Teoria Social da Política Internacional

by Alexander Wendt, Vivian Mannheimer (Translator), Paula Vedoveli (Translator)

No momento em que foi publicado no exterior, o livro de estreia de Alexander Wendt se tornou imediatamente obra de referência não só para os estudos de Relações Internacionais, como também para aqueles que procuram compreender as transformações históricas da política mundial. Sofisticado, ousado e extraordinariamente provocador -- não foram poucos os adjetivos da imprensa especializada. Baseando-se em filosofia e teoria social, Wendt propôs uma abordagem sistêmica das relações internacionais que contrasta com o mainstream realista. Para entender o fim do esquema bipolar e a atual distribuição do poder, o autor pensou além dos conceitos tradicionais e formulou uma tese que estabelece o sistema internacional, suas estruturas, agentes e processos como construções sociais, em vez de realidades materiais dadas. Lançando mão de uma abordagem construtivista, a obra nos encoraja a refletir com mais clareza sobre as questões e tensões contemporâneas, em que os interesses, poderes e capacidades dos Estados são intercambiáveis e redefinidos com a velocidade típica do século XXI.

Teoria Social da Política Internacional surge como uma impressionante contribuição que merece ser considerada por todos os alunos de RI, bem como aqueles que buscam entender o papel das ideias, normas e cultura na vida política.

Genres: International Relations, Politics, Nonfiction, Political Science, Philosophy, Sociology, Academic

536 pages, Paperback

First published October 6, 1995

About the author

Alexander Wendt is Mershon Professor of International Security and Professor of Political Science at The Ohio State University. He received his PhD from the University of Minnesota in 1989. Wendt taught previously at Yale University, Dartmouth College, and the University of Chicago, before coming to OSU in 2004.

Wendt is interested in philosophical aspects of social science, with special reference to international relations. He is most well-known for his work on constructivism in world politics, including Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge, 1999), which received the International Studies Association’s “Best Book of the Decade” award in 2006.

In 2017 Wendt was named the most influential scholar in International Relations over the past 20 years in a TRIP survey of 1400 IR faculty.

And in 2023, for their contributions to constructivism Wendt and Martha Finnemore were awarded the prestigious Skytte Prize in Political Science.

In his more recent work, Quantum Mind and Social Science (Cambridge, 2015) and beyond, Wendt explores some implications for social science of the finding that the Kahneman-Tversky anomalies in rational decision-making can all be resolved if quantum theory is used as a baseline rather than an expected-utility model based on classical probability theory. If the human mind is actually a quantum phenomenon, that could revolutionize today’s classical social sciences in the same way that quantum theory did physics in the 1920s.

Reviews

[Aziz Qaissi]

Social Theory of International Politics is principally a work of theory. In it, Alexander Wendt, a political scientist, suggests rather a different reading for international relations and states systems. This he calls the social constructivist theory. On one level, Wendt’s constructivism, which basically builds on previous stripes of the same theory, is established both as a meta-theory that examines the social world and as a substantial theory of International Relations scholarship. In 429 pages, the book is divided into two parts, respectively entitled Social Theory and International Politics, with a long, explanatory chapter, a Map of Structural Theorizing, that precedes both parts addressing the philosophical and sociological roots of his social constructivist theory. The philosophical line of thought that Wendt draws upon is that of Immanuel Kant. Obtained knowledge about the world, the Kantian view argues, will always be subjective knowledge in the sense that it is filtered through human consciousness. From this follows the focus that constructivism puts on human awareness or consciousness and its influence on world affairs. The sociological link to Wendt’s theory stems from two sociologists whose ideas have so long influenced social theory in general. The first is Max Weber’s ideas about how human beings rely on understanding of each other’s actions and assigning “meaning” to them. Thus in order to comprehend human interaction, we cannot merely describe as we do with physical phenomena. Instead, the comprehension requires rather new ways of understanding (what he calls in German “verstehen”). The second is Anthony Giddens’ views about structure-agency problems. This relationship between the structure and agents is neither top-down nor bottom-up. It is a relationship of “structuration” and its implications mean that the structure and the agents are mutually constituted and shaped, hence involves intersubjective understanding.

Provided the structure-agents problem, Wendts differentiates between two levels where this problematic is realized: the macro-level and the micro-level. The former consists of individuals with ideas and beliefs. These are exhibited through the creation of cultural forms such as rules, norms, laws, institutions, myths, customs, traditions, ideologies, narratives, etc. These constitute a “common knowledge” of the micro-structure which is highly subjective. The latter consists of states, international organizations, international norms and rules, etc. together they form a set of “representations” or “collective knowledge”. The macro-structure (collective knowledge) and micro-structure (common knowledge) are involved in a constitutive and co-determining relationship.

Constructivists, accordingly, disagree with and differ from classical theories of International Relations (Realism, Neorealism and Neoliberalism) with respects to three levels. First is the methodological difference in which realists are interested in how incentives in the international system affect the price of behaviour (constructivists instead ask the question: where those identities and incentives come from?). The second is the ontological difference; that is the nature of the international system (classical theories claim it is materialist, individualist, while constructivists argue it is idealist). Third is the empirical difference which addresses the extent to which identities and interests are constructed by domestic structures versus the systemic structures.

From the disagreements pointed out above come the two effects of structure: causal and constitutive. The former can be reduced to this mathematical formula X generates Y → X exists independently of Y. The latter as X is what it is in virtue of its relation to Y →X presupposes Y → their relationship is necessary rather than contingent. Based on the differentiation between constitutive and causal effects of structure, constructivists assume that (i) international system is a social phenomenon not a materialist one – an idealist view of structure as a distribution of knowledge and ideas and not material capabilities; (ii) state identities and interests are more constituted by the international system, and (iii) anarchy has no specific logic apart from process and that structure is structured resulting in rather three logics of anarchy (Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian). Linked to this is the distinction made between two types of knowledge, based on which interests are constituted. The first is private knowledge. This kind of knowledge held within single individuals and include their ideas and beliefs. The second is shared knowledge. This type of knowledge is reached when private knowledge is socially shared; that is when private knowledge is disseminated internationally through foreign policy.

Wendt goes as far as to postulate a state theory-like and calls it “the essential state” whose ontological basis is not materialist but ideational/idealist/ideal. The attempt is identify the common properties and features that states have in common. The objectives of such theorization tend to (i) give a model of state as a “body” by showing that it is an actor which cannot be reduced to its parts; (ii) give a the model of state a “life” by identifying its intrinsic motivational dispositions or “national interests”, and (iii) show that states are ontologically prior to states system per se. In doing so, Wend uses three significant conceptualizations of state. First is the Webrian organizational theory which views state as an organization possessing sovereignty and territorial use of organized violence. Second is the Marxist structural theory which views the state as a structure that binds organizational actors and society in a relationship of mutual constitution. The third is the reductive theory which claims that state is reducible to the interest groups and individuals in society. The synthetic position of Wendt drawing upon these three conceptualizations is that “the referent object of “the state” should be conceptualized as ab organizational actor that is internally related to the society it governs by a structure of political authority, which in effect rolls all three views up in one.” (p. 201). Wendt uses the term “essential state” to refer to the common properties and features that all states share regardless of their formal variations (i.e., democratic, communist, capitalist, etc.).

Constructivism view the state as a “corporate agency” with properties (institutional-legal order, monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence, internal and external sovereignty, territory, and society); with the agency of state structure (individuals’ ideas, beliefs and intentionality), and with identities and interests (individuals’ ideas and intentionality are constitutive elements of the interests and actions of the state). Wendt synthesizes his view of essential state as corporate agency stating that "concrete individuals play an essential role in state action, instantiating and carrying it forward in time, but state action is no more reducible to those individuals than their action is reducible to neurons in the brain. Both kinds of agency exist only in virtue of structured relationships among their elements, but the effect of those structures is to constitute irreducible capacities for intentionality. These capacities are real, not actions." (p. 221).

The ontological status of state is “idealist”. As a social structure, state action (agency) depends on the actions of those individuals, since social structures exist in virtue of the practices which instantiate them. This structure is reducible to the properties and interactions of the individuals who make it up.

Actors ↔Ideas ↔ Identities ↔ interests
(State Structure – while ↔means ‘constitute’)

The application of the structural theorizing laid down in the first part of the book takes on the assumption that the states international system is ontologically informed by anarchy, but anarchy is what the states make of it! This ordering principle of the international system does not have an inherent logic of its own. Shared knowledge, culture, constitute the resulting logic of anarchy which then characterizes society, either in cooperative terms or conflictual ones. Not least because shared ideas may constitute conflict while material forces may induce cooperation, or to use the famous example Wendt states: “five hundred British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the US than five North Korean ones” because the British are friends, North Koreans are not. Thus, Wendt proposes three ideal types of anarchy but asserts they are not definitively exhaustive.

The first is the Hobbesian culture. The principle of this culture is “war of all against all”. It is a characteristic of the nature state. This culture generates enmity role as a position of the Other and has implications for the posture of the Self. The logic of this culture is conflict that produces a security dilemma.

The second is the Lockean culture. Its principle is captured by the phrase “live and let live”. While generating rival roles, unlike the Hobbesian culture, the logic of this culture is to recognize the Other’s sovereignty, life and liberty. Rivalry of the Lockean culture does not make it less contingent in terms of conflict. Conflict may occur at any moment.

The third is the Kantian culture. Here the relationship between the Self and Other is characterized by friendship under the aphorism of “live in peace but go their separate ways”. This culture leaves room for cooperation and creates a rather collective security in which the security of the Other is seen as the security of the Self – this is when Kantian norms are deeply internalized.
It should be mentioned that Wendt suggests three degrees of internalization for each culture and argues that the transition from one degree to another, or from one culture to another presupposes a process (temporal and special frameworks); that is how “state agents and systemic cultures are sustained by foreign policy practices, and sometimes transformed” (p. 313).

On the basis of what has been established above, it seems that the tendency to look at International Relations from a constructivist lens requires four central points of focus:

(i) Social being. This point addresses the ontology/nature of states system. For neorealists and neoliberals, it is a purely materialist and individualist ontology. For constructivists, it is rather an idealist ontology.

(ii) Mutual constitution. A social structure leaves space for agency, that is, for individuals to influence and act upon the structure, as well as to be influenced by it (structuration). Wendt’s famous article (1992) captures this idea: “Anarchy Is What the States Make of It”.

(iii) Social facts. These includes culture, politics, economy, history, religion, etc. Being indispensible elements to the formation of world politics, these social facts are seen as social phenomena which are constituted and informed by ideas and beliefs. That is to say, the international relations phenomenon is not one that is to be understood and described as a physical, material object. It is rather a social phenomenon requiring new ways of understanding (>“verstehen”).

(iv) Social cognition. The issue of intentionality and intent in designing material objects or institutions invites issues about the role of human reasoning. Social meaning attributed to these objects and institutions must be understood from within as the Weberian concept of “verstehen” suggests.

[Nisa · Rating 4 out of 5]

Wow, that was a hard one to read. Although "Anarchy is what states make of it." sounds quite simple, this book is so much more than just that. Trying to create a via media between existing IR theories that seem to be incompatible with each other, Wendt uses a more holist and idealist approach to IR, while also borrowing the concept of anarchy from Neorealism (especially Waltz's Neorealism). It is important to add that he also disagress with Waltz on various points, though.
At first glance, you might see him as a constructivist. Well, he himself claims his theorizing to be thin constructivism: it is not "ideas all the way down" as radical constructivists or poststructuralists would claim, but he argues that there are ultimately a material basis for everything, eventhough the values and interests in those very same things are constituted of ideas. This is one his attempts to 'harmonize' two radical views.
On cultures of anarchy, Wendt sees three different types of anarchy: Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian. These three are also divided into three degrees of internalization.
And there is still so much more in the book which would take me forever to summarize here.

All in all, this book is definitely a must for anyone who wants to study IR deeper. It enriches one's understanding of other IR theories and shows that it is possible to do IR theorizing without being entirely radical. Two thumbs up!

[Eric · Rating 3 out of 5]

Alexander Wendt, in his Social Theory of International Politics, explicitly takes aim at Kenneth Waltz’s seminal work, Theory of International Politics. Wendt, powerfully arguing that Waltz’s characterization of anarchy in the international system is underspecified, makes the claim that distribution of ideas are a key underlying causal factor for anarchy and thus conflict, as opposed to Waltz’s distribution of capabilities. At first glance, Wendt’s focus on the distribution of ideas is a seemingly major advance for international relations theory, yet Wendt’s analysis is not as revolutionary as it initially appears; though he undermines the logic of certain key Waltzian claims, Wendt is unable to convincingly show that concern for survival might not retain its paramount position in relations between states. As a result, even if Wendt is able to convincingly move beyond Theory of International Politics, his conclusions are far more circumscribed than might be initially assumed.

Wendt’s argument strikes at the heart of Theory of International Politics by focusing on the Waltzian assumption that systemic anarchy is constant and that interests necessarily follow from that anarchy. Wendt’s central critique of Waltz’s theory is that, ‘Anarchy and the distribution of power are insufficient to tell us which is which. U.S. military power has a different significance for Canada than for Cuba, despite their similar “structural” positions’. If states are not pre-determined to act in a particular way toward other states with equal structural attributes to one another, then Waltz’s theory is incomplete and there is a need to further explain these empirical irregularities. Because states act differently towards other states with the same capabilities, Wendt argues that interests cannot be accounted for purely by Waltz’s anarchy. This is a major step forward because if interests are indeed exogenous to Waltz’s notion of anarchy, then it begs the question of what determines these interests. Yet, Wendt limits the cutting nature of this critique by agreeing with Waltz that anarchy does exist – that there certainly is no leviathan or overarching authority within the international system. What accounts for these different interests therefore is not a lack of anarchy, but rather different types of anarchies. This is a key conceptual shift because it subsequently refocuses the debate on what determines when each type of anarchy occurs (Hobbesian, Lockean, or Kantian). At this point, Wendt argues that the distribution of ideas about these anarchies, determined by processes of socialization, is what really explains the international system.

By increasing the number of potential anarchies, Wendt is able to move the causal chain back multiple notches and unleash the possibility for systemic change. Such a move seems to have great conceptual and applicable promise because if the anarchy of the system varies and if that variation has cooperative or non-warlike manifestations, the potential for positive systemic change (specifically in Wendt’s language from a 1st order Hobbesian to 3rd order Kantian world) exists. Despite this move however, Wendt’s argument runs into significant problems that undermine this potential.

The first is Wendt’s claim regarding state interests. Wendt tries to move the debate away from a focus solely on state survival by both suggesting that other types of anarchies and other types of interests exist that often play important roles. Along this second line of reasoning, Wendt suggests three other potential interests that states follow: autonomy, collective well-being, and self-esteem. The problem with this approach is that Wendt incorrectly claims that a stable hierarchy of interests does not exist. Though states do have each of these interests, Wendt’s suggestion that each of these interests are required for the long-term survival of the state does not recognize that some are more important than others. Indeed, it seems that physical survival of the state would be predominately important to a state because without it, it would not be possible to pursue the other interests. Subsequently, if survival is the pre-eminent interest of states, then this suggests a serious limitation to the potential revolutionary nature of Wendt’s claim of the existence of multiple anarchies. To illustrate, consider the prescriptive potential of having socially constructed anarchies. If these anarchies could be constructed over time, one could create the least conflictual one. If, regardless of the type of anarchy in existence, interest does not change or does not change very much (e.g. state survival is still paramount), this suggests that changes in forms of anarchy are not as important as Wendt claims and that socialization is not predominantly important in determining interests. Because state security is the most important value for state survival, the prescriptive argument that changes in types of anarchy could have a significant ameliorative effect is undermined.

Second, though Wendt argues that social process can change the system, this problematically presupposes that states can overcome previously entrenched social systems to identify in new ways. Wendt acknowledges the possibility of change over time and explicitly argues that such a possibility provides for a more optimistic approach to IR than what Waltz has previously offered but also offers the caveat that such change might actually be more difficult in systems of entrenched distributions of ideas. While recognizing the difficulties, he claims, both in Social Theory of International Politics and elsewhere that the prospect for this socialization leading to change exists because states were, at one time, pre-social and through first contacts able to form opinions of other states. Because of this initial process of socialization, which was not determined to be hostile, Wendt reasons that the possibility for change continues to exist in international relations. The problem with this optimism is that it is unclear whether states, in their initial ‘pre-social’ forms, were actually these blank slates. As Jonathan Mercer has shown via experimental testing, human subjects in groups will form negative opinions of out-group members regardless of whether the in-group members have had previous contact with the out-group members. Using this data, Mercer concludes that even in these ‘pre-social stages’, groups are predisposed to be hostile towards one another:
Once we assume that we have two states, we can assume each will compete against the other regardless of the other’s behavior. Competition need not be triggered by economic or security concerns and is not necessarily function of selfishness or limited resources; instead, competition results from categorization, comparison, and a need for a positive social identity.

Thus Wendt’s argument that there is some blank slate which serves as a starting point appears incorrect. If no blank slate exists, then Wendt cannot accurately claim that the movement from a blank slate to a process of socialization occurred and the optimism of his reconceptualization is significantly dampened.
Wendt tries to address this problem by recognizing Mercer’s assertion but claiming that, even though groups form in-group/out-group notions of identity before processes of socialization, this does not dispose them a priori to enmity. If they are not initially hostile, then the possibility exists for these states to become socialized to cooperation. This possibility might be true according to his theory, but, according to Mercer’s Social Interaction Theory, the possibility is nothing more than theoretical – interactions between individuals and states will not, in reality, produce non-competitive relations. This is because any of the mechanisms Wendt posits as necessary to socialize units often increase misunderstanding and merely reflect ethnocentric projections rather than accurate communications. The resulting picture is that, even if states were blank slates which could be socialized, the likelihood of positive socialization leading away from the Hobbesian world of anarchy is essentially nil.
This image points to the larger conclusion that, though Wendt’s theory is a significant break from Waltz’s, it is not nearly as revolutionary, especially in its optimism, than it initially appears. Wendt’s positing of state survival as the most important issue for states, combined with the theoretically mutable but seemingly practically immutable identities of states seems to leave us much in the same position as Waltz’s work did. In this way, Wendt’s world resembles Waltz’s and will for any foreseeable future. Despite this limited scope, Social Theory of International Politics still moves the conceptualization of international relations forward significantly and at least introduces the theoretical possibility of change.

[Alessandro Mura · Rating 4 out of 5]

Porcodio che mattonazzo. Dio ne scampi!!! È un classico e perciò va letto. Impressionante la capacità di sintesi tra varie posizioni che ha Wendt, così come è impressionante la varietà degli argomenti trattati e la ricchezza della bibliografia. Il risultato teorico, per quanto mi riguarda, è insoddisfacente: mi sembra parecchio utopico e semplicistico in tanti aspetti. Però chapeau Wendt!

[Zhaslan · Rating 5 out of 5]

I have learned a lot about constructivism, its core assumption about the meaning of ideas in the political philosophy.

Constitutive role of ideas. For materialists it's causal relationships, effects, and questions, for idealists - constitutive.
Holists are interested in structure, individualists in agents. If I understood correctly, consequently there are micro- and macrostructures. On the y-axis we have structure (individualism vs. holism from down to top), on the x ideas (fr. materialism to idealism). Lower left square is home to classical realism, neorealism and neoliberalism. Upper left - to Neorealism, World-Systems Theory, and Neo-Gramscian Marxism. P. 31 explains that lower right quadrant - state identities and
interests are constructed largely by domestic politics, but have a more social view of what the structure of the international system is made of. Power and interest vs. ideas and institutions (neorealism and neoliberalism). Upper right is of constructivists.

Domestic politics <-> liberalism?

Neorealists hold that state interests stem from the material structure of anarchy.

Desure+belief+reason=action

P. 236: by taking the perspective of the other that the Self sees itself.

Ch. 6, toward the end, path dependency, tendency to get better, not worse.

First encounter of Ego and Alter, potential for conflict is higher because congruence of interests is less likely.

Corporate and type identities

Huntington, "heterogeneity breeds conflict"

Collective identity formation needs division of labour, common fate, interdependence, and self-restraint. Functional specialization's possible, compatible w/ homogeneity of identity.

Notes taken:
-take identities in relation to others;
-unit-level theorizing;
-to be on speaking terms;
-press arguments;
-inferences from observable events to broader patterns;
-by nature\by nurture
-impact on net utility
-to take sth as an unproblematic given
-empirical record;
-epiphenomenon of;
-status quoness; dyad;
-worst-caseism
-to get routinized;
-unidirectional
-winnow-narrow and avowed-stated
-shore up the boundary

Need to brush up on causal theory of reference; Humean model of man; intentional theory of action; self-help system; Just War Theory (wars can be constitutive and configurative); consequentialism; Bayesian statistics; MORE ON supervenience (non-reductive and non-causal).

Also read Haas and Waltz.

[Peter Fox · Rating 4 out of 5]

Wendt has produced a piece of writing that is worthy of his reputation and brings social theory to a new level. Understanding international relations is complicated due to the multi layering and multi-faceted perspectives that are associated with the subject matter. Reading Wendt's essays in this field of study cannot only enhance the reader's knowledge but also bring about a change in perspective.
There is more to international relations than realism and liberalism and their various saplings. Wendt highlights this through strong arguments and consistent philosophical referencing to key authors in the field of study: Locke, Hobbes, Kant and occasionally draws in Rousseau, Wittgenstein, Nietzsche and Poppers.
Just as imperative are the social theory concepts that are generated and utilised in the setting of IR, to make the concepts and ontology not only relevant but foundational. The only disappointment that I have is the limited reference to Huntington whose work is benchmark material, even though it may sit on the opposite side of the argument to Wendt.
If you are wanting to understand international relations than reading both Wendt and Huntington are a must. Waltz's work lays the foundation, Huntington will supply the practicalities and Wendt adds the social and philosophical grounding.

[Haris Avdic · Rating 5 out of 5]

A fresh approach to the study of international relations that embraces multiple parameters and acknowledges the complexity of our reality, offering answers to many of the pressing questions within the brutal arena of high politics. The work challenges the traditional notion of states as purely rational actors seeking to maximize power in pursuit of national security as their ultimate goal. Instead, it presents states as complex entities composed of a multitude of actors who operate based on socially constructed realities and identities rooted in deep-seated beliefs and worldviews.
This book emphasizes the power of identity, narrative, ideology, discourse, and culture over the dry mechanics of realpolitik. It is a compelling contribution that invites readers to rethink international relations through a more nuanced, human-centered lens.

[S · Rating 5 out of 5]

The text upends many base assumptions that readers are likely to have about IR. It is profoundly idealist and thinks of states as central actors in the international system and makes a case that ideational factors are primary for states as opposed to material circumstances. Wendt's major argument is that relationships determine reactions between states before all other considerations. Takeaway: ideas, identities, and norms matter as they are necessary for states to define one another in the context of a vacuum.

[Patrick F · Rating 5 out of 5]

A must read for IR graduate students.

[Patrick Sauriol · Rating 3 out of 5]

Talks about dogs a strange amount. Doesn't understand post-modernism.

[Jeff Mann · Rating 4 out of 5]

I have a feeling Wendt is six feet tall.

[Raj Agrawal · Rating 3 out of 5]

[Disclaimer: This is a snapshot of my thoughts on this book after just reading it. This is not meant to serve as a summary of main/supporting points or a critique – only as some words on how I engaged with this book for the purposes of building a theoretical framework on strategy.]

-- Assigned portions of chapters 3 and 6 for School of Advanced Air & Space Studies –

(pp. 165-190)
In this first (turgid) assigned section, Wendt discusses his two effects of structure: causal and constitutive. Causal relationship lend themselves more to realist IR theory, while he argues for a more holistic approach – one that highlights the complexity of individual interests while considering behavior. His concern seems to be that while cultural and normative variables can shape the behavior between individuals, they also can shape the individual as well as the context of the relationship. Even further, the context may be a variable in of itself that affects the individuals as well as the normative variables. Wendt is attempting to expand on the realist perspective of the individual – that it is not a single variable, but a representative of multiple variables within the context of other variables. Culture matters, and culture can be as anticipatory as the traditional rational-actor model.

(pp. 215-245)
Wendt takes a pretty risky leap with his premise on the state (as perceived by all IR theorists): “All sides seem to agree that corporate agency is actually a kind of structure: a structure of shared knowledge or discourse that enables individuals to engage in institutionalized collective action” (215). I would argue that neorealists do not consider the representative nature of states as they relate to the individual – this may be more of a liberal interpretation that would distort Wendt’s follow-on argument. As an aside, his premise in the previous section regarding casual relationships also seems suspect to me: “Causal relationships can exist only between independently existing entities” (167); however, this premise may hold for neorealists such as Waltz.

This section is devoted to defending the state as a representative agency within the international structure, but with important caveats from realism. The idea seems to be what distinguishes states from one another instead of material capability/resources, and these ideas have the potential to build relationships or create conflict between states. He expresses concern about the rational-actor model (via anthropomorphization) in a similar fashion to Gilpin – that the domestic variables in each state may have more to do with how it behaves in the international system than Waltz gives it credit for. I argue that Waltz hedges against this risk in his assumptions up front; however, there certainly is room for expansion on the role of domestic variables. In addition to ideas, identities (corporate, type, role, and collective) play a significant role in how a state behaves. Nevertheless, he concludes that states may very well be the basic unit in international politics.

(pp. 324-343)
Finally, in this section the author takes a look at how culture is passed onto subsequent generations within an identity group – through imitation and social learning. It seems to be a play on “natural selection” from what I can tell, but the ideas are quite reasonable. He takes a very optimistic view on the individual where “nurture” is a much stronger influence than “nature.” Successful behaviors are emulated and then passed on, and those behaviors that seem to make society better are passed between individuals for the long-term success of the identity group. I feel he overlooks Waltz’s first image to his theory’s detriment. If he had included it, it would have demonstrated an intellectual rigor that would have made his theory more useful as an alternative.

[Yunze · Rating 4 out of 5]

In the IR literature, it is as hard to bypass Wendt as it is to ignore constructivism, whose singular representativeness for a new school of theory counts as an enlightening trail-blazer that opens up a whole spectrum of possibilities aside from traditionally predominant paradigms of realism and liberalism. By investigating and integrating sophisticated findings from sociology, linguistics, anthropology into his ingenious frame of analysis, Wendt's penetrating insights into the subtle connexion between social theory, epistemology, and international politics would only stimulate more fruitful points of exchanges and refinement for politics scholars interested in broadening their research agendas. A must read for IR theories, though sufficient theoretical grounding in IR, politics, and even sociology is a definite prerequisite for any in-depth absorption!

[Arys Aditya · Rating 5 out of 5]

Nah, harus ada yang menerjemahkan buku ini ke Bahasa Indonesia, supaya mahasiswa HI di Indonesia tidak terperangkap ke Realisme/Neorealisme dan Liberalisme/Neoliberalisme saja. Harus!
Wendt, yang sangat tersohor lewat kata 'Anarchy is What States Make of It' melahirkan salah satu aliran filsafat paling kuat HI melalui buku ini: Konstruktivisme Sosial. Maka untuk buku sekelas itu, sudah semestinya telah diterjemahkan.

[Jonathan · Rating 3 out of 5]

Wendt's magnum opus is really two books--one on social theory, the other on systems theory--and this makes it somewhat unwieldy. But it is a must for all students of IR who are serious about systematically thinking about our ontological positions.

[Barry McCulloch · Rating 4 out of 5]

Although stuck in its own 'via media', Wendt makes an invaluable contribution to contemporary IR theory.

[Will · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is Wendt's seminal work on the approach of social constructivism in International Relations. Not the easiest of reads, but a must for any IR scholars.