This pioneering study focuses on the experiences and writings of the surprisingly large number of Prussian, British, and French military observers who witnessed the Civil War firsthand. Luvaas's fascinating account reveals why they came, what they wrote, what their armies learned (or failed to learn) from their reports, and how their writings influenced later European military theorists.
For this edition, Luvaas has added a thoughtful introduction that analyzes why some "military lessons" are learned and others ignored and examines the extent to which such lessons can be applied to subsequent conflicts.
A U.S. Navy veteran, Jay Luvaas graduated from Allegheny College, and received a Ph.D. in history from Duke University. He served as the Director of the Flowers Collection of Southern Americana at Duke University Library, and as a long-time professor of history at Allegheny College in Meadville, Pennsylvania. He was the first civilian to be appointed as Visiting Professor of Military History at the United States Military Academy. He also taught at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, PA, where he served as Professor of Military History from 1982 to 1995. Following his retirement, he was honored in 1997 as a Distinguished Fellow of the Army War College. He twice received the Outstanding Civilian Service Medal from the Department of the Army for his many contributions to the educational mission of the U.S. Army.
Luvaas' book is an appreciation of the impression the American Civil War made on military tactics in Europe. Unfortunately for the reader, the conclusion drawn is that there wasn't much of one. In Luvaas' own words, "there was never a time when the Civil War exerted a direct influence upon military doctrine in Europe." Such a thesis is, needless to say, a bit of an anticlimax to a book with this title. Still, the book isn't a total waste.
The author starts by describing the military missions, official and unofficial, sent to America by the English, French, and Germans, then moves on to English, French, and German writing on the war up to 1914. The choice of cut-off dates is obvious - the tactics of the Civil War, especially in its late stages, pre-figure the First World War. Luvaas' continual refrain is that European military thinkers and leaders largely failed to heed the lessons of the American conflict, for reasons ranging from stubborn traditionalism to simple lack of imagination, with tragic results in the early 20th century. Pace Paddy Griffith, the American Civil War was, at least in the later stages, very much a modern war, a war in which frontal attack was relatively useless and tactical maneuver was the best option, thanks to the lethal range and accuracy of rifled weapons and the use of field entrenchments. Any student of military history, of course, recognizes how stultifying effective the defense was in WWI, rendering the whole conflict a bloody slog in the mud much like the Siege of Petersburg. Although the author highlights those rare, maverick theorists who perceived some or all of the lessons of the Civil War, the leitmotif of the study is that - aside from an appreciation for the importance of establishing a special branch to administer railroads, little else was taken from the Civil War, even the thunderingly obvious lesson that the day of cavalry shock tactics had decidedly passed. It was only after the Great War that European military writers, now unable to deny the salience of Civil War tactics, began to cultivate a useful interest in it.
Luvaas is a capable enough writer, thankfully, and even turns a good phrase now and then. His research is impeccable and his evaluations insightful. And, rare for a book on the Civil War, the ground he treads has not been worn bald by a thousand other writers. All these things should make this volume a treasure, a joy, for the serious student of the American Civil War. Unfortunately, the promise of a book about the influence of the conflict on European military tactics is spoiled by the repeated refrain of "no one took notice." Luvaas winds up telling us that "the European inheritance" of the Civil War is so much nothing, more or less. Even if it's true - and the author's thorough and well-documented case convinces the reader it is - it can't help but be a let-down. Mind you, the story of how the various European writers who studied the war failed to absorb its most important lessons is at least somewhat interesting, not to mention instructive in its own right, but given the promise of the title, I couldn't help but be disappointed.
The important tactical developments of the Civil War highlighted by Luvaas won't come as a surprise to anyone who's even moderately well-informed about military history. The attitudes of European military writers about the war were news to me, as I suspect they will be to most readers, but that's because they are, generally speaking, nugatory, which makes this book rather a long run for a short slide, as it were. Still, for the completist, it's not a total waste of time.
Only Chapter 9 is worth reading. Skip the other 200+ pp that endlessly repeat the uninteresting point that Europeans didn't learn much from the Civil War. The introduction is worth reading only if you're into cringe-worthy self-congratulation.
This book contains two sections: One containing the viewpoint of Europeans who traveled to America and witnessed the war first-hand, and the second is the opinions of European contemporaries who did not. As a different reviewer mentioned, the book overall is anti-climactic. Although much of the subject material was interesting, the book is a dense read, very detailed in the minutiae of the differences in the American and European militaries down to the differences in how they recruited troops and replenished their ranks. The last chapter of the book was it's most redeeming feature. This chapter discusses the reappraising of the Civil War by European officers after having run into similar issues in the first world war and realizing a more careful study could have helped them avoid many of the issues they encountered.