The Echo of Battle: The Army's Way of War

by Brian McAllister Linn

From Lexington and Gettysburg to Normandy and Iraq, the wars of the United States have defined the nation. But after the guns fall silent, the army searches the lessons of past conflicts in order to prepare for the next clash of arms. In the echo of battle, the army develops the strategies, weapons, doctrine, and commanders that it hopes will guarantee a future victory. In the face of radically new ways of waging war, Brian Linn surveys the past assumptions--and errors--that underlie the army's many visions of warfare up to the present day. He explores the army's forgotten heritage of deterrence, its long experience with counter-guerrilla operations, and its successive efforts to transform itself. Distinguishing three martial traditions--each with its own concept of warfare, its own strategic views, and its own excuses for failure--he locates the visionaries who prepared the army for its battlefield triumphs and the reactionaries whose mistakes contributed to its defeats. Discussing commanders as diverse as Dwight D. Eisenhower, George S. Patton, and Colin Powell, and technologies from coastal artillery to the Abrams tank, he shows how leadership and weaponry have continually altered the army's approach to conflict. And he demonstrates the army's habit of preparing for wars that seldom occur, while ignoring those it must actually fight. Based on exhaustive research and interviews, The Echo of Battle provides an unprecedented reinterpretation of how the U.S. Army has waged war in the past and how it is meeting the new challenges of tomorrow.

Genres: History, Military Fiction, Military History, Nonfiction, War, American

320 pages, Hardcover

First published November 1, 2007

Reviews

[Ian Fleischmann · Rating 3 out of 5]

Read it for the bibliography and genealogy of American military thought, not for Linn's synthesis.
First, and perhaps least, Linn introduces the concept that America has never developed a way of war, in short that our doctrine is inherently pragmatic and battle-focused and we have never firmly grasped an institutionally-accepted role of war. I would argue that this is a straw man and that perceptions on the role of war has shifted over time within every nation. Linn's battle-focus seems to be a method of focusing his topic consideration but the bleed-over is evident when he begins to place Guardians and Heroes into the camps of Isolationists and Imperialists, reflecting perceptions of international relations and hence the political aims of war.
Second, the metaphor overwhelms the text. In his effort to continually categorize leaders into the roles of Guardians, Heroes, and Managers, Linn oversimplifies the motivations and drives of individuals when he himself admits in the prologue that each individual is more a mixture of these traditional military philosophies than pure personifications. The categorization detracts from the useful tracing of doctrinal development and evolution to fit a story, bringing me to my third point: Linn's selective use of history.
Again, despite his warning in the prologue, Linn seems to pick personalities and events which fit his story and to juxtapose decisions and context regardless or chronology. For example, Linn places the Philippines War as a singularly important event in the execution of counterinsurgency or peacemaking. While it was certainly significant, it was hardly the only time the US Military executed these types of duties and there was obviously a good deal of speculation and (at least informal) doctrine on the matters of its execution. Linn obviously focuses on the Philippines because of his prior expertise but his summary dismissal of the Banana Wars and Spanish American War lead me to believe that historical events were chosen to match Linn's storyline more than vice versa. Where military leaders did not fit cleanly into the mold of a Guardian, Hero, or Manager they were either ignored or forced to fit. Just Cause in Panama appears to be a similar case where Linn showcases it as a failure of AirLand battle and reliance on overwhelming firepower without detailed analysis. Would not the judicious application of firepower rapidly at the decisive point itself be an example of AirLand Battle? Did the US military not rapidly depose an unwanted regime, secure a territory, and turn it over to a more friendly regime which then retained power and secured our national interest while we withdrew forces? If Just Cause in Panama achieved our strategic objectives with acceptable loss of blood and treasure, how is it anything but a success? These questions need to be answered before Linn's assertions should be accepted as anything but. Linn also attempts to juxtapose thoughts as competing hypothesis which have no chronological similarity. If Schofield changed his perspectives on conflict between 1830 and 1847, is there a reason for this? Again, more scholarly attention to detail is required.
Lastly, I found Linn's occasional parochial service-oriented perspectives grating coming from someone who's central thesis seems to imply that the American way of war has been on a collision course with joint-ness either from internal review or external force for much of its history.

Overall I find Linn's chronology of the development of American Operational Art to be useful as a defense of a uniquely American style of warfare and an advocacy of American military innovation. His bibliography is detailed and can serve a good building block for the examination of alternative documents with great influence on the core printed doctrinal manuals, providing essential details for the accurate analysis of American operational art.

[Dave Beeman · Rating 4 out of 5]

Excellent expose on the history of the U. S. Armies approach to fighting the next war. From the 1820's through Iraq the author describes how the three major schools of thought defined as the Guardians, Managers and Heroics wove their prejudices and processes into the fabric of the army. Weapons procurement, training, doctrine all were affected by the these three schools and which was at the top of the heap. He spares no one as he views how the army prepared for the next war and did not always take away the correct lessons learned from the previous war.

[Joel Blankenship · Rating 5 out of 5]

Exceptional book on the transformation of Army doctrine

[David Farrell · Rating 5 out of 5]

One of the better books I’ve read about the history of Army strategic culture and the competing groups in the Army that attempted to influence and drive Army force design and force development.

[Madeline]

reading this as a pacifist is like pulling teeth

[Scottnshana · Rating 5 out of 5]

This may be the best analysis I've read on U.S. military policy--it's certainly up there with Weigley's "American Way of War". Dr. Linn has divided that policy into 3 paradigms and examined every significant event in American military history via each. Guardians, e.g., believed that America should stay home behind two great oceans and build coastal forts (like Sumter) as the most significant defense apparatus. "Even as the nation prepared for empire," writes Linn, "they held to thier conviction that the army's purpose was defensive and deterrent, that the most dangerous threat was a sudden attack, and that technology and the correct program could provide the nation with absolute security, if only its citizens would accept unquestioningly the guidance of its military scientist-strategists." This is 19th-century thinking, but the author points out that it wasn't a big leap from Guardian strategy to the "We fight them there so it doesn't end up here" argument we were all hearing around 2003. The second paradigm--Managers--is epitomized by generals like Marshall, Powell, and Eisenhower, big-picture men who knew all the logistic and policy requirements for sending a world power to war. Like any population, though, the book points out that there were plenty of not-so-great soldiers embracing this paradigm and trying to fit warfare into neat equations and to justify panacaea weapon systems. The third, the Heroes, is the one I honestly find most appealing. The concentration on character and morality in the individual American soldier is the perspective that attracted so many great people to raise their right hands in the wake of 9/11; Linn argues that it goes awry, though, when its proponents start claiming civilian leadership and the American public stab the military in the back when things go wrong in places like Mogadishu and Saigon. I was impressed with the way the author wrapped the book up. His Epilogue claims that "the army's peacetime thinkers, as much as its wartime commanders, have defined the service's martial identity, identified its mission, determined professional standards, and created its distinct way of war... Together, these martial traditions form the peacetime army's intellectual construct of warfare. Like a braid, each strand will, for a time, be visible on the surface and at other times will disappear, only to emerge farther down the braid. At times the strands are so closely knit as to be indistinguishable; at other times they practically pull apart." In short, this history is well-organized and well-written; I can wholeheartedly reccommend it to anyone interested in American civil-military relations or geopolitics.

[Billhotto · Rating 4 out of 5]

A LOOK AT HOW THE ARMY'S MILITARY INTELLECTUALS DRAW LESSONS FROM THE LAST WAR (OR LAST SUCCESSFUL WAR) TO PREPARE FOR THE NEXT WAR. THE INABILITY TO PREDICT WHERE WHEN OR HOW THE NEXT WAR WILL BE FOUGHT LEADS TO THE ALMOST INEVITABLE COCKUPS WE FACE AT THE BEGINNING OF EVERY NEW CONFLICT. THE PROBLEM IS THAT AN ENEMY IS UNLIKELY TO AGREE TO FIGHT THE WAR THAT WE HAVE PREPARED OURSELVES TO FIGHT. WARS ARE OFTEN WON IN PEACETIME. THE AUTHOR POINTS OUT THAT THERE IS OFTEN A DISCONNECT BETWEEN THE PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER AND SOCIETY. THIS FAILURE BY THE PROFESSSIONALS TO UNDERSTAND THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REALITIES AND VALUES ARE AS LIMITING AS THEIR INABILITY TO UNDERSTAND POTENTIAL ENEMIES.

[Chris · Rating 4 out of 5]

One of the reoccuring themes in the book is a breakdown of officers into three categories: Guardians, Managers, and Heroes. I believe that's a little overly simplistic considering most people probably have some of all in them. The book addresses this very briefly in the beginning stating that while most people are a combination, if you break it down to their core they'll hold one as their dominating thinking/attitude/presence. The book as a whole is very illuminating, and you can tell it was well-researched. Personally, I believe it should be required reading for all officers, and I would recommend it for all citizens as well.

[Red Fox · Rating 3 out of 5]

Interesting, but not groundbreaking, book on how the Army prepares to fight in the years between wars. I found it a little frustrating that the author did not take a view or present a recognizable thesis, but more just presented some observations on what people had said or written in the inter-war years. I am not sure I learned any lessons other than it is difficult to predict the next war, and that it is probably better to prepare to fight 2-3 types of wars (ranging from very small to world wars).

If he did have a novel idea, it was to group the planners and thinkers in the Army into Managers, Heroes and Guardians.

[Jon Hatch · Rating 4 out of 5]

The book helps unveil some of the dominant schools of thought within the Army during peace time from the revolution to the outset of OIF. As Iraq war vet a lot of what Mr. Linn writes about makes sense. I hope he could expand on these ideas when looking back on OEF and OIF someday.

[Leo · Rating 4 out of 5]

Dr. Linn's organization of Army thinkers into three camps: Guardians, Heroes, and Managers. It is a useful tool to look at the history of our Army and also how to analyze how our Army will approach the future.

[Bryan Fencl · Rating 4 out of 5]

A good survey of how the US Army has conducted its operations over its history. An over-simplification but a good structure to analyzing how the Army looks at problems.

[Alan · Rating 4 out of 5]

Interesting. Applies metaphor/culture approach to understanding strategy and decisions.