Disaster: Hurricane Katrina and the Failure of Homeland Security is not not a Monday-morning Quarter-back session. Its a deep and insightful look at what went horribly wrong. The story is written about the governmental failures at all three levels- the local, state and especially federal levels. It documents the rise and fall of one of the United States' most confused and misunderstood agencies- the Federal Emergency Management Agency - FEMA, and the men and women who collectively used it and ruined it.
The story begins with "Hurricane Pam" - a gigantic Category 4 Hurricane that ravaged New Orleans in 2004, flood waters drowning the whole city, topping the levees, and stranding hundreds of thousands of people and killing thousands of others. In all, a massive economic, social and human tragedy of unprecedented scale...
... at least on paper. Hurricane Pam was a FEMA-run training exercise, designed to get the state agencies coordinated with FEMA as they tried to prepare for certain disasters. The topping of New Orleans' levees (but not heir breach) was a major, ongoing concern with FEMA (and later with Mike Brown), and they wanted state agencies prepared for such a catastrophe. In other words- EVERYONE saw this disaster coming.
Hurricane Pam taught everyone many things, but chief among them was that FEMA could respond to any challenge. All during the exercise, whenever somebody asked a very detailed question- ie: where will we get blankets? Who will take care of busing people out? Where will the generators come from? A FEMA agent would say, (paraphrasing) "FEMA will take of that; we have those resources." So the state of Louisiana- in just the YEAR BEFORE Katrina - was taught a very valuable lesson: FEMA could handle this. Few doubted them.
The book takes great pains to describe the growth of FEMA since before the Reagan administration and how it was designed, primarily, to handle natural disasters. With Regan, he shifted the focus to deal more with nuclear disasters and the focus was narrowed too much. That all changed with James Witt, Clinton's man to head FEMA who reorganized the agency to do what came "naturally": deal with natural disasters when the state (or more appropriately, states) could not. Prior to Witt, FEMA was on the federal chopping block.
Then the Mississippi River overflowed in a disaster not seen since the 19th century. FEMA sprung into action with a vengeance, hooking states up to vital supplies and stemming the flow of water where it could; evacuating people out of harm's way when they could not. It was simply a stellar performance by a federal agency that 1) had a clear mission, 2) the funds to achieve its mission (Clinton had cut the military budget properly to get funds flowing to other agencies), and 3) had a leader that could fulfill that mission. The Mississippi River crisis NEVER was considered a disaster and it slunk away from the public consciousness thanks in no small part to FEMA.
On September 11, 2001, that all changed. FEMA suddenly and dramatically (and without even the smallest hint of direction) was transformed from a natural disaster agency and into an anti-terrorism organ, one that was responsible for dealing with terrorist attacks in a country that was suddenly bat-shit crazy over terrorist attacks. FEMA was immediately consumed by the new cabinet level agency, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). DHS was a massive, lumbering very, very very focused agency all-consumed with overtaking the war on terror in the US. One of its chief missions was to transform US federal agencies into soldiers in the war on terror.
Even if, like FEMA, they had ZERO experience doing so.
The result was chaos. Federal agencies were completely baffled as to what their mission was; could not figure out who was in control, were complete animals in protecting turf, and lost pretty much every shred of cooperation between agencies.
This was no clearer than in the ascension of Michael Brown to become head of FEMA
Brown had no experience as a head of a disaster agency of any kind. However, all sources agree that what Brown lacked in experience, he made up for in determination and hard-work. He hit the ground running and became intimately involved in the details of FEMA. And his principal recommendation was that FEMA was not prepared nor good at anti-terrorist involvment, and should get back to its core mission: preparing and responding to natural disasters.
But Michael Chertoff disagreed. Chertoff wanted everything poised at anti-terrorism AND natural disasters. But almost all of Chertoff's visions for natural disasters were based, bizarrely, with how terrorists would exploit natural disasters. The book does an excellent job of describing the Hubris between Brown and Chertoff: Chertoff the former judge and Brown the political animal and agency novice. Brown made few friends in Washington, was eminently dis-likable, was at times too quick to point out how hapless FEMA was becoming, and generally did not have any imagination or vision. All he did, mostly, was go to war with other departments n trying to increase FEMA's power and resources. Chertoff, the book is quick to point out, was mostly directed at cutting out FEMA's powers, most notably, its grant funding power.
Brown resented Chertoff and the two men developed a powerful rift.
But another rift was forming off the coast of Africa.
The book is absolutely clear on dispelling the vast (almost comical) rumors that took hold in the wake of Katrina. But the most amazing is that Katrina- while a powerful and strong storm -was NOT by ANY means a "storm of the century." It started over the dusty plains of Ethiopia and hit Tropical Storm status over the West Coast of Africa. While id DID achieve Category 4 status briefly over the Gulf of Mexico, it hit the LA coast as a pedestrian Cat. 3 storm.
And it also did NOT hit New Orleans head on. The storm grazed the city... and SLAMMED the Mississippi coast like a freight train. However, if the storm was the only thing to go wrong, it, at best, only struck the area hard.
However, the government was busy failing all over the place. The US Army Corps of Engineers had done a terrible job maintaining the levees in New Orleans; the devices that kept the city from being consumed by the largest river in the US and the largest lake in the state. In 2004, in response to the Hurricane Pam exercise, the Engineers stated that the levees were in exemplary condition; absolutely in tact in impervious to natural disasters. This caused the Pam designers to model the storm only TOPPING the levees, not breaching them.
The levees failed on contact with Katrina. The rumor that Chartoff and others CLUNG TO like a flood victim to a raft was that the levees failed after prolonged exposure to such a powerful storm. Wrong again. The levees crumbled immediately, sending water cascading over the National Guard barracks at the edge of the city almost immediately. Chertoff would say for YEARS that there were TWO disasters in NO: the hurricane and the levees. He NEVER connected the two. He has not to this day.
As the storm ravaged the city, one thing became incredibly clear AND WOULD BE MISREPORTED FOR YEARS AFTER: the city was essentially deserted. The book catalogs the rate in which the incredibly inept Ray Nagin and the completely out-of-touch Governor of LA lurched blindly in all this: but that they had, effectively, evacuated the city. Nagen had first ordered a voluntary evac, but then made it mandatory the next day. When the storm hit, only those unable (or exempt from the order: ie: hospitals) to move out were left behind. NO has completed one of the largest evacuations ever. A s the book is quick to point out, this explains why "only" appx 1100 people were killed in the storm.
The result was predictable: the states turned to FEMA under the idea that FEMA could handle the problems LA would soon experience: just like had been the case with Pam. FEMA ... blinked.
Mike Brown panicked. He put on a brave face and tried to convince everyone BELOW him that everything was fine; but to Chertoff and others he said that this was going to be a huge problem. He kept flinching at the idea that the levees may be topped, or worse, breached. Nobody paid him any mind. But Brown NEVER impressed upon his superiors how critical the situation was, even trying to cover his own tail by simply saying they were ready for "the Big One."
FEMA was not.
Other myths: few of the people in NO had flood insurance; utterly not true. The city had one of the best records of flood insurance in the country; the city did not order a mandatory evacuation; they absolutely did. Another lie was that LA did not ask for federal disaster relief until weeks after the storm; they asked for it two days BEFORE the storm hit. Other rumors wee that the people in the Superdome were committing atrocities and the same was true for the people in the Convention Center (wildly untrue; 6 people died inside the SD, 0 at the Convention center).
The book goes into detail at how completely clueless the organization was and how absolutely abysmal the DHS handled the whole situation; pulling resources around, moving Brown from one bad assignment to another, finally sequestering him in Baton Rouge where he effectively was useless. Bush and Cheney were so hapless during the problems that they often wanted to send in Army troops and Federalize the National Guards (both Governors of LA and MI refused all such "assistance"). When Bush visited No (after comically exhibiting his cluelessness by flying over NO in Air Force One trying to "visualize" the carnage), he seemed more like a lost tourist than a President.
And the complete and total lack of coordination in getting supplies ANYWHERE- nobody got anything from the Fed for days; people roasted in their homes, died to exposure, drowning, thirst, etc. Brown at one point promised buses to get the people out of town; the buses NEVER showed (the state had to use their own which were not nearly as large or as rugged as the FEMA ones- but at least they were there). Bodies rotted in the street as FEMA mortuary teams never were put into place; even the act of packing for animals was short-circuited as FEMA vacillated as to get cages for animals or not (pets were not allowed in the Superdome).
When Bush finally hit the ground he displayed three things: he did not know the scope of the problem, he seemed callously indifferent to those affected by the problem (bizarrely talking about only ONE victim while he was on the ground: Mississippi Senator Trent Lott and the loss of Lott's vacation home), and seemed utterly incapable of solving the problem. He then turned to Mike Brown and uttered the now famous "Kiss of Death" : "And Brownie, you're doing a heck of a job." When the dust settled, Bush was politically crippled (note how support for the Iraq War began to disintegrate right around Katrina; Nobody could pretend Bush of his team knew, cared or could solve any legitimate problems). Bush was regulated to a lame duck within hours of Katrina. In 2008, at the RNC, Bush gave a speech... via satellite, many miles from convention cite, with every Republican desperate to stay as far away from their President as possible. Mike Brown was forced to resign. He states to this day that the problems of Katrina were almost entirely those of the bloated, incompetent, and chaotic DHS.
But Brown failed in two vital areas: he never could engender support from his superiors or from those in other agencies he had to coordinate with AND he failed to display any vision or imagination in his post. However, DHS crippled FEMA long before Katrina crippled New Orleans.
The city was hampered by Ray Nagen and his own "dear-in-headlights" leadership style, and a LA governor who was too removed and was swayed too easily. Neither had good plans going into the disaster; neither could do much of anything while they were in the disaster. But they were told- for YEARS -that FEMA had the ball, long after FEMA clearly did not.
In the aftermath, the book details how everything went back to where it all started. Brown started doing independent consulting work, even for a NO parish (county). When word got out that Brown was involved with disaster protection, residence almost revolted. Brown refused to be paid in order to keep the peace. To this day, people stop Brown in the streets to say that they are sorry that they ever blamed him for what was obviously DHS's massive screw-up and that he was, most likely, a scapegoat. But to be fair, he is also a proper scape goat.
In 2005, Michael Chertoff gave a speech wherein he told an audience that in a disaster, people should plan to have supplies on hand for 72 hours. In other words, people are on their own.
Gee... thanks...
The book is amazing at describing the intricacies of a failure, describing EXACTLY what went wrong and why it went wrong. The book does not lay blame, but leaves it to the reader (the book is almost deferential to Bush). The book is also excellent at describing how the state and local governments screwed up as well, and does a good job explaining where what they did worked.
The book does have some failures; it spends a whole chapter describing post-Katrina issues that fall flat. The book also teds over certain facts that I wish were explored more. Finally, the book only describes the personal horrors of the storm after-the-fact, and I did not think this was particularly effective.
But overall the book describes a failure: not of levies or of storm command, but of leadership, vision, and determination. And above all, it shows that FEMA was also lost on 9/11- it was changed from a natural disaster responder and into an anti-terrorst machine.
And that in the end, it can do neither.