" In 1994 genocide in Rwanda claimed the lives of at least 500,000 Tutsi—some three-quarters of their population—while UN peacekeepers were withdrawn and the rest of the world stood aside. Ever since, it has been argued that a small military intervention could have prevented most of the killing. In The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention, Alan J. Kuperman exposes such conventional wisdom as myth. Combining unprecedented analyses of the genocide's progression and the logistical limitations of humanitarian military intervention, Kuperman reaches a startling even if Western leaders had ordered an intervention as soon as they became aware of a nationwide genocide in Rwanda, the intervention forces would have arrived too late to save more than a quarter of the 500,000 Tutsi ultimately killed. Serving as a cautionary message about the limits of humanitarian intervention, the book's concluding chapters address lessons for the future. "
We all are appalled by genocides. For it is the most heightened version possible within the capacity of human beings, of a crime that is truly unlike anything we've ever seen before. That being said, we've been propelled to make generally spurious claims about this atrocity, particularly along the lines of how the failure to prevent one from occurring can be attributed exclusively to a lack of will from able governments. Such assertions have rarely, if ever, been subjected to meaningful and rigorous scrutiny. This book is an attempt to scrutinize these—although good-natured, ultimately harmful—assertions. It is comprehensive, despite its brevity. It took into account necessary analyses regarding extreme specificities of logistics, which ultimately turns out to be an essential, if not the most deciding factor in preventing genocides. I generally agree with a lot of the hypotheses arising from the research that the writer has done at great lengths, except on several parts regarding the call to liquidate the Hutu's Hate Radio as I found it unconvincing. — "...Clearly, none of these options can be relied on to avert genocide in every case. Moreover, decisions about whether and how to intervene in specific cases inevitably will be caught up in politics. However, for such decisions to have a good chance of success they must be informed by realistic appraisals of the prospects of humanitarian intervention rather than wishful thinking about the ease of saving lives with force."
Kuperman is extremely convincing in his argument but it just logistically justifies no intervention. Morally it has no grounds and there should have been intervention whether or not it was going to be all end all. It didn't have to be the US either there were many state actors in the UN that could have taken on the task
A closely argued study of the practicalities of intervening to stop genocide. Kuperman convincing concludes that the logistics of intervention are daunting, requiring powers to better support peacekeeping efforts before genocide starts, rather than trying to respond after it is too late.