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The Pragmatic Superpower: Winning the Cold War in the Middle East
The Arab Spring, Iran’s nuclear ambitions, the Iraq war― the contemporary conflicts in the Middle East have deep roots in the region’s postwar emergence from colonialism.
Foreign policy experts Ray Takeyh and Steven Simon reframe the legacy of midcentury U.S. involvement in the Middle East. Cutting against conventional wisdom, the authors argue that when an inexperienced Washington entered turbulent Middle Eastern politics, it succeeded. Eyes ever on its global conflict with the Soviet Union, America shrewdly navigated the rise of Arab nationalism, the founding of Israel, and seminal conflicts including the Suez War and the Iranian revolution. By the early 1990s, America had emerged as a stabilizing influence while successfully promoting its own strategic interests.
A vital reexamination of a time when the United States got it right, The Pragmatic Superpower sheds new light on the makings of the contemporary Middle East and provides an indispensable guide to its challenges today.
Foreign policy experts Ray Takeyh and Steven Simon reframe the legacy of midcentury U.S. involvement in the Middle East. Cutting against conventional wisdom, the authors argue that when an inexperienced Washington entered turbulent Middle Eastern politics, it succeeded. Eyes ever on its global conflict with the Soviet Union, America shrewdly navigated the rise of Arab nationalism, the founding of Israel, and seminal conflicts including the Suez War and the Iranian revolution. By the early 1990s, America had emerged as a stabilizing influence while successfully promoting its own strategic interests.
A vital reexamination of a time when the United States got it right, The Pragmatic Superpower sheds new light on the makings of the contemporary Middle East and provides an indispensable guide to its challenges today.
- GenresMiddle EastHistory
416 pages, Hardcover
First published April 18, 2016
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Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
March 7, 2020
Having had the pleasure of studying under Steven Simon, I can say that this book represents his and Ray Takeyh’s deep understanding of the strategic and tactical decisions, mishaps, successes, and failures of U.S. and Soviet Union foreign policy in the Middle East during the Cold War. However, the book’s value further increases with the excellent analysis of “on the ground” events that shaped the region.
I picked up this book assuming to learn more about U.S. and Soviet Union strategic posturing in the Middle East. While I certainly did, I found greater knowledge gained in the breakdown of critical events, primary sources from key players in those events, and the inside look into how different administrations dealt with the ever boiling Middle East.
However, I am struggling with one very interesting question posed by the authors in the conclusion. The book begins by arguing that U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War toward the Middle East was successful in accomplishing its goals of: keeping the Soviet Union out of the Middle East; maintaining access to vast petroleum reserves; and resolve the conflict between a Jewish homeland and the Arab states. I agree with their argument and find their position well supported. However, the book’s conclusion asks, “did the U.S. win the Cold War in the Middle East or did the Soviet Union lose it?” Frankly, the Soviets lost it. The U.S. made blunders in its postering and handle of certain issues. But, the Soviets failed to capitalize on these blunders as much as the U.S. succeed with good moves. The Arab states were never receptive to mass communist ideology, and the Soviets failed to reciprocate the level of U.S. effort. The Middle East was a central priority to every U.S. administration from Truman to Reagan, and the Soviets just didn’t try hard enough in the Middle East. Or, as the authors state, “simply put, it [the Middle East] meant more to us than to them.”
The natural advantage of higher importance provided the U.S. an advantage. That said you still need to make the lay-ups, and the U.S. was able to do that. And when the Soviets missed a few lay-ups of their own, we were able to capitalize.
Therefore, I struggle to apply all the lessons of this book because, if the region simply meant more to the U.S., and we put more resources and effort toward it than our opponent, how do we apply this now as the U.S. begins to prioritize other regions and put fewer resources toward the Middle East? How do we apply this to other regions like Asia? Is the simple answer “just try harder? Just throw more resources at the problem?” Maybe the answer is that luck plays a role in all of life, and certainly foreign policy. We were lucky to have the Soviets place less emphasis toward the region and we were lucky to make the right decisions when the stakes were highest.
As I continue to grapple with this question, the daunting reality is that the domestic situation now is far different from the Cold War era, as the authors allude to briefly. Our domestic population seems far less willing to back massive efforts such as those described in the book. Combine that with fatigue and desensitization due to horribly long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the American people are ready for a break. What this means is whatever our next great power competition is, be it Russia or China, or our next conflicts with smaller state or non-state actors, the domestic population will be unlikely to support massive foreign policy efforts. In practice this will mean that the U.S. will need to do more with less.
We will have to execute a soft-power-first strategy as we did during the Cold War. Unless provoked by an attack on the homeland, I do not foresee the American people having the appetite for further, large-scale hard power operations. In my opinion, this point is the greatest lesson this book provides.
We will have to pick our shots, choose our battles, and increase our winning percentage, because we will have fewer opportunities to direct our policies and defeat our adversaries.
An excellent book.
I picked up this book assuming to learn more about U.S. and Soviet Union strategic posturing in the Middle East. While I certainly did, I found greater knowledge gained in the breakdown of critical events, primary sources from key players in those events, and the inside look into how different administrations dealt with the ever boiling Middle East.
However, I am struggling with one very interesting question posed by the authors in the conclusion. The book begins by arguing that U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War toward the Middle East was successful in accomplishing its goals of: keeping the Soviet Union out of the Middle East; maintaining access to vast petroleum reserves; and resolve the conflict between a Jewish homeland and the Arab states. I agree with their argument and find their position well supported. However, the book’s conclusion asks, “did the U.S. win the Cold War in the Middle East or did the Soviet Union lose it?” Frankly, the Soviets lost it. The U.S. made blunders in its postering and handle of certain issues. But, the Soviets failed to capitalize on these blunders as much as the U.S. succeed with good moves. The Arab states were never receptive to mass communist ideology, and the Soviets failed to reciprocate the level of U.S. effort. The Middle East was a central priority to every U.S. administration from Truman to Reagan, and the Soviets just didn’t try hard enough in the Middle East. Or, as the authors state, “simply put, it [the Middle East] meant more to us than to them.”
The natural advantage of higher importance provided the U.S. an advantage. That said you still need to make the lay-ups, and the U.S. was able to do that. And when the Soviets missed a few lay-ups of their own, we were able to capitalize.
Therefore, I struggle to apply all the lessons of this book because, if the region simply meant more to the U.S., and we put more resources and effort toward it than our opponent, how do we apply this now as the U.S. begins to prioritize other regions and put fewer resources toward the Middle East? How do we apply this to other regions like Asia? Is the simple answer “just try harder? Just throw more resources at the problem?” Maybe the answer is that luck plays a role in all of life, and certainly foreign policy. We were lucky to have the Soviets place less emphasis toward the region and we were lucky to make the right decisions when the stakes were highest.
As I continue to grapple with this question, the daunting reality is that the domestic situation now is far different from the Cold War era, as the authors allude to briefly. Our domestic population seems far less willing to back massive efforts such as those described in the book. Combine that with fatigue and desensitization due to horribly long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the American people are ready for a break. What this means is whatever our next great power competition is, be it Russia or China, or our next conflicts with smaller state or non-state actors, the domestic population will be unlikely to support massive foreign policy efforts. In practice this will mean that the U.S. will need to do more with less.
We will have to execute a soft-power-first strategy as we did during the Cold War. Unless provoked by an attack on the homeland, I do not foresee the American people having the appetite for further, large-scale hard power operations. In my opinion, this point is the greatest lesson this book provides.
We will have to pick our shots, choose our battles, and increase our winning percentage, because we will have fewer opportunities to direct our policies and defeat our adversaries.
An excellent book.
August 2, 2019
Understanding the History of US Foreign Policy in the Middle East
Outstanding & comprehensive from a political point of view. Though many of the conclusions are conventional there are quite a number of surprising insights which make Takeyh and Simon's work informative and enjoyable for both novice and veteran readers of the Middle East scene. What the authors do, often absent in many historical accounts, is to include what happened elsewhere and else when that influenced or distracted from the current affair. Thus Nixon and Kissinger saw Egypt and Syria's 1973 attack on Israel as encouraged and abetted by Russia, and a sign that their current policy of Détente with the Soviets might be falling apart. Saddam's uncertainty of his hold on power also references the concurrent fall of the Iron Curtain. The Shah's psychological collapse in 1979 in the face of dissent and his hope of finding leadership guidance from the Americans leapfrogs decades of self confident authoritarian rule taking us 3 decades back to the Mossadeq affair. In the 90s and beyond Middle Eastern powers miscalculate American resolve based on Vietnam and the speedy 1983 American withdrawal from Lebanon leading to Saddam's decision to invade Kuwait – because Iraq was deeply debt from the Iran/Iraq war and the Gulf States refused Saddam's extortionist demand for billions in “aid”.
IRAN, ISRAEL, IRAN
For most of this period, up until the collapse of the Soviet Union, American interests were dominated by the desire to stop the spread of Communism. It begins with the Iran crisis of 1946 which was largely about the Soviet occupation of Iranian territory in Azerbaijan and their backing of the Iranian Tudeh (Communist) Party. Next the 1947 Partition of the British Mandate for Palestine and Truman's recognition of Israel and then back to Iran's 1953 contretemps between the Shah and his Prime Minister Mossadeq. The authors hold that it was sparked by the fact that Mossadeq wanted a larger share of oil revenues than Iran had with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, because Saudi Arabia in 1950 (and Mexico and Venezuela before that) had negotiated much better 50/50 arrangements with the Americans. Britain, who owned 52.5% of the AIOC was reluctant to let go as it's weak economy was highly dependent on both the oil and the income. The Americans sided with the British and Mossadeq raised the spectre of a Communist takeover. While such a line might have worked on the Truman administration the Americans realized that the West controlled the flow of oil based on their effective monopoly on the world's 1500 tankers. Though the CIA did instigate a disinformation campaign against the Iranian PM, at one point (sadly) insinuating that Mossadeq had Jewish ancestors, the authors conclude that the counter coup that the Americans sparked had genuine support from most Iranians.
WRT the Palestine Mandate, the initial outlook of the State Department, the CIA was that the Arabs were well positioned to follow through on their intent of wiping out the Jews and a National Security Report estimated that it would take 160,000 troops to prevent that from happening. (pp41) Loy Henderson (State Department) concluded that supporting Partition and later Recognition would drive the Arabs into the arms of the Soviets. The Joint Chiefs of staff concurred. They did not want to reverse the vast post WW II demobilization and existing US forces were needed in Europe to deter the Soviets and back the Marshall Plan. It was even suggested that Israel would wind up being a Soviet outpost. As perilous as these and other concerns seemed it was all proven wrong. Israeli socialism was limited and the Soviets saw Israel as a capitalist society that would more naturally align with the West. Arab monarchs and dictators were hardly interested in communist revolutions and western capital, expertise and markets were far more capable of developing their economies. After Recognition the US did give Israel loan guarantees, which cost the Americans nothing as Israel never defaulted on any of it's loans. Pragmatically by not committing troops the American relationship with the Arab world never resulted in any sort of a major rift, and was enhanced by Eisenhower's position in the Suez affair, 8 years later.
SUEZ, UAR, IRAQ, JORDAN, LEBANON (1958)
Chapter 4 is about the 1956 Suez War, begun by France and Britain over the loss of the Canal. The French proposed the initial plans. Eisenhower's insight was that Nasser was a nationalist and a populist who was equally wary of the US and the Soviets, however it was Saudi Arabia that Eisenhower valued. The 1958 revolution in Iraq worried many as to which direction the new Qasim government would go. Calling themselves “Free Officers”, a label used 6 years earlier in Egypt, the regime made overtures to Nasser, but was rebuffed. The Jordanian monarchy, worried about a similar coup, asked the Americans for help in the form military aid, as did the Chamoun government in Lebanon under threat from Syria (funded and supported by Nasser) which received of a friendly visit from 14,000 US Marines – operation Blue Bat. The aid was forthcoming because as Secretary Dulles put it “Turkey, Iran and Pakistan would feel – if we don not act – that our inaction is because we are afraid of the Soviet Union.” (pp149) Meanwhile the Egyptian and Syrian merger into United Arab Republic, an expression of pan-Arabism, failed because Nasser's authoritarian centralization of power in Cairo was not what the Syrian military had in mind, so they reverted to tradition and staged another coup.
ARAB-ISRALI CONFLICT (1967 -> CAMP DAVID)
Chapters 6 & 7 cover the diplomacy and political realities behind the Six Day and Yom Kippur wars and discusses the Camp David accords. Johnson, while pro-Israel, resented the fact that the American Jewish community didn't support the Vietnam war, and though he considered threatening to withhold aid packages to Israel he decided against it. There's an intriguing note that Generals Yariv (Israel) and Gamasy (Egypt) took a walk in the desert together at the end of the Yom Kippur War and nearly resolved the problem of disengagement on their own when Kissinger halted it as there would be no role nor credit for the Americans who were planning to mediate a solution in Geneva. Another apropos insight, often said, is that President Carter in 1977 wanted to revive the Geneva talks as a multilateral conference and bring in the Soviets, focusing on the symbolism of international cooperation. This was the LAST thing that Sadat himself wanted as the more fingers in the pie the more difficult a deal would be and he had already rid himself of Russian involvement in Egypt's affairs in order to be closer to the Americans. His acceptance of Begin's challenge to come to Jerusalem was based largely on a desire to avoid another Geneva.
IRANIAN REVOLUTION, IRAN-IRAQ WAR, GULF WARS I & II
Chapters 8 & 9 discuss the Iranian revolution which, in spite of French reports that the Shah was visiting cancer specialists, caught Jimmy Carter and the US intelligence community entirely by surprise and clueless about Khomeini's true nature, as was everyone else. It was interesting to note that Saddam, when he attacked Iran in September 1980 assumed that the Iranian masses would rise up in support. When the Ayatollah Khomeini began his March 1982 counteroffensive into Iraq he believed that the Iraqi masses would welcome and join him. Completing the pattern, George W. Bush made the same wrong footed conclusion. All three received a bloody nose. Of all the leaders discussed in this time frame, the senior George H. Bush comes off as the most pragmatic in that he used the Kuwait crisis to forge a wide coalition that managed to contain Saddam with minimal loss of lives on the American side, yet left Iraq intact enough to persist as a foil against Iran. That and the realization that his son missed, which was there was no end game nor identifiable leadership to take his place afterwards. This echoes back to an earlier observation during the Eisenhower years that though the British and the French hoped to depose Nasser, they had no idea either as to who or what would have come next.
PROBLEMS
Two quibbles with their understanding of the Israelis. In the lead up to the 1967 war, the authors fail to note that Nasser had used his air force as recently as February to attack Yemeni villagers using poison gas. The Israelis were aware of Nasser's use of former Nazi scientists and would be extremely alarmed because of the association of gas in the Holocaust. This would have been strong incentive for the preemptive strike against Egypt's planes. Though unprepared for this in 1967, in Gulf War I Israel was prepared and widely distributed gas masks to all its citizens. Another is the statement on page 320 “The dispatch of Patriot missile batteries that proved an effective barrier against the Scuds helped convince Israel to defer military action.” While the installation of the Patriot missiles may have reassured Israel, they were totally ineffective – not one of the 39 SCUD missiles that landed in Israel was intercepted. Neither of these points detract from the overall analysis.
The book also barely touches the Kennedy and Clinton years. While Kennedy and Johnson might better be described as overly optimistic, Clinton would IMV exemplifies pragmatism.
CONCLUSION
The authors pine for the pragmatic policies of Truman, Eisenhower with US power and influence reaching its apogee under George H. Bush. In a post Cold War age later Presidents forgot that the American interests were most effectively served not by grandiose plans or dubious appeals to good will and idealism but rather a solid conservative understanding of personalities, intelligence an appreciation of loyal allies. The Arab Spring proved that linkage theory, the assertion that the key to middle east peace lay in solving the Arab-Israeli conflict was basically incorrect. And while Obama's middle east policy droned on, they end with one very pragmatic point which is that the Arab world can no longer blame their own lack of good governance on a distant colonial past.
An excellent book of political analysis that has a deservedly good chance of making it onto best seller lists. Highly recommended both for a personal read and for acquisition by libraries!!!!
Outstanding & comprehensive from a political point of view. Though many of the conclusions are conventional there are quite a number of surprising insights which make Takeyh and Simon's work informative and enjoyable for both novice and veteran readers of the Middle East scene. What the authors do, often absent in many historical accounts, is to include what happened elsewhere and else when that influenced or distracted from the current affair. Thus Nixon and Kissinger saw Egypt and Syria's 1973 attack on Israel as encouraged and abetted by Russia, and a sign that their current policy of Détente with the Soviets might be falling apart. Saddam's uncertainty of his hold on power also references the concurrent fall of the Iron Curtain. The Shah's psychological collapse in 1979 in the face of dissent and his hope of finding leadership guidance from the Americans leapfrogs decades of self confident authoritarian rule taking us 3 decades back to the Mossadeq affair. In the 90s and beyond Middle Eastern powers miscalculate American resolve based on Vietnam and the speedy 1983 American withdrawal from Lebanon leading to Saddam's decision to invade Kuwait – because Iraq was deeply debt from the Iran/Iraq war and the Gulf States refused Saddam's extortionist demand for billions in “aid”.
IRAN, ISRAEL, IRAN
For most of this period, up until the collapse of the Soviet Union, American interests were dominated by the desire to stop the spread of Communism. It begins with the Iran crisis of 1946 which was largely about the Soviet occupation of Iranian territory in Azerbaijan and their backing of the Iranian Tudeh (Communist) Party. Next the 1947 Partition of the British Mandate for Palestine and Truman's recognition of Israel and then back to Iran's 1953 contretemps between the Shah and his Prime Minister Mossadeq. The authors hold that it was sparked by the fact that Mossadeq wanted a larger share of oil revenues than Iran had with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, because Saudi Arabia in 1950 (and Mexico and Venezuela before that) had negotiated much better 50/50 arrangements with the Americans. Britain, who owned 52.5% of the AIOC was reluctant to let go as it's weak economy was highly dependent on both the oil and the income. The Americans sided with the British and Mossadeq raised the spectre of a Communist takeover. While such a line might have worked on the Truman administration the Americans realized that the West controlled the flow of oil based on their effective monopoly on the world's 1500 tankers. Though the CIA did instigate a disinformation campaign against the Iranian PM, at one point (sadly) insinuating that Mossadeq had Jewish ancestors, the authors conclude that the counter coup that the Americans sparked had genuine support from most Iranians.
WRT the Palestine Mandate, the initial outlook of the State Department, the CIA was that the Arabs were well positioned to follow through on their intent of wiping out the Jews and a National Security Report estimated that it would take 160,000 troops to prevent that from happening. (pp41) Loy Henderson (State Department) concluded that supporting Partition and later Recognition would drive the Arabs into the arms of the Soviets. The Joint Chiefs of staff concurred. They did not want to reverse the vast post WW II demobilization and existing US forces were needed in Europe to deter the Soviets and back the Marshall Plan. It was even suggested that Israel would wind up being a Soviet outpost. As perilous as these and other concerns seemed it was all proven wrong. Israeli socialism was limited and the Soviets saw Israel as a capitalist society that would more naturally align with the West. Arab monarchs and dictators were hardly interested in communist revolutions and western capital, expertise and markets were far more capable of developing their economies. After Recognition the US did give Israel loan guarantees, which cost the Americans nothing as Israel never defaulted on any of it's loans. Pragmatically by not committing troops the American relationship with the Arab world never resulted in any sort of a major rift, and was enhanced by Eisenhower's position in the Suez affair, 8 years later.
SUEZ, UAR, IRAQ, JORDAN, LEBANON (1958)
Chapter 4 is about the 1956 Suez War, begun by France and Britain over the loss of the Canal. The French proposed the initial plans. Eisenhower's insight was that Nasser was a nationalist and a populist who was equally wary of the US and the Soviets, however it was Saudi Arabia that Eisenhower valued. The 1958 revolution in Iraq worried many as to which direction the new Qasim government would go. Calling themselves “Free Officers”, a label used 6 years earlier in Egypt, the regime made overtures to Nasser, but was rebuffed. The Jordanian monarchy, worried about a similar coup, asked the Americans for help in the form military aid, as did the Chamoun government in Lebanon under threat from Syria (funded and supported by Nasser) which received of a friendly visit from 14,000 US Marines – operation Blue Bat. The aid was forthcoming because as Secretary Dulles put it “Turkey, Iran and Pakistan would feel – if we don not act – that our inaction is because we are afraid of the Soviet Union.” (pp149) Meanwhile the Egyptian and Syrian merger into United Arab Republic, an expression of pan-Arabism, failed because Nasser's authoritarian centralization of power in Cairo was not what the Syrian military had in mind, so they reverted to tradition and staged another coup.
ARAB-ISRALI CONFLICT (1967 -> CAMP DAVID)
Chapters 6 & 7 cover the diplomacy and political realities behind the Six Day and Yom Kippur wars and discusses the Camp David accords. Johnson, while pro-Israel, resented the fact that the American Jewish community didn't support the Vietnam war, and though he considered threatening to withhold aid packages to Israel he decided against it. There's an intriguing note that Generals Yariv (Israel) and Gamasy (Egypt) took a walk in the desert together at the end of the Yom Kippur War and nearly resolved the problem of disengagement on their own when Kissinger halted it as there would be no role nor credit for the Americans who were planning to mediate a solution in Geneva. Another apropos insight, often said, is that President Carter in 1977 wanted to revive the Geneva talks as a multilateral conference and bring in the Soviets, focusing on the symbolism of international cooperation. This was the LAST thing that Sadat himself wanted as the more fingers in the pie the more difficult a deal would be and he had already rid himself of Russian involvement in Egypt's affairs in order to be closer to the Americans. His acceptance of Begin's challenge to come to Jerusalem was based largely on a desire to avoid another Geneva.
IRANIAN REVOLUTION, IRAN-IRAQ WAR, GULF WARS I & II
Chapters 8 & 9 discuss the Iranian revolution which, in spite of French reports that the Shah was visiting cancer specialists, caught Jimmy Carter and the US intelligence community entirely by surprise and clueless about Khomeini's true nature, as was everyone else. It was interesting to note that Saddam, when he attacked Iran in September 1980 assumed that the Iranian masses would rise up in support. When the Ayatollah Khomeini began his March 1982 counteroffensive into Iraq he believed that the Iraqi masses would welcome and join him. Completing the pattern, George W. Bush made the same wrong footed conclusion. All three received a bloody nose. Of all the leaders discussed in this time frame, the senior George H. Bush comes off as the most pragmatic in that he used the Kuwait crisis to forge a wide coalition that managed to contain Saddam with minimal loss of lives on the American side, yet left Iraq intact enough to persist as a foil against Iran. That and the realization that his son missed, which was there was no end game nor identifiable leadership to take his place afterwards. This echoes back to an earlier observation during the Eisenhower years that though the British and the French hoped to depose Nasser, they had no idea either as to who or what would have come next.
PROBLEMS
Two quibbles with their understanding of the Israelis. In the lead up to the 1967 war, the authors fail to note that Nasser had used his air force as recently as February to attack Yemeni villagers using poison gas. The Israelis were aware of Nasser's use of former Nazi scientists and would be extremely alarmed because of the association of gas in the Holocaust. This would have been strong incentive for the preemptive strike against Egypt's planes. Though unprepared for this in 1967, in Gulf War I Israel was prepared and widely distributed gas masks to all its citizens. Another is the statement on page 320 “The dispatch of Patriot missile batteries that proved an effective barrier against the Scuds helped convince Israel to defer military action.” While the installation of the Patriot missiles may have reassured Israel, they were totally ineffective – not one of the 39 SCUD missiles that landed in Israel was intercepted. Neither of these points detract from the overall analysis.
The book also barely touches the Kennedy and Clinton years. While Kennedy and Johnson might better be described as overly optimistic, Clinton would IMV exemplifies pragmatism.
CONCLUSION
The authors pine for the pragmatic policies of Truman, Eisenhower with US power and influence reaching its apogee under George H. Bush. In a post Cold War age later Presidents forgot that the American interests were most effectively served not by grandiose plans or dubious appeals to good will and idealism but rather a solid conservative understanding of personalities, intelligence an appreciation of loyal allies. The Arab Spring proved that linkage theory, the assertion that the key to middle east peace lay in solving the Arab-Israeli conflict was basically incorrect. And while Obama's middle east policy droned on, they end with one very pragmatic point which is that the Arab world can no longer blame their own lack of good governance on a distant colonial past.
An excellent book of political analysis that has a deservedly good chance of making it onto best seller lists. Highly recommended both for a personal read and for acquisition by libraries!!!!
April 17, 2021
While this book took a long time to finish due to my own busy schedules, it has given me a lot of new knowledge on American containment strategies in the Middle East during the Cold War. Notable stories that caught my attention include Nasser’s rise to power, Israel’s war against Arab states, and the Suez War.
However, this book barely touches on important events of the Middle East’s Cold War, such as Iran-Contra scandal, Palestinian uprisings, the CIA’s involvements in various coup attempts, Saddam’s atrocities during his own Iraqi regime, and the Iranian Revolution.
With that being said, I still believe that this book is a good starting point for those who are willing to spend time to learn more about the Middle East, particularly from the 50s to the 90s.
However, this book barely touches on important events of the Middle East’s Cold War, such as Iran-Contra scandal, Palestinian uprisings, the CIA’s involvements in various coup attempts, Saddam’s atrocities during his own Iraqi regime, and the Iranian Revolution.
With that being said, I still believe that this book is a good starting point for those who are willing to spend time to learn more about the Middle East, particularly from the 50s to the 90s.
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September 27, 2022عرض كتاب "القوة العظمى البراجماتية: كسب الحرب الباردة في الشرق الأوسط"
الكتاب: القوة العظمى البراجماتية: كسب الحرب الباردة في الشرق الأوسط
المؤلف: راي تقية، ستيفن سيمون
الناشر: W. W. Norton & Company
تاريخ الإصدار: 31 مارس 2016
عدد الصفحات: 416
اللغة: الإنجليزية
(1)
الربيع العربي، وطموحات إيران النووية، وحرب العراق، وما يصر الغربيون على تسميته الحرب الأهلية السورية؛ كلها صراعات معاصرة تعود جذورها العميقة إلى مرحلة انتقال الشرق الأول من فترة الاستعمار ما بعد الحرب.
في هذا الكتاب، يعيد خبيرا السياسة الخارجية راي تقية وستيف سايمون صياغة إرث الانخراط الأمريكي في العالم العربي ما بين 1945 و1991، ويسلطا ضوءًا جديدًا على الشرق الأوسط المعاصر.
وإذ يسبح المؤلفان عكس تيار المعتقد السائد، يجادلان بأن واشنطن- قليلة الخبرة- حينما اقتحمت عالم السياسة المضطرب في الشرق الأوسط؛ نجحت من خلال براجماتية عنيدة، وحجزت مكانها كقوة عظمى عالمية.
وبينما كانت العيون مركزة على الصراع العالمي مع الاتحاد السوفيتي، مخرت أمريكا بدهاء عباب صعود القومية العربية، وتأسيس إسرائيل، وعددا من الصراعات من بينها حرب السويس والثورة الإيرانية.
ويكشف تقيه وسيمون في كتابهما "القوة البراجماتية العظمى" أن أهداف أمريكا في المنطقة كانت في الغالب غير معقدة، لكنها نادرًا ما كانت متواضعة. إذ انتهجت واشنطن دبلوماسية بارعة لمنع التسلل السوفيتي إلى المنطقة، واستمرار الحصول على مواردها النفطية الكبيرة، وحل الصراع بين الوطن القومي لليهود والدول العربية التي تعارضه.
ويوفر الكتاب إطلالة على مناورات واشنطن في السباق من أجل السلطة العالمية، ويقدم تقييما مختلفا لسياسات أمريكا خلال فترة الحرب الباردة في منطقة حساسة من العالم.
(2)
يحاول الكتاب في الأساس أن يوضح كيف كانت سياسة الولايات المتحدة في الشرق الأوسط خلال فترة الحرب الباردة، ما بين 1946 وحتى 1991، ناجحةً في الواقع- ليس نجاحا تامًا، ولكنه نجاح ملحوظ.
وذلك عبر دراسة مجموعة من الأزمات: كيف تعاملت الولايات المتحدة مع الوضع الثوري، والصراع بين الدول، والحروب العربية-الإسرائيلية، والثورة، وانهيار نظام الدولة. هذا هو في الأساس فحوى النقاش الذي يدور حوله الكتاب.
ثم يحاول الكتاب استكشاف لماذا نجحت هذه السياسة حيثما نجحت، ولماذا فشلت حيثما فشلت. ليخلُصَ إلى أن ذلك يرجح جزئيًا إلى البراجماتية الأمريكية، وجزئيًا إلى القدر. وإن كان تقية يعترف بأن الولايات المتحدة جيدة جدًا في شن الحرب، لكنها ليست جيدة دائما في توقع ما يأتي بعد.
ووسط حالة الفوضى التي يموج بها القرن الـ21، يرى تقيه وسيمون أن هناك حاجة ملحة للنظر للوراء، إلى تلك الفترة التي أدارت فيها الولايات المتحدة الأمور كما ينبغي. عندها فقط- بحسب المؤلفان- سوف نفهم التحديات التي نواجهها اليوم على نحو أفضل.
(3)
حين سُئِل راي تقيه عما يعنيه بالبراجماتية تحديدا، أجاب: أن الولايات المتحدة تحدد مصالحها بعناية وبطريقة محسوبة. فليس لها أعداء على طول الخط، أو حتى حلفاء دائمون. ويمكن رؤية ذلك بشكل خاص في عهد أيزنهاور، حيث كانت سنواته الأربعة الأولى فاشلة إلى حد كبير، ثم عاد برؤية ثاقبة أكثر إلى حد كبير، بعد إعادة النظر في افتراضاته، وافتراضات إدارته.
ويرى تقية أن الرئيس الأمريكي الأكثر براجماتية، هو: أيزنهاور؛ لأنه قام بشيء نادر: غيَّر سياسته، ما يعني تغيير افتراضاته. على الجانب الآخر، كان أيزنهاور يولي ثقة كبرى في العمليات السرية، وجميع العمليات السرية التي جربها في الشؤرق الأوسط فشلت: في إيران العملية أجاكس عام 1953، وسوريا، والعملية أوميجا التي كانت تستهدف تقويض نظام عبدالناصر.
وفي حين يرى تقية أن الرئيس الأمريكي الأقل براجماتية، كان: كارتر وريجان- الأول لأنه نادرا ما تحدى افتراضاته، ولم يكن لديه الوقت الكافي، وكان غارقا في أزمة لم يفهمها. والثاني فلم يكن يمثل له الشرق الأوسط شيئًا ذا معنى. يخالفه سيمون فيما يتعلق بـ كينيدي الذي يراه كان براجماتيا جدًا، ويضيف اسم جونسون إلى القائمة.
(4)
- "يُحدِث ثقبا في جدار الخرافات المتأصلة.. واضح وميسر" (بابلشرز ويكلي)
- "طرح ثاقب وشامل" (نيويورك تايمز بوك ريفيو)
- "إطلالة فريدة على السياسة الخارجية للولايات المتحدة في الشرق الأوسط" (كيركوس ريفيوز)
- "سطر تقيه وسيمون- وكلاهما عالم بارز في شؤون الشرق الأوسط- تحديًا حيًا واستفزازيًا للمعتقد السائد بشأن السياسة الأمريكية تجاه هذه المنطقة المضطربة خلال الحرب الباردة. يرون أنه باستبعاد الاتحاد السوفيتي، ودعم الحلفاء العرب المحافظين، واستغلال ظهور إسرائيل كقوة كبرى، أحاط واضعو السياسة الأمريكية مصالحهم خلال الحرب الباردة بسياجٍ آمن. وهي دراسة يجب أن يقرأها صناع القرار والطلاب الذين يدرسون السياسة الأمريكية، لأنها تمثل إسهاما كبيرًا في مناقشاتنا الجارية حول دور الولايات المتحدة في الشرق الأوسط". (روبرت كاجان، مؤلف كتاب "العالم الذي صنعته أمريكا").
- حكاية رائعة لانخراط أمريكا المتشابك في الشرق الأوسط، يحكيها اثنان من أكثر خبراء واشنطن الإقليميين ذكاء وحنكة. الأصداء الغريبة لعناوين اليوم يتردد صداها في جنبات هذه الإطلالة الأخَّاذة على تاريخ أحد المسارح الحاسمة للحرب الباردة. وكما قال فوكنر*: الماضي لا يموت. بل إنه ليس بماضٍ. وهي المقولة التي لا تتجلى في ثوب أكثر صدقًا مثلما تتجسد في الشرق الأوسط، وهذا الكتاب الممتاز الذي ألفه تقيه وسيمون يوضح لك لماذا". (جدعون روز، محرر، مجلة فورين أفيرز).
* وليام فوكنر- رواية "قداس لراهبة Requiem for a Nun"
(نُشِرَ هذا العرض على موقع مركز إدراك للدراسات والاستشارات في عام 2016، ومتاح على الرابط التالي https://idraksy.net/programmatic-supe...، كما نُشِرَ على موقع "العالم بالعربية"؛ أول منصة عربية متخصصة في رصد وتحليل اتجاهات الصحف ومراكز الأبحاث والإصدارات العالمية)
الكتاب: القوة العظمى البراجماتية: كسب الحرب الباردة في الشرق الأوسط
المؤلف: راي تقية، ستيفن سيمون
الناشر: W. W. Norton & Company
تاريخ الإصدار: 31 مارس 2016
عدد الصفحات: 416
اللغة: الإنجليزية
(1)
الربيع العربي، وطموحات إيران النووية، وحرب العراق، وما يصر الغربيون على تسميته الحرب الأهلية السورية؛ كلها صراعات معاصرة تعود جذورها العميقة إلى مرحلة انتقال الشرق الأول من فترة الاستعمار ما بعد الحرب.
في هذا الكتاب، يعيد خبيرا السياسة الخارجية راي تقية وستيف سايمون صياغة إرث الانخراط الأمريكي في العالم العربي ما بين 1945 و1991، ويسلطا ضوءًا جديدًا على الشرق الأوسط المعاصر.
وإذ يسبح المؤلفان عكس تيار المعتقد السائد، يجادلان بأن واشنطن- قليلة الخبرة- حينما اقتحمت عالم السياسة المضطرب في الشرق الأوسط؛ نجحت من خلال براجماتية عنيدة، وحجزت مكانها كقوة عظمى عالمية.
وبينما كانت العيون مركزة على الصراع العالمي مع الاتحاد السوفيتي، مخرت أمريكا بدهاء عباب صعود القومية العربية، وتأسيس إسرائيل، وعددا من الصراعات من بينها حرب السويس والثورة الإيرانية.
ويكشف تقيه وسيمون في كتابهما "القوة البراجماتية العظمى" أن أهداف أمريكا في المنطقة كانت في الغالب غير معقدة، لكنها نادرًا ما كانت متواضعة. إذ انتهجت واشنطن دبلوماسية بارعة لمنع التسلل السوفيتي إلى المنطقة، واستمرار الحصول على مواردها النفطية الكبيرة، وحل الصراع بين الوطن القومي لليهود والدول العربية التي تعارضه.
ويوفر الكتاب إطلالة على مناورات واشنطن في السباق من أجل السلطة العالمية، ويقدم تقييما مختلفا لسياسات أمريكا خلال فترة الحرب الباردة في منطقة حساسة من العالم.
(2)
يحاول الكتاب في الأساس أن يوضح كيف كانت سياسة الولايات المتحدة في الشرق الأوسط خلال فترة الحرب الباردة، ما بين 1946 وحتى 1991، ناجحةً في الواقع- ليس نجاحا تامًا، ولكنه نجاح ملحوظ.
وذلك عبر دراسة مجموعة من الأزمات: كيف تعاملت الولايات المتحدة مع الوضع الثوري، والصراع بين الدول، والحروب العربية-الإسرائيلية، والثورة، وانهيار نظام الدولة. هذا هو في الأساس فحوى النقاش الذي يدور حوله الكتاب.
ثم يحاول الكتاب استكشاف لماذا نجحت هذه السياسة حيثما نجحت، ولماذا فشلت حيثما فشلت. ليخلُصَ إلى أن ذلك يرجح جزئيًا إلى البراجماتية الأمريكية، وجزئيًا إلى القدر. وإن كان تقية يعترف بأن الولايات المتحدة جيدة جدًا في شن الحرب، لكنها ليست جيدة دائما في توقع ما يأتي بعد.
ووسط حالة الفوضى التي يموج بها القرن الـ21، يرى تقيه وسيمون أن هناك حاجة ملحة للنظر للوراء، إلى تلك الفترة التي أدارت فيها الولايات المتحدة الأمور كما ينبغي. عندها فقط- بحسب المؤلفان- سوف نفهم التحديات التي نواجهها اليوم على نحو أفضل.
(3)
حين سُئِل راي تقيه عما يعنيه بالبراجماتية تحديدا، أجاب: أن الولايات المتحدة تحدد مصالحها بعناية وبطريقة محسوبة. فليس لها أعداء على طول الخط، أو حتى حلفاء دائمون. ويمكن رؤية ذلك بشكل خاص في عهد أيزنهاور، حيث كانت سنواته الأربعة الأولى فاشلة إلى حد كبير، ثم عاد برؤية ثاقبة أكثر إلى حد كبير، بعد إعادة النظر في افتراضاته، وافتراضات إدارته.
ويرى تقية أن الرئيس الأمريكي الأكثر براجماتية، هو: أيزنهاور؛ لأنه قام بشيء نادر: غيَّر سياسته، ما يعني تغيير افتراضاته. على الجانب الآخر، كان أيزنهاور يولي ثقة كبرى في العمليات السرية، وجميع العمليات السرية التي جربها في الشؤرق الأوسط فشلت: في إيران العملية أجاكس عام 1953، وسوريا، والعملية أوميجا التي كانت تستهدف تقويض نظام عبدالناصر.
وفي حين يرى تقية أن الرئيس الأمريكي الأقل براجماتية، كان: كارتر وريجان- الأول لأنه نادرا ما تحدى افتراضاته، ولم يكن لديه الوقت الكافي، وكان غارقا في أزمة لم يفهمها. والثاني فلم يكن يمثل له الشرق الأوسط شيئًا ذا معنى. يخالفه سيمون فيما يتعلق بـ كينيدي الذي يراه كان براجماتيا جدًا، ويضيف اسم جونسون إلى القائمة.
(4)
- "يُحدِث ثقبا في جدار الخرافات المتأصلة.. واضح وميسر" (بابلشرز ويكلي)
- "طرح ثاقب وشامل" (نيويورك تايمز بوك ريفيو)
- "إطلالة فريدة على السياسة الخارجية للولايات المتحدة في الشرق الأوسط" (كيركوس ريفيوز)
- "سطر تقيه وسيمون- وكلاهما عالم بارز في شؤون الشرق الأوسط- تحديًا حيًا واستفزازيًا للمعتقد السائد بشأن السياسة الأمريكية تجاه هذه المنطقة المضطربة خلال الحرب الباردة. يرون أنه باستبعاد الاتحاد السوفيتي، ودعم الحلفاء العرب المحافظين، واستغلال ظهور إسرائيل كقوة كبرى، أحاط واضعو السياسة الأمريكية مصالحهم خلال الحرب الباردة بسياجٍ آمن. وهي دراسة يجب أن يقرأها صناع القرار والطلاب الذين يدرسون السياسة الأمريكية، لأنها تمثل إسهاما كبيرًا في مناقشاتنا الجارية حول دور الولايات المتحدة في الشرق الأوسط". (روبرت كاجان، مؤلف كتاب "العالم الذي صنعته أمريكا").
- حكاية رائعة لانخراط أمريكا المتشابك في الشرق الأوسط، يحكيها اثنان من أكثر خبراء واشنطن الإقليميين ذكاء وحنكة. الأصداء الغريبة لعناوين اليوم يتردد صداها في جنبات هذه الإطلالة الأخَّاذة على تاريخ أحد المسارح الحاسمة للحرب الباردة. وكما قال فوكنر*: الماضي لا يموت. بل إنه ليس بماضٍ. وهي المقولة التي لا تتجلى في ثوب أكثر صدقًا مثلما تتجسد في الشرق الأوسط، وهذا الكتاب الممتاز الذي ألفه تقيه وسيمون يوضح لك لماذا". (جدعون روز، محرر، مجلة فورين أفيرز).
* وليام فوكنر- رواية "قداس لراهبة Requiem for a Nun"
(نُشِرَ هذا العرض على موقع مركز إدراك للدراسات والاستشارات في عام 2016، ومتاح على الرابط التالي https://idraksy.net/programmatic-supe...، كما نُشِرَ على موقع "العالم بالعربية"؛ أول منصة عربية متخصصة في رصد وتحليل اتجاهات الصحف ومراكز الأبحاث والإصدارات العالمية)
August 9, 2025
I almost want to give this four stars. its positives are that it lays out in very clear, relatively concise detail all of the bewildering, Byzantine events that occurred during the Cold war in the Middle East. They break the book down into 10 events that were critical to the US involvement in the Middle East during the Cold war. In particular, I found the description of the Gulf war and the Iran Iraq war to be illuminating. There are a lot of details that I either forgot or was never aware of in terms of how various players interacted. these events were, not surprisingly, more nuanced than I remember or then the general public opinion certainly views those two conflicts today.
However, I don't know how much greater insight I achieved from reading this book. That's probably too harsh an analysis. I gained a sharper picture. of this period but the picture overall didn't change. I do appreciate their stance which is generally counter to the current understanding of the US role in the Middle East. I don't know their political affiliation, but they appear more predisposed to view Republican presidents better than Democratic. But that might not be fair. Eisenhower did do a great job as president and in managing the Middle East . They're quite critical of Jimmy Carter and his lack of attention on Iran and the idealistic blinders that prevented him from taking action. In particular his misunderstanding of the Shah and of the nature of the Islamic revolution itself. I do appreciate that idealists can be quite dangerous. Leaders who allow their morality to get in the way of pragmatism can be ultimately quite costly.
Im the end, this is a solid book for anyone wanting to get an understanding of the details. without necessarily a deeper understanding of the larger forces and patterns that shaped the US involvement in the Middle East. I may come back and give this four stars the more I'm talking about it, but for now I'll leave it as it is. it is quite comprehensive as a survey of that time.
However, I don't know how much greater insight I achieved from reading this book. That's probably too harsh an analysis. I gained a sharper picture. of this period but the picture overall didn't change. I do appreciate their stance which is generally counter to the current understanding of the US role in the Middle East. I don't know their political affiliation, but they appear more predisposed to view Republican presidents better than Democratic. But that might not be fair. Eisenhower did do a great job as president and in managing the Middle East . They're quite critical of Jimmy Carter and his lack of attention on Iran and the idealistic blinders that prevented him from taking action. In particular his misunderstanding of the Shah and of the nature of the Islamic revolution itself. I do appreciate that idealists can be quite dangerous. Leaders who allow their morality to get in the way of pragmatism can be ultimately quite costly.
Im the end, this is a solid book for anyone wanting to get an understanding of the details. without necessarily a deeper understanding of the larger forces and patterns that shaped the US involvement in the Middle East. I may come back and give this four stars the more I'm talking about it, but for now I'll leave it as it is. it is quite comprehensive as a survey of that time.
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