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Osprey Fortress #77
The Stalin and Molotov Lines: Soviet Western Defences 1928-41
During the Russian Civil War, the Red Army created a series of fortified areas, or ukreplinnyje rajony (UR), which were to be used not only for defence but were also to act as staging points for offensive operations. Following the end of the war these defences were extended, creating a front that stretched over 2,000km from the Baltic to the Black Sea, that consisted of more than 3,000 positions from forts to machine gun and antitank positions, emplaced tank turrets, and observation and command positions. By the outbreak of World War II, these defenses - known as the Stalin Line - were largely complete.
However, after the Soviet occupation of eastern Poland in October 1939 the Stalin Line was too far behind the new border to be of use as a springboard for an offensive. So, a new set of defenses was begun, named after the Soviet Foreign Minister, Molotov. Equipment was stripped from the Stalin Line, but only 25 percent of the positions had been completed by the time of the German invasion in June 1941 and it proved no match for the Wehrmacht - positions were mostly empty or simply bypassed during the advance. Illustrated with cutaway artwork and rare photographs this book provides a detailed examination of the development of these defensive lines, and the fighting that took place around them in 1941, and is packed with detail and information that is not readily available in the English.
However, after the Soviet occupation of eastern Poland in October 1939 the Stalin Line was too far behind the new border to be of use as a springboard for an offensive. So, a new set of defenses was begun, named after the Soviet Foreign Minister, Molotov. Equipment was stripped from the Stalin Line, but only 25 percent of the positions had been completed by the time of the German invasion in June 1941 and it proved no match for the Wehrmacht - positions were mostly empty or simply bypassed during the advance. Illustrated with cutaway artwork and rare photographs this book provides a detailed examination of the development of these defensive lines, and the fighting that took place around them in 1941, and is packed with detail and information that is not readily available in the English.
64 pages, Paperback
First published September 23, 2008
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
January 8, 2021
My project as of this year has been to read as many books published by Osprey, as these books are a wealth of knowledge despite their relative shortness. For a book on this subject, it does well, and covers as much as it can on the fortifications, why they were built, the laborers, the leaders, and such.
July 13, 2019
Excellent Osprey book about the fortifications that the Soviets put in place starting in the late 1920s - the Stalin line - and subsequently, the Molotov line built at the border of Prussia, once Hitler had invaded Poland and in accordance with the Motolov-Ribbentrop Pact, divided the country up with the Soviet Union. Both lines of defenses failed, the book explains why, to prevent the blitzkrieg of Operation Barbarossa, although defenders fought valiantly many times to the end, rather than give up bunkers etc. The defenses were no match for the Germans - just as the Maginot Line had been smashed. The tide of war turned the following year in momentous battles at Stalingrad, Kursk, Moscow. And within 4 years of the beginning of Barbarossa, the hammer and sickle was flying over the Reichstag in Berlin.
Even so, this is a fascinating book that does give detailed information about the design of the bunkers, including information on the types of arms (machine guns, anti-tank guns etc.) housed therein, and the ingenious organization/layout of spaces within the strong points. Although all the forts/pillboxes/bunkers eventually fell along the entire Stalin and Molotov Lines, the defenders, as noted above, put up a heroic defense and in many cases lasted several days. They just could not withstand the well-trained, well-equipped German army. The details were given as to how the bunkers were taken out. One Russian team actually blew the bunker up with then in it rather than be captured alive, or let the Germans get the bunker. Today, there are numerous memorials to the dead up and down the lines, and some have been turned into museums.
This is an interesting way to learn about history and Soviet planning for the war. There are a lot of details on Soviet military organization and how the work of constructing fortifications along the gigantic lines was organized, paid for, and carried out - and in some cases, perhaps too many cases, was still incomplete at the time of the invasion, and why. Workers were poorly paid, conditions were harsh, and morale was low despite Soviet propaganda extolling zealous workers. Some of the work crews didn't complete the work, or didn't work at all. It was better to be accused of laziness than sabotage, if they happened to make a mistake in construction. Therefore, some didn't do any work at all.
After the USSR absorbed the Baltic States and half of Poland, the guns of the Stalin line were transferred to the Molotov line - at the Prussian border. The Stalin line was therefore mostly useless. The entire Soviet plan to counter Nazi Germany was utterly useless when the invasion came, as the lines crumbled one by one, and the armies had to retreat, many times in disarray, or be encircled and captured, such as at Kiev. Tragically, we all know the fate of Soviet POWs - not just dying of starvation and disease, but also quite possibly deliberately exterminated in death camps. We've all seen the photos of the newly captured soldiers out in open fields. There they were not given food or shelter, and so many died of exposure and starvation. In WWII the Soviet Union lost a total of 27 million soldiers and civilians - a number almost beyond comprehension. However, remember that the Nazis were murderous of civilians wherever they went and the largest Soviet cities were besieged - millions starved there - and so the number is then comprehensible. At least somewhat.
This book is ultimately about the tragedy of the defenders - it also covers the basic details of the aftermath of the fall of both lines - and the disorganization and poor planning and mindset of military leaders, as well as Stalin himself. A huge amount of money and scarce resources was expended on these defensive measures yet they did not succeed in appreciably slowing down the blitzkrieg. Stalin had ordered the bulk of the army to pull back from the border so as not to provoke Hitler. But that left the border lightly guarded by NKVD troops. Then the fortifications fell one by one and the first echelon didn't hold, neither did the second. The Germans got bogged down later - over the winter - by the cold, and many irrational orders by Hitler himself. However, the following year, the Soviets counter-attacked and turned the tide of the war. They lost over one million soldiers dead, wounded or missing at Stalingrad - but their determination at that battle probably changed the course of history, since it also cost the Germans and their allies hundreds of thousands of soldiers.
Like all Osprey titles, the book is well-organized and illustrated. It is thought-provoking - in that fortifications on both the Eastern and Western fronts proved no match for the blitzkrieg. No doubt some form of fortifications are still in use in Europe - but thank goodness at least Germany is no longer a threat, and despite the saber rattling and so forth, even despite Ukraine, since the advent of the nuclear age, it is highly unlikely that the West will embark on WW3 vs. Russia, which is not even an ideological enemy anymore. The USSR and the Warsaw Pact are no more - perhaps who has the upper hand is decided other ways, in the post Cold War era.
Just one (extended) quote from the Introduction:
"After the Civil War relations with the west gradually thawed, driven in no small part by commercial interest in exploiting the vast Soviet market. Nevertheless, there was still concern in the capitalist west at the subversive activities of the Soviets, who supported political extremists all over the world. As the Soviet economy recovered, fears grew in London and Paris that this strength would be used to restore the Red Army and that the Soviet Union would threaten the independence of the small states on its border. The western democracies therefore looked to strengthen the 'small Entente' states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Finland) against possible aggression. This intervention discomfited the Bolshevik government, because although neither Britain nor France had a common border with the Soviet Union their involvement in these countries offered them another opportunity to destabilize or even overthrow the government."
Even so, this is a fascinating book that does give detailed information about the design of the bunkers, including information on the types of arms (machine guns, anti-tank guns etc.) housed therein, and the ingenious organization/layout of spaces within the strong points. Although all the forts/pillboxes/bunkers eventually fell along the entire Stalin and Molotov Lines, the defenders, as noted above, put up a heroic defense and in many cases lasted several days. They just could not withstand the well-trained, well-equipped German army. The details were given as to how the bunkers were taken out. One Russian team actually blew the bunker up with then in it rather than be captured alive, or let the Germans get the bunker. Today, there are numerous memorials to the dead up and down the lines, and some have been turned into museums.
This is an interesting way to learn about history and Soviet planning for the war. There are a lot of details on Soviet military organization and how the work of constructing fortifications along the gigantic lines was organized, paid for, and carried out - and in some cases, perhaps too many cases, was still incomplete at the time of the invasion, and why. Workers were poorly paid, conditions were harsh, and morale was low despite Soviet propaganda extolling zealous workers. Some of the work crews didn't complete the work, or didn't work at all. It was better to be accused of laziness than sabotage, if they happened to make a mistake in construction. Therefore, some didn't do any work at all.
After the USSR absorbed the Baltic States and half of Poland, the guns of the Stalin line were transferred to the Molotov line - at the Prussian border. The Stalin line was therefore mostly useless. The entire Soviet plan to counter Nazi Germany was utterly useless when the invasion came, as the lines crumbled one by one, and the armies had to retreat, many times in disarray, or be encircled and captured, such as at Kiev. Tragically, we all know the fate of Soviet POWs - not just dying of starvation and disease, but also quite possibly deliberately exterminated in death camps. We've all seen the photos of the newly captured soldiers out in open fields. There they were not given food or shelter, and so many died of exposure and starvation. In WWII the Soviet Union lost a total of 27 million soldiers and civilians - a number almost beyond comprehension. However, remember that the Nazis were murderous of civilians wherever they went and the largest Soviet cities were besieged - millions starved there - and so the number is then comprehensible. At least somewhat.
This book is ultimately about the tragedy of the defenders - it also covers the basic details of the aftermath of the fall of both lines - and the disorganization and poor planning and mindset of military leaders, as well as Stalin himself. A huge amount of money and scarce resources was expended on these defensive measures yet they did not succeed in appreciably slowing down the blitzkrieg. Stalin had ordered the bulk of the army to pull back from the border so as not to provoke Hitler. But that left the border lightly guarded by NKVD troops. Then the fortifications fell one by one and the first echelon didn't hold, neither did the second. The Germans got bogged down later - over the winter - by the cold, and many irrational orders by Hitler himself. However, the following year, the Soviets counter-attacked and turned the tide of the war. They lost over one million soldiers dead, wounded or missing at Stalingrad - but their determination at that battle probably changed the course of history, since it also cost the Germans and their allies hundreds of thousands of soldiers.
Like all Osprey titles, the book is well-organized and illustrated. It is thought-provoking - in that fortifications on both the Eastern and Western fronts proved no match for the blitzkrieg. No doubt some form of fortifications are still in use in Europe - but thank goodness at least Germany is no longer a threat, and despite the saber rattling and so forth, even despite Ukraine, since the advent of the nuclear age, it is highly unlikely that the West will embark on WW3 vs. Russia, which is not even an ideological enemy anymore. The USSR and the Warsaw Pact are no more - perhaps who has the upper hand is decided other ways, in the post Cold War era.
Just one (extended) quote from the Introduction:
"After the Civil War relations with the west gradually thawed, driven in no small part by commercial interest in exploiting the vast Soviet market. Nevertheless, there was still concern in the capitalist west at the subversive activities of the Soviets, who supported political extremists all over the world. As the Soviet economy recovered, fears grew in London and Paris that this strength would be used to restore the Red Army and that the Soviet Union would threaten the independence of the small states on its border. The western democracies therefore looked to strengthen the 'small Entente' states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Finland) against possible aggression. This intervention discomfited the Bolshevik government, because although neither Britain nor France had a common border with the Soviet Union their involvement in these countries offered them another opportunity to destabilize or even overthrow the government."
July 27, 2021
A well-researched and thorough study of the two defensive lines
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews