In Defense of Anarchism

by Robert Paul Wolff

This work of anarchist scholarship defends individualist anarchism. The premise is that individual autonomy & state authority are mutually exclusive &, as individual autonomy is inalienable, the state's moral legitimacy collapses. Published by Harper & Row in 1970 as In Defense of Anarchism: With a Reply to Jeffrey H. Reiman's In Defense of Political Philosophy, it's run to five editions.
It's in three parts, opening with "The Conflict between Authority & Autonomy," which posits as modern political philosophy's essence "how the moral autonomy of the individual can be made compatible with the legitimate authority of the state." What follows is about authority, Kantian autonomy & their incompatibility.
"The Solution of Classical Democracy" investigates representative, majoritarian & unanimous direct democracy, drawing on Rawls' arguments for consensus decisionmaking's practicality. Wolff claims consensus is limited by requirements that participants are generally rationally altruistic & communities aren't large. He critiques democratic representation, noting that representatives don't obey constituents' wishes. It's impossible not to distinguish between rulers & ruled in such systems.
"Beyond the Legitimate State" arrives at a foreshadowed conclusion that because autonomy & the legitimacy of state power are incompatible, one must either embrace anarchism or surrender autonomy to whichever authority seems strongest. In this schema, democracy is a priori no better than dictatorship as both require foresaking autonomy.

Genres: Philosophy, Politics, Nonfiction, Political Science, Academic, Theory, Law

118 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1970

About the author

Robert Paul Wolff was an American political philosopher and professor emeritus at the University of Massachusetts Amherst.
Wolff has written widely on topics in political philosophy, including Marxism, tolerance (against liberalism and in favor of anarchism), political justification, and democracy.

Reviews

[C · Rating 5 out of 5]

Premise 1: The State claims a legitimate right to be an authority (rule) over a certain territory and people.
Premise 2: You have a moral obligation to be autonomous.
P1 and P2 cannot go together, so the state cannot have a legitimate right to claim authority over someone who has a moral obligation to be autonomous. Hence, be a philosophical anarchist.

Such a simple, sweet, elegant, and sound argument. We can still support left-wing state programs, because they persuade us as morally autonomous agents, but not because the state claims the right to force you to accept such programs.
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I think I've read this book four or five times now. Fantastic teaching tool, with sober writing and argumentation.

[Terence · Rating 2 out of 5]

In Defense of Anarchism is an extended essay that is not so much the titular defense of anarchism as it is an offensive against the moral authority of the state, i.e., that there is a case where the state can command an individual even against that person’s moral beliefs. Since Wolff insists on the total autonomy of the individual, it’s not surprising that he can’t find any polity that can claim the de iure right to compel obedience, with one exception. That exception is the case of a unanimous universal democracy. A condition found only in small groups, and – even there – one that breaks down in a short time.

I’m catching up on a depressingly large backlog of reviews and I don’t want to devote a lot of time to this so I offer up the notes I took while reading, which may interest readers sufficiently that they will read the book themselves:

• [author] can find no de iure justification for “the state”

• i.e., there exists no form of government that in some manner doesn’t deny individual autonomy, even democracies

• all states rest on violence (cf. Jensen), economic coercion and the myth of legitimacy

• a state can be de facto legitimate in the sense that the majority of its citizens accept its prescriptions but there is no moral imperative to obey, esp. since most citizens forfeit autonomy when accepting state authority

• [author] holds out possibility of such a state because social and political conventions are manmade, not natural, and some genius could someday create the conditions where individual and state were reconciled

• I think the issue is unresolvable. We can aim for an ideal – the least amount of coercive authority and the greatest amount of individual autonomy* – but we must recognize that we’ll only achieve an approximation. We should strive for a society that can best handle that constantly moving target.

• Whatever legitimacy a state possesses comes from its ability to promote the welfare of all its citizens and provide opportunity for them to influence its policies. If power is concentrated in the few or the one, then a state has little or no legitimate authority.

* And this point is not universally accepted. A Neo-Confucian, for example, would be appalled at the idea of individual autonomy (at least as conceived by myself or Wolff). And even in the Western democracies there are far too many (IMO) who would grant the state enormous coercive and intrusive powers.

[Antonio Miller-Perez · Rating 2 out of 5]

This is ridiculous. It’s a defense of anarchism through Kantian ethics and a critique of classical liberalism in the from Rousseau, Locke, etc. It has no relation to Anarchist tradition, no mention of Godwin, Proudhon, or Kropotkin. Its premise is the question of whether a just state can exist with respect to personal autonomy an analysis in which both contrasting entities are poorly defined. There is little to no mention of class and its relation to the state, no historical inquiry, and proposes, like many sophomoric philosophers, simples uncomplicated thought experiments. It has scant valuable critiques of the premise of democracy and its problematic nature but does not further investigate beyond that, just denouncing democracy for its inability to fully respect the totality of all autonomous persons within a state no matter the form it takes.

[Andrew · Rating 1 out of 5]

This book is pretty good at explaining one of the core issues in political philosophy: what justifies the authority of the state? However, the positive argument is very weak: it relies on a vague, underdeveloped "Kantian" account of moral autonomy, from which it is not surprising that philosophical anarchism follows. However, it is very unclear why one should accept this picture of autonomy, especially given the implausible conclusions which it seems to lead to. Wolff notes in his preface that he thought of himself as following Russell's account of a good philosophical argument: start with uncontroversial premises, and derive surprising conclusions. Actually, it's very much the opposite: start with *very* controversial premises and wind up with conclusions which, although surprising in themselves, are fairly straightforward, given the controversial premises. A good read for an intro political philosophy class if you want to get your students to see what one of the fundamental questions in political philosophy is, before moving on to better writing on the authority of the state.

[Conrado · Rating 5 out of 5]

A.K.A. The sceptic's guide to political authority; or, why unanimous direct democracy is the only solution.

This is a book that questions the possibility of political philosophy (understood as "The discovery, analysis, and demonstration of the forms and principles of legitimate authority--of the right to rule" (p.5)) by questioning the legitimacy of its central concept; that is, the normative concept of state, understood as "the group of persons who have the right to exercise supreme authority [i.e., the right to command and correlatively the right to be obeyed] within a territory" (ibid.).

The legitimacy question asks for the conditions under which a state (or supreme authority) can rightly exist, and the reasons for this; supreme authority being a nonempirical normative concept, the only way we can know whether it is legitimate is by making an a priori argument that shows that there can be forms of human community in which one (or some) men have a moral right to rule (p.8). Correlatively, this can be understood as a quest for an argument that shows that we have a moral obligation to obey commands by the state.

Now Wolff presents a single crucial second element here: as rational beings who are responsible for their actions (therefore, metaphysically free), humans have an obligation to be morally autonomous; that is, they have an obligation to rationally deliberate and decide by and for themselves what they should do, and only bind themselves to laws that they have legislated for themselves (that is the meaning of being autonomous, according to Wolff -- see p.14). What is implied by this is that, as long as someone strives to be autonomous, they will never obey any commands because they are told to do so: the autonomous man recognizes no authority or will over him (of course, he can come up with his own reasons for doing what he is told to do, but as long as those reasons come out of his own will and deliberation, it will be an autonomous decision).

By combining the absolute authority essential to the normative concept of state and the moral obligation to be autonomous, we arrive at what is considered by Wolff to be the fundamental problem of political philosophy: The conflict of authority and autonomy.

If every conceivable de jure state has by conceptual entailment supreme authority, and everyone has an obligation to be autonomous (and this in itself implies that no one should obey commands or laws because they are told to do so), then everyone must reject the state's claim of authority over them if they strive to achieve autonomy. In other words, if there's moral obligation to be achieve autonomy at whatever cost, there are no states whose subjects have a moral obligation to obey its commands: no state is legitimate, and the only viable option available to the autonomous man is philosophical anarchism (p.18).

It should be noted that this by itself doesn't mean that one should abolish the state, or that every state is unworthy of support: Wolff clearly recognizes this when he says the we can engage in prudential reasonings to obey various state laws (maybe by self-interest or any other kind of reasoining of the sort); the only thing the autonomous man is obliged to is to never obey an external law simply because it is the law: again, the decision must come from his own will and reasons.

It should also be noted that this problem is supported by very controversial assumptions, that should not be taken as truths at face-value, I believe: that every agent is essentially (i.e., analitically) autonomous; that autonomy conceptually precludes any kind of authority; that "state" is a concept that can be clearly defined (therefore with clearly identifiable essential properties), etc. So Wolff's argument is not trivial at all, and should analysed carefully.

The rest of the book proceeds to analyse various alternative solutions to the problem of authority and autonomy. Wolff believes the solution lies in democracy, since in it every man is a law-giver and a law-obeyer, and therefore men can collectively bind themselves to laws collectively made by themselves (p.21-2). More precisely, the only form of democracy that constitutes a genuine solution is unanimous direct democracy, under which "every member of society wills freely every law which is actually passed", thus allowing authority and autonomy to coexist harmoniously (and this does not require that men have equal desires or reasons -- in fact, there can be disagreement in those departments). Therefore, unanimous direct democracy is the only condition for a legitimate state (I even wonder why Wolff bothered to call this a defense of anarchism in the first place, since he just demonstrated the legitimacy of the normative concept of state -- go figure). For reasons I won't develop here, Wolff rejects other forms of democracy as genuine solutions to the problem, whether it be representative ones founded on contractual promises, or majoritarian ones. I personally find this section to be of great use if one wants to question standard conceptions of democracy.

Leaving unanimous direct democracy aside, if there's no way to resolve the conflict between authority and autonomy, we're left with a dilemma: either we treat all existing states as illegitimate and only obey their commands after careful evaluation, or we give up autonomy altogether and stick to whatever form of government we think is the most beneficial or just to us; and, if we do that, then we'll have no moral reason to prefer democracy to any other beneficial form of government, such as benevolent dictatures or monarchies. Wolff thinks that giving up autonomy is completely out of the question, but doesn't seem very satisfied with the anarchist conclusion (What is your choice?). Lastly, Wolff sketches out a (not very detailed) model of anarchist society that could preserve a reasonable degree of social coordination as part of a positive anarchist project, though recognizing it as a massively underdeveloped part of the project.

Overall, I'm very impressed by the book, and I enjoyed almost every single page of it; I would easily read all of it again, and even use it for didactic purposes. Wolff's style is clear and engaging, the problem, solutions and discussion he presents are stimulating, and his arguments are also pretty interesting in themselves. I recommend this to anyone interested in the problem of authority; you will most likely not be disappointed.

[Philip of Macedon · Rating 3 out of 5]

I can’t say I’ve ever had any interest in anarchism as a political philosophy, but I’ve been curious if any political philosopher has taken it seriously enough to write about. It’s not a subject I would have sought out, but when coming across a small book on it at a used bookstore it seemed like my question had been answered.

Despite its title, In Defense of Anarchism is not a book about anarchism. Only its last four pages give any discussion of anarchism as a political philosophy, as a theoretical, Utopian model grounded in real instead of fantasy political ideas. It is a rather brief and nuanced, but unconvincing discussion. Most of the book looks at a more interesting problem: the author’s search for political harmony between individual moral autonomy and the legitimate authority of the state.

He lays out his conceptions of authority and autonomy and shows how complete personal autonomy is not compatible with submission to the complete authority of state power. It is difficult to realize what legitimate authority might look like and under what circumstances we can call authority legitimate. And once we recognize such an authority, one cannot submit to it without sacrificing their own autonomy, which Wolff holds as the supreme importance. “The defining mark of the state is authority, the right to rule. The primary obligation of man is autonomy, the refusal to be ruled.” He observes many of the obstacles we might encounter in realizing both this authority and in a perfectly rational autonomy. So how do we resolve this conflict?

He moves straight to what he calls the only feasible solution for such a problem and centers his study around democracy. He discusses unanimous direct democracy, which requires impossibly restrictive conditions that make it hardly applicable to any real society. Only if all its members are in strong agreement about most of the matters of importance can this model work. Then he looks at representative democracy, with all its well-known strengths and its well-discussed weaknesses, such as the forfeiture of any direct say in political matters, giving up autonomy to a representative who was likely elected before many issues of importance were known, and so who can never fairly represent anyone they are expected to.

He visits over and over again the question of how we may be asked to obey laws which we had no say in, and reflects on the reality of modern politics and legislation, in which no voter can be expected to be informed enough to participate at a meaningful level with representatives. His outlook is not as bleak as it may sound, though. Wolff proposes an idea for instant direct democracy, in which citizens have attachments to their TV sets (written in 1970, so today this would probably be tied to cell phone) that allow them to vote directly and immediately on the issues they care about. While this could have chaotic consequences at first, he argues that over time it will level out, folks will recognize their immediate impact through voting, and may increase citizen involvement in political matters. It doesn’t solve the problem of people voting impulsively and without careful consideration, but he hopes this sort of thing will be mitigated over time.

He then discusses majoritarian democracy, borrowing from Plato, Locke, and Rousseau and a few others to get into its complexity. He takes a lot from the Social Contract to examine how this model might work, and comes away unconvinced, I think rightly so. He picks apart some of Rousseau’s flawed conclusions, tracing them to what he believes are simple confusions. He points to errors in how decisions on important issues would manifest, creating an irrational and inconsistent body of ideas that do not reflect the desires of rational citizens.

Despite seeing majoritarian democracy as the only legitimate way in which the citizenry rule themselves, Wolff claims the citizenry does not truly remain free and self-ruled while submitting to the majority. The majority, he probably rightly posits, is more often wrong than right. Right answers are usually only adopted by the minority early on.

So after finding all forms of democracy inadequate to fulfill the goal of total individual autonomy, and providing good if imperfect arguments in support, Wolff admits he is at a loss for a solution.

“If autonomy and authority are genuinely incompatible, only two courses are open to us. Either we must embrace philosophical anarchism and treat all governments as non-legitimate bodies whose commands must be judged and evaluated in each instance before they are obeyed; or else, we must give up as quixotic the pursuit of autonomy in the political realm and submit ourselves to whatever form of government appears most just and be efficient at the moment.”

He chooses not to follow the latter course, because he supposes it would have us swearing allegiance to benevolent dictatorships or majoritarian tyrannical democracies. In his view, we cannot give up moral autonomy. I agree, but I haven’t been convinced that he has explored all possibilities, or with enough care. He closes by offering his Utopian Glimpse of a World Without States. Instead of providing a strongly reasoned thesis based on most of what he has already discussed, he outlines a rough idea of how common problems in an anarchistic world (economy, defense, traffic safety, city reconstruction or social organization more generally) might be overcome. He admits that he has not solved anything and that his vision is incomplete, and there is more to be figured out. This is him laying the groundwork for what I assume was a longer and more complete book. Still, he offers a sane and rational analysis of some basic problems in political philosophy.

[J.D. Steens · Rating 2 out of 5]

Wolff wants to find the sweet spot between individual autonomy and the authority of a political entity to govern. This he calls "the fundamental problem of political philosophy." By "autonomy," Wolff means, in the Kantian sense, an individual's free consent. By authority, Wolff means that the individual freely consents to the governing entity.

In the popular view, a democracy is said to be best suited to meeting these twin objectives, but Wolff points out some fundamental problems. Direct democracy solves the problem only when there's unanimity, which is possible only in small-scale settings. Representative democracy removes the individual from self-governance and places the governing power in someone who takes their (her/his) place. That is not an inherent problem if the representative governance decisions reflect the will of those represented, an impossible task within a pluralistic society. In this situation, a representative democracy becomes, he says, a majoritarian democracy which has tyrannical implications over "the defenseless minority." This is so even with guarantees for some minority rights as many majority decisions would still be opposed by minority interests in a pluralistic setting.

In the end, Wolff comes to what he refers to as a dead end - which is the "inability to solve the dilemma of autonomy and authority, even for a utopian society." He then goes on to say that his arguments for "the just state must be consigned to the category of the round square, the married bachelor, and the incensed sense-datum." For Wolff, this is intolerable: "Men are no better than children if they not only accept the rule of others from force of necessity, but embrace it willingly and forfeit their duty unceasingly to weigh the merits of the actions which they perform. When I place myself in the hands of another, and permit him to determine the principles by which I shall guide my behavior, I repudiate the freedom and reason which give me dignity. I am then guilty of what Kant might have called the sin of willful heteronomy." While he gives up his quest, tentatively,* his only viable option is "philosophical anarchism." By this he means that we must "treat all governments as non-legitimate bodies whose commands must be judged and evaluated in each instance before they are obeyed...."

I suppose Wolff's defiance is regarded as noble by many, but his stance struck me as overly self-oriented. We are not pure ego; we are ego that is always in a relationship. At birth, the self begins its social journey where the world is "wholly other." The self, as ego, is but one among a sea of other selves. How does one then reconcile one's own freedom with the freedom of others? Or, rather, how does one insist that one's own sense of rightness prevail over those who see the world differently? Autonomy and freedom are entirely consistent with our biologically-given survival/well-being mandate, but that is just as often as not, or more so than not, achieved via group life which then of course begets the need for a governance entity to provide order so that the freedom of one is compatible with the freedom others. This requires compromise of a major sort, rather than an insistence on one's consent. The latter is nothing but a formula for disorder that compromises the freedom of all.

Wolff implies that the rational man could see the ramifications of all of this and overcome it by becoming the advocate of the common good. No doubt some of this can be done. It is a worthy aspiration, but a healthy dose of realism needs to be part of the mix. Even if their intent was honorable, what one sees as good for the whole will likely differ from what another sees in some respect. More significantly, a good part of humankind cares nothing about the common good. The motivation is just not there. In the end, we are stuck with imperfection as formulated by majority rule with some accommodation for minority rights, but even so, we are able to move forward with some form of ordered individual freedom which is, of course, antithetical to Wolff's self-focused "philosophical anarchism."

*"...I am unwilling to accept as final the negative results of our search for a political order which harmonizes authority and autonomy....When rational men, in full knowledge of the proximate and distant consequences of their actions, determine to set private interests aside and pursue the general good, it must be possible for them to create a form of association which accomplishes that end without depriving some of them of their moral autonomy. The state, in contrast to nature, cannot be ineradicably other."

[Maddi Shakespeare · Rating 2 out of 5]

I read this because someone I know claims that they are an "anarchist" and I wanted an academic knowledge of anarchy in order to tell them to stfu.

In total honesty, this essay kinda fell flat for me. There is very little written in the defense of anarchism. Rather, it's a total slander of the state's impact on an individual's autonomy. While I agree that the legitimacy of an authority relies on the complacency of the masses, it just felt like a lot repetition with not much specificity of anarchism.

This kind of academic writing can be difficult to parse and requires dedicated intentionality in order to read and understand. Felt like I spent a lot of energy on a whole lot of nothing and am still ill-equipped to tell this guy that he's a fraud.

[Public Scott · Rating 1 out of 5]

A struggle. I barely got about halfway through before throwing in the towel. That's especially sad since this thin volume is only around 120 pages. I found the airy-fairy philosophizing too abstract. I don't feel like I really learned anything substantial about Anarchism. I was surprised that the author actually used "anarchy" as a synonym for chaos. Not my speed.

[German DarthSith · Rating 4 out of 5]

¿la democracia representativa y el gobierno de la mayoría, nos representa? ¿Se puede sacrificar nuestra autonomía y obedecer a una autoridad cuya autoridad (valga la redundancia) no deseamos o es detestable? ¿La razón? No ha sido capaz de representarnos, ni busca el bien común, sino, el beneficio de algunos pocos?
¿Nos podemos poner en las manos de otro y darles permiso para decidir sobre la conducta que debemos guardar, nuestra libertad cuando no nos inspira confianza? ¿es eso racional, autónomo o humano?
Como plantean Max y Hobbes, ¿acaso no seria ideal vivir en una comunidad de individuos de buena voluntad donde desaparezca la necesidad de un estado?

Si esta interesado en las respuestas, este es un libro importante

[Erik Graff · Rating 3 out of 5]

This was a rather disappointing book assigned for PHIL482, "Social & Political Philosophy". The claim that individual moral autonomy is irreconcilable with state authority is correct, but correct in the trivial sense that many contracts or promises are so incompatible. Are all such covenants therefore immoral?

I think not--not if certain basic rights are guaranteed. What is good is everything which increases the real autonomy of moral agents. What is bad is anything which decreases it. One can enter into an agreement which may decrease one's freedom for a time, such as one person promising to do the dishes when another does the cooking, but the fulfillment of this agreement hardly diminishes one's moral agency. The ability to contract for a time represents rather an important dimension of moral agency. It is, however, possible to imagine contracts which entail unintended consequences, contracts which should, for ethical reasons, be broken. Clearly, the foundational rules of a moral society would have to take account of such eventualities and allow for the breaking of contracts--with or without sanctions, depending on the circumstances. One must employ the categorical imperative in everything from the formulation of such foundational rules to the making of promises, but, being incapable of universal inductions, we humans will never be able to do so certainly. So far as the groundworks of any society are concerned this means, on the one hand, that something like constitutional amendation must be possible (even constitutional conventions whereby the whole structure is reconsidered) to, on the other hand, that all agents have the real option of leaving the society.

One important consideration which Wolff and many political philosophers fail to remark is the question of what constitutes a moral agent. Instead, tied to bourgeois modernism, they consider individual human bodies to be the agents--and, usually, only individual human bodies which are adult and not significantly disabled. This is remarkable, not just because the studies of ancient history, of the anthropology of contemporary traditional societies and of depth psychology show that notions of moral agency are actually quite variable, but also because at least two modern currents of political thought, communism and fascism, have a more corporative notion of agency. So, too, of course, do most of the world's religions, including Christianity. Insofar as Wolff does allow for such a concept it is in the notion of the state, but he precludes the possibility of its morality from the start by opposing it to the modern fiction of the individual ego. A more thorough account would take up a broad range of agencies, everything from supposed psychic complexes (as in what's called dissociative personality disorder, or in certain altered states of consciousness or in the sense of what the law regards as nonculpable acts of passion or diminished capacity), to individual bodies, to genetically-linked groups (everything from families to nations), to the highest level agencies (such as states or even a world government). All, I would think, present problematics, but at first glance I suspect they all are of a similar character.

[R · Rating 5 out of 5]

The book started out in the 1960s as an essay called "The Fundamental Problem of Political Theory", but eventually came to be called "The Impossibility of a Solution to the Fundamental Problem of Political Philosophy". In the conflict between authority and autonomy, even representative and majoritarian democracy faces a crisis of legitimation.

A "legitimate state" turns out to be a myth. The only possible legitimacy is in a direct democracy where there is a complete 100% consensus on a given issue, and then such a "vote" only applies to the subject of that vote. Of course such a thing would be extremely rare, and thus such a notion of state legitimacy is effectively useless.

I'd have to rank this as one of my top recommended books because the author does indeed focus in on identifying the fundamental problem of political philosophy and efficiently demonstrates to his own chagrin that a solution is impossible. Such a text should be considered foundational to all social and political philosophy since all else follows.

[DJ · Rating 3 out of 5]

overall, there's some fairly good critique here of "majority rules" voting as a decision-making process, and of governmental authority generally. this includes, but is not limited to, ineffectiveness at consistently choosing policy based on the majority's views or preferences, "wasted votes," and the lack of consent and autonomy that results for those who did not vote "with" the majority. a couple thought experiments and practical alternatives are discussed.

some parts made more sense with (my admittedly limited) background in political theory. familiarity with Locke, Rousseau, Hobbes, Kant, and Marx (among others) made Wolff's work more readable than it would've been otherwise.

some aspects left me skeptical. for example, the work seems limited by its exclusive interaction with European/U.S.ian conceptions of government, political theory, society, and nation-state. what would it look like if both the community decision-making structures and political thinking of more societies or groups were fully considered?

[Verdiana Calvetti · Rating 2 out of 5]

Lucido ma troppo kantiano (bisogna ammettere che nella prefazione alla seconda edizione del libro lo segnala l'autore stesso come difetto forse non proprio così fatale); per me c'è stata durante tutta la lettura una tentazione assurda di mettere in discussione alcune posizioni, e spiace, dato che stona tantissimo rispetto al rigore con cui difende le sue tesi che costituiscono il nucleo del libro. Tocca anche segnalare che alla fine dà abbastanza per scontata anche un'intera teoria sociologica, o comunque ha sviluppato un argomento solo per sommi capi.
E' anche vero che in 120 pagine semmai si compone un manifesto, non si scrive un saggio in cui si espone una tesi così tecnicamente semplice (in termini filosofici) eppure così complicata, perché lo si fa con mille sottesi sotto e presupposti.

Inoltre, si sarebbe dovuto chiamare "In difesa dell'anarchia filosofica" e non per forza dell'anarchismo tout court (che vuol dire tutto e niente).

[Dave Kinkead · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a lucid and concise challenge to the ideal of political authority. Wolff lays out a simple argument concerning the incompatibility of two fundamental concepts in political philosophy - the right of a state to rule and an individual's obligation to be morally autonomous.

And while his account makes too strong a case for the primacy of moral autonomy - the same argument also seems to invalidate obligations arising from promises - In Defense of Anarchism will remain one of the most important works of contemporary political theory.

[Annicken · Rating 4 out of 5]

Thought provoking and extremely interesting. Are people autonomous in contemporary states? Can you as an individual be free in a democracy where you are unquestioningly obliged to obey the laws of the state; laws that shape your whole life, even though they're created by other people than yourself? Is it possible to create a system of unanimous decision-making in contemporary democracies? Really recommend this book to everyone, whether you're interested in political theory or not.

[Sleepless Dreamer · Rating 3 out of 5]

More like 3.5 stars but I'm feeling bitter. Review to come

[Alex · Rating 2 out of 5]

My dad gave me this book when I was in college but I hadn’t given it a passing glance until now. I guess he thought the argument was compelling or maybe he just suggested it to me since he knew I was interested in political and economic theory. It’s a much shorter book and I wasn’t sure what to expect, considering my dad did not seem like the anarchist type.

After finally coming around to reading it, I can’t say that I’m entirely convinced by the arguments made by the author. It doesn’t help that the author himself seems insecure in his arguments, the preface of this essay making known to the reader immediately of the flaws present in this essay. I can appreciate an author that is aware of their own shortcomings and it’s often necessary to point out to make the reader aware that this is not a final solution, but the whole essay felt unsure of itself. Obviously the argument made is hard to contend with- that only anarchism, as in the ideological denial of the legitimate authority of the state, can solve the political problem of the compatibility of the moral autonomy of the individual with the legitimate authority of the state. It’s essentially a non-answer to the question at hand. The author spends the first half of the book making a logical argument for why anarchism can be the only solution in this case. The logic is sound, but I don’t know if that’s saying much considering it’s based on the author's own logical paradigm. Obviously, if you define ‘individual moral autonomy’ as a ‘submission to laws which one has made for oneself’ and that the autonomous man is not ‘subject to the will of another’ then it’s easy to see how any form of state authority is incompatible with the moral autonomy of man. After all, as the author points out, the only state solution to this dilemma (direct democracy) is impossible to undertake in reality given how many options can be conceived and voted on for even a small group of people, much less an entire nation. Even if we somehow found a way to make it work, some people would still be left with laws that they did not agree with it that they would be forced to follow. Either way, does not look very good for the moral autonomy of man.

Of course, this all begs the question of why were that concerned with this definition of moral autonomy to begin with. While it’s important to recognize that our own moral responsibility in the actions we take, as social creatures we are ultimately beholden to make some compromises on our complete autonomy for the good of both our species and ourselves. Would we have truly survived as long as we did if each of us acted out completely autonomously, looking out only for our short term interests, ignoring the interests of our most vulnerable memebers in society, like children or the old? Despite what seems like solid logic on behalf of the author, ultimately it ignores a crucial historical point, that humans have never been fully autonomous, self-serving creatures. If we had been, our children would not survive, and we’d have no organized societal structure to speak of. This sort of leads into my main criticism of the essay, which is its lack of historical context, and nothing encapsulates this more than the part on the ‘Utopian Glimpses of a World Without States’.

I didn’t want to harp on this point too much since the author himself acknowledges this as something utopian and unrealistic, but the fact that the author sees this as an ideal for society says a lot about the authors lack of historical knowledge. First of all, he suggests that a world without states would still have a high order of social coordination in which ‘there is a collective pursuit of some external national goal such as national defense, terroitorial expansion or economic imperialism’ but in the same breath says these purposes must be outside the purpose of domination and exploitation of one segment of society of another. The author doesn’t capitulate on this point, but I wonder how he imagines a stateless group to pursue ‘national goals’ like imperialism and terroitorial expansion without domination or exploitation of one segment of society. There is also the maintenance of the industrial economy that he points out. He doesn’t really go into how this would work either. He suggests a decentralized economy would be most coherent with the moral authority of men, but seems to miss that organizations and groups within decentralized economies can still enforce their authority on the autonomy of man. Sure, maybe a state isn’t there to tell man what laws to follow, but if he doesn’t get up to work for Organization 1 or Organization 2 he loses the resources necessary to maintain this sense of autonomy.

Overall, the arguement overall is unsatisfactory, and might have been more appealing if the author focused less on the mathematical logic of anarchism and more on what material conditions prevent a stateless society from occurring, and whether anarchism is materially possible given our current state.

[Ari · Rating 2 out of 5]

Written partly as a stunt by a philosophy professor, this is a short and polemical work intended to convince you that no realistic political system can have moral force -- we should all understand ourselves to be free to choose what laws to obey.

I was not impressed. The analysis starts by assuming a Kantian notion about how moral autonomy is a key human good and that, inasmuch as we allow others to make (moral) decisions for us, we have done wrong: we are only doing well if we do well as a result of our own moral choices. This is at best un-obvious; for example, most traditional theology starts from the opposite premise and asserts that obedience and submission to the will of God is the right thing to do. Likewise, Plato and Aristotle take for granted that most people have poor moral character and are better off if they are forced to behave well. (Everybody agrees that _involuntary_ actions are morally irrelevant, but we might be acting _voluntarily_ while still obeying without understanding, or obeying out of duty. For Plato and Thomas, this is fine, for Wolff it is inadequate.)

Wolff argues that because moral autonomy is necessary for us to be proper adult humans, we should understand obedience to law as a bad habit -- we should always be asking ourselves what to do, rather than obeying out of duty.

I don't quite follow why this point is supposed to be decisive. Yes, there is value in constantly evaluating what the right thing to do is. But there is also value in coordination and social cohesion -- there is social value, even moral value, to the norm of following laws. This was already obvious to Thomas, who is aware of the distinction between malum prohibitum and malum in se.

The book has a somewhat painful lack of contingent facts. The author starts by asserting that political philosophy is the study of when a state is legitimate and should be obeyed; he then talks about how a state has a monopoly on force, and claims a monopoly on obedience, and wants to be the only source of authority.

But this is wildly false as a description of human societies. "The state" is a term that only comes into use at the end of the 16th century to describe a thing that hadn't previously existed or certainly hadn't existed in Europe since antiquity. It took a very long time for the state system to become the world's dominant mode of political organization, and even now states do not make nearly such sweeping claims as Wolff has them make. Most governments are to some extent limited government -- they claim oversight over some kinds of human behavior, not others.

This is of philosophical importance, because if real states make much more limited claims than Wolff has them make, those claims might have defenses that Wolff doesn't consider. It's rather easy to point to regional government bodies whose sole purpose is some narrow project -- flood control, irrigation, transit electricity, etc. Many of Wolff's arguments seem exceedingly odd when applied to the East Bay Municipal Utility District. Your status as a moral actor hasn't been infringed by having the government say "don't pee in the reservoir, and your water bill is this much." There is moral value in having the least restrictive rules and lowest taxes compatible with running the water system, but you aren't qualified to decide for yourself what that concretely amounts to. Moreover, people are notoriously bad at judging their own cases, and so there is moral value in deferring to an impartial judge.

This felt like more an artifact of a time and place than an important enduring work.

[Otto Lehto · Rating 3 out of 5]

Anarchism is a simple doctrine. Some would say simplistic. Debate rages on whether this counts AGAINST or FOR it. Wolff's defence of anarchism is also simple and equally hard to judge. Nobody can accuse Wolff of being dumb. He is an authority on Kant and a veritable critic of Rawls. This book, however, is light on quotations and short on logical reasoning. It reads more like a pamphlet. This must explain its popularity. Nonetheless, it contains a few powerful philosophical ideas and deductions. Wolff starts with assuming that the Kantian notion of moral autonomy (ethics) logically entails to the doctrine of self-legislation (political philosophy). From this, in turn, he derives the doctrine of the illegitimacy of any political authority. How? He claims that a strict reading of autonomy is incompatible with ANY alienation of autonomy to external authorities.

Instead of offering a positive vision of anarchism, most of the book is spent arguing against the legitimacy of political authority, and especially that of (majoritarian) democratic decision-making. On the basis of modern social choice theory (including Kenneth Arrow and Duncan Black), Wolff argues that, contrary to what Rousseau and his followers believed, democratic decision-making cannot preserve the moral autonomy of citizens. Indeed, democracy cannot even consistently instantiate people's revealed preferences in ordinary circumstances. From this, Wolff thankfully does not draw the conclusion that democracy should be abandoned immediately. He merely points out that democracy is on a less secure footing than is commonly accepted. Whatever its legitimacy, it cannot rest on its supposed ability to protect the autonomy or "general will" of citizens. Sadly, although Wolff manages to point out many problems with existing justifications of political authority, he does not offer a positive vision of a productive anarchist society aside from a few scattered notes regarding the desirability of a rationally planned, highly decentralized form of anarcho-socialism. (It is not clear to me why people would want to embrace socialism from the point of view of autonomy, and his arguments against anarcho-capitalism are nonexistent.)

Wolff's conclusions are stark and there are plenty of holes in his all-too-brief chain of reasoning. I do not rate this book very highly in terms of political theory since it lacks depth of analysis and its approach is rather scattershot and simplistic, but it is a fun polemical text nonetheless. Indeed, I basically agree with his central analysis that past political philosophers, from Kant to Rousseau, have failed to ground political legitimacy on the preservation of moral autonomy. There is ample need to develop anarchistic and libertarian alternatives to statist political theory. Nonetheless, it seems that some form of government may, in theory, be justified using the logical tools of social contract theory (which he only briefly mentions in a footnote devoted to Rawls). Whether the anarchist course is right remains to be settled. But the boy who cried Wolff has as point.

[Charlie · Rating 5 out of 5]

A fascinating and thought-provoking view of anarchism, which, in my opinion, is a much more accessible and enjoyable (not to mention concise) analysis than Noam Chomsky's On Anarchism. Though Wolff repeatedly says he doesn't have "the answers", as it were, he doesn't need to with this book. In Defense Of Anarchism serves as two-prong work - exploring in defense of anarchism the contradictions of autonomy versus democracy and the morality (or lack thereof) of authority, and proposing in academic earnest the possibilities of a completely autonomous society unhindered by a source of authority that acts against the will or happiness of the people.

One of my favorite segments, for example, is a thorough examination of the forfeiture of autonomy under the guise of a "justified authority". One example Wolff puts forth is that of the doctor and the patient - if the patient adheres to what the doctor says, that patient is technically forfeiting their autonomy on decisions of their health, yet we can acknowledge this as justifiable because doctors are typically a sound and respectable authority on medical matters that the common citizen isn't likely knowledgeable on. Another example is that of the democracy by majority rule, that practice adopted and enforced by so much of the world. In a majoritarian democracy, the populace as a whole agrees to laws and regulations that are agreed upon by, as the name says, a majority of the citizenry. This is typically believed (as Wolff points out a number of times) by virtually everyone to be a justifiable or even "morally correct" form of governance, and yet, a problem arises that is traditionally cast off in thought of consequence: those in the minority who are distinctly against the laws/decisions/etc must adhere - against their will - to now-rules that they do not respect and may even be harmed by. Most scholars and defenders of democracy agree and accept these are acceptable conditions in order to upkeep a democratic state, but Wolff correctly points out that this invariably operates as an act of taking away the freedom and free will of others...a result that seems to directly contradict the ideal of a liberty-driven democratic state.

In Defense Of Anarchism, it must be said, lacks the source-heavy, scholarship-as-foundation nature typical of Chomsky's anarchist analyses; instead, it reads closer to ideological examinations of anarchism such as can be found in the works of Emma Goldman or Mikhail Bakunin. Personally, I don't see this as a problem - I find Goldman and Bakunin's insights more intriguing and less droning than Chomsky's can at times be. After reading this, I definitely look forward to reading more of Wolff's books. I recommend it highly to anyone interested in anarchism, whether you be an ideological follower or strictly a political academic; either way, you'll find something considerable and fascinating here.

[Soyorin · Rating 2 out of 5]

为了学校的要求读了这本书。确实是打破了我对安安的一些误解（比如作者承认了安安可能守法，也甚至可能承认安的社会无法实现），但其中还是有些逻辑漏洞让我不是很满意。

首先，Wolff对“国家（state）”的定义严重脱离现实，混淆了“权威的结构性分配”与“绝对权力”。Wolff在《IDA》中明确将国家定义为：a group of persons who have and exercise supreme authority within a given territory；且他将supreme authority等同于“不受制衡的命令权”——即权威行使者可直接向他人下达具有约束力的命令，且自身不受其他力量约束（如他在区分“authority与power”时强调：权威是“right to command”，无需依赖说服或妥协）。
但本身supreme authority在这里的定义就很模糊且反现实——国家权威是“制度性权威”，而非个人/小团体的绝对权力。Wolff的定义错误地将“国家权威”等同于“个人或少数人的命令权”，却忽略了现代国家的核心特征：国家的“最高权威”并非由某一“群体”独占，而是通过制度流程（如立法、行政、司法制衡）分散在不同机构中，且每个机构的权威都受“规则约束”（如法律制定需经议会投票、行政命令需符合宪法）。 例如Ch2中提到“Locke认为合法国家的权威是有限的”，Wolff却回避了“有限权威的制度实现方式”：比如美国国会通过法案需经总统签署——此时的“最高权威”是“制度本身”，而非某个人或群体。Wolff的定义导致他无法解释：为何现实中“国家权力行使者（如总统）也需守法”？若国家是“行使最高权威的群体”，按他的逻辑，这个群体应不受法律约束，但现实中总统会因违法被弹劾（如尼克松水门事件）——这说明他的“国家定义”完全脱离“权威的制度性本质”，将国家权威错误地简化为“个人意志的强加”；而完全忽视了这些人之间利益的冲突以及这些人为了互相制衡制定的，高于他们本人存在的，法律。
因此，“领土内所有人生效”的条件无法通过Wolff的定义实现。Wolff隐含假设：“最高权威”必须对领土内“所有人”无条件生效，否则国家权威不成立。但现实中，国家权威的“普遍性”是“规则适用的普遍性”，而非“命令的无条件服从”——比如公民可通过诉讼、抗议挑战法律，这正是“权威的合法性验证机制”，而非“权威的失效”。例如《IDA》中Wolff批判“多数民主”时说：“少数派服从法律是被迫的，而非自主的”，但他忽略了“少数派可通过司法诉讼推翻不合理法律”（如美国民权运动中少数族裔通过最高法院推翻种族隔离法）。Wolff的定义因排除“权威的动态调整机制”，导致他误将“权威的暂时性适用”等同于“权威的合法性缺陷”。

此外，Wolff认为“自治与权威不可调和”，但忽略了“程序性自治”的存在——民主制度中，服从法律可成为自治的集体形式。Wolff的核心论点是：The state’s defining feature is authority (the right to rule); man’s primary moral obligation is autonomy (the refusal to be ruled). Thus, there can be no resolution of the conflict. 他将“自治”严格定义为“个人对每一个行为的自主判断”，将“服从权威”定义为“放弃个人判断”，但这一逻辑完全排除了“通过集体程序实现自治”的可能性。 “程序性自治”完全符合Wolff对自治的定义——公民通过参与立法流程，将个人意志融入集体规则，此时守法是“自我立法的延伸”。Wolff承认：“自治是taking responsibility for one’s actions，即持续的理性判断与责任承担”。而在民主制度中，公民通过参与规则制定监督规则执行来修正偏离集体意志的法律。此时，服从法律并非“放弃自治”，而是“履行自治的集体责任”——因为法律是个人意志与他人意志协商的结果，符合Wolff所说的“自治是对自身行为后果的负责”。Wolff批判代议制民主时认为“代表无法完全反映选民意志”，但他忽略了“代议制的动态反馈机制”：选民可通过中期选举罢免不称职代表、通过信访渠道影响政策，这正是“持续的自治判断”，而非一次性的“意志臣服”。

第三，Wolff对obedience的定义过于狭隘，误将“遵守规则”等同于“服从权威”。他的定义是：doing what he tells you to do because he tells you to do it，并认为所有守法行为都是“obedience”，从而得出“大部分人守法即放弃自治”的结论。但这一定义严重脱离现实——现实中守法更多是“对共享规则的自主认同”，而非对权威的臣服。

总而言之。Wolff的论证建立在三个脱离现实的定义之上：
1. 国家=“行使绝对权威的一群人”（忽略权威的制度性分配）；
2. 自治=“个人对每一个行为的直接控制”（排除集体程序的自治）；
3. 服从=“因权威命令而行动”（混淆规则认同与权威臣服）。

这些定义导致他只能看到“权威与自治的对立”，却看不到“通过制度实现权威与自治的兼容”——现实中的民主国家，正是通过“程序性自治”“结构性权威”“规则认同”，实现了Wolff认为不可能的“自治与权威的平衡”。因此，他的“哲学无政府主义”更多是一种逻辑推演，而非对现实政治的合理分析。或者说，逻辑本身是非黑即白的，但人不是，社会更不是。

[Alexander L · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is an excellent argument. With clear, pointed prose, Wolff successfully reveals the contradictions and incoherence of the defenses of the existing conception of the state. Another reviewer’s breakdown of his argument shows how simple Wolff’s premises are and how easily the conclusion follows from their irreconcilable differences. Wolff is right: a “just state” is an oxymoron. With this argument, he rips the wool of state propaganda and state education programs off the eyes of the reader, allowing them to see states for what they are. For that reason alone, I must recommend this book.

However, the praise heaped on this book by right-wing so-called “libertarian” morons shows that this book suffers from some errors and glaring omissions.
The first is that Wolff fixates on the individual as the primary unit of analysis. I think that this doesn’t invalidate the argument, but certainly states conflict with group and societal obligations as well. That should be included.
Second, that unit of analysis is contrasted with the state, which he seems to conflate with an ordered society. You can have an ordered society without a state, as demonstrated time and time again by anarchist theory Wolff seems to say he is defending in his title—but clearly is not! So abandoning the state is merely abandoning an institutionalized system of violence against the person and the people. This is not as shocking of a conclusion as Wolff seems to think!
Third, Wolff does not discuss imbalances of power created by capitalism. He alludes to the conflict between the individual and the natural processes of the market, but does not explore them here. This is a tremendous flaw, one that forces Wolff’s book to be only half the story he tries to tell. You cannot have autonomy or democracy with capitalism. A “free capitalist society” is as much an oxymoron as the “just state.” It too must be abandoned for the rights of the individual and humanity to be fulfilled.

Nonetheless, these flaws are not enough to dissuade future readers. Read this book. Everyone should. But don’t stop here. Go farther.

[Jef · Rating 4 out of 5]

there are so many great reviewers on this platform that I rarely opt to share my own take on a literary work. This is such an obscure text and I had such a disparity between my expectations going in and my actual experience with the book that I felt driven to jot down a few thoughts here, in the hope that it will encourage others to undertake this small but mighty tome.
First, this is a very short book. The author himself, who has written a preface a decade or two after the original was written, which was the 1960's (you can easily verify the real date), tells us that this was born out of his thesis work during his philosophy studies. This treatise is Mr. Wolff's struggle to resolve the issues of autonomy vs authority. He begins examining the then current system of governance in the US, but in no real detail, the branches into democracy, majoritarianism (and how technology could advance this position), and the place of the individual.
I should encourage any future readers to understand that this isn't written for the layman. It is the work of a philosopher for fellow philosophers, but examining the question of how we can best organize ourselves with authority to respect the autonomy of each. So, it is not a simple read but I would consider it accessible to any with even partial college work under their belts.
Perhaps of greatest import is the fact that he made this examination and the poignance of his conclusions, not only in reach but applicability. I did feel like there was more that SHOULD have come at the end of the book, but that the Tannehills' "Market For Liberty" aptly carries on with his discussion, so at least there is no void to be filled of necessity.
I strongly recommend this to any who care enough about their own freedom, about what their neighbors do, and/or care enough to vote.

[Prerna Munshi · Rating 4 out of 5]

What brilliant arguments, Prof.Wolff extends in this little book. One can find this work influenced by Kant and Rousseau’s ‘Social Contract’.

The book rests on a very primordial argument— it is difficult to align the individual autonomy with the state legitimacy. The very aim of political philosophy, as he puts in a rather Kantian style, is to deduct the concept of the state. He delineates authority from power. While authority rests on a dual function of command and obedience, power is a forced imposition resting on fear and threat.

The State , which he defines as an authority restricted by territory,acting over a certain populace , shall always restrict the individual autonomy even if it appears that the State had been brought to effect by the will of the populace.

He goes on to investigate various systems of government from unanimous direct democracy to majoritarian democracy and finds unavoidable gaps in them, recognising them as systems where individuals are ‘forced’ to choose freedom. The unanimous direct democracy is not pragmatic in its approach, further, the majoritarian democracy undermines the autonomy of the minority and while a consensus or the vote may have been raised to the status of ‘sacrosanct’, Prof.Wolff shows how disparate a consensus becomes when executed by a collective. A voting system is thus flawed for it bears several paradoxes through which the collective’s choice becomes inconsistent with the individual’s to the extent of even appearing as irrational.

Prof. Wolff clearly doesn’t see anarchism as a state of chaos. He sees it as a system without the sin of wilful heteronomy, comprising of morally free and thus responsible individuals. However, the same required a little more elaboration on the writer’s part.


Should be read for its concise, insightful and taut arguments.

[Noah · Rating 2 out of 5]

This is NOT the book to read if you are interested in anarchism. I had to read it fir my political philosophy class, else I wouldn't have completed this travesty of philosophy. The author argues effectively that human nature is to be autonomous (he never justifies this stance) and that the state is set to be the supreme authority. These two irreconcilable positions leads the author to conclude that anarchism (specifically individualist anarcho-capitalism) is the only solution which resolves this contradiction. There is very little thought on the issues this entails, the horrible logic the author uses to explain a command vs a 'volunteer' action, and vastly changes the definition of common words used in politics without justifying why the devation from the standard is needed. If it wasn't for my friends who are anarchist talking with me about other forms of anarchism, this would have made me leave this ideology to the dustbin of history. Much like reading Epicurus, I am worse off for having read this.

[Erik · Rating 3 out of 5]

I liked this book. 3 stars.

This is my third anarchist book of 2017. Unlike the otehrs, it didnt try to to spell out a system in which MAGIC HAPPENS and everything works.

Instead, its a series of arguments about how there is no legitimate authority for any state to rule over you. Except that of unanimous direct democracy. These arguments are well thought out and are convincing. Additional time is spent on majority-based democracy and its specific abuses of authority.

There is no recommendation of specific government types, no specific advocation for democracy or otherwise. Author cites predominant post-enlightenment government thinkers and is agble to respond to contradictions well.

The author is successful at his limited scope - to reject statist authority on it has no basis for operating - and nothing more, nothing less.

[Diane · Rating 3 out of 5]

Picked this up on a whim at a library booksale years ago and while delving into Rousseau and Locke, decided it made sense to read it now. The first chapter was excellent...super interesting and thought-provoking. The rest of the book was just okay. I'm not sure how what this author is advocating is anarchy. I also can't imagine how what he proposes in the last chapter could work on a mass scale. His version of anarchy seems very rooted in society continuing to largely function in the way he's complaining about with only a person here or there stepping out of form. During the last chapter, I kept thinking, "This guy needs to read 'If Everybody Did'." So, in finishing it, I'm not sure that I have any better of an idea of how anarchists think society should work, but it was at least short enough not to feel like a waste of time.

[Henry Perretta · Rating 1 out of 5]

Libertarianism or anarchism or whatever you want to call stateless ideation is a fun thought experiment but as soon as it’s parsed out academically it becomes glaringly obvious that it’s a terrible idea. We, in our internet-using, book writing/reading states, are the result of the State and in trying to elevate a concept of moral individuality and the ability to fail Wolff inadvertently was arguing against their own thesis. We can’t revert to this stateless imagination without losing a vast majority of all people and without losing basically every convenience/advancement of modern society. Fun thought experiment and well drawn out but not worth the read. The thesis was false and obviously so; I came away more secure in the democratic nation state model.

[Jacqueline Guerrero · Rating 3 out of 5]

Wolff made some interesting points at the beginning. His stance on state legitimacy is one I believe any human being interested in their stance in the world, or anyone who thinks critically would agree with. There are no legitimate states, therefore we must agree with political anarchism.

However, I find his section on democratic solutions unnecessarily long and repetitive. I enjoyed his quips and jabs at government and submission to be enjoyable, however his section on voting from your tv kind of made everything seem unserious.

This whole book, and Wolff’s whole argument kind of gave off rebellious teenager vibes in the sense that political anarchy is essentially: “I know you’re wrong and I disagree what you’re telling me to do but I will do it out of my own convenience, not because you told me to.”