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The Truman- MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War
Professor John W. Spanier examines the central issue of this crisis--the grave challenge to the traditional concept of civilian supremacy, resting in the President of the United States, over the military, that was posed by MacArthur's stand. He makes it clear that this controversy was not unique, that it stemmed not only from MacArthur's personality but also from tremendous pressures to change a "limited war" into a total effort for complete victory.
- GenresHistoryNonfiction
311 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1959
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Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
May 30, 2026
Very well researched book focused on the Truman-MacArthur controversy of 1951, although the seeds of this mistrust had started years earlier. I especially liked the later chapters which focused on the MacArthur hearings in Congress. I’d heard of them previously, but had not studied them nor read some of the transcripts. Very interesting to review. Key excerpts below.
- Decision on whether to unify Korea by force, by crossing the parallel, had to be made, and quickly after Inchon: there was little time to consider all the facets of the problem without losing the military initiative and allowing the North Koreans a breathing spell to regroup. P89. PJK: Sometimes time is very short on when to exploit an opportunity. During this time in Korea, a relatively quick decision was made to cross the parallel and essentially pursue the retreating North Korean forces… but just because the order was to cross the parallel, should the UN forces have gone as far as the Yalu River region?
- On June 13th 1950, only two weeks before the outbreak of the Korean War, he (Acheson) had himself declared that the “one difference which is just about impossible to negotiate is someone's desire eliminate your existence altogether.” P91. PJK: This applies to so many scenarios… Middle Eastern countries attitude towards Israel; Russia and Ukraine, etc.
- In this respect, Mr. Truman was especially concerned by his field commander’s expressed belief Asians respected only aggressive and forceful leadership, and the implication of this remark that Asia's problems could be solved by force… p109. PJK: Obviously, Truman and the Joint Chief’s had a different perspective; they better understood that the U.S. did not have the 100 Army division of WWII anymore. Resources were limited thus MacArthur’s belief that force was the only tool was not a feasible course of action.
- MacArthur’s sin was of a far more serious nature. He had violated in spirit, if not in letter, the policy that Washington had prescribed for him, even though he had invoked Secretary Marshall's message to rationalize his move. Administration policy was to send only South Korean troops into the area along the Manchurian frontier… to reassure Peking that the American-led forces would not be used to invade Manchuria. P128. PJK: enough said; MacArthur disobeyed orders.
- … and they became concerned lest MacArthur again disobey the policy prescribed for him and thereby precipitate a military incident which might ignite a World War. P129.
- A senior commander does not, as Secretary Marshall put it during the hearings, tell an opposition leader “that he as the commander is in total disagreement with his own people.” … MacArthur's letter to Representative Martin was his last public challenge. The March 24th statement had convinced the Commander in Chief that he could no longer ignore MacArthur's threat to his constitutional authority in the field of foreign affairs and civilian control of the military. P203. PJK: A huge and deliberate mistake… sending a letter critical of the Administration to the opposite party in Congress.
- Of equal, if not of far greater importance however, was the reverse side of this hysterical enthusiasm for General MacArthur: the public's frustration with the country's continued participation in world affairs. First, there had been the intense efforts of World War 2; these had been followed by the disappointment of the high wartime hopes for a lengthy period of peace. P218.
- The Chinese Communists possessed a privileged sanctuary in Manchuria, but the United States possessed a similar sanctuary in Japan, Okinawa, and South Korea, particularly around the main port of Pusan. P253.
- Decision on whether to unify Korea by force, by crossing the parallel, had to be made, and quickly after Inchon: there was little time to consider all the facets of the problem without losing the military initiative and allowing the North Koreans a breathing spell to regroup. P89. PJK: Sometimes time is very short on when to exploit an opportunity. During this time in Korea, a relatively quick decision was made to cross the parallel and essentially pursue the retreating North Korean forces… but just because the order was to cross the parallel, should the UN forces have gone as far as the Yalu River region?
- On June 13th 1950, only two weeks before the outbreak of the Korean War, he (Acheson) had himself declared that the “one difference which is just about impossible to negotiate is someone's desire eliminate your existence altogether.” P91. PJK: This applies to so many scenarios… Middle Eastern countries attitude towards Israel; Russia and Ukraine, etc.
- In this respect, Mr. Truman was especially concerned by his field commander’s expressed belief Asians respected only aggressive and forceful leadership, and the implication of this remark that Asia's problems could be solved by force… p109. PJK: Obviously, Truman and the Joint Chief’s had a different perspective; they better understood that the U.S. did not have the 100 Army division of WWII anymore. Resources were limited thus MacArthur’s belief that force was the only tool was not a feasible course of action.
- MacArthur’s sin was of a far more serious nature. He had violated in spirit, if not in letter, the policy that Washington had prescribed for him, even though he had invoked Secretary Marshall's message to rationalize his move. Administration policy was to send only South Korean troops into the area along the Manchurian frontier… to reassure Peking that the American-led forces would not be used to invade Manchuria. P128. PJK: enough said; MacArthur disobeyed orders.
- … and they became concerned lest MacArthur again disobey the policy prescribed for him and thereby precipitate a military incident which might ignite a World War. P129.
- A senior commander does not, as Secretary Marshall put it during the hearings, tell an opposition leader “that he as the commander is in total disagreement with his own people.” … MacArthur's letter to Representative Martin was his last public challenge. The March 24th statement had convinced the Commander in Chief that he could no longer ignore MacArthur's threat to his constitutional authority in the field of foreign affairs and civilian control of the military. P203. PJK: A huge and deliberate mistake… sending a letter critical of the Administration to the opposite party in Congress.
- Of equal, if not of far greater importance however, was the reverse side of this hysterical enthusiasm for General MacArthur: the public's frustration with the country's continued participation in world affairs. First, there had been the intense efforts of World War 2; these had been followed by the disappointment of the high wartime hopes for a lengthy period of peace. P218.
- The Chinese Communists possessed a privileged sanctuary in Manchuria, but the United States possessed a similar sanctuary in Japan, Okinawa, and South Korea, particularly around the main port of Pusan. P253.
July 13, 2020
Straight forward writing full of excellent information.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews