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The Pentagon Wars: Reformers Challenge the Old Guard
From the late 1960s through the mid-1980s, a small band of military activists waged war against corruption in the Pentagon, challenging a system they believed squandered the public's money and trust. The book examines the movement and its proponents and describes how the system responded to the criticisms and efforts to change accepted practices and entrenched ways of thinking.
The author, an air force colonel and part of the movement, worked in the pentagon for fourteen years. He presents a view of the Department of Defense that only an insider could offer. He exposes serious flaws in the military policy-making process, particularly in weapons development and procurement. The details he gives on the unrelenting push for high-tech weapons, despite their ineffectiveness and extraordinary cost-overruns, provide a strong case for the charge of ethical bankruptcy.
The second half of the book deals with the author's attempts to get frontline equipment tested under combat conditions. For the first time, readers learn the nasty details of his battle with the army over line-fire testing of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle--a battle that he eventually won, leading to the personnel carrier's redesign and the saving of many lives.
Never reluctant to name names and reveal details, James G. Burton presents a forceful case. And his revelations offer insights not found elsewhere into the motivations and actions of the people who wield power from within. Nor does he stop at the walls of the Pentagon. In his epilogue he tells what happened in the field during the final hours of the Gulf War that allowed Hussein's elite Republican Guard to escape.
Now back in print after having inspired a feature HBO film, this explosive account of insider corruption is sure to serve policy-makers for generations to come.
The author, an air force colonel and part of the movement, worked in the pentagon for fourteen years. He presents a view of the Department of Defense that only an insider could offer. He exposes serious flaws in the military policy-making process, particularly in weapons development and procurement. The details he gives on the unrelenting push for high-tech weapons, despite their ineffectiveness and extraordinary cost-overruns, provide a strong case for the charge of ethical bankruptcy.
The second half of the book deals with the author's attempts to get frontline equipment tested under combat conditions. For the first time, readers learn the nasty details of his battle with the army over line-fire testing of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle--a battle that he eventually won, leading to the personnel carrier's redesign and the saving of many lives.
Never reluctant to name names and reveal details, James G. Burton presents a forceful case. And his revelations offer insights not found elsewhere into the motivations and actions of the people who wield power from within. Nor does he stop at the walls of the Pentagon. In his epilogue he tells what happened in the field during the final hours of the Gulf War that allowed Hussein's elite Republican Guard to escape.
Now back in print after having inspired a feature HBO film, this explosive account of insider corruption is sure to serve policy-makers for generations to come.
336 pages, Paperback
First published September 1, 1993
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Displaying 1 - 29 of 29 reviews
August 18, 2015
I came to this book having thoroughly enjoyed the movie of the same name, expecting more of the same. While the salient points are present in the book, the book is quite serious in tone, whereas the movie is comedic all the way through, making the book a significantly different beast.
In the Pentagon Wars, Burton relates the story of how a small group of reformers within the officer ranks of the US military strove to effect fundamental change to how the US military performed procurement, from a larger sense of a need to shift battlefield tactics from the all-out assaults and war of attrition of the first world war, the Korean war, and the Vietnam war, to more adaptable and flexible maneuver warfare.
Through a series of examples spanning from the development of the F15 and F16 fighter jets to the Bradley Fighting Vehicle (described as "A troop transport that can't carry troops, a reconnaissance vehicle that's too conspicuous to do reconnaissance, and a quasi-tank that has less armor than a snow-blower, but carries enough ammo to take out half of D.C."), Burton spins a tale that should be familiar to anyone dealing with public procurement projects.
In particular, it deals with the issues of confirmation bias and tests designed to yield the desired results, while overstating performance, understating costs, and professing exacting knowledge of how a weapons platform will perform in a given situation, while pointing out the real results, costs, and severe miscalculation of knowledge of how e.g. the Bradley would perform when hit.
Though the subject matter is dry, Burton is able to write an engaging and interesting book that educates the reader, not only on how things used to be done, but also sheds some light on how things are still done. A current example is the massive increase in weight for the F35 Joint Strike Fighter, compared to the F16, which is what it is slated to replace.
To his credit, Burton not only offers criticism, but also some real proposals for improvement which, had they been followed, would have benefited not only the US armed forces, but their allies around the world who use the same weapons platforms. Extensive reading lists and references to sources are also present, in the best of academic tradition.
In the Pentagon Wars, Burton relates the story of how a small group of reformers within the officer ranks of the US military strove to effect fundamental change to how the US military performed procurement, from a larger sense of a need to shift battlefield tactics from the all-out assaults and war of attrition of the first world war, the Korean war, and the Vietnam war, to more adaptable and flexible maneuver warfare.
Through a series of examples spanning from the development of the F15 and F16 fighter jets to the Bradley Fighting Vehicle (described as "A troop transport that can't carry troops, a reconnaissance vehicle that's too conspicuous to do reconnaissance, and a quasi-tank that has less armor than a snow-blower, but carries enough ammo to take out half of D.C."), Burton spins a tale that should be familiar to anyone dealing with public procurement projects.
In particular, it deals with the issues of confirmation bias and tests designed to yield the desired results, while overstating performance, understating costs, and professing exacting knowledge of how a weapons platform will perform in a given situation, while pointing out the real results, costs, and severe miscalculation of knowledge of how e.g. the Bradley would perform when hit.
Though the subject matter is dry, Burton is able to write an engaging and interesting book that educates the reader, not only on how things used to be done, but also sheds some light on how things are still done. A current example is the massive increase in weight for the F35 Joint Strike Fighter, compared to the F16, which is what it is slated to replace.
To his credit, Burton not only offers criticism, but also some real proposals for improvement which, had they been followed, would have benefited not only the US armed forces, but their allies around the world who use the same weapons platforms. Extensive reading lists and references to sources are also present, in the best of academic tradition.
March 15, 2020
Books written by self-described skeptics deserve to be read with a healthy dose of skepticism themselves. It is in the nature of a skeptic to reject arguments, even and perhaps especially, rational ones. All skeptics are biased in one way or another and those biases are often easily discerned. Sometimes the skeptic will freely identify his biases in order to strengthen his argument. Such is the case with James G. Burton’s Pentagon Wars. Burton is skeptical and biased, buthis work is all the stronger for it. Sometimes biases can interfere with an argument to the point that the skeptic becomes a polemicist. When the skeptical author is also part of his story, the danger of a twisted narrative is even greater….hence the need for discernment on the part of the reader. No matter, this is an excellent book.
When the book was published in 1993, it caused a sensation. Army and Air Force Combat Developers were outraged at this little known but institutionally reviled Air Force officer who had the audacity to point out the flaws he saw in some of the services’ most celebrated weapon systems, the F-16, and the M 2/3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle. After heaping scorn on the acquisitions infrastructure of the Air Force, the Army, and the Department of Defense, Col. Burton was forced to retire … and write this book. To add insult to injury, the book later became a movie which further ridiculed the services. Now with three decades of hindsight, Burton's work has stood the test of time. Many of the issues Burton uncovered with the Bradley system remained unchanged, and therefore the Future Combat Systems (FCS) failed in spectacular fashion. This book is a cautionary tale and should be required reading for Concept Developers and Acquisition Specialists.
When the book was published in 1993, it caused a sensation. Army and Air Force Combat Developers were outraged at this little known but institutionally reviled Air Force officer who had the audacity to point out the flaws he saw in some of the services’ most celebrated weapon systems, the F-16, and the M 2/3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle. After heaping scorn on the acquisitions infrastructure of the Air Force, the Army, and the Department of Defense, Col. Burton was forced to retire … and write this book. To add insult to injury, the book later became a movie which further ridiculed the services. Now with three decades of hindsight, Burton's work has stood the test of time. Many of the issues Burton uncovered with the Bradley system remained unchanged, and therefore the Future Combat Systems (FCS) failed in spectacular fashion. This book is a cautionary tale and should be required reading for Concept Developers and Acquisition Specialists.
May 5, 2025
Its a book about doing what is right, not doing what is easy.
Will you be brave enough to cross the Rubicon?
You will have two choices to make - to be or to do.
To be is to be somebody with a title; To do is creating meaningful impact with your work.
To be is to have form and style; To do is to have substance and balls of steel.
To be is to play safe; To do is to rebel with integrity.
To be is to go for promotions and following the status quo; To do is to challenge the status quo even if its at your own expense.
Jame Burton dared to fight against the dishonest bureaucratic establishment that put unsafe military vehicles first, soldiers' lives second. Going against his corrupt leaders, he prioritised soldiers' lives first, vehicles and weapons second. His contribution saved many lives in the Gulf War with his Bradley Fighting Vehicle redesigns. For example, he seperated the fuel tank and ammunitions away from where the soldiers are seated in the infantry vehicle so that if an enemy anti-tank weapon hit the Bradley, it won't explode as easily.
Is being a team player always a good quality? Not if the senior leadership is doing the wrong things.
In the Pentagon, being a "team player" means blindly advocating for the production of weapons by falsifying test results simply because that's what the senior leadership wants. James Burton chose not to be a team player and do his job honestly, even if it meant risking promotions or getting forced into early retirement.
Which choice would you pick when you face the same issue?
Would you still do the right thing even if no one thanks you?
Will you be brave enough to cross the Rubicon?
You will have two choices to make - to be or to do.
To be is to be somebody with a title; To do is creating meaningful impact with your work.
To be is to have form and style; To do is to have substance and balls of steel.
To be is to play safe; To do is to rebel with integrity.
To be is to go for promotions and following the status quo; To do is to challenge the status quo even if its at your own expense.
Jame Burton dared to fight against the dishonest bureaucratic establishment that put unsafe military vehicles first, soldiers' lives second. Going against his corrupt leaders, he prioritised soldiers' lives first, vehicles and weapons second. His contribution saved many lives in the Gulf War with his Bradley Fighting Vehicle redesigns. For example, he seperated the fuel tank and ammunitions away from where the soldiers are seated in the infantry vehicle so that if an enemy anti-tank weapon hit the Bradley, it won't explode as easily.
Is being a team player always a good quality? Not if the senior leadership is doing the wrong things.
In the Pentagon, being a "team player" means blindly advocating for the production of weapons by falsifying test results simply because that's what the senior leadership wants. James Burton chose not to be a team player and do his job honestly, even if it meant risking promotions or getting forced into early retirement.
Which choice would you pick when you face the same issue?
Would you still do the right thing even if no one thanks you?
September 29, 2012
A must read. Much more than the movie of the same name, only 1/3 is on the Bradley. The stories of the F-15, F-16, A-10, and others are just as educational. And the John Boyd reading list at the back of the book is a treasure. Thank you to James Burton and John Boyd and all of the Reformers for working so hard to do the right thing.
Some nice quotes:
The flow of information from the military institutions to the senior leaders at the top is filtered, massaged, manipulated, and shaped to pump up the good news and suppress the bad news. If senior leaders really want to know what is happening in their domain, they must develop outside sources of information...For the majority of senior leaders in the Pentagon, the Yellow Bird is the primary outside source of information...According to aides, Secretary Caspar Weinberger was always asking, "Why didn't I know about this before? Why did I have to learn about this in the Yellow Bird?"
Fun Fact: the 'Yellow Bird' was the original Early Bird. It was called the Yellow Bird b/c it had a yellow cover sheet. Burton also notes that the editor of the Early Bird was "steadfast in his commitment that the Yellow Bird contain a true representation of the press coverage of the military." Nice to know.
"The general said, 'Tell Bennett we didn't mean to do it. Tell him the Army isn't devious, we're just dumb.'"
"I am constantly amazed at how clever and resourceful people can be in explaining away disaster after disaster for which they were responsible without suffering any personal career damage."
Some nice quotes:
The flow of information from the military institutions to the senior leaders at the top is filtered, massaged, manipulated, and shaped to pump up the good news and suppress the bad news. If senior leaders really want to know what is happening in their domain, they must develop outside sources of information...For the majority of senior leaders in the Pentagon, the Yellow Bird is the primary outside source of information...According to aides, Secretary Caspar Weinberger was always asking, "Why didn't I know about this before? Why did I have to learn about this in the Yellow Bird?"
Fun Fact: the 'Yellow Bird' was the original Early Bird. It was called the Yellow Bird b/c it had a yellow cover sheet. Burton also notes that the editor of the Early Bird was "steadfast in his commitment that the Yellow Bird contain a true representation of the press coverage of the military." Nice to know.
"The general said, 'Tell Bennett we didn't mean to do it. Tell him the Army isn't devious, we're just dumb.'"
"I am constantly amazed at how clever and resourceful people can be in explaining away disaster after disaster for which they were responsible without suffering any personal career damage."
September 9, 2016
You really can't understand the defense department and all the issues with the US military unless you read this book. It's not just a case study of what went wrong with the Bradley; it's a searing indictment of the military establishment through the prism of the procurement process and the Bradley in particular.
November 28, 2020
Must read expose on the inefficiency and institutional challenges (some might say dishonesty and corruption) of the frequently maligned military-industrial complex. Nevertheless, the book is far from flawless and should not be taken as gospel. I often felt the author was a little polemic and had difficulty being a dispassionate observer, which I feel all non-fiction writer should be even if they are writing of issues they were personally involved in. For avoidance of doubt, dispassionate doesn't mean apathetic - I don't think anyone goes to the trouble of writing a detailed book like this unless they care greatly about the subject. For these reasons, I think the book is only one piece of research into how the Pentagon buys weapons. I won't get into my own opinions on the core subject of the issues with the weapon procurement process or how to improve it, though I did find it interesting that many of the programs in the late 70's and early 80's appeared to strive for technologies that have only become feasible in the last decade or so. Maybe there's a lesson in that too.
July 27, 2022
A great presentation, from first-hand experience, of the inertia and madness gripping large bureaucracies. Multiple Army and Air Force programmes are provided as case studies of waste, aversion to change, intolerance of dissent and perverted incentives. These synergise into a comprehensive account of one man's unwinnable fight against the "machine". The book's only flaw is frequent over-saturation with military specifics; while some are obviously necessary to set the scene for the "Pentagon Wars", some felt excessive and unnecessary for the proper delivery of the book's key lessons re management and bureaucracy behaviour.
May 30, 2007
If you're interested in how it came to pass that the military paid $500 for a hammer or $800 for a toilet, this is the book you should read. Burton was placed in a position to see the kind of group-think in action that almost ruined the American Military in the 1980's. More than a study of contemporary American political history, it's a study of group decision making and what can go wrong with it.
February 5, 2011
Good read although author is not entirely objective. He often sounds jaded, but I can understand his disillusionment. Unfortunately little has changed in the world of Pentagon Acquisition programs which occurs for the large and small programs alike - based on my first hand experiences.
May 5, 2025
“The military does not enjoy having civilian masters. Military officers publicly support the Constitution, but privately, they wish that the civilians would just go away. The generals view the civilians as transients who come in, mess things up, and then move on. For good reasons, general mistrust exists between the two camps.” This is from The Pentagon Wars: Reformers Challenge the Old Guard by Col James G Burton, now a retired US Air Force officer.
Spoiler Alert: The book is dense with military jargon, which may deter casual readers. It’s best for readers with a specific interest in military or bureaucratic dysfunction rather than general audiences.
The book is a compelling and meticulously detailed exposé of the systemic corruption and inefficiency within the US military’s weapons procurement process during the late 1960s to mid-1980s. It is part memoir and part critique of the system, where he highlights how progressive military officers find it hard to work, even progress, in a system entrenched with prioritisation of careerism and sycophancy, cronyism, nepotism, and mediocrity in the guise of chain of command and orders.
“This obsession with looking good in front of the big boss caused the staff to spend 95 per cent of its time reacting to events rather than controlling them. [Senior officers] … control(ed) their future. (T)he(y) decide(d) which ones would be promoted and which ones would not.” Seeking their favour, they (officers) routinely falsify data and information to support answers and statements that their bosses want. Those who play the game are rewarded with promotions, foreign training opportunities, and UN missions or missions outside the country where allowances are lucrative.
He writes: ‘Anyone who would not play his game was fired. I watched many people sell their souls, piece by piece … in exchange for one more promotion … They never realised that, in the process of compromising their principles so often in order to get there, they would become programmed to continue operating in that same fashion once they arrived at the top.” The advice he got from his colleague, Colonel John Boyd, was: “… you are at a point in your life where you have to make a choice about what kind of a person you are going to be. There are two career paths in front of you, and you have to choose which path you will follow. One path leads to promotions, titles, and positions of distinction. To achieve success down that path, you have to conduct yourself a certain way. You must go along with the system and show that you are a better team player than your competitors. The other path leads to doing things that are truly significant for the Air Force (system), but the rewards will quite often be a kick in the stomach because you may have to cross swords with the party line on occasion. You can’t go down both paths, you have to choose. Do you want to be a man of distinction, or do you want to do things that really influence the shape of the Air Force (System)? To be or to do, that is the question.”
Manipulation of the system, procurement of substandard weapon systems or refurbishing obsolete weapon systems, which he describes as “ethically and morally corrupt from top to bottom”, careerism, and politicisation of the military, is a system designed to maintain power dynamics rather than innovate or prioritise national defence.
Without drawing out any specific comparisons, Kenya’s public procurement system, particularly in defence and infrastructure, shares striking parallels with the corruption Burton describes in the Pentagon. While the contexts differ, the underlying dynamics of bureaucratic inefficiency, conflicts of interest, and prioritisation of personal gain over public welfare resonate strongly.
The Pentagon Wars: Reformers Challenge the Old Guard by James G. Burton is a compelling read for specific audiences interested in understanding how the military works. I recommend it to all military personnel so that they know how messed up ‘The System’ is, readers interested in knowing whether their militaries are corrupt, military personnel who choose the lesser travelled path of principles and not careerism, and (don’t even think about it) whistleblowers in the military.
Spoiler Alert: The book is dense with military jargon, which may deter casual readers. It’s best for readers with a specific interest in military or bureaucratic dysfunction rather than general audiences.
The book is a compelling and meticulously detailed exposé of the systemic corruption and inefficiency within the US military’s weapons procurement process during the late 1960s to mid-1980s. It is part memoir and part critique of the system, where he highlights how progressive military officers find it hard to work, even progress, in a system entrenched with prioritisation of careerism and sycophancy, cronyism, nepotism, and mediocrity in the guise of chain of command and orders.
“This obsession with looking good in front of the big boss caused the staff to spend 95 per cent of its time reacting to events rather than controlling them. [Senior officers] … control(ed) their future. (T)he(y) decide(d) which ones would be promoted and which ones would not.” Seeking their favour, they (officers) routinely falsify data and information to support answers and statements that their bosses want. Those who play the game are rewarded with promotions, foreign training opportunities, and UN missions or missions outside the country where allowances are lucrative.
He writes: ‘Anyone who would not play his game was fired. I watched many people sell their souls, piece by piece … in exchange for one more promotion … They never realised that, in the process of compromising their principles so often in order to get there, they would become programmed to continue operating in that same fashion once they arrived at the top.” The advice he got from his colleague, Colonel John Boyd, was: “… you are at a point in your life where you have to make a choice about what kind of a person you are going to be. There are two career paths in front of you, and you have to choose which path you will follow. One path leads to promotions, titles, and positions of distinction. To achieve success down that path, you have to conduct yourself a certain way. You must go along with the system and show that you are a better team player than your competitors. The other path leads to doing things that are truly significant for the Air Force (system), but the rewards will quite often be a kick in the stomach because you may have to cross swords with the party line on occasion. You can’t go down both paths, you have to choose. Do you want to be a man of distinction, or do you want to do things that really influence the shape of the Air Force (System)? To be or to do, that is the question.”
Manipulation of the system, procurement of substandard weapon systems or refurbishing obsolete weapon systems, which he describes as “ethically and morally corrupt from top to bottom”, careerism, and politicisation of the military, is a system designed to maintain power dynamics rather than innovate or prioritise national defence.
Without drawing out any specific comparisons, Kenya’s public procurement system, particularly in defence and infrastructure, shares striking parallels with the corruption Burton describes in the Pentagon. While the contexts differ, the underlying dynamics of bureaucratic inefficiency, conflicts of interest, and prioritisation of personal gain over public welfare resonate strongly.
The Pentagon Wars: Reformers Challenge the Old Guard by James G. Burton is a compelling read for specific audiences interested in understanding how the military works. I recommend it to all military personnel so that they know how messed up ‘The System’ is, readers interested in knowing whether their militaries are corrupt, military personnel who choose the lesser travelled path of principles and not careerism, and (don’t even think about it) whistleblowers in the military.
August 17, 2022
A tale of brave, ingenious men fighting against the incompetent beaurocracy to save the lives of soldiers! Too bad it's all BULLSHIT.
I committed myself to read this book in its entirety before writing a review. I'm sorry. I just can't. None of these people have the slightest idea of what they're talking about. I can't open the book to random section and read more than a page without reading something so ridiculous that I have to slam the book shut and put my head down in sad laughter.
The Pentagon Wars is an asinine rewriting of history by the idiots who could not see their own stupidity. Burton lauds his group as the inventor of all successful tactics and aircraft and Bradley-modifications without any of it being true.
Long story short, the Army did eventually run live-fire testing. But there were two vehicles involved: the Army's proposed High Survivability Test Vehicle (HSTV) and Burton's proposed Advanced Survivability Test Bed. Surprise! The A2 upgrade that came out of this program featured changes tested in the HSTV. This included things like like upgraded armor and spall liners. Burton's ASTB, meanwhile, proposed putting the ****ing ammo on the outside of the armor. I just. I just can't. How did they end up building not one but THREE HSTVs to test?
James Burton's true colors can be seen only outside the book. Take, for example, his statements at the 1987 hearing following the end of Phase II trials, led not by Burton but by a man named James O'Bryon, a man who would eventually lead basically all live-fire testing at the Department of Defense. O'Bryon delivered an even-handed summary of the circumstances of the tests, the proposed changes in the HSTV and ASTB, and the resulting upgrade package that would make A1's into A2's. Burton comes on the scene later and basically says, "I'm happy that you did it, but why wasn't there a report from the Department of Operational Testing and Evaluation???? Huh??? Also I disagree with 50% of the changes and my testbed was better but I'll save that for a closed session."
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?i...
Burton doesn't want to fix things. He wants to show how the current things are bad and claim credit for good things. Except they aren't nearly as bad as he thinks and he's not nearly as involved in the solutions as he claims. I'll close out here with a quote on the Reformers from an excellent dissertation written by Marshall L Michel III:
"One scholar, Timothy Lefler, defines critics as members of a group that have support neither for their proposals nor an interest in succeeding by conciliation and cooperation. Lefler continues that to become a reformer one must bridge the gap between criticism and successful reform by recognizing the obstacles to change, and then gaining the support of state authority and the cooperation of the active participants. The next decade would show Boyd, Sprey and the rest of a group they gathered around themselves were never interested in bridging the gap and becoming reformers; they preferred to remain critics."
I would highly suggest reading pages 76-83 of the paper. It's an enlightening view of the Reformers from outside their little imaginary world. http://etd.auburn.edu/bitstream/handl...
***oh and i just want to add Michel III bothers to cite sources that aren't his friends and he cites more than just direct quotes. ***
***also what the heck is this reading list. Clausewitz I understand. "Taking the Quantum Leap" (https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/6...) I do not. And Ender's Game? Really?***
I committed myself to read this book in its entirety before writing a review. I'm sorry. I just can't. None of these people have the slightest idea of what they're talking about. I can't open the book to random section and read more than a page without reading something so ridiculous that I have to slam the book shut and put my head down in sad laughter.
The Pentagon Wars is an asinine rewriting of history by the idiots who could not see their own stupidity. Burton lauds his group as the inventor of all successful tactics and aircraft and Bradley-modifications without any of it being true.
Long story short, the Army did eventually run live-fire testing. But there were two vehicles involved: the Army's proposed High Survivability Test Vehicle (HSTV) and Burton's proposed Advanced Survivability Test Bed. Surprise! The A2 upgrade that came out of this program featured changes tested in the HSTV. This included things like like upgraded armor and spall liners. Burton's ASTB, meanwhile, proposed putting the ****ing ammo on the outside of the armor. I just. I just can't. How did they end up building not one but THREE HSTVs to test?
James Burton's true colors can be seen only outside the book. Take, for example, his statements at the 1987 hearing following the end of Phase II trials, led not by Burton but by a man named James O'Bryon, a man who would eventually lead basically all live-fire testing at the Department of Defense. O'Bryon delivered an even-handed summary of the circumstances of the tests, the proposed changes in the HSTV and ASTB, and the resulting upgrade package that would make A1's into A2's. Burton comes on the scene later and basically says, "I'm happy that you did it, but why wasn't there a report from the Department of Operational Testing and Evaluation???? Huh??? Also I disagree with 50% of the changes and my testbed was better but I'll save that for a closed session."
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?i...
Burton doesn't want to fix things. He wants to show how the current things are bad and claim credit for good things. Except they aren't nearly as bad as he thinks and he's not nearly as involved in the solutions as he claims. I'll close out here with a quote on the Reformers from an excellent dissertation written by Marshall L Michel III:
"One scholar, Timothy Lefler, defines critics as members of a group that have support neither for their proposals nor an interest in succeeding by conciliation and cooperation. Lefler continues that to become a reformer one must bridge the gap between criticism and successful reform by recognizing the obstacles to change, and then gaining the support of state authority and the cooperation of the active participants. The next decade would show Boyd, Sprey and the rest of a group they gathered around themselves were never interested in bridging the gap and becoming reformers; they preferred to remain critics."
I would highly suggest reading pages 76-83 of the paper. It's an enlightening view of the Reformers from outside their little imaginary world. http://etd.auburn.edu/bitstream/handl...
***oh and i just want to add Michel III bothers to cite sources that aren't his friends and he cites more than just direct quotes. ***
***also what the heck is this reading list. Clausewitz I understand. "Taking the Quantum Leap" (https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/6...) I do not. And Ender's Game? Really?***
July 30, 2021
The pentagon reformers were a group of individuals in the military who wanted to reform the way the US military fought wars and prepared for them. A lot of their focus, and what this book focuses on, is the politics and system around how the US military purchases weapons. Basically, it is a toxic process fraught with corruption and fraud at every turn. It results in the military overspending on weapons and materials that don't end up working. This book paints a pretty graphic picture of how poor of a system it is. This book is from the 1990s so I don't know if it is still the same way but I'm assuming it is. While it is for sure an interesting topic, this book goes into the details and minutia of the attempt to reform the military's effort to purchase and develop the Bradley Fighting Vehicle. The book is a very thorough review of Burton's role in that process and the battles he fought at every turn to force the Army to change the Bradley for the better. It was shocking the lengths the Army went to prevent this from happening.
One of the things I didn't expect to learn was how the Army relied heavily on computer models to simulate what would happen to the vehicle if it came under fire on the battlefield. Instead of running tests and shooting live rounds at the vehicle under similar battlefield conditions the Army just ran these models and took the model's results as fact. What Burton found was the models were not even close to what happened in reality and the Army wasn't even interested in fixing them. This is just another example of institutions relying on models to tell them what reality is and then finding out it is totally wrong. This is just a pet peeve of mine and I'm finding more and more examples of these.
This was a pretty good book. A little long in parts when it feels like it is covering another memo Burton writes to his superiors for the hundredth time. Also, the book jumps around in time the first 1/3 so it was a little hard to follow when things were taking place compared to other events that came before it in the book. But, if you are interested in John Boyd or the reform movement he is associated with it's worth a read.
Also, there is a comedy film based on the book that I need to watch now.
One of the things I didn't expect to learn was how the Army relied heavily on computer models to simulate what would happen to the vehicle if it came under fire on the battlefield. Instead of running tests and shooting live rounds at the vehicle under similar battlefield conditions the Army just ran these models and took the model's results as fact. What Burton found was the models were not even close to what happened in reality and the Army wasn't even interested in fixing them. This is just another example of institutions relying on models to tell them what reality is and then finding out it is totally wrong. This is just a pet peeve of mine and I'm finding more and more examples of these.
This was a pretty good book. A little long in parts when it feels like it is covering another memo Burton writes to his superiors for the hundredth time. Also, the book jumps around in time the first 1/3 so it was a little hard to follow when things were taking place compared to other events that came before it in the book. But, if you are interested in John Boyd or the reform movement he is associated with it's worth a read.
Also, there is a comedy film based on the book that I need to watch now.
October 4, 2024
“To be or to do, that is the question”. An interesting book about James Burton’s fight as a member of the 1970-80 TAC Air Shop Reform Movement in the Pentagon. Demonstrates how difficult it is to do “hard things” in a bureaucracy which is riddled with corruption, people pleasers, and “staff spend[ing] 95 percent of their time reacting to events rather than controlling them”.
Boyd’s “OODA loop” concept is fascinating. One can see how the tactic of getting inside the opponents’ OODA loop can be used to politically devastating effect, both in the Pentagon Wars and in seismic Western campaigns. Good examples include Brexit (see “Turkey will join the EU” or “£350m a week for the NHS”) or, more pertinently now, Trump’s ability to use outrageous comments to divert media attention towards a topic politically useful for the Republicans. Take his debate performance against VP Harris: widely written off as a “dire performance”, post-debate discussion was focussed upon Haitians “eating the pets”, a clear ploy (leaving aside the question of intentionality) to break into the MSM/Democrat OODA loop and force them to talk about immigration for days afterwards, reinforcing the Democrats’ failures in that area.
Why 3* rather than 4 or 5? My criticism is that the prose is often monotonous, it was essentially the same story of corruption and cover-up repeated several times, and for at least the first third of the book, the narrative has no clear temporal structure so it is often difficult to know what came when.
Boyd’s “OODA loop” concept is fascinating. One can see how the tactic of getting inside the opponents’ OODA loop can be used to politically devastating effect, both in the Pentagon Wars and in seismic Western campaigns. Good examples include Brexit (see “Turkey will join the EU” or “£350m a week for the NHS”) or, more pertinently now, Trump’s ability to use outrageous comments to divert media attention towards a topic politically useful for the Republicans. Take his debate performance against VP Harris: widely written off as a “dire performance”, post-debate discussion was focussed upon Haitians “eating the pets”, a clear ploy (leaving aside the question of intentionality) to break into the MSM/Democrat OODA loop and force them to talk about immigration for days afterwards, reinforcing the Democrats’ failures in that area.
Why 3* rather than 4 or 5? My criticism is that the prose is often monotonous, it was essentially the same story of corruption and cover-up repeated several times, and for at least the first third of the book, the narrative has no clear temporal structure so it is often difficult to know what came when.
May 21, 2025
The book, to me, is three parts. Part 1, an interesting read on how the Pentagon works. Part 2, a love letter to John Boyd that I could have done without. And Part 3, the authors fight with the DOD over live-fire testing.
I liked Part 1, some good stuff in there.
Part 2, was like a kid writing about how great his dad was.
And Part 3, came off as a bit biased and self-aggrandizing, like it was written by a spurned spouse. He had good points and if I worked with him I would probably be with him. However, I find it hard to believe people across the Pentagon everywhere were waiting with baited breathe for his next memo on the testing of the Bradley. It just did not come off great; everyone is corrupt and dumb and only us reformers have ANY moral bearing.
His comment about "black" projects only being that way as a means to hide corruption is asinine.
In short, I'd just watch the movie, its more enjoyable and funnier. The book was 60 pages too long.
I liked Part 1, some good stuff in there.
Part 2, was like a kid writing about how great his dad was.
And Part 3, came off as a bit biased and self-aggrandizing, like it was written by a spurned spouse. He had good points and if I worked with him I would probably be with him. However, I find it hard to believe people across the Pentagon everywhere were waiting with baited breathe for his next memo on the testing of the Bradley. It just did not come off great; everyone is corrupt and dumb and only us reformers have ANY moral bearing.
His comment about "black" projects only being that way as a means to hide corruption is asinine.
In short, I'd just watch the movie, its more enjoyable and funnier. The book was 60 pages too long.
March 31, 2025
A must read for anyone interested in government, defense, reform, and/or innovation. Nothing like the worth watching HBO movie of the same name which appears to have been loosely inspired by the book. Col
Burton describes both the pentagon reform movement of the late 1970s to early 1980s (to include some great successes of it), the conflicts of interest he witnessed in operational testing of weapons systems, and his travails with the Bradley fighting vehicle. One star knocked off for a frequently turgid writing style.
Burton describes both the pentagon reform movement of the late 1970s to early 1980s (to include some great successes of it), the conflicts of interest he witnessed in operational testing of weapons systems, and his travails with the Bradley fighting vehicle. One star knocked off for a frequently turgid writing style.
September 14, 2021
Very troubling
Having long ago seen the movie, I was interested to finally read the real account. It is extremely troubling and I found myself angry at the corruption described most of the time I was reading. It is not a relaxing book, that much is certain. The author goes to great lengths to cite detailed information and provide references. I know it was written a long time ago. I pray the situation has improved significantly.
Having long ago seen the movie, I was interested to finally read the real account. It is extremely troubling and I found myself angry at the corruption described most of the time I was reading. It is not a relaxing book, that much is certain. The author goes to great lengths to cite detailed information and provide references. I know it was written a long time ago. I pray the situation has improved significantly.
December 25, 2022
People have criticised the reformers in all sorts of different ways - but at the end of the day when we look at the USA spending 20 years and 20 trillion dollars at war, and still losing Afghanistan... Yeah, the reformers were right about so much. Maybe the military-industrial complex needs a few more critics.
August 25, 2025
I like the movie which almost has a comedic undertone and the book dives deep into many other government projects and it’s hard not to mention a less known documentary available to stream on Prime that follows 3 government whistleblowers dealing with retaliation of their actions to do the right thing. “War on Whistleblowers”
March 6, 2019
Interesting Perspective
Great read that demonstrates the importance of testing under relevant conditions. It also provides good details on the importance of accountability in order to create a successful project.
Great read that demonstrates the importance of testing under relevant conditions. It also provides good details on the importance of accountability in order to create a successful project.
November 19, 2020
Very interesting case study how to drive change in a large bureaucratic organization and how much resistance there is.
October 8, 2021
Very very interesting and the author wrote in an attractive and approachable manner, while still being very earnest.
March 6, 2023
Enjoyed the movie and the extra detail from the book, however the author was a terrible writer. Difficult to get through.
May 18, 2012
There was an HBO black comedy with the same title based on this book, but I wanted to read the original. In the 1980s, US Air Force Colonel Burton was one of a group of officers charged with reforming the way the United States Armed Forces acquires weapons. In particular, he wanted to subject the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, a cross between a tank and a troop transporter, to realistic tests. Should a war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact have broken out, American and allied infantrymen would be riding in this vehicle and receiving Soviet fire. Burton wanted to make sure that this would result in as few casualties as possible. In the M1 Abrams tank, ammunition is stored in a special compartment with a blowout panel, so if the ammunition explodes, the force of the explosion will be directed away from the crew. In the Bradley it is stored inside; Burton could never understand, why the Abrams solution was impossible. Burton visited a factory that made the M113 armored personnel carrier; it manufactured two variants: one with the fuel tanks on the inside for the US Army, and one with the fuel tanks on the outside for the Israeli Army; perhaps the Israelis knew something the Americans didn't. Burton did a great deal of arm-wrestling with the Army to make sure that antitank weapons are fired at the Bradley, the M113 and a Soviet armored personnel carrier, and the results are recorded. The Army tried to transfer Burton to Alaska, but at the last moment found that he had influential patrons. The Army claimed that on the battlefield, most hits will come near the center of mass of the vehicle, so moving the water cans there and ammunition away would make the vehicle safer; of course this assumption was false. The Army tried to fire smaller Romanian rounds instead of bigger Soviet ones; this cheating was exposed. If the warhead from a TOW missile is put on a table and exploded next to a plate of armor, it makes a neat little hole; if the missile is actually fired at the plate, the hole is much bigger. Burton and his patrons forced the Army to conduct realistic tests and to make modifications to the vehicle to make it safer; this undoubtedly saved many American soldiers' lives during the Gulf War. Burton testified before the US Congress, which passed a law to subject all new weapon systems to testing under simulated combat conditions. Despite the happy ending, I was amazed at how many people's careers were staked on the expectation that no independent agency ever tests the results of their work. When this happens in the private sector, at least usually nobody dies.
June 23, 2023
Thank You fighter Mafia, as a retired Acquisition and Logistics Officer that spanned the Strategic Air Command to working directly on the A-10 and F-16's, Burton is absolutely accurate, about the infighting, Careerism, end-runs and in-fighting between the services.
We need another round of New-Reformers and fighter Mafia.....The fight continues
Integrity matters---"Will you do or be ? " A person of distinction, or a person who makes lasting changes to our Nations defense forces, you cannot go down both paths simultaneously.
We need another round of New-Reformers and fighter Mafia.....The fight continues
Integrity matters---"Will you do or be ? " A person of distinction, or a person who makes lasting changes to our Nations defense forces, you cannot go down both paths simultaneously.
January 10, 2022
me: "so was it really this bad back then?"
acquisitions expert friend: "actually it's worse now"
the world needs more books like this--deeply informed and committed people with a justified axe to grind taking on stulted bureaucracies. Maybe we'll get someone from within the FDA about their response to COVID?
acquisitions expert friend: "actually it's worse now"
the world needs more books like this--deeply informed and committed people with a justified axe to grind taking on stulted bureaucracies. Maybe we'll get someone from within the FDA about their response to COVID?
Want to read
May 21, 2011I spent all last week in training for how to be a Contract Officer's Representative (COR). If I passed the test, I can buy tanks and stuff, or just educational research, whatever. Our teacher mentioned this book and HBO miniseries over and over and over. I might need to check it out....
March 21, 2012
This is the book Josh made me read as part of our annual book swap and it was actually pretty interesting and helped me understand what he does at work better so I'm glad he had me read it.
March 13, 2013
If you ever wanted to know why we as a nation are broke, read this book. An excellent companion piece to Robert Coram's BOYD.
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