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War and Peace in Modern India
As the leader of a new state created amidst the bloodiest partition in history, saddled with new and outstanding problems, Nehru was confronted with a range of disputes which threatened to boil over. War and Peace in Modern India challenges and revises ou
384 pages, Paperback
First published April 27, 2010
About the author
Srinath Raghavan
12 books118 followersSrinath Raghavan is a senior fellow at the Centre for Policy Research. He is also a senior research fellow at the India Institute at King’s College London. Srinath works on contemporary and historical aspects of India’s foreign and security policies.
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Displaying 1 - 13 of 13 reviews
January 1, 2021
A superb account of how Nehru dealt with the crises that confronted a just born India – Junagadh, Hyderabad, Bengal and Kashmir. With extensive footnotes, it is clear that every information that’s presented is a result of rigorous research. For a book so thick with facts, the narration is breezy and the tension is palpable.
For someone who’s never read a book on Kashmir, this was especially good. It never assumes you know something and really, each chapter begins with a brief background on the matter so you can always make sense of what’s coming.
A whole two chapters are on Kashmir – the tribal invasion, the U.N intervention, the difficulty in reaching an agreement on how a plebiscite could be conducted – all of these are spelt out with exceptional detail.
In each of these, Nehru did his best to avoid escalations and he is conciliatory almost to a fault. Nehru, it seems to me now, saw the consequences of what a war would do to a fledgling India and was clearly eager to avoid it.
The book then goes on to explain the boundary dispute between and India and China – and the events that led to India’s crushing defeat in the Sino-Indian war of 1962. Here, the book is critical of the Forward Policy – and discusses how both the military and civilian assessment of the matter was wrong. It was always known that India could not handle a full-fledged war with China and yet Nehru had misjudged that patrolling previously unoccupied areas would not evoke retaliation from China. How the Soviet treated the boundary dispute is also set out – here again Nehru seems to have miscalculated that after the Sino-Soviet split, the Russians would not be too eager to lend support to China.
In the concluding chapter, it is suggested that more than anything, Nehru understood that power should never be divorced from legitimacy. An entire other book could be written on it, but I can imagine Nehru struggling for an entire lifetime wondering when war would be justified. He comes across as a man who viscerally hated it, and to his credit he has shown restraint even when he had the means to offend. More than ever now, I shudder to think of anyone else as the first Prime Minister of this fascinating nation.
For someone who’s never read a book on Kashmir, this was especially good. It never assumes you know something and really, each chapter begins with a brief background on the matter so you can always make sense of what’s coming.
A whole two chapters are on Kashmir – the tribal invasion, the U.N intervention, the difficulty in reaching an agreement on how a plebiscite could be conducted – all of these are spelt out with exceptional detail.
In each of these, Nehru did his best to avoid escalations and he is conciliatory almost to a fault. Nehru, it seems to me now, saw the consequences of what a war would do to a fledgling India and was clearly eager to avoid it.
The book then goes on to explain the boundary dispute between and India and China – and the events that led to India’s crushing defeat in the Sino-Indian war of 1962. Here, the book is critical of the Forward Policy – and discusses how both the military and civilian assessment of the matter was wrong. It was always known that India could not handle a full-fledged war with China and yet Nehru had misjudged that patrolling previously unoccupied areas would not evoke retaliation from China. How the Soviet treated the boundary dispute is also set out – here again Nehru seems to have miscalculated that after the Sino-Soviet split, the Russians would not be too eager to lend support to China.
In the concluding chapter, it is suggested that more than anything, Nehru understood that power should never be divorced from legitimacy. An entire other book could be written on it, but I can imagine Nehru struggling for an entire lifetime wondering when war would be justified. He comes across as a man who viscerally hated it, and to his credit he has shown restraint even when he had the means to offend. More than ever now, I shudder to think of anyone else as the first Prime Minister of this fascinating nation.
October 17, 2018
TL;DR: If you have any thoughts about Nehru and you want them substantiated by facts, read this book.
Military power is most impactful when it's latent. I'm mangling the quote, but the sentiment seems to set the tone of Jawaharlal Nehru's foreign policy. Srinath Raghavan's study of his handling of conflicts in independent India dives deep into the thought process which came out with such a unique foreign policy, and brings out nuances which seem to have been hitherto dismissed or, to give some critics their due, merely missed.
The author takes the reader through all the major crises Nehru faced during his seventeen year-long tenure as Prime Minister involving other countries, or in some cases, Indian princely states. Junagarh, Hyderabad and Kashmir are all presented as case studies all linked with each other. While the first two are the subjects of a chapter each, Kashmir, due to its outsize importance, is mentioned in nearly every chapter and has two long chapters completely dedicated to it. A forgotten crisis in Bengal, diffused ironically by the assassination of Pakistani Prime Minister Liaquat Khan gets another chapter, while the Sino-Indian war gets two.
All the chapters are expertly written. Each one is extensively sourced, the footnotes have annotations, and viewpoints are presented properly. Justice is done to the opinions of everyone involved, whether they be British, Indian or Pakistani to the extent the sources vindicate them. The chapters flow into each other in the case of chapters two to four, and the rest of them dovetail nicely into the next. The end result is a coherently written, cogent source of information about the Nehru years which both Nehru admirers and revanchists ought to read.
Perhaps the only criticism I can lay upon it is that it seems to portray Nehru in a rather favourable light. It would be rather interesting to see points of view other than the ones which support Nehru. What exactly was Jayprakash Narayan thinking during all this? Can we get a better idea about what was going on in the minds of the Pakistanis while all this was going on? Maybe get a bit more detail into the strategic interests and ruminations of the Chinese? Of course, these criticisms aren't enough to derail my enjoyment of the book itself, but they do remain in my mind.
5/5, no doubt about it. Brilliant book which breaks the mold into which the legacy of Jawaharlal Nehru has been cast.
Military power is most impactful when it's latent. I'm mangling the quote, but the sentiment seems to set the tone of Jawaharlal Nehru's foreign policy. Srinath Raghavan's study of his handling of conflicts in independent India dives deep into the thought process which came out with such a unique foreign policy, and brings out nuances which seem to have been hitherto dismissed or, to give some critics their due, merely missed.
The author takes the reader through all the major crises Nehru faced during his seventeen year-long tenure as Prime Minister involving other countries, or in some cases, Indian princely states. Junagarh, Hyderabad and Kashmir are all presented as case studies all linked with each other. While the first two are the subjects of a chapter each, Kashmir, due to its outsize importance, is mentioned in nearly every chapter and has two long chapters completely dedicated to it. A forgotten crisis in Bengal, diffused ironically by the assassination of Pakistani Prime Minister Liaquat Khan gets another chapter, while the Sino-Indian war gets two.
All the chapters are expertly written. Each one is extensively sourced, the footnotes have annotations, and viewpoints are presented properly. Justice is done to the opinions of everyone involved, whether they be British, Indian or Pakistani to the extent the sources vindicate them. The chapters flow into each other in the case of chapters two to four, and the rest of them dovetail nicely into the next. The end result is a coherently written, cogent source of information about the Nehru years which both Nehru admirers and revanchists ought to read.
Perhaps the only criticism I can lay upon it is that it seems to portray Nehru in a rather favourable light. It would be rather interesting to see points of view other than the ones which support Nehru. What exactly was Jayprakash Narayan thinking during all this? Can we get a better idea about what was going on in the minds of the Pakistanis while all this was going on? Maybe get a bit more detail into the strategic interests and ruminations of the Chinese? Of course, these criticisms aren't enough to derail my enjoyment of the book itself, but they do remain in my mind.
5/5, no doubt about it. Brilliant book which breaks the mold into which the legacy of Jawaharlal Nehru has been cast.
June 29, 2016
Bit disappointed with this; despite claiming to provide a balanced view of Nehru, it still seeks to shield him from criticism on a lot of policy blunders. The China war of 1962 is a case in point, his attempt to explain the Brooks-Henderson report not being released due to its potentially damaging revelations about the incompetence of the then military leadership in India rather than protecting Nehru's posthumous reputation are frankly unconvincing. More damaging is the whitewashing of Nehru's policy in Kashmir leading to Sheikh Abdhullah's arrest - which Raghavan very implausibly seeks to defend Nehru from orchestrating and not one word is really spoken about the subsequent period in Kashmir and how it laid the ground for continual interference in state politics from Delhi and created the foundation for the alienation of the 1980s which would explode into an insurgency.
June 4, 2016
The thesis of this balanced and professionally written work is twofold. First, that Jawaharlal Nehru's foreign policy choices were guided not merely by naive idealism or as the revisionist histories claim mere opportunism/cutthroat realism. Second, there was consistency as well as continuity in Nehru's handling of foreign policy issues. In both of these, the book succeeds and them some. I will take a moment to point, the book is not a hagiography. While the author doesn't opine on the matter making it at cursory glance seem like one mid-read, a closing reading as well as the concluding notes make more than clear it is anything but. This is a remarkable first work by a historian and a valuable contribution.
I came into this with very high expectations given all I'd heard about it so was somewhat disappointed for two reasons. First, the book's explanation of other actors relevant to circumstances (Pakistan, China who come off seemingly irrational) is not nearly as detailed. It is perfectly understandable that this was probably beyond the scope of the work which is after all, as the title makes clear about modern India. I understand the constraints, nevertheless, was left wanting for some more information on the matter. Second, the book's explanation of the IR theory paradigms it talks about (coercive, controlling and consensual strategies) could have benefitted from some more exposition too. 4.5
I came into this with very high expectations given all I'd heard about it so was somewhat disappointed for two reasons. First, the book's explanation of other actors relevant to circumstances (Pakistan, China who come off seemingly irrational) is not nearly as detailed. It is perfectly understandable that this was probably beyond the scope of the work which is after all, as the title makes clear about modern India. I understand the constraints, nevertheless, was left wanting for some more information on the matter. Second, the book's explanation of the IR theory paradigms it talks about (coercive, controlling and consensual strategies) could have benefitted from some more exposition too. 4.5
August 24, 2020
Scholarly work. Clearly dispenses on the myths revisionists are trying to portray. End of the day people forget the context and make absurd claims of 'Naive Nehru' who was lost in 'idealism' and they couldn't be more wrong. Case by case the author discerns the strategic maneuvering of Nehru govt simultaneously addressing various issues presented back then. If there was any wrong that was with his realism wrt China debacle where his miscalculations about USSR contributed to various factors that were involved in the escalation. Apart from the China debacle Nehru made sure India started its journey in the right path backing up legitimacy to whatever power it could display.
To quote the author 'it is the fact that very few of them turned into hot warrs. During each of the crisis with Pakistan, this was a distinct possibility. It is to Nehru's credit he swerved from the wars which were pregnant with internecine consequences which seemed imminent at various points. That he managed to do so without conceding India's core interests was Jawaharlal Nehru's major achievement in strategic affairs.'
To quote the author 'it is the fact that very few of them turned into hot warrs. During each of the crisis with Pakistan, this was a distinct possibility. It is to Nehru's credit he swerved from the wars which were pregnant with internecine consequences which seemed imminent at various points. That he managed to do so without conceding India's core interests was Jawaharlal Nehru's major achievement in strategic affairs.'
August 27, 2021
An important book to know complex challenges faced by nascent Indian nation, on diplomatic and war fronts, especially in dealing with integration of princely states and troubles with Pakistan and China. A thoroughly researched and excellently presented book.
March 13, 2025
In the initial years of post-independence, India faced the daunting task of resettling the refugees from the partition, consolidating and unifying the Indian union, and initiating the reconstruction of the nation-state. Raghavan, in this well-researched book, presented the strategic history of the first 15 years of independent India wherein he explores the transformative events of war and peace keeping the context and complexities of the times in perspective. In the process, one gets to know the political landscape, the strengths and weaknesses of the leadership at the helm, their ideology & positions taken on various issues, public opinion, and the motivations of the stakeholders including international players.
Post-independent India was confronted, among many other things, with the integration of 500 and odd princely states into the union. While Patel and V P Menon's team succeeded in obtaining accession to most of the princely states, Junagadh, Hyderabad, and Kashmir posed formidable problems. Hyderabad refused to join any side preferring to remain independent, Junagadh with a Muslim king presiding over the majority Hindu population decided to accede to Pakistan even without having geographical contiguity to Pakistan, Kashmir, geographically contiguous both to Pakistan and India, on the other hand, had a Hindu ruler with majority Muslim population acceding to India. Raghavan takes us through complex political parleys, military strategies, and territorial disputes while dealing with these intractable issues. The many options available to resolve issues in each state had implications and consequences in the other state. The principled approach, resolve, and pragmatism shown by the leadership including Nehru and Patel were of the highest order with no other motive than building the Indian nation. Owing to its geographical and strategic location, Kashmir eluded resolution and continues to be the festering problem between India and Pakistan. Raghavan documents the chequered history of the Kashmir dispute - the role played by the superpowers reflecting the emerging Cold War imperatives, domestic public opinion concerning the special status given to Kashmir, and Nehru’s concerns regarding the fragile communal situation in India. A broken Nehru tries to find an amicable solution for Kashmir till the day of his death to no avail.
The other major issue concerns the border dispute with China in Ladakh and NEFA (Northeast Frontier Agency). The scant historical evidence to identify the territorial extent controlled by Tibet and British India and the rejection of the border treaties between China and British India by the new dispensation in China have left the border issue open for contestation. India stood firm on the McMahon Line as the defining border on the eastern sector and the border defined by tradition, trade and transit of people on the western sector (Ladakh). India was ready for discussions and minor adjustments keeping the McMahon Line as the basis. Judgemental errors on the part of Nehru, the opaqueness of Chinese intentions, the trust deficit between the respective governments, the Lack of military preparedness on the Indian side, lack of clarity in communication, and domestic political conditions both in India and China inexorably led the events to an inevitable showdown resulting in a humiliating defeat for India. China unilaterally declared a ceasefire at their claim line on the Western sector and at the McMahon line on the east. In the process, we lost Aksai Chin. The halo around Nehru concerning his superior grasp on external affairs has taken a severe beating. Nehru was left broken and crestfallen post-China war.
While attempting to judge the role of Nehru in these crises, Raghavan quotes a Dutch historian Pieter Geyl as saying, “History is an argument without end”. This is true about the historical assessment of Nehru’s long years in office. His conduct with Pakistan in finding a solution for the Kashmir issue, his role in the accession of princely states to the union, and his foreign policy especially during the Chinese war in the early 1960s are the subject of intensely divided and disputed discussions.
The Nehru that emerges from these crises appears fallible and weak at times. But equally, he was pragmatic, cautious and genuinely interested in settling matters diplomatically eager to avoid war. Though Nehru was blamed for being an idealist, his actions reflected his concerns for the position of Muslims in India and Hindus in Pakistan. The massacres during partition, the violence after the liberation of Hyderabad, and the refugee crisis in Bengal as a result of violence against Hindus in east Bengal have alerted him to the fragility of inter-communal relations in India. Consequently, his approach to any crisis was to find solutions diplomatically and avoid any action that could precipitate matters leading to conflict. Nehru stuck to this principle even at the risk of being judged as a weak prime minister. He was aware that a poor country liberated after a hard struggle can ill afford a war that can seriously hamper the job of providing succor to the large population. Strong measures were contemplated, and coercion was employed to make the adversary see the rationale in discussion and dialogue. As a liberal, he was particularly concerned with the moral and political legitimacy of his actions and never liked to deviate from norms of international behavior.
Usually, as the historical events recede in time, the complexities and the justifications leading up to an event turn hazy resulting in simplified narratives attributing motives to the people involved consistent with the prevailing political winds. Visceral hatred can cloud the judgment. While historical events are amenable to many interpretations, it is always desirable to have an account presented based on archival data and objective analysis, considering all the possible angles, to get a balanced assessment.
Raghavan made a sincere effort to this end.
Post-independent India was confronted, among many other things, with the integration of 500 and odd princely states into the union. While Patel and V P Menon's team succeeded in obtaining accession to most of the princely states, Junagadh, Hyderabad, and Kashmir posed formidable problems. Hyderabad refused to join any side preferring to remain independent, Junagadh with a Muslim king presiding over the majority Hindu population decided to accede to Pakistan even without having geographical contiguity to Pakistan, Kashmir, geographically contiguous both to Pakistan and India, on the other hand, had a Hindu ruler with majority Muslim population acceding to India. Raghavan takes us through complex political parleys, military strategies, and territorial disputes while dealing with these intractable issues. The many options available to resolve issues in each state had implications and consequences in the other state. The principled approach, resolve, and pragmatism shown by the leadership including Nehru and Patel were of the highest order with no other motive than building the Indian nation. Owing to its geographical and strategic location, Kashmir eluded resolution and continues to be the festering problem between India and Pakistan. Raghavan documents the chequered history of the Kashmir dispute - the role played by the superpowers reflecting the emerging Cold War imperatives, domestic public opinion concerning the special status given to Kashmir, and Nehru’s concerns regarding the fragile communal situation in India. A broken Nehru tries to find an amicable solution for Kashmir till the day of his death to no avail.
The other major issue concerns the border dispute with China in Ladakh and NEFA (Northeast Frontier Agency). The scant historical evidence to identify the territorial extent controlled by Tibet and British India and the rejection of the border treaties between China and British India by the new dispensation in China have left the border issue open for contestation. India stood firm on the McMahon Line as the defining border on the eastern sector and the border defined by tradition, trade and transit of people on the western sector (Ladakh). India was ready for discussions and minor adjustments keeping the McMahon Line as the basis. Judgemental errors on the part of Nehru, the opaqueness of Chinese intentions, the trust deficit between the respective governments, the Lack of military preparedness on the Indian side, lack of clarity in communication, and domestic political conditions both in India and China inexorably led the events to an inevitable showdown resulting in a humiliating defeat for India. China unilaterally declared a ceasefire at their claim line on the Western sector and at the McMahon line on the east. In the process, we lost Aksai Chin. The halo around Nehru concerning his superior grasp on external affairs has taken a severe beating. Nehru was left broken and crestfallen post-China war.
While attempting to judge the role of Nehru in these crises, Raghavan quotes a Dutch historian Pieter Geyl as saying, “History is an argument without end”. This is true about the historical assessment of Nehru’s long years in office. His conduct with Pakistan in finding a solution for the Kashmir issue, his role in the accession of princely states to the union, and his foreign policy especially during the Chinese war in the early 1960s are the subject of intensely divided and disputed discussions.
The Nehru that emerges from these crises appears fallible and weak at times. But equally, he was pragmatic, cautious and genuinely interested in settling matters diplomatically eager to avoid war. Though Nehru was blamed for being an idealist, his actions reflected his concerns for the position of Muslims in India and Hindus in Pakistan. The massacres during partition, the violence after the liberation of Hyderabad, and the refugee crisis in Bengal as a result of violence against Hindus in east Bengal have alerted him to the fragility of inter-communal relations in India. Consequently, his approach to any crisis was to find solutions diplomatically and avoid any action that could precipitate matters leading to conflict. Nehru stuck to this principle even at the risk of being judged as a weak prime minister. He was aware that a poor country liberated after a hard struggle can ill afford a war that can seriously hamper the job of providing succor to the large population. Strong measures were contemplated, and coercion was employed to make the adversary see the rationale in discussion and dialogue. As a liberal, he was particularly concerned with the moral and political legitimacy of his actions and never liked to deviate from norms of international behavior.
Usually, as the historical events recede in time, the complexities and the justifications leading up to an event turn hazy resulting in simplified narratives attributing motives to the people involved consistent with the prevailing political winds. Visceral hatred can cloud the judgment. While historical events are amenable to many interpretations, it is always desirable to have an account presented based on archival data and objective analysis, considering all the possible angles, to get a balanced assessment.
Raghavan made a sincere effort to this end.
March 11, 2017
A comprehensive review of Indian politico military evolution after Independence. One striking feature of this book is every assertion and description is backed up by specific document and citation which gives this book a authentic flavour that many others may only be reduced to opinions or viewpoints. In that dimension author has done substantial research and hence this should be considered as an authentic account of Indian politico military evolution post independence. One would have expected a road map of future and at least mapping those elements that author found are visible in Indian politco military thought after 6 decades of independence to be described or commented upon. For that miss _ a final chapter _ I have taken one star from the rating ! Nevertheless a must read book for understanding the evolution of politico military thought of post independent India.
March 2, 2020
Srinath Raghavan provides a gripping account of the tumultuous years that followed the independence of India from the British rule in 1947. The nascent postcolonial Indian state was faced with the onerous task of integration of the various princely states, arresting the rising tide of communal violence, and tempering a hostile neighbor. In this backdrop, Raghavan presents deeply learned yet readable account of the strategy adopted by the tall leaders of the day. Central to Raghavan's inquiry into the strategy of Indian state is the role of Jawaharlal Nehru, the first prime-minister of postcolonial India. Nehru's "liberal realism" of locating the Indian state's strategy, diplomatic or military, within the broader context of social history of India and the repercussions it will have on the pre-exisiting fissiparous pulls will appear refreshing to a 21st century reader whose world is now beset with belligerence. A sensitive reader can only hope for a belated return of world politics to the Nehruvian reason and wisdom.
January 20, 2023
A well-researched book that traces the strategy of Nehru’s (domestic and) foreign policy after Indian independence. For a book like this to come out during the present day political climate is slightly unthinkable now. The aspect that I appreciated the most was that this book showed how the making of India was a violent and constructed political project — independent India after all was not a primordial nation-state gaining national consciousness after British rule. The choice — and justification of — case studies is slightly puzzling given other important cases like that of Manipur and Sikkim did not bear a mention. The author, in an explicitly moderate view, still seems to have come across more sympathetic to Nehru. Overall, the book holds value in its use of archival materials and broad undertaking.
July 29, 2021
Commendable amount of research to present all aspects of various geopolitical flare ups from 1947 to 1962. A ring side view of the inner workings of various aspects of the administration and of taking decisions knowing fully well that all necessary information isn’t available. As a history buff, I learnt of many new events and loved the way the narrative was stitched together by the author.
July 6, 2015
An Excellent Work on Nehru's Response to Crisis with Princely States(Junnagadh, Hyderabad, Kashmir) and China and Pakistan.
Displaying 1 - 13 of 13 reviews