, to begin to explore the philosophical, social, and personal consequences they are likely to have for all of us." (Pg. xi)
He states, "It is of course possible that mental states do have nonphysical features. And it remains possible that one's autoconnected epistemic pathways are precisely what detect them... These ideas are certainly not impossible. Quite the contrary. But their credentials as default assumptions have now evaporated. The mere existence of autoconnected epistemic pathways, which almost every creature possesses, should no longer even suggest the existence of nonphysical features. If they do exist, it is the burden of some other argument to spotlight them... [but] even if such nonphysical features were to exist, why should one's autoconnected pathways pay any attention to them? Those pathways are themselves entirely physical. How could they interact with any nonphysical goings-on?" (Pg. 200)
He critiques John Searle: "Why, one might ask, is Searle so confident in his conviction that the qualitative features of his sensations cannot be physical in nature? His explanation is that one has direct and unmediated knowledge of the character of one's own sensations. In the case of physical things, he says, there is a legitimate distinction between appearance and reality. But in the case of the mental, the distinction disappears; it cannot be drawn; here, within the mind, the appearance IS the reality and vice versa. One cannot be wrong about the nature of the contents of one's own mind. This doctrine about the infallibility of introspection is familiar to contemporary philosophers, as a hangover from an earlier and more ignorant time. It has by now been so thoroughly discredited that it is plain curious to find a philosopher of Searle's prominence still clinging to it." (Pg. 205)
He admits, "Can such a systematic reduction ever illuminate the mind? Can we reconstruct all known MENTAL phenomena in neurodynamical terms? Not at the moment, we can't. Not by a long shot. But is there reason to believe that it could happen? Is it a prospect worthy of our systemic pursuit?" (Pg. 211) He later adds, "Could an electronic machine be conscious? It rather looks that way. Will it happen soon? Probably not, although small steps will continue to be taken." (Pg. 252)
He states, "Consciousness... is primarily a BIOLOGICAL phenomenon rather than a social one. The social institution of language has nothing to do with the genesis of consciousness." (Pg. 269) He notes, "Language has led to a profound transformation in the CONTENTS of human consciousness... But the phenomenon, consciousness itself, is a commodity we share with much of the animal kingdom. On the best evidence and theory currently available, the higher animals are just as conscious as we are." (Pg. 271)
This is an excellent summation of Churchland's positions, as well as an exploration into many other areas he has not previously mentioned, (e.g., religion, on pages 291-292).
December 13, 2016
This book sets forth Paul M. Churchland’s program for understanding the mind by understanding the brain. The approach that he discusses is parallel distributed processing (PDP), also known as neural nets. The basics behind PDPs are networks that consists of three layers: an input layer, a middle layer, and an output layer. The layers are massively connected with more than one unit being connected to other units. The input layer receives some form of data, like sensory information. The middle layer is than computed, using random values at the start, but than these are adjust depending on how close the output layer matches the input layer. This is called training the network. Once the network has had sufficient training, it is able to correctly output the appropriate interpretation of the input information a large percentage of the time.
The reason behind using these networks to process information is it is thought to be similar to brain networks of nerve cells, massively connect to each other. Of course, the brain’s neurons are vastly more connected than the simple networks researchers in this field use to explore the supposed workings of the brain. But, the sense in this field of computation is that while these networks (setup on a computer) are simpler than the brain’s connections of brain cells it captures the way the brain actually works.
There are some pretty impressive results using PDPs. Churchland gives examples throughout the first part of the book, including facial recognition, stereoscopic vision (3-D vision), sonar perception, vocal production, sensorimotor coordination, recognition of facial emotional expressions, and grammar production. In addition in part one to the presentation of these various networks, Churchland provides analysis in the form of vector coding which provides areas of prototypical zones. The final chapter to this first part of the book is the use of neuroimaging and various brain disorders, which are the results of damage to certain brain networks, such as language processing, facial recognition, memory problems, and mental illness.
In the second part of the book Churchland moves into the philosophical sphere. The first thing he tackles is “The Puzzle of Consciousness.” Here he presents a list of seven things that need explaining. He also goes over some of the negative views on being able to explain consciousness and goes on to refute them. He also posits what might be happening in the brain while we are conscious. Next up is machine consciousness and the chances that this could happen. After this he dives in to cultural aspects, dealing with language, science, politics, and art. Finally, he covers the merger of humans and technology, what that might entail, and the view of ourselves that might occur.
The first question I have about PDPs is: if they work like the network of neurons in the brain, what works in the brain to provide the corrections seen in the PDPs? Also, these PDPs might not even be implemented in the brain, and Churchland does not provide any evidence beyond the structural that the brain actually works like the PDPs he describes.
I find support for my notion that we do not think in language when Churchland writes: “In fact, the cognitive priority of the preverbal over the verbal shows itself, upon examination, to be feature of almost all our cognitive categories.” (page 144) Again: “. . . cognitive activities are exceedingly unlikely to have such a sentence-like and inference-like structure. . . . the basic unit of animal and human cognition is not the sententially expressible state . . .” (page 182)
I will say that when Churchland says, “. . .[it] is a logically possible neurocomputational account of the phenomenon of consciousness,” (page 223, italics in original) I think, yes, if the brain uses neurocomputation as describe in the PDPs presented in the book.
Churchland discusses and critiques Roger Penrose’s argument that a machine could not do mathematics. I would add that a machine could be programmed to add the Godel statement it might run up against as a new axiom to the formal system under consideration. This weakens Penrose’s argument in The Emperor's New Mind that brains do not work like computers, not that I think that, only for different reasons. Another thing I would point out is that formal systems are not the everyday practice of mathematicians, so machines could very well do mathematical proofs.
Here are a few more thoughts about what Churchland writes in the book. I wondered if it was necessary for Churchland to defend Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy of science in order to show that paradigms are important in his philosophy of mind. Also, when Churchland argues for prototypes and not rules as determining the actions of neural networks, I thought couldn’t the prototypes enact the rules others think are indicative of learning.
Finally, While Churchland does not mention eliminative materialism, which is critical of folk psychology, by name, it is evident. I still think eliminative materialism carries a huge promissory note to it. Also, I question why neural nets cannot produce the contents of folk psychology, such as beliefs, desires, intentions, etc., as prototypes in vector space. We surely have these contents in our mental life, so according to him they should be found in the prototypes in vector spaces of the computations of PDPs.
While not quite a great book, I did find it a very good one. The main reason for not placing it in the first category is Churchland’s presentation of the PDPs, especially those on perception, which is not a major thing of interest to me in both brain science and the philosophy of mind. It was certainly a thought provoking book, and while I have my questions about the actual reality of his premises, they do appear to possibly be a workable solution in the end. Admirably, he is trying to understand how the brain produces the mind and not ignoring what neuroscience shows.
This book is not for the philosophical, computational, and brain science faint of heart. But, if you want to dive into these areas of concern, you will probably find it both profitable for thought and enjoyable to boot.
I will say one final thing: I am glad I have such a wondrous thing as a brain.
The reason behind using these networks to process information is it is thought to be similar to brain networks of nerve cells, massively connect to each other. Of course, the brain’s neurons are vastly more connected than the simple networks researchers in this field use to explore the supposed workings of the brain. But, the sense in this field of computation is that while these networks (setup on a computer) are simpler than the brain’s connections of brain cells it captures the way the brain actually works.
There are some pretty impressive results using PDPs. Churchland gives examples throughout the first part of the book, including facial recognition, stereoscopic vision (3-D vision), sonar perception, vocal production, sensorimotor coordination, recognition of facial emotional expressions, and grammar production. In addition in part one to the presentation of these various networks, Churchland provides analysis in the form of vector coding which provides areas of prototypical zones. The final chapter to this first part of the book is the use of neuroimaging and various brain disorders, which are the results of damage to certain brain networks, such as language processing, facial recognition, memory problems, and mental illness.
In the second part of the book Churchland moves into the philosophical sphere. The first thing he tackles is “The Puzzle of Consciousness.” Here he presents a list of seven things that need explaining. He also goes over some of the negative views on being able to explain consciousness and goes on to refute them. He also posits what might be happening in the brain while we are conscious. Next up is machine consciousness and the chances that this could happen. After this he dives in to cultural aspects, dealing with language, science, politics, and art. Finally, he covers the merger of humans and technology, what that might entail, and the view of ourselves that might occur.
The first question I have about PDPs is: if they work like the network of neurons in the brain, what works in the brain to provide the corrections seen in the PDPs? Also, these PDPs might not even be implemented in the brain, and Churchland does not provide any evidence beyond the structural that the brain actually works like the PDPs he describes.
I find support for my notion that we do not think in language when Churchland writes: “In fact, the cognitive priority of the preverbal over the verbal shows itself, upon examination, to be feature of almost all our cognitive categories.” (page 144) Again: “. . . cognitive activities are exceedingly unlikely to have such a sentence-like and inference-like structure. . . . the basic unit of animal and human cognition is not the sententially expressible state . . .” (page 182)
I will say that when Churchland says, “. . .[it] is a logically possible neurocomputational account of the phenomenon of consciousness,” (page 223, italics in original) I think, yes, if the brain uses neurocomputation as describe in the PDPs presented in the book.
Churchland discusses and critiques Roger Penrose’s argument that a machine could not do mathematics. I would add that a machine could be programmed to add the Godel statement it might run up against as a new axiom to the formal system under consideration. This weakens Penrose’s argument in The Emperor's New Mind that brains do not work like computers, not that I think that, only for different reasons. Another thing I would point out is that formal systems are not the everyday practice of mathematicians, so machines could very well do mathematical proofs.
Here are a few more thoughts about what Churchland writes in the book. I wondered if it was necessary for Churchland to defend Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy of science in order to show that paradigms are important in his philosophy of mind. Also, when Churchland argues for prototypes and not rules as determining the actions of neural networks, I thought couldn’t the prototypes enact the rules others think are indicative of learning.
Finally, While Churchland does not mention eliminative materialism, which is critical of folk psychology, by name, it is evident. I still think eliminative materialism carries a huge promissory note to it. Also, I question why neural nets cannot produce the contents of folk psychology, such as beliefs, desires, intentions, etc., as prototypes in vector space. We surely have these contents in our mental life, so according to him they should be found in the prototypes in vector spaces of the computations of PDPs.
While not quite a great book, I did find it a very good one. The main reason for not placing it in the first category is Churchland’s presentation of the PDPs, especially those on perception, which is not a major thing of interest to me in both brain science and the philosophy of mind. It was certainly a thought provoking book, and while I have my questions about the actual reality of his premises, they do appear to possibly be a workable solution in the end. Admirably, he is trying to understand how the brain produces the mind and not ignoring what neuroscience shows.
This book is not for the philosophical, computational, and brain science faint of heart. But, if you want to dive into these areas of concern, you will probably find it both profitable for thought and enjoyable to boot.
I will say one final thing: I am glad I have such a wondrous thing as a brain.
February 27, 2021
a bit dense sometimes and dated, but this book has been a charming journey into the workings of the brain
September 1, 2023
Worth getting just for the stereoscopic glasses!
August 18, 2013
While the ending chapter was a bit idealistic with the application of recurrent networks, the book portrays the new framework of mind incredibly well.
There is lots of very good evidence supporting Churchland's view that he brings up in the book, and still acknowledge the shortcomings we have yet to address.
I liked it a lot.
There is lots of very good evidence supporting Churchland's view that he brings up in the book, and still acknowledge the shortcomings we have yet to address.
I liked it a lot.
April 8, 2007
I am learning about the brain!
September 15, 2011
Without being able to posit a closed system for the mind, Churchland's work isn't completely definitive, but it's the best neurology-oriented book on consciousness out there.
July 7, 2013
Damn good
Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews