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Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory
It is of the very definition of any "classic" work that it will not only introduce a new depth and direction of thought, but that its original insights endure. When it first appeared in 1940, Reason and Revolution by Herbert Marcuse (1898-1979) was acclaimed for its profound and undistorted reading of Hegel's social and political theory. Today, the appreciation of Marcuse's work has remained high, more relevant now than ever before.In the rapidly changing context of post-Cold War political realities, there is no better guide than Marcuse to where we have been and to what we might expect. As he well understood, turbulent and spectacular political events always ran within channels earlier set by political theory; and he equally understood that it was Hegel's often unappreciated and misunderstood theory which actually set a fundamental path of modern political life.It is a fortunate combination to have a scholar of Marcuse's brilliance and lucid honesty addressing the sources and consequences of Hegel's social theory.
439 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1940
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About the author
Herbert Marcuse
260 books612 followersGerman-Jewish philosopher, political theorist and sociologist, and a member of the Frankfurt School. Celebrated as the "Father of the New Left", his best known works are Eros and Civilization, One-Dimensional Man and The Aesthetic Dimension. Marcuse was a major intellectual influence on the New Left and student movements of the 1960s.
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October 15, 2019
A very impressive project.
The first half is a comprehensive interpretation of Hegel's work from start to finish, finding generally that the dialectical method is 'negative' insofar as it is a challenge to the world as it currently exists--despite Hegel's ultimate conclusion that the restored German monarchy is the best state:
Sensing the inherent challenge, the German monarchy did not feel flattered by the overt praise and conscripted intellectuals to refute Hegel--this is the second half of the text. The great enemy is positivism--designated thus specifically against Hegel's negativism. Marcuse really shines in this section, detailing the ideological response to Hegel, up to and including the fascists. There's some comments about Marx in there ("The truth, Hegel maintained, is a whole that must be present in every single element, so that if one material element or fact cannot be connected with the process of reason, the truth of the whole is destroyed. Marx said there was such an element--the proletariat" (260-1)), but the main focus is on how the right-wing handled Hegel.
On Comte: "The positivist repudiation of metaphysics was thus coupled with a repudiation of man's claim to alter and reorganize his social institutions in accordance with his rational will. This is the element Comte's positivism shares with the original philosophies of counter-revolution sponsored by Bonald and De Maistre" (344). Comte's thesis involved a "negation of metaphysics and [...] 'the subordination of imagination to observation' [...] a tendency to acquiesce in the given" (347). The laws positivist science discovered and that distinguish it from empiricism, were positive also in the sense that they affirmed the prevailing order as a basis for denying the need to construct a new one" (348): "Happiness in the shelter of a strong arm--the attitude so characteristic today in Fascist societies, makes juncture with the positivist ideal of certainty" (350-1). By contrast with Marx,
The first half is a comprehensive interpretation of Hegel's work from start to finish, finding generally that the dialectical method is 'negative' insofar as it is a challenge to the world as it currently exists--despite Hegel's ultimate conclusion that the restored German monarchy is the best state:
True democracy, he holds, expresses an early phase in human development, a phase prior to that in which the individual is emancipated, and one incompatible with emancipation. [...] The reason the Greek city-state could be a democracy, Hegel implies, is that it was made up of citizens who were not yet conscious of their essential individuality. Hegel held that a society of emancipated individuals conflicted with democratic homogeneity. Any recognition of individual freedom consequently seemed to involve tearing down the ancient democracy. 'That very subjective freedom which constitutes the principle and determines the peculiar form of freedom in our world--which forms the absolute basis of our political and religious life, could not manifest itself in Greece otherwise than as a destructive element.' This destructive element was brought into the Greek city-state by Socrates [...] He was condemned to death. This act was justified in so far as the Athenians were condemning their 'absolute foe.' On the other hand, the death sentence contained the 'deeply tragical' element that the Athenians thereby also condemned their society and their state. For, their sentence recognized that 'what they reprobated in Socrates had already struck firm root among themselves.' (242-44)However, the thuggish German monarchy allows free individuals. So, it is similar to Hobbes and to Luther--but Marcuse wants to keep focused on the method, which presents a means to challenge the world as it is.
Sensing the inherent challenge, the German monarchy did not feel flattered by the overt praise and conscripted intellectuals to refute Hegel--this is the second half of the text. The great enemy is positivism--designated thus specifically against Hegel's negativism. Marcuse really shines in this section, detailing the ideological response to Hegel, up to and including the fascists. There's some comments about Marx in there ("The truth, Hegel maintained, is a whole that must be present in every single element, so that if one material element or fact cannot be connected with the process of reason, the truth of the whole is destroyed. Marx said there was such an element--the proletariat" (260-1)), but the main focus is on how the right-wing handled Hegel.
On Comte: "The positivist repudiation of metaphysics was thus coupled with a repudiation of man's claim to alter and reorganize his social institutions in accordance with his rational will. This is the element Comte's positivism shares with the original philosophies of counter-revolution sponsored by Bonald and De Maistre" (344). Comte's thesis involved a "negation of metaphysics and [...] 'the subordination of imagination to observation' [...] a tendency to acquiesce in the given" (347). The laws positivist science discovered and that distinguish it from empiricism, were positive also in the sense that they affirmed the prevailing order as a basis for denying the need to construct a new one" (348): "Happiness in the shelter of a strong arm--the attitude so characteristic today in Fascist societies, makes juncture with the positivist ideal of certainty" (350-1). By contrast with Marx,
the fact of the proletariat worried Comte's sociology as it did its antithesis, the Marxian critique. There could be no positive theory of civil society unless the fact of the proletariat could be reconciled with the harmonious order of progress it so patently contradicts. [...] Sociology must, in the face of this, present a refutation of the dialectical thesis that accumulation of wealth takes place alongside an intensification of poverty. Comte regarded the latter thesis as a 'sinister and immoral prejudice,' one that positivism had to eradicate [...] In contrast to Hegel, whose philosophy showed a similar tendency, Comte slurred over the fact that the turn is made necessary because of the antagonistic structure of civil society. Classes in conflict, he held, are but vestiges of an obsolete regime, soon to be replaced by positivism, without any threat to the 'fundamental institution of property.' (356-7)Plenty more. Stahl, for instance, "indicts Hegel along with the most outstanding representatives of European rationalism since Descartes--a configuration that recurs in the ideological attacks of National Socialism" (365)--and also in Ayn Rand (recall her unwarranted litanies against the entire history of philosophy). For their part, NSDAP propagandists asserted that Hegel is "the symbol of all that National Socialism abhors and rejects; the 'emancipation from Hegel' is hailed as forerunner of a return to a true philosophy" (417) and Hegel is declared otherwise as "'the source of all liberal, idealistic, and materialistic philosophies of history'" (418).
December 28, 2020
CRITIQUE:
The Object of the Subject
This book is something of an anomaly.
Marcuse was a Marxist at the time of writing. Yet, he believed that "the rise of Fascism calls for a reinterpretation of Hegel's philosophy." He hoped that his interpretation would "demonstrate that Hegel's basic concepts are hostile to the tendencies that have led into Fascist theory and practice."
The first part of the book is a lucid restatement of the structure of Hegel's system. It reveals a familiarity with the whole of Hegel's work. But it goes further and seeks to "elucidate those implications of Hegel's ideas that identify them closely with the later developments in European thought, particularly with...Marxian theory."
However, it's difficult to work out the real purpose of this most purposive book.
Was Marcuse trying to reinvigorate Hegelianism? Or was he trying to reinforce Marxism?
Was he trying to promote an understanding of a more Hegelian Marxism, or a more Marxist Hegelianism?
"I Have Never Met Napoleon"
Marcuse begins his introduction by acknowledging that, like other German idealist philosophers, Hegel wrote his philosophy "largely as a response to the challenge from France to reorganise the state and society on a rational basis, so that social and political institutions might accord with the freedom and interest of the individual.
The Realisation of Reason
Early in the book, Marcuse acknowledges that "the concept of reason is central to Hegel's philosophy. He held that philosophical thinking presupposes nothing beyond it, that history deals with reason and with reason alone, and that the state is the realisation of reason."
What Hegel means by reason needs to be clarified:
Marcuse equates this to "Robespierre's deification of reason".
Marcuse says:
Marcuse paraphrases this by saying that -
The Glorification of the State
The concern about Hegel's relationship with Fascism derives, in part, from his apparent glorification of the State as the "realisation of reason".
Marcuse seeks to excuse Hegel's "glorification of the Prussian monarchy":
Marcuse argues that Hegel conceived of a state that was fundamentally different from an authoritarian dictatorship or tyranny.
Marx Contradicts Hegel
Marcuse devotes much of the book to his analysis of the dialectical method.
He recognises that Marx derived his own dialectical method from Hegel's dialectic. However, he seeks to identify the resemblance of the two methods, rather than, as Marx did, the manner in which they differed. Indeed, I was surprised that Marcuse failed to mention the views Marx expressed in Volume 1 of "Capital":
It's arguable that Marcuse might have differed from Marx in his assessment of Hegel's mysticism. He seems to think that Hegel's dialectic isn't solely metaphysical or idealistic, but is actually compatible with Marx' materialism. He comes close to suggesting that Hegel anticipated some of Marx' dialectical materialism, especially when it applies to labour and the relationship between the worker and the bourgeoisie.
The Antagonistic Process
The most fundamental of Hegel's propositions is that "Being is, in its substance, a 'subject'."
Marcuse infers that "the idea of the 'substance as subject' conceives reality as a process wherein all being is the unification of contradictory forces:
The Dialectic as History
Marcuse continues:
Marcuse concludes that "the 'spirit of contradicting' is the propulsive force of Hegel's dialectical method."
Labour as a Function of the Dialectic
Hegel analyses labour in terms of the dialectic:
Marcuse effectively finds in Hegel what would become the foundation of Marx' theory of labour value.
SOUNDTRACK:
The Object of the Subject
This book is something of an anomaly.
Marcuse was a Marxist at the time of writing. Yet, he believed that "the rise of Fascism calls for a reinterpretation of Hegel's philosophy." He hoped that his interpretation would "demonstrate that Hegel's basic concepts are hostile to the tendencies that have led into Fascist theory and practice."
The first part of the book is a lucid restatement of the structure of Hegel's system. It reveals a familiarity with the whole of Hegel's work. But it goes further and seeks to "elucidate those implications of Hegel's ideas that identify them closely with the later developments in European thought, particularly with...Marxian theory."
However, it's difficult to work out the real purpose of this most purposive book.
Was Marcuse trying to reinvigorate Hegelianism? Or was he trying to reinforce Marxism?
Was he trying to promote an understanding of a more Hegelian Marxism, or a more Marxist Hegelianism?
"I Have Never Met Napoleon"
Marcuse begins his introduction by acknowledging that, like other German idealist philosophers, Hegel wrote his philosophy "largely as a response to the challenge from France to reorganise the state and society on a rational basis, so that social and political institutions might accord with the freedom and interest of the individual.
"The ideals of the French Revolution found their resting place in the processes of industrial capitalism. Napoleon's empire liquidated the radical tendencies and at the same time consolidated the economic consequences of the revolution...The economic process appeared as the foundation of reason."
The Realisation of Reason
Early in the book, Marcuse acknowledges that "the concept of reason is central to Hegel's philosophy. He held that philosophical thinking presupposes nothing beyond it, that history deals with reason and with reason alone, and that the state is the realisation of reason."
What Hegel means by reason needs to be clarified:
"These statements will not be understandable, however, so long as reason is interpreted as a pure metaphysical concept, for Hegel's idea of reason has retained, though in an idealistic form, the material strivings for a free and rational order of life."
Marcuse equates this to "Robespierre's deification of reason".
Marcuse says:
"The core of Hegel's philosophy is a structure the concepts of which - freedom, subject, mind, notion - are derived from the idea of reason."
"Unless we succeed in unfolding the content of these ideas and the intrinsic connection between them, Hegel's system will seem to be obscure metaphysics, which it in fact never was...
"Hegel contrasts an employment of reason and an uncritical compliance with the prevailing conditions of life. 'Nothing is reason that is not the result of thinking.'
"Man has set out to organise reality according to the demands of his free rational thinking instead of simply accommodating his thoughts to the existing order and the prevailing values.
"Man is a thinking being. His reason enables him to recognise his own potentialities and those of his world. He is thus not at the mercy of the facts that surround him, but is capable of subjecting them to a higher standard, that of reason.
"If he follows its lead, he will arrive at certain conceptions that disclose reason to be antagonistic to the existing state of affairs. He may find that history is a constant struggle for freedom, that man's individuality requires that he possess property as the medium of his fulfillment, and that all men have an equal right to develop their human faculties...
"Consequently the 'unreasonable' reality has to be altered until it comes into conformity with reason."
Marcuse paraphrases this by saying that -
"Thought ought to govern reality...What men think to be true, right, and good ought to be realised in the actual organisation of their societal and individual life...
"Unless man possesses concepts and principles of thought that denote universally valid conditions and norms, his thought cannot claim to govern reality.
"In line with the tradition of Western philosophy, Hegel believes that such objective concepts and principles exist. Their totality he calls reason.
"But to Hegel, reason cannot govern reality unless reality has become rational in itself. This rationality is made possible through the subject's entering the very content of nature and history.
"The objective reality is thus also the realisation of the subject."
The Glorification of the State
The concern about Hegel's relationship with Fascism derives, in part, from his apparent glorification of the State as the "realisation of reason".
Marcuse seeks to excuse Hegel's "glorification of the Prussian monarchy":
"[Hegel feels] the intellectual weakness of the monarch is preferable to the wisdom of civil society...
"He is guilty not so much of being servile as of betraying his highest philosophical ideas. His political doctrine surrenders society to nature, freedom to necessity, reason to caprice. And in so doing, it mirrors the destiny of the social order that falls, while in pursuit of freedom, into a state of nature far below reason.
"The dialectical analysis of civil society had concluded that society was not capable of establishing reason and freedom of its own accord. Hegel therefore put forward a strong state to achieve this end and tried to reconcile that state with the idea of freedom by giving a strong constitutional flavouring to monarchy...Hence the state is bound by laws that are the opposite of authoritarian decrees."
Marcuse argues that Hegel conceived of a state that was fundamentally different from an authoritarian dictatorship or tyranny.
Marx Contradicts Hegel
Marcuse devotes much of the book to his analysis of the dialectical method.
He recognises that Marx derived his own dialectical method from Hegel's dialectic. However, he seeks to identify the resemblance of the two methods, rather than, as Marx did, the manner in which they differed. Indeed, I was surprised that Marcuse failed to mention the views Marx expressed in Volume 1 of "Capital":
"My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel, the life process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the name of 'the Idea,' he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of 'the Idea.' With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought...
"The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel's hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell."
It's arguable that Marcuse might have differed from Marx in his assessment of Hegel's mysticism. He seems to think that Hegel's dialectic isn't solely metaphysical or idealistic, but is actually compatible with Marx' materialism. He comes close to suggesting that Hegel anticipated some of Marx' dialectical materialism, especially when it applies to labour and the relationship between the worker and the bourgeoisie.
The Antagonistic Process
The most fundamental of Hegel's propositions is that "Being is, in its substance, a 'subject'."
Marcuse infers that "the idea of the 'substance as subject' conceives reality as a process wherein all being is the unification of contradictory forces:
"'Subject' denotes not only the epistemological ego or consciousness, but a mode of existence, to wit, that of a self-developing unity in an antagonistic process."
"Man alone has the power of self-realisation, the power to be a self-determining subject in all processes of becoming, for he alone has an understanding of potentialities and a knowledge of 'notions'.
"His very existence is the process of actualising his potentialities, of molding his life according to the notions of reason."
"Reason presupposes freedom, the power to act in accordance with knowledge of the truth, the power to shape reality in line with its potentialities. The fulfillment of these ends belongs only to the subject who is master of his own potentialities as well as those of the things around him.
"Freedom, in turn, presupposes reason, for it is comprehending knowledge, alone, that enables the subject to gain and to wield this power. [Comprehending knowledge is] real subjectivity."
"Reason terminates in freedom, and freedom is the very existence of the subject. On the other hand, reason itself exists only through its realisation, the process of its being made real...
"The life of reason appears in man's continuous struggle to comprehend what exists and to transform it in accordance with the truth comprehended."
The Dialectic as History
Marcuse continues:
"Reason is also essentially a historical force. Its fulfillment takes place as a process in the spatio-temporal world, and is, in the last analysis, the whole history of mankind.
"The term that designates reason as history is mind (Geist) which denotes the historical world viewed in relation to the rational process of humanity - the historical world not as a chain of acts and events but as a ceaseless struggle to adapt the world to the growing potentialities of mankind...
"As long as there is any gap between real and potential, the former must be acted upon and changed until it is brought into line with reason...'Real' comes to mean not everything that actually exists (this should rather be called appearance), but that which exists in a form concordant with the standards of reason. 'Real' is the reasonable (rational), and that alone."
Marcuse concludes that "the 'spirit of contradicting' is the propulsive force of Hegel's dialectical method."
"The subject is the very process of becoming the predicate and of contradicting it.
"This process dissolves into a multitude of antagonistic relations the stable subjects that traditional logic had assumed. Reality appears as a dynamic in which all fixed forms reveal themselves to be mere abstractions.
"The realisation of reason is not a fact but a task. The form in which the objects immediately appear is not yet their true form. What is simply given is at first negative, other than its real potentialities.
"It becomes true only in the process of overcoming this negativity, so that the birth of the truth requires the death of the given state of being...
"All forms are seized by the dissolving movement of reason which cancels and alters them until they are adequate to their notion...
"Dialectic in its entirety is linked to the conception that all forms of being are permeated by an essential negativity, and that this negativity determines their content and movement...
"Everything that is given has to be justified before reason, which is but the totality of nature's and man's capacities..."
"[For Hegel] all contradictions are resolved and yet preserved in 'reason'. Hegel conceived life as mind, that is to say, as a being able to comprehend and master the all-embracing antagonisms of existence...
"In life, 'the particular...is at the same time a branch of the infinite tree of Life; every part outside the whole is at the same time the whole, Life'. Each living individual is also a manifestation of the whole of life, in other words, possesses the full essence or potentialities of life.
"Furthermore, though every living being is determinate and limited, it can supersede its limitations by virtue of the power it possesses as a living subject. Life is at first a sequence of determinate 'objective' conditions - objective, because the living subject finds them outside of its self, limiting its free self-realisation.
"The process of life, however, consists in continuously drawing these external conditions into the enduring unity of the subject. The living being maintains itself as a self by mastering and annexing the manifold of determinate conditions it finds, and by bringing all that is opposed to itself into harmony with itself.
"The unity of life [is therefore] the result of a constant active overcoming of everything that stands against it. It is a unity that prevails only as the result of a process of 'mediation' (Vermittlung) between the living subject as it is and its objective conditions.
"The mediation is the proper function of the living self as an actual subject, and at the same time it makes the living self an actual subject. Life...is the first model of a real unification of opposites and hence the first embodiment of the dialectic...
"For Hegel a perfect union of subject and object is a prerequisite to freedom... Man alone is able to transform objective conditions so that they become a medium for his subjective development...[He is] able to organise the world in conformity with reason...
"[Although] it means no more than life, the concept mind...[emphasises that the unity of life is]...the work of the subject's free comprehension and activity, and not of some blind natural force."
"The real object is constituted by the (intellectual) activity of the subject, [which] must make the world its own doing if it is to recognise itself as the only reality…
"The final reality in which the antagonisms are resolved [is] ‘the Absolute’..."
Labour as a Function of the Dialectic
Hegel analyses labour in terms of the dialectic:
"Through his labour, man overcomes the estrangement between the objective world and the subjective world, [which] he transforms into an appropriate medium for self-development. When... taken and shaped by labour, objects become part of the subject who is able to recognise his needs and desires in them. 'The individual satisfies his needs by his labour, [while] the product of [his] labour becomes a commodity'."
Marcuse effectively finds in Hegel what would become the foundation of Marx' theory of labour value.
SOUNDTRACK:
September 26, 2019
هناك نوع من الكتب يجبرنا أن نفكر، يقذف الأفكار في دماغنا مثل ما تُقذف الذخائر. استطاع هربرت ماركوزه في هذا الكتاب أن يفعل معي ذلك، طوال صفحات الكتاب الـ400 كنت أفكر في ما يطرحه، كنت أغيّر من أفكاري القديمة بناءً على الأطروحات الجديدة التي لم أسمع بها من قبل والتي فتحت عيوني على أبواب لم أكن على علم بها، وأقول كيف بحق السماء فكرت في ذلك؟. يقول الفيلسوف الألمانيّ آرثر شوبنهاور أن المرء يظل طفلًا حتى يقرأ كانط، أظن أن المرء يظل طفلًا أيضًا إذا لم يقرأ هيجل، وكان هذا الكتاب دليلًا على ذلك؛ فما طرحه ماركوزه عن هيجل هنا -والله- ليتحدى أبسط البديهيات التي كنت أعتقد بها وأسلم بصحتها.
سأذكر بعض من الأمثلة على ذلك، أسمع الكثيرين يقولون على فلسفة هيجل أنها غير مفهومة وصعبة، وذلك صحيح إلى حد ما، ولكن الصعوبة لا تعني أنه لا يمكن فهمه، ولكنها تعني أنه يجب أن نبذل بعض المجهود لفهمها، وبعد فهمها لا نعود كما كنا أبدًا.
يستخدم هيجل اللغة استخدامًا مختلفًا عن الاستخدام الشائع. علينا أن نعرف أولًا أن الاستخدام الشائع للغة استخدام اعتباطيّ؛ فأي كلمة لها دلالة على شيء واقعيّ، قد أخذت ذلك الطابع بسبب اتفاق بعض الناس في عصر (زمان) معيّن على أن تكون تلك الكلمة بهذا المعنى، ولكن هل هذا يعني أنها معبرة عن حقيقة أو جوهر هذا الشيء؟ هذا ما يتحداه هيجل بوضع معانٍ جديدة للكلمات التي يستخدمها الجميع مثل "الواقع" و"الحقيقة" و"الحرية" و"الروح"، وذلك لأن فلسفته تسبق اللغة ذاتها، فاللغة تتعامل مع الأشياء على أرض الواقع على أنها ثابتة، وهذا يعني أن تلك اللغة ذاتها لها توجه فلسفيّ أو إيديولوجيا. أما هيجل فيرى في الوجود صيرورة لا ثباتًا، لذلك ولكي يتفادى فخ الالتباس اللغويّ بالتعارض بين ما يقصده من استخدام الكلمات بعد ما تفلسف في ما-قبل-اللغة، فإنه أعاد استخدام الكلمات بمدلولات مختلفة، مما يعطينا فهمًا مختلفًا اختلافًا جذريًا عن الوجود.
يربط ماركوزه بمهارة وذكاء بين الفلسفة والسياسة، فما هو فلسفيّ وما هو سياسيّ دائمًا متشابكان. فنراه يربط بين الفلسفة المثاليّة –والتي بلغت ذروتها مع هيجل- وبين رفض الواقع المعطى والرغبة في تغييره، فالمثاليّة هي رفض التسليم بالواقع المعطى والاعتقاد بأن الحقيقة أعمق من ذلك. وهذا هو الدور الذي قامت بها الفلسفة منذ سقراط، فالفلسفة الحقة هي عملية حفر في الظاهر السطحيّ للوصول إلى ما هو عميق بالسؤال والتفكير والنقد. كما أنه يربط أيضًا بين الفلسفة الوضعيّة وبين قبول الواقع المعطى والخضوع له دون أي محاولة في تغييره. ظهرت النظريّة الاجتماعيّة من رحم الفلسفة فكانت النظريّة الاجتماعيّة الماركسيّة المتأثرة بالجدل الهيجليّ نظريّة ترغب في تغيير المجتمع نظرًا لأن جذورها الفلسفيّة مثاليّة، تقوم بسلب الواقع والنظر إلى متناقضاته رغبة في النفاذ للعمق، فهيجل يرى أنه لا معنى للحديث عن الحرية الفردية بدون تحقيق الحرية الاجتماعيّة. أما علم الاجتماع الذي وضع أسسه أوجست كونت فإنه علم وضعيّ ينقل التغيير من الجانب الاجتماعيّ إلى الجانب الفكريّ، لأن جذوره الفلسفيّة وضعيّة لا تنتقد الواقع المعطى رغبة في الوصول للحقيقة الأعمق، بل تقبل بالوقائع باعتبارها حقائق نهائيّة. وهذه النظرة الوضعيّة مسيطرة بشدة على الأوساط العلميّة والسياسيّة هذه الأيام نظرًا لعوامل عدة لا داعي لذكرها الآن.
كذلك الحال عند التعامل مع المنطق، فما دفع هيجل إلى كتابة كتابه في علم المنطق ربما يكون رفضه للمنطق الصوريّ التقليديّ والذي يتعامل مع الهويّة باعتبارها شيئًا ثابتًا (متأثرًا في ذلك بالفلسفة اليونانيّة التي كانت ترى أن الماهيّة تسبق الوجود) ذلك المنطق الذي يرمز للهويّة بالرمز [أ] وكأنها ثابتة. أما هيجل فعلى النقيض، يستخدم المنهج الجدليّ الذي لا يرضى بثبات الواقع، ومنطقه هو أداة نقديّة قبل كل شيء، بل يراه متغيرًا وصائرًا باستمرار، فيكون هناك الفكرة أو الأطروحة ثم نقيضها ثم مركبًا بين الأطروحة ونقضيها وهكذا في ديالكتيك مستمر للأبد. فهيجل ينظر للأمور باعتبارها مسار وليست حالة. فتكوين الهويّة عند هيجل هي مسار/عمليّة مستمرة وليست الهويّة شيئًا نبحث عنه بل شيء نبنيه مما يؤدي إلى تحققنا الفعليّ Self-realization وكأننا لم نكن واقعيّين ابتداءً ونقوم بتحقيق أنفسنا واقعيًا في هذه العمليّة، وهذا مما أثر على الفلسفة الوجوديّة كثيرًا والذي أفرد له ماركوزه فصلًا يتحدث فيه عن سورين كيركيجارد.
يرى هيجل أن الحريّة هي الهدف التاريخيّ الأكثر جوهريّة، وأن كل الصراعات هي صراع على نيل الحريّة، فهناك مستغِلين وهناك مستغلَين، وكلاهما يتصارع لنيل الحريّة. لذلك لا معنى لربط هيجل بالشموليّة أو الفاشيّة، قد أوضح ماركوزه كيف أن هذا الربط متهافت في فصول نهاية الكتاب. يوضح هيجل أيضًا كيف أن الفلسفة والدين لعبا دورًا في نقل الحريّة من النطاق الاجتماعيّ إلى النطاق الباطنيّ، فالفلسفة تنشد الحريّة في مجال الفكر، بينما ينشد الدين تلك الحريّة في الحياة الآخرة، وذلك لعجزهما عن إحداث الثورة وتغيير الوضع الاجتماعيّ، ذلك لعجزهما عن المشاركة في الحياة الفعليّة.
إن المرء ليعجز حقيقة عن الإلمام بكل الدرر الواردة في الكتاب في هذه المراجعة القصيرة، ولكني سأحاول أن أطرح البعض منها في سلسلة منشورات على الفيسبوك وإضافتها للمراجعة باستمرار. هذه المراجعة هي لتدوين ما جال بخاطري بمجرد الانتهاء من الكتاب.
سأذكر بعض من الأمثلة على ذلك، أسمع الكثيرين يقولون على فلسفة هيجل أنها غير مفهومة وصعبة، وذلك صحيح إلى حد ما، ولكن الصعوبة لا تعني أنه لا يمكن فهمه، ولكنها تعني أنه يجب أن نبذل بعض المجهود لفهمها، وبعد فهمها لا نعود كما كنا أبدًا.
يستخدم هيجل اللغة استخدامًا مختلفًا عن الاستخدام الشائع. علينا أن نعرف أولًا أن الاستخدام الشائع للغة استخدام اعتباطيّ؛ فأي كلمة لها دلالة على شيء واقعيّ، قد أخذت ذلك الطابع بسبب اتفاق بعض الناس في عصر (زمان) معيّن على أن تكون تلك الكلمة بهذا المعنى، ولكن هل هذا يعني أنها معبرة عن حقيقة أو جوهر هذا الشيء؟ هذا ما يتحداه هيجل بوضع معانٍ جديدة للكلمات التي يستخدمها الجميع مثل "الواقع" و"الحقيقة" و"الحرية" و"الروح"، وذلك لأن فلسفته تسبق اللغة ذاتها، فاللغة تتعامل مع الأشياء على أرض الواقع على أنها ثابتة، وهذا يعني أن تلك اللغة ذاتها لها توجه فلسفيّ أو إيديولوجيا. أما هيجل فيرى في الوجود صيرورة لا ثباتًا، لذلك ولكي يتفادى فخ الالتباس اللغويّ بالتعارض بين ما يقصده من استخدام الكلمات بعد ما تفلسف في ما-قبل-اللغة، فإنه أعاد استخدام الكلمات بمدلولات مختلفة، مما يعطينا فهمًا مختلفًا اختلافًا جذريًا عن الوجود.
يربط ماركوزه بمهارة وذكاء بين الفلسفة والسياسة، فما هو فلسفيّ وما هو سياسيّ دائمًا متشابكان. فنراه يربط بين الفلسفة المثاليّة –والتي بلغت ذروتها مع هيجل- وبين رفض الواقع المعطى والرغبة في تغييره، فالمثاليّة هي رفض التسليم بالواقع المعطى والاعتقاد بأن الحقيقة أعمق من ذلك. وهذا هو الدور الذي قامت بها الفلسفة منذ سقراط، فالفلسفة الحقة هي عملية حفر في الظاهر السطحيّ للوصول إلى ما هو عميق بالسؤال والتفكير والنقد. كما أنه يربط أيضًا بين الفلسفة الوضعيّة وبين قبول الواقع المعطى والخضوع له دون أي محاولة في تغييره. ظهرت النظريّة الاجتماعيّة من رحم الفلسفة فكانت النظريّة الاجتماعيّة الماركسيّة المتأثرة بالجدل الهيجليّ نظريّة ترغب في تغيير المجتمع نظرًا لأن جذورها الفلسفيّة مثاليّة، تقوم بسلب الواقع والنظر إلى متناقضاته رغبة في النفاذ للعمق، فهيجل يرى أنه لا معنى للحديث عن الحرية الفردية بدون تحقيق الحرية الاجتماعيّة. أما علم الاجتماع الذي وضع أسسه أوجست كونت فإنه علم وضعيّ ينقل التغيير من الجانب الاجتماعيّ إلى الجانب الفكريّ، لأن جذوره الفلسفيّة وضعيّة لا تنتقد الواقع المعطى رغبة في الوصول للحقيقة الأعمق، بل تقبل بالوقائع باعتبارها حقائق نهائيّة. وهذه النظرة الوضعيّة مسيطرة بشدة على الأوساط العلميّة والسياسيّة هذه الأيام نظرًا لعوامل عدة لا داعي لذكرها الآن.
كذلك الحال عند التعامل مع المنطق، فما دفع هيجل إلى كتابة كتابه في علم المنطق ربما يكون رفضه للمنطق الصوريّ التقليديّ والذي يتعامل مع الهويّة باعتبارها شيئًا ثابتًا (متأثرًا في ذلك بالفلسفة اليونانيّة التي كانت ترى أن الماهيّة تسبق الوجود) ذلك المنطق الذي يرمز للهويّة بالرمز [أ] وكأنها ثابتة. أما هيجل فعلى النقيض، يستخدم المنهج الجدليّ الذي لا يرضى بثبات الواقع، ومنطقه هو أداة نقديّة قبل كل شيء، بل يراه متغيرًا وصائرًا باستمرار، فيكون هناك الفكرة أو الأطروحة ثم نقيضها ثم مركبًا بين الأطروحة ونقضيها وهكذا في ديالكتيك مستمر للأبد. فهيجل ينظر للأمور باعتبارها مسار وليست حالة. فتكوين الهويّة عند هيجل هي مسار/عمليّة مستمرة وليست الهويّة شيئًا نبحث عنه بل شيء نبنيه مما يؤدي إلى تحققنا الفعليّ Self-realization وكأننا لم نكن واقعيّين ابتداءً ونقوم بتحقيق أنفسنا واقعيًا في هذه العمليّة، وهذا مما أثر على الفلسفة الوجوديّة كثيرًا والذي أفرد له ماركوزه فصلًا يتحدث فيه عن سورين كيركيجارد.
يرى هيجل أن الحريّة هي الهدف التاريخيّ الأكثر جوهريّة، وأن كل الصراعات هي صراع على نيل الحريّة، فهناك مستغِلين وهناك مستغلَين، وكلاهما يتصارع لنيل الحريّة. لذلك لا معنى لربط هيجل بالشموليّة أو الفاشيّة، قد أوضح ماركوزه كيف أن هذا الربط متهافت في فصول نهاية الكتاب. يوضح هيجل أيضًا كيف أن الفلسفة والدين لعبا دورًا في نقل الحريّة من النطاق الاجتماعيّ إلى النطاق الباطنيّ، فالفلسفة تنشد الحريّة في مجال الفكر، بينما ينشد الدين تلك الحريّة في الحياة الآخرة، وذلك لعجزهما عن إحداث الثورة وتغيير الوضع الاجتماعيّ، ذلك لعجزهما عن المشاركة في الحياة الفعليّة.
إن المرء ليعجز حقيقة عن الإلمام بكل الدرر الواردة في الكتاب في هذه المراجعة القصيرة، ولكني سأحاول أن أطرح البعض منها في سلسلة منشورات على الفيسبوك وإضافتها للمراجعة باستمرار. هذه المراجعة هي لتدوين ما جال بخاطري بمجرد الانتهاء من الكتاب.
January 11, 2022
Cualquier aproximación al pensamiento de Hegel y Marx puede resultar compleja y difícil de seguir, sin embargo, Marcuse hace un intento notable por otorgar cierta síntesis de ambos filósofos respecto a cuestiones fundamentales de su pensamiento.
Aunque más que Hegel o Marx, este libro es el pensamiento de Marcuse, su síntesis de ambos -por si misma- constituye una nueva filosofía. Un pensamiento del cual aún podemos servirnos, tanto para interpretar al mundo, como para cambiarlo.
Aunque más que Hegel o Marx, este libro es el pensamiento de Marcuse, su síntesis de ambos -por si misma- constituye una nueva filosofía. Un pensamiento del cual aún podemos servirnos, tanto para interpretar al mundo, como para cambiarlo.
June 14, 2013
This book is a clearly written study in intellectual history and the history of ideas. It is about what the subtitle says it is about: "Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory". This means that, after introducing the pertinent aspects of Hegel's system (which takes up the entire first half of the book), the author proceeds to show how people who wanted to understand social change at a time when sociology did not exist, used his philosophical categories and applied them to create such understandings. Because Hegel had a system of thought, the projection of those categories onto social realities created also systematic understandings, of which Marx's is the best known but not the only one. In fact, the discussion of Marx represents barely one-eighth of the entire book and concludes with a clear and useful summary of the differences between the Marxian and the Hegelian dialectic. Beyond Marx, Marcuse also covers, among others, Saint-Simon, Auguste Comte, Friedrich Julius Stahl, and the forgotten but no less important Lorenz von Stein. Like most of Marcuse's analytical-exegetic philosophical criticism (as opposed to his utopian, sometimes lyrical works), the writing here is diamond-sharp, although it might be tough going for readers who are unfamiliar with the authors whom he discusses, particularly in the early parts.
May 23, 2012
An excellent overview of Hegelian theory in the first part of the book. Though a bit redundant at times, it is far more enjoyable than reading Hegel. The first part work traces Hegel's radical social theory through his muted conservatism in favor of a hereditary monarchy, and focusing extensively on the Hegelian reappropriation of the Aristotelian concept of human potential (actuality vs. potentiality). The second half is more entertaining, covering the advancement of social theory, through the Hegelian vein, from theorists like Feuerbach, Kierkegaard, Marx and Saint-Simon.
Read
February 4, 2023Manages to be a very comprehensive study that takes seriously Hegel's Negative, Critical element which often seems ignored in favour of reading Hegel as just Totalising that is to say merely system-building.
Hegel's philosophy here is accounted as particularly destructive in a philosophical sense, which is to say that the acceptance of the Given, of facts as they appear to us, are subjected to critical analysis. This of course is opposed to the empiricist school, or the later mentioned positivists and sociologists e.g. Stahl, (later) Schelling, etc.
After a pretty robust account of Hegel, culminating mainly in his Philosophy of Right, we move to the "Rise of Social Theory" which covers the movement of Marxism in both receiving the Negating element of Hegelian philosophy, as well as making a fundamental criticism of Hegel. Where Hegel's society culminates in the realisation of a subject's freedom in Private Property ("The Philosophy of Right claims that private property is the material reality of the free subject and the realization of freedom." pg. 201), Marx identifies the blaring issue of the proletariat which can only be the negation of Hegel's society, and of capitalism broadly: the proletariat does not own private property, in fact it represents the alienation of the proletarian class ("Alienation has taken its most universal form in the institution of private property..." pg. 282). Marx thus no longer continues a philosophical tradition, but a critical theory broadly on political-economical lines. In broad strokes the main element well perceived here is the inheritence of Hegel in Marx. It is not necessarily adequate to say Marx flips "idealism on its head" as is often said in introductory texts and lectures, but rather carries on a tradition in a different key.
The section defending Hegelianism against charges that it was the grounds for Fascism or National Socialism were particularly well written, observed, and surprsingly poignant. Just briefly the conclusion to the book itself speaks to this:
The supplementary epilogue has interesting comments that mirror Marcuse's direct views and not just his interests. Interesting points are made, particularly of Lenin:
Though Marcuse continues this line of thought in an interesting way I might agree with—that is in advanced industrial society the negative force of the proletariat is increasingly "whittled down" due to a flourishing of needs, technological advancements, and his concept of "repressive desublimation" (found outside of this book but clearly implied)—it is important to bear in mind that the Proletariat as negative force would also cease to be proletariat in its revolution, should a revolution truly take place. The proletariat by its nature is self-abolishing in its abolishment of capitalism. That the proletariat in essence remained in Soviet society does not declare the Soviets to still be capitalist (that would probably be a naïve view), but it does show that the goal of communism, as the realisation of the negation of capitalism, had certainly not been realised
In all, this is a really well done study of Hegel and reactions toward him with an eye to resurfacing the Negative in Critical Theory, and with an eye toward its function in revolution.
Hegel's philosophy here is accounted as particularly destructive in a philosophical sense, which is to say that the acceptance of the Given, of facts as they appear to us, are subjected to critical analysis. This of course is opposed to the empiricist school, or the later mentioned positivists and sociologists e.g. Stahl, (later) Schelling, etc.
After a pretty robust account of Hegel, culminating mainly in his Philosophy of Right, we move to the "Rise of Social Theory" which covers the movement of Marxism in both receiving the Negating element of Hegelian philosophy, as well as making a fundamental criticism of Hegel. Where Hegel's society culminates in the realisation of a subject's freedom in Private Property ("The Philosophy of Right claims that private property is the material reality of the free subject and the realization of freedom." pg. 201), Marx identifies the blaring issue of the proletariat which can only be the negation of Hegel's society, and of capitalism broadly: the proletariat does not own private property, in fact it represents the alienation of the proletarian class ("Alienation has taken its most universal form in the institution of private property..." pg. 282). Marx thus no longer continues a philosophical tradition, but a critical theory broadly on political-economical lines. In broad strokes the main element well perceived here is the inheritence of Hegel in Marx. It is not necessarily adequate to say Marx flips "idealism on its head" as is often said in introductory texts and lectures, but rather carries on a tradition in a different key.
The section defending Hegelianism against charges that it was the grounds for Fascism or National Socialism were particularly well written, observed, and surprsingly poignant. Just briefly the conclusion to the book itself speaks to this:
The first edition of (Carl Schmitt's) Begriff des Politischen raises the question of how long 'the spirit of Hegel' lived in Berlin, and he replies, 'in any case, the school that became authoritative in Prussia after 1840 preferred to have the "conservative" philosophy of F. J. Stahl, while Hegel wandered from Karl Marx to Lenin and to Moscow.' And he summarises the entire process in the striking statement that on the day of Hitler's ascent to power 'Hegel, so to speak, died.' pg. 419
The supplementary epilogue has interesting comments that mirror Marcuse's direct views and not just his interests. Interesting points are made, particularly of Lenin:
The decisive importance of the relation between the pre-revolutionary proletariat and post-revolutionary proletariat has been demonstrated only after the death of Marx (...) it was this development which transformed Marxism into Leninism and determined the fate of Soviety society - its progress under a new system of repressive productivity. Marx' conception of the "free" proletariat as the absolute negation of the established social order belonged to the model of "free" capitalism... pg. 436
Though Marcuse continues this line of thought in an interesting way I might agree with—that is in advanced industrial society the negative force of the proletariat is increasingly "whittled down" due to a flourishing of needs, technological advancements, and his concept of "repressive desublimation" (found outside of this book but clearly implied)—it is important to bear in mind that the Proletariat as negative force would also cease to be proletariat in its revolution, should a revolution truly take place. The proletariat by its nature is self-abolishing in its abolishment of capitalism. That the proletariat in essence remained in Soviet society does not declare the Soviets to still be capitalist (that would probably be a naïve view), but it does show that the goal of communism, as the realisation of the negation of capitalism, had certainly not been realised
In all, this is a really well done study of Hegel and reactions toward him with an eye to resurfacing the Negative in Critical Theory, and with an eye toward its function in revolution.
January 14, 2020
يبدأ الكتاب بعرض مبسط وموجز لأبرز معالم فلسفة هيجل فيتناول المنطق الهيجلى والنقد المثالى وتحوله الى نظرية فى الحق المدنى والدولة والذى سيتبلور فى صورة النقد الواقعى فى الفكر الماركسي ثم الانتقال الحاسم فى الفكر الغربى الى ادراك خطورة النقد - كفكرة ثورية شاملة لكل واقع - والدعوة للفلسفة الوضعية الناشئة والداعية لقبول الواقع والوضع السائد مع العمل على تطوره وتقدمه التدريجى لا الرغبة الهدامة المعتمدة على النقد المجرد المستمر وهى الدعوة التى تبناها هيجل بدليل انه فى اغلب اجزاء كتاباته نشعر بدعوتيه المستمرتين المتناقضتين ففى بعض الاماكن يدعو الى البحث عن البدائل الأكثر عقلانية عن الوضع اللاعقلانى الحالى وهو ما يوهم بعض القراء بكون فلسفة هيجل ودعوته هى الأشد ثورية. وفى اماكن اخرى نجده يبرر الواقع على أساس ما فيه من عقلانية وعلى أنه الوضع الأكثر نضجا على كل الأوضاع السابقة ويدعو لتقبله بل وانه فى فقرات معينه يزعم زعما مقصودا ذو مغزى بأن الدولة الالمانية تمثل قمة التطور التاريخى وان الروح الالمانية هى الروح الفلسفية الحقة . وهو ما جعل المفكرين فى زمنه وفى وطنه يظنون ان الفكر الهيجلى هو الأشد محافظة . الا ان الحقيقة تكمن فى محاولة هيجل للدعوة الى الوصول بالفكر الى اشد الافكار والقضايا تطرفا ثم ادراك اقصى اطراف نقيض القضية موضوع التفكير لمحاولة ادراك درجات الامكانات الوجودية المختلفة ثم محاولة الموازنة بين النقيضين بايجاد مقولة واقعية هى نسبية فى حد ذاتها نظرا لواقعيتها ولأنها تستطيع تحقيق اية امكانية محددة من بين الممكنات وهى شاملة نظرا لأنها تجمع بين النقيضين فى ذات الوجود وهذا العرض الفكرى رغم منهجيته الا ان ما فيه من شدة التعارض وايضاحه لتعدد الامكانيات المتاحة وامكان تحققها وتقبلها هو ما أدى الى خلق أزمات فكرية حادت بالمفكرين - الوضعيين والثوريين على السواء - عن الوصول الى تبرير منطقى و مقصود للأوضاع القائمة فاضطروا الى بناء الواقع بناءً لا عقلانياً قائماً أحيانا على الطاعة وأحيانا على الخضوع للمصلحة العامة واحيانا للدولة التسلطية الفاشية بحجة انها الجامع الحقيقى لتناقضات المجتمع وانها المعطى الايجابى والسابق على وجود الأفراد لا على معايير العقل والحرية . وبذلك ادت هذه الافكار الى نشوء نظريات اجتماعية فى صورة علمية تهدف الى دراسة الحركة التطورية للمجتمع وقوانينه الديناميكية وما يتعلق بها من أبحاث إقتصادية أو أخلاقية كما نجد هذه الاتجاهات مبسطة فى شرح ماركيوز لكل من ماركس ، أوجست كونت ، سيسموندى ، شتال وفون شتاين وإبراز مدى تأثر كل منهم بالفكر الهيجلى رغم انهم يمثلون التيار النافى للمثالية المطلقة فيما بعد هيجل .
February 21, 2017
Marcuse outlines Hegel’s thought and suggests how it informed the later rise of social theory and critical theory. The book is a fine exposition of Hegel and Marx. It suffers, however, by rarely attaching the two. Therefore, the subtitle should actually read “Hegel + The Rise of Social Theory.”
For Hegel Reason functions as an acid-drip, dissolving all historical forms, leading to the liberation of nature. As Marcuse says, it is a “task,” not a fact (Marcuse 26). While many repeat Hegel’s famous dictum that the Real is the Rational, Marcuse points out that reason will dissolve social orders via its inherent negativity, which will then usher in new forms of the rational.
The progress of thought begins when we try to grasp the structure of Being. But when we do this, Being dissolves into many quantities and qualities, which are actually a totality of antagonistic relations. This is the essence of Being. Therefore, Being is antagonistic. Indeed, Being is *violent.*
Hegel’s thought allows a visible dynamic between reason, externality, and alienation (as famously seen in Marx). Through labor man overcomes the estrangement between the objective world and the subjective world. Man is alienated when he is subordinated to abstract labor. Mechanization facilitates this alienation.
Alienation of the person: the person externalizes himself and becomes an object. I can sell my time and labor. Marcuse, like Marx earlier, sees that many of Hegel’s conclusions, lead to antagonisms and clashes in society (196). However, in Hegel’s society, as Marx would later note, people participate and share only on the basis of Capital, which itself will create more inequalities (205).
The second half of the book is a skillful analysis of Marx and later sociologists. This has been covered in depth by other writers, so there is no need to review it here. The book succeeds as an excellent analysis of Hegel, yet it seems about 100 pages too long.
For Hegel Reason functions as an acid-drip, dissolving all historical forms, leading to the liberation of nature. As Marcuse says, it is a “task,” not a fact (Marcuse 26). While many repeat Hegel’s famous dictum that the Real is the Rational, Marcuse points out that reason will dissolve social orders via its inherent negativity, which will then usher in new forms of the rational.
The progress of thought begins when we try to grasp the structure of Being. But when we do this, Being dissolves into many quantities and qualities, which are actually a totality of antagonistic relations. This is the essence of Being. Therefore, Being is antagonistic. Indeed, Being is *violent.*
Hegel’s thought allows a visible dynamic between reason, externality, and alienation (as famously seen in Marx). Through labor man overcomes the estrangement between the objective world and the subjective world. Man is alienated when he is subordinated to abstract labor. Mechanization facilitates this alienation.
Alienation of the person: the person externalizes himself and becomes an object. I can sell my time and labor. Marcuse, like Marx earlier, sees that many of Hegel’s conclusions, lead to antagonisms and clashes in society (196). However, in Hegel’s society, as Marx would later note, people participate and share only on the basis of Capital, which itself will create more inequalities (205).
The second half of the book is a skillful analysis of Marx and later sociologists. This has been covered in depth by other writers, so there is no need to review it here. The book succeeds as an excellent analysis of Hegel, yet it seems about 100 pages too long.
Want to read
May 3, 2011فجأة اتضح لي بعد متابعة احداث الثورة في مصر ان نظرية هيجل تفسر كل شيء في حركة المجتمع!! بحثت عن بعض القراءات حتي استطيع دراسة تلك الفكرة بشكل اكبر انتهت بمجموعة من القراءآت هذا الكتاب احدها
الكتاب فتح لي افاقا كثرة علي فكر هيجل يبدو انني لم افهم هيجل جيدا من البداية
الكتاب فتح لي افاقا كثرة علي فكر هيجل يبدو انني لم افهم هيجل جيدا من البداية
April 14, 2020
A lengthy review of Hegel's work. The constant struggle between Thought & Action and Freedom & Liberty mostly under the shadow of the State and how a man is conditioned by the result of these struggles.
July 22, 2021
This one took me forever. It is a very useful, albeit repetitive, piece of mid-20th-century secondary scholarship on Hegel. Here, Marcuse essentially attempts to redeem Hegel from the mid-century claims that Hegel's absolutist view of the state was necessarily fascist. Instead, Marcuse champions Hegel as the forerunner to Marx and the hinge-piece between idealism and materialism, philosophy and social theory.
Though I disagree with many of Marcuse's conclusions - I especially found his treatment of German Protestantism, and religious belief more generally, (as a coping mechanism that merely distracts from the realization of the absolute rational social order) elitist and insultingly dismissive - I found this book endlessly useful in parsing out the pieces of Hegel's philosophy that I was having trouble articulating. After reading Phenomenology of the Spirit last summer, along with a number of Hegel's other famous essays, I was dumbfounded. Unlike Kant, who can be difficult but tends at least to write clearly, Hegel is sometimes deliberately obfuscatory and opaque, simply because his philosophy tries to grasp at concepts that lie outside the power of language.
I especially appreciated the passages on Hegel's Logic, since the Logic is a book I am unlikely to take the time to read, given its size.
After reading this, I can finally articulate the points where I find Hegelianism fascinating, and the points where I find it weak, or even terminally stupid. It is interesting to see how the genealogy of so much of what we term "postmodern" thinking can be seen as having its roots in fascism. It is interesting to see how Marcuse responds to these critiques, saying that the Hegelian absolutism that gave birth to the authoritarian right in Germany was not "real" Hegelianism. Okay, Marcuse. Then couldn't I make the claim that the Christians who went to war in the Crusades, betraying the command "thou shalt not kill," were not "real" Christians?
There is a problem with this logic. Both actuality and ideality must factor in when we judge any group or sect for its actions. The Nazis were real Hegelians, and the genocidal colonizers of the Americas were real Christians. You cannot separate ideology from actuality, at least too far, and thus Marcuse falls into a childish fallacy.
What shelters Christianity against the valid critiques of any century is the basic idea of fallenness. The essence of Christianity is that the individual will never measure up, and thus, though Christians will continue to commit historical and personal atrocities, the paradox is that this fallenness remains internally consistent within Christianity.
In many ways, Hegelianism can be thought of the same way. (It is, after all, inspired by Lutheran theology.)
But where Hegelianism fails is in personal ethics. Hegelianism is a relativist philosophy, and it furnishes no set of practical ethics for the individual. Philosophy that lacks personal practicality is mere navel-gazing, and is far more complacent than the 19th and 20th-century conservative German Protestants that Marcuse seeks to criticize as "regressive."
To conclude, give me Kant any day. Kant was a man of many glaring faults, but his attempt to furnish personal ethics on top of an idealist system makes him far more noble in my eyes than Hegel.
Though I disagree with many of Marcuse's conclusions - I especially found his treatment of German Protestantism, and religious belief more generally, (as a coping mechanism that merely distracts from the realization of the absolute rational social order) elitist and insultingly dismissive - I found this book endlessly useful in parsing out the pieces of Hegel's philosophy that I was having trouble articulating. After reading Phenomenology of the Spirit last summer, along with a number of Hegel's other famous essays, I was dumbfounded. Unlike Kant, who can be difficult but tends at least to write clearly, Hegel is sometimes deliberately obfuscatory and opaque, simply because his philosophy tries to grasp at concepts that lie outside the power of language.
I especially appreciated the passages on Hegel's Logic, since the Logic is a book I am unlikely to take the time to read, given its size.
After reading this, I can finally articulate the points where I find Hegelianism fascinating, and the points where I find it weak, or even terminally stupid. It is interesting to see how the genealogy of so much of what we term "postmodern" thinking can be seen as having its roots in fascism. It is interesting to see how Marcuse responds to these critiques, saying that the Hegelian absolutism that gave birth to the authoritarian right in Germany was not "real" Hegelianism. Okay, Marcuse. Then couldn't I make the claim that the Christians who went to war in the Crusades, betraying the command "thou shalt not kill," were not "real" Christians?
There is a problem with this logic. Both actuality and ideality must factor in when we judge any group or sect for its actions. The Nazis were real Hegelians, and the genocidal colonizers of the Americas were real Christians. You cannot separate ideology from actuality, at least too far, and thus Marcuse falls into a childish fallacy.
What shelters Christianity against the valid critiques of any century is the basic idea of fallenness. The essence of Christianity is that the individual will never measure up, and thus, though Christians will continue to commit historical and personal atrocities, the paradox is that this fallenness remains internally consistent within Christianity.
In many ways, Hegelianism can be thought of the same way. (It is, after all, inspired by Lutheran theology.)
But where Hegelianism fails is in personal ethics. Hegelianism is a relativist philosophy, and it furnishes no set of practical ethics for the individual. Philosophy that lacks personal practicality is mere navel-gazing, and is far more complacent than the 19th and 20th-century conservative German Protestants that Marcuse seeks to criticize as "regressive."
To conclude, give me Kant any day. Kant was a man of many glaring faults, but his attempt to furnish personal ethics on top of an idealist system makes him far more noble in my eyes than Hegel.
August 22, 2012
Marcuse by far gives the best introduction to Hegels major texts and how Marx re-appropriated Hegels philosophies. Where for Hegel freedom was a state of mind and reason the universal spirit, for Marx the economy was the universal spirit that created false consciousness because the laborer is always alienating herself by creating objects and unlike Hegels figure cant free herself from material condition to think.The outbreak of the French Revolution caused Hegel and others to rethink the potential that humans have to achieve freedom. For Hegel his trajectory led him to surmise that only in thinking is freedom obtained and the state must reconcile this by creating institution that dont undermine the freedom to think for individual but there in lies the contradiction. Democratic states tend to wield totalitarian reason that censors thought. Its easy to see where contemporary Marxist move from Hegelian reason to Marx's ideology as a dominant theory in modern life reading this work. His remarks on Hegels influence across Europe against the raise of Positivism and Sociology are also insightful challenging fields like anthropology that tend to run on participant observation to document what they see (spell of positivism) as opposed to critical theory that attempts to shake up the status quo by showing contradictions.
August 25, 2019
ერთ-ერთი საუკეთესო წიგნი რაც ჰეგელზე წამიკითხავს და არა მხოლოდ ჰეგელზე, ზოგადად, ახალი დროის ფილოსოფიის ისტორიაში. წიგნი მოიცავს ჰეგელის ფილოსოფიის მწყობრ, მარტივ და გასაგებ გადმოცემას ნაშრომთა ქრონოლოგიის მიხედვით, ფილოსოფიის მსვლელობას ჰეგელიდან მარქსამდე, ფილოსოფიის წყვეტას მარქსთან, მის გარდაქმნად სოციალურ თეორიად და ბოლოს, ჰეგელი vs ნაციზმი/ფაშიზმი, რაც იყო კიდეც ერთ-ერთი მიზანდასახულობა ამ წიგნის, რასაც მარკუზე აღნიშნავს შესავალში, რომ ჰეგელის ფილოსოფიას, კერძოდ სახელმწიფოს მისეულ თეორიასა და ფაშისტურ თეორიას შორის კავშირი არ არსებობს.
July 20, 2009
Up front, I just read the first part which is where he tries to explain Hegel in general. I found this reasonably useful. As I mentioned in the review for the appropriate Copleston volume, I thought the comparison was very interesting. On the other hand this volume is a little bit in between for me. It does some of the same work, but the Marxist touch is a bit distracting though if I was reading the book more for the overall point it would probably be more interesting.
October 15, 2017
About as lucidly written as you can get with a book about Hegel, I think. I learned quite a bit from this... the sections on Stahl and von Stein were interesting since I had never really heard of them before reading this book. The last couple sections detailing the relationship between fascism/Nazism with (anti-)Hegelianism was also very enlightening to me.
September 25, 2017
Essential.
October 18, 2024
For a project spanning over 400 pages, not a sentence is wasted (this might be the most I’ve ever highlighted a text).
Marcuse retains a laser-focus on the subject matter throughout, and in doing so somehow retains a playful ingenuity which draws unprecedented associations and conclusions. If an idea is ever repeated, it is either furnished with new material, presented in light of another perspective, or articulated with a form which reveals hitherto opaque dimensions.
Let this not be construed as a blind tribute to concision or matter-of-factness for the sake of it - Marcuse consistently shines as the subjective interpreter rather than the objective surveyor; To do anything less would be to betray his very argument, to validate the anti-hegelian positivism he takes to task so effortlessly.
Marcuse takes you on a journey through Hegel’s thought as it appeared to contemporaries, as it was subsumed and drawn upon by successors, and most importantly of all, how it appears to him.
For Marcuse, Hegel (or at the very least his thought) is, for all intents and purposes, genuinely revolutionary - not merely insofar as what he represented in the history of philosophy, but as a thinker whose method opened the floodgates (only barely cracked open by Kant) for action to transform the world, in light of a reason that might glean the essence of reality, struggling through the maelstrom of contradiction to actualise itself.
At heart, Hegel is interpreted as both a philosopher of imminent antagonism and universal freedom - inextricably bound concepts, no doubt.
One must first come to “consciousness” of reality as incongruent with the demands of reason, or at the very least as the appearence of an existence emerging dialectically with its essence, not quite yet embodying its notion.
This self-consciousness must precede right action - by necessity - by definition. Awareness of contradiction drives the will (which is “free” if it is universal, it is “inwardly concrete” and no longer in tension with the negation of otherness) of the subject, both establishing and challenging ethical imperatives.
The subject recognises that the old must be outright negated in its determinacy in order to bring forth its potential, not merely adjusted gradually. Sprinkle in a little materialism and what do you know - revolutionary class consciousness is born!
At every step of the way, Marcuse really accentuates the emancipatory potential for Hegel’s philosophy, revealing why his dialectic simply had to become the foundation for Marx’s critique. The importance of the universal enabled Hegel to see problems and contradictions in the world as ultimately structural in one way or another - arguably the defining characterstic of the leftist posture. Marcuse demonstrates how Hegel’s concept of freedom requires that the subject be self-conscious of its “true form” owed to him as human, as reasoning subject.
Whilst often caricatured as demanding the ruthless leveling of all difference, squashing all claims to individuality for the sake of the collective (contra Hegel), Marcuse highlights how the ethical thrust of Marxism is in actuality underpinned by the desire to realise individual freedom.
It just so happens, of course, that freedom for the individual can only be founded upon the freedom of all: universal liberation. Not only is particularist reform thereby improbable, but it is misguided and innefective since it fails to recognise the way that the particular is intrinsically related to the universal whole.
Marcuse notes Marx’s conviction that capitalist society negates the individual by subsuming them into their class, but is it not this very process which fosters the conditions for reason to grasp the inequity of the world?
As the Frankfurt school would go on to explore, the system obfuscates the recognition of class relations (reification). This is why the ruling class is so preoccupied by the culture wars, nationalism etc - whatever divides and distracts those with genuinely similar material and ethical interests.
Today we experience neoliberalism as the apogee of this mystification project, wherein one is compelled to see their faux individuality reflected back at them, experienced only through the transparent screen of ideology.
There’s genuinely a fair few Hegel quotes in the earlier portions of the book with a truly uncanny resemblence to Marx…
This is not to say that he overlooks the tendencies in Hegel’s thought which gesture in the complete opposite direction - make no mistake, this is not Hegel apologia.
Especially on The Philosophy of Right, Marcuse depicts a much greater emphasis on submission to the given order, rejecting the earlier, more idealistic stance on the individual/state relation, evacuating the dialectic in the process. Through private property the will is not perfectly reconciled with its object, but property is still hypostatised as the ontological manifestation of the will’s “assertion”.
In elevating property to the ascendent concretisation of reason, late Hegel fails to retain the spontaneous freedom of the individual which he was once at such pains to ensure.
Labour and property are, at this stage, managed by an “authoritarian” state. But, according to Hegel’s own Logic, must not this organisation itself be implicated - even constituted by - a self-undermining contradiction? It is here, immortalised in his veneration of the Prussian monarchy, where Hegel’s thought exceeds him (as is the fate for all great thinkers).
Although not explicitly avowed, Hegel’s philosophy of history necessitates the sublation of the state into the self-consciousness of the Weltgeist.
Moreover, for Hegel the dialectic is the ontological process of Being itself, whereas for Marx it is purely historical and structural.
Armed with the ontological dialectic, Hegel’s Logic begins to merge subject with object.
Through negating the negation which the object assumes in relation to otherness, the object is imbued with almost a sort of rudimentary subjectivity, insomuch as the determinate object’s Being is sustained, is mediated by otherness reflected back into itself. The possibile as universal, as essence, as notion, thereby constitutes the tension in the existent object as particular subject.
Given that this process of becoming ultimately implies the necessary death of the subject/object through its emergence into a new form, it is no wonder that Marx was so confident in the inevitable and incoming end of capitalism.
I was also completely unaware of how central the question of Labour was in Hegel’s early works. It is so rarely if ever mentioned just how central the capitalist economic process was for shaping Hegel’s theory of civil society. So much more shockingly progressive and frankly innovative materialist groundwork was laid for Marx beyond merely the methodology of the dialectic.
Of course, Marx does owe the method and analysis of contradiction, of a dialectic of social diagnosis, to Hegel. Both recognised the liberal state as an unstable system of antagonism, but whereas Hegel believed in rationally proceeding towards a more authoritarian and disciplinary mode of administration in order to reconcile or at least supress such antagonisms, Marx, evidently, did not.
Marcuse’s account of Marx stresses not the inheritance he owes to the dialectic, nor his development of Hegel’s analysis of labour, but the absolute negation of philosophy as such. I’m not so sure I would go quite so far; Could it not, for instance, be argued that the proletariat does not *negate* the claims of reason or philosophy as such, but in fact that it only goes to show that its principles are yet to be realised?
In his chapter of Marx’s dialectic, Marcuse explores class society as pre-history, in contrast to the “actual” history which commences upon its abolition. Viewed in this way, we need not trouble ourselves with locating the *end* of history, but rather its true beginning.
Employing this premise, Marcuse ingeniously combats the conception of Marx as a mechanistic historical determinist - rather, he is a *pre* historical determinist - the leap into History as such can now only be taken by the free action of individuals. Ergo, the transformation of class society into its negation, in the form of rationally organised production, emancipates consciousness from the strict determination of social conditions. We will no longer be fated to a reified, ideological existence, it seems.
The state, for Hegel, is a power over and above society, not an expression or aspect of it. Nonetheless, if it is to exercise significant control over civil society, it must maintain the flourishing of individuality. Especially in his early work, Hegel recognised the fractured anarchy of borgeouis society, a society which could not possibly be explained by the rather particularist project of Rousseau, for instance.
Marcuse demonstrates how the spirit of enlightenment and the principles of the french revolution were themselves responsible for their own betrayal (abstract rights begetting concrete wrongs), both through fomenting alienation and facilitating the hegemonic ascendence of capitalism.
Of course, this also precipitated outright rejections of rationalism as such; Marcuse in fact implies, in his section on Kierkegaard, that in calling the universal into question, thereby clearing the path for exalting “certain particularities (such as the race or the folk) to the rank of the highest values”, existentialism paved the way for Fascism.
I enjoy reading Hume, but it’s clear to see how Empricism’s rejection of the universal, by rejecting the emancipatory potential of reason, the socially pacifying dogma of positivism was to ultimately arise - a dogma comporting itself exclusively within the circumscribed limits of the status quo.
It is no surprise then, that this distinctly anti-Hegelian philosophical counter-revolution, in the thought of F. J. Stahl, lays the groundwork for the Nazi state.
Hegel may have envisaged an authoritarian state, but it was to at the very least be a state able to exert power only insomuch as it can discipline the anarchy of civil society, so that individual freedom can be preserved whilst uniting it with the universal of the state, and really humanity at large. The Fascist state, on the other hand, crushes the individual in service of the particularist ends of race and class.
Another post-Hegelian positivist discussed is Lorenz Von Stein. In evacuating dialectics (anathema to positivism) from the procedure of analysis, Von Stein can only go so far as to describe society as antagonistic, no matter how much Hegelian jargon he dresses up his argument in.
This passive descriptive gesture is totally immobilised and blunted as a critical tool, instead reduced into objective laws which can only be remotely observed in their independent action.
Also worth briefly mentioning that, although it isn’t mentioned (and i could be way off the mark here), the chain of relations within the dialectics of Hegel’s dynamic logic seem to presage structuralist semiotics (an object defined by what it isnt, much like a signifier is determined by what it isnt).
Anyways I’m no Hegel scholar (better yet, I haven’t even read the guy yet), but Marcuse sure does a damn fine job here. Blimey!
Marcuse retains a laser-focus on the subject matter throughout, and in doing so somehow retains a playful ingenuity which draws unprecedented associations and conclusions. If an idea is ever repeated, it is either furnished with new material, presented in light of another perspective, or articulated with a form which reveals hitherto opaque dimensions.
Let this not be construed as a blind tribute to concision or matter-of-factness for the sake of it - Marcuse consistently shines as the subjective interpreter rather than the objective surveyor; To do anything less would be to betray his very argument, to validate the anti-hegelian positivism he takes to task so effortlessly.
Marcuse takes you on a journey through Hegel’s thought as it appeared to contemporaries, as it was subsumed and drawn upon by successors, and most importantly of all, how it appears to him.
For Marcuse, Hegel (or at the very least his thought) is, for all intents and purposes, genuinely revolutionary - not merely insofar as what he represented in the history of philosophy, but as a thinker whose method opened the floodgates (only barely cracked open by Kant) for action to transform the world, in light of a reason that might glean the essence of reality, struggling through the maelstrom of contradiction to actualise itself.
At heart, Hegel is interpreted as both a philosopher of imminent antagonism and universal freedom - inextricably bound concepts, no doubt.
One must first come to “consciousness” of reality as incongruent with the demands of reason, or at the very least as the appearence of an existence emerging dialectically with its essence, not quite yet embodying its notion.
This self-consciousness must precede right action - by necessity - by definition. Awareness of contradiction drives the will (which is “free” if it is universal, it is “inwardly concrete” and no longer in tension with the negation of otherness) of the subject, both establishing and challenging ethical imperatives.
The subject recognises that the old must be outright negated in its determinacy in order to bring forth its potential, not merely adjusted gradually. Sprinkle in a little materialism and what do you know - revolutionary class consciousness is born!
At every step of the way, Marcuse really accentuates the emancipatory potential for Hegel’s philosophy, revealing why his dialectic simply had to become the foundation for Marx’s critique. The importance of the universal enabled Hegel to see problems and contradictions in the world as ultimately structural in one way or another - arguably the defining characterstic of the leftist posture. Marcuse demonstrates how Hegel’s concept of freedom requires that the subject be self-conscious of its “true form” owed to him as human, as reasoning subject.
Whilst often caricatured as demanding the ruthless leveling of all difference, squashing all claims to individuality for the sake of the collective (contra Hegel), Marcuse highlights how the ethical thrust of Marxism is in actuality underpinned by the desire to realise individual freedom.
It just so happens, of course, that freedom for the individual can only be founded upon the freedom of all: universal liberation. Not only is particularist reform thereby improbable, but it is misguided and innefective since it fails to recognise the way that the particular is intrinsically related to the universal whole.
Marcuse notes Marx’s conviction that capitalist society negates the individual by subsuming them into their class, but is it not this very process which fosters the conditions for reason to grasp the inequity of the world?
As the Frankfurt school would go on to explore, the system obfuscates the recognition of class relations (reification). This is why the ruling class is so preoccupied by the culture wars, nationalism etc - whatever divides and distracts those with genuinely similar material and ethical interests.
Today we experience neoliberalism as the apogee of this mystification project, wherein one is compelled to see their faux individuality reflected back at them, experienced only through the transparent screen of ideology.
There’s genuinely a fair few Hegel quotes in the earlier portions of the book with a truly uncanny resemblence to Marx…
This is not to say that he overlooks the tendencies in Hegel’s thought which gesture in the complete opposite direction - make no mistake, this is not Hegel apologia.
Especially on The Philosophy of Right, Marcuse depicts a much greater emphasis on submission to the given order, rejecting the earlier, more idealistic stance on the individual/state relation, evacuating the dialectic in the process. Through private property the will is not perfectly reconciled with its object, but property is still hypostatised as the ontological manifestation of the will’s “assertion”.
In elevating property to the ascendent concretisation of reason, late Hegel fails to retain the spontaneous freedom of the individual which he was once at such pains to ensure.
Labour and property are, at this stage, managed by an “authoritarian” state. But, according to Hegel’s own Logic, must not this organisation itself be implicated - even constituted by - a self-undermining contradiction? It is here, immortalised in his veneration of the Prussian monarchy, where Hegel’s thought exceeds him (as is the fate for all great thinkers).
Although not explicitly avowed, Hegel’s philosophy of history necessitates the sublation of the state into the self-consciousness of the Weltgeist.
Moreover, for Hegel the dialectic is the ontological process of Being itself, whereas for Marx it is purely historical and structural.
Armed with the ontological dialectic, Hegel’s Logic begins to merge subject with object.
Through negating the negation which the object assumes in relation to otherness, the object is imbued with almost a sort of rudimentary subjectivity, insomuch as the determinate object’s Being is sustained, is mediated by otherness reflected back into itself. The possibile as universal, as essence, as notion, thereby constitutes the tension in the existent object as particular subject.
Given that this process of becoming ultimately implies the necessary death of the subject/object through its emergence into a new form, it is no wonder that Marx was so confident in the inevitable and incoming end of capitalism.
I was also completely unaware of how central the question of Labour was in Hegel’s early works. It is so rarely if ever mentioned just how central the capitalist economic process was for shaping Hegel’s theory of civil society. So much more shockingly progressive and frankly innovative materialist groundwork was laid for Marx beyond merely the methodology of the dialectic.
Of course, Marx does owe the method and analysis of contradiction, of a dialectic of social diagnosis, to Hegel. Both recognised the liberal state as an unstable system of antagonism, but whereas Hegel believed in rationally proceeding towards a more authoritarian and disciplinary mode of administration in order to reconcile or at least supress such antagonisms, Marx, evidently, did not.
Marcuse’s account of Marx stresses not the inheritance he owes to the dialectic, nor his development of Hegel’s analysis of labour, but the absolute negation of philosophy as such. I’m not so sure I would go quite so far; Could it not, for instance, be argued that the proletariat does not *negate* the claims of reason or philosophy as such, but in fact that it only goes to show that its principles are yet to be realised?
In his chapter of Marx’s dialectic, Marcuse explores class society as pre-history, in contrast to the “actual” history which commences upon its abolition. Viewed in this way, we need not trouble ourselves with locating the *end* of history, but rather its true beginning.
Employing this premise, Marcuse ingeniously combats the conception of Marx as a mechanistic historical determinist - rather, he is a *pre* historical determinist - the leap into History as such can now only be taken by the free action of individuals. Ergo, the transformation of class society into its negation, in the form of rationally organised production, emancipates consciousness from the strict determination of social conditions. We will no longer be fated to a reified, ideological existence, it seems.
The state, for Hegel, is a power over and above society, not an expression or aspect of it. Nonetheless, if it is to exercise significant control over civil society, it must maintain the flourishing of individuality. Especially in his early work, Hegel recognised the fractured anarchy of borgeouis society, a society which could not possibly be explained by the rather particularist project of Rousseau, for instance.
Marcuse demonstrates how the spirit of enlightenment and the principles of the french revolution were themselves responsible for their own betrayal (abstract rights begetting concrete wrongs), both through fomenting alienation and facilitating the hegemonic ascendence of capitalism.
Of course, this also precipitated outright rejections of rationalism as such; Marcuse in fact implies, in his section on Kierkegaard, that in calling the universal into question, thereby clearing the path for exalting “certain particularities (such as the race or the folk) to the rank of the highest values”, existentialism paved the way for Fascism.
I enjoy reading Hume, but it’s clear to see how Empricism’s rejection of the universal, by rejecting the emancipatory potential of reason, the socially pacifying dogma of positivism was to ultimately arise - a dogma comporting itself exclusively within the circumscribed limits of the status quo.
It is no surprise then, that this distinctly anti-Hegelian philosophical counter-revolution, in the thought of F. J. Stahl, lays the groundwork for the Nazi state.
Hegel may have envisaged an authoritarian state, but it was to at the very least be a state able to exert power only insomuch as it can discipline the anarchy of civil society, so that individual freedom can be preserved whilst uniting it with the universal of the state, and really humanity at large. The Fascist state, on the other hand, crushes the individual in service of the particularist ends of race and class.
Another post-Hegelian positivist discussed is Lorenz Von Stein. In evacuating dialectics (anathema to positivism) from the procedure of analysis, Von Stein can only go so far as to describe society as antagonistic, no matter how much Hegelian jargon he dresses up his argument in.
This passive descriptive gesture is totally immobilised and blunted as a critical tool, instead reduced into objective laws which can only be remotely observed in their independent action.
Also worth briefly mentioning that, although it isn’t mentioned (and i could be way off the mark here), the chain of relations within the dialectics of Hegel’s dynamic logic seem to presage structuralist semiotics (an object defined by what it isnt, much like a signifier is determined by what it isnt).
Anyways I’m no Hegel scholar (better yet, I haven’t even read the guy yet), but Marcuse sure does a damn fine job here. Blimey!
November 17, 2019
In 1930's two great political events took place; the first one Bolshevik Revolution in Russia and the second one the rise of Faschism in Germany. Both these events exerted a great impact on the lives and intelect of the thinkers of the epoch both positively and negatively. The intelectual group which is known as Frankfurt School from both events got influenced in a negative way. Even though they were famous for being Marxist thinkers, the revolution that carried out in the name of Marxism disappointed them not only because of Stalinist purge but also by the beurocractic regime that built by Lenin. Therefore, they withdrew from the field of action and they focused on theory to find a way. Instead of economic field, they mostly concentrated their investigations on cultural sphere. And it became the harbinger of a new philosophical discussions.
As a reaction and solution to the questions and discusions above one of the most prolific thinkers of the school as a starting point he took Hegel in order to study the fields that Marx had dealt with. That is why, he is known to have brought forefront Marx with a Hegelian point of view.
In this study Marcuse delves in to Hegelian concepts; his epistemology, morality, philosophy of history, his influence over the other political or philosophical streams.
Marcuse describes Hegel as the theoritician of the French Revolution. Hegel suggests that absolute idea (Geist) can spread universally through bourgoise state. Individuals can actualize their freedom through the state. It is rational. He who acts in accordence with the laws that put by the state will have acted rationally. Since the state is the manifestation of the perfection of the universal reason it is the last reaonable political institution.
Hegel left an impression on Fascism by blesing the state, on totalitarianism by a system which is all compassing, on Marxism "as a never ending process" and emphasizing "appearence and essence" (class in itself -class for itself) by essentializing human nature on politics.
August 19, 2023
Why do my mother and father who, let's be generous, are not PhDs in philosophy, but are two-time Trump voters and are eager and willing to support the Donald in the next election cycle, not only because he is "more fun" but because they feel America is in danger of failing into a hellstorm of an abyss without his immediate return to the Presidency, is at least partially due to the fact that they get most of their news and info-entertainment from Fox News and Newsmax, which is a radical right-wing news outlet for the truly cuckoo. I suspect that the truth is we are being manipulated by the capitalist system which has penetrated our psyche in much the same way that Hegel originally injected his negative poetics into what was Kant's essentially conservative dialectical reasoning. The fact that present-day Americans live in a continuous state of anxiety with regard to the possibility of a falling-off in the rate of return of corporate profits leads me to believe that there is an incestuous relationship between the exacerbation of the class struggle and a trend which closely follows it, the exhortation of society's competitive struggle among both producers and consumers, something which Karl Marx originally pointed out over 150 years ago. I felt this book by Herbert Marcuse was much more successful than the other two of his major works, "One-Dimensional Man" and "Eros and Civilization", which I have read previously. Perhaps I should have started with this book, a more academic work which took an established philosopher and his works as its starting-point rather than jettisoning us off into the heights of Marxist critical theory, seemingly without a net for us to rest in. Three stars.
April 28, 2012
Marcuse's goal in Reason and Revolution is to demonstrate that Hegel was not as right wing as people believe him to be, and that there is no excuse for using him to vindicate Nazi practice. The later is true, but the former is not. Marcuse is certainly a deeper Hegel scholar than I am, or ever will be, but page after page it's clear he's reading his own Marxism into Hegel, and not the other way around. In passages that most people would find to be reactionary, and repressive, Marcuse ask that we ignore what he's actually saying, and dwell on Hegel's method as a revolutionary method. While the method may be revolutionary, why are Hegel's results always so authoritarian?
His Chapter on Marx is interesting, but hardly worth picking the book up over, and he spends too little time defending Hegel from Kierkegaard (8 pages). In short, he concludes Kierkegaard must be wrong because Kierkegaard wants to find man's solace in religion, and despises socialism. It's not a very philosophical argument, but more of a presumptuous one, where Marcuse just presumes the reader is a socialist and/or not a christian, and therefore won't see any wisdom in Kierkegaard.
Overall a mixed bag of a book, I'm not sure I'd recommend it to anyone though.
His Chapter on Marx is interesting, but hardly worth picking the book up over, and he spends too little time defending Hegel from Kierkegaard (8 pages). In short, he concludes Kierkegaard must be wrong because Kierkegaard wants to find man's solace in religion, and despises socialism. It's not a very philosophical argument, but more of a presumptuous one, where Marcuse just presumes the reader is a socialist and/or not a christian, and therefore won't see any wisdom in Kierkegaard.
Overall a mixed bag of a book, I'm not sure I'd recommend it to anyone though.
February 11, 2008
In this book Herbert Marcuse provides a well-crafted genealogy of social theory. He begins with Hegel, summarizes the relationship between the Hegelian dialectic and the Marxist form, thereby explaining the major criticisms that Marx had towards Enlightenment philosophy. Lastly, he sums up the development of positivist thought and formation of sociology as a discipline.
Even though Marcuse does not put together a very engaging analysis of the theories that he brings forth, the book is very informative and provocative, especially when thinking about the Hegelian transcendetalization of Reason, and the theological aspects of modernity - the search for a new God that will give relief, and that will guide us through the new modern world. Dialectics as a method also becomes questionable upon reading the book - is there a "truth" that we, as the wise theorists will bring to light? Can contradiction ever be removed from human life?
Even though Marcuse does not put together a very engaging analysis of the theories that he brings forth, the book is very informative and provocative, especially when thinking about the Hegelian transcendetalization of Reason, and the theological aspects of modernity - the search for a new God that will give relief, and that will guide us through the new modern world. Dialectics as a method also becomes questionable upon reading the book - is there a "truth" that we, as the wise theorists will bring to light? Can contradiction ever be removed from human life?
January 2, 2015
One of the classic statements of Hegelian Marxism and critical theory. Marcuse argues that Hegel's conciliatory conservatism was inconsistent with his method, and places Marx as the rightful heir of the dialectical legacy. The Popperian argument that Hegel's mystification of Enlightenment engendered totalitarianism is overturned by Marcuse showing how the classics of positivistic sociology legitimatized statist authoritarianism with their instrumental concept of reason. Dated, but still a great read.
January 8, 2025
Reason and Revolution!
“People overthrow tyranny not merely because it is abject and detestable, but because it has become superfluous.”
Marcuse could not have possibly chosen a more suitable title for this book. The patient reader will understand why as the book evolves by the end of the first section. I think this is an essential read for anyone who is on the left and is willing to trace the origins of its ideas in reason and practice. Marcuse's framework is set on the task to demonstrate how fascism is in direct contrast to the Hegel's ideas. Through this journey, Marcuse provides a very comprehensive yet concise account of Hegel's system of philosophy, the birth of socialogy, freedom and state etc. The writing style is straightforward, quite different from his most famous 'One-Dimensional Man'.
The book is divided into two main sections. In the first one, Marcuse offers a well-explained and concise introduction to Hegel's philosophical system, managing to distill the 'Phenomenology' into less than 30 pages. While it may require some prior knowledge of Hegel's main concepts, it remains an excellent introduction. Marcuse starts with the observation, which is the crucial onset of Hegel's philosophy:
“While the French Revolution had already begun to assert the reality of freedom, German idealism was only occupying itself with the idea of it.”He clearly outlines the origins of German idealism in line with the strong influence of the French Revolution. Reason becomes the subject of study, but Marcuse emphasizes that Hegel's system is far from a pure metaphysical construct. This becomes a key point in understanding Hegel's philosophy, and Marcuse provides vivid examples to support his claims. The book delves into the historical societal background of Hegel's era to justify his early writings, contrasting them with his later philosophical works. Hegel's initial philosophical writings encapsulate negativity, the speculative process of thinking, and the unification of contradictions, referred to as Aufhebung. This term is thoroughly explained in the Vorwort of Hegel's 'Phenomenology of Mind'. Marcuse elaborates on the concept of Aufhebung, noting how Hegel argues that the physical realm sets limits on the potentiality of notions. His philosophy explores how the particular becomes the universal and, in doing so, allows the universal to form its agency. This process is both intriguing and also reminiscent of Spinoza's ideas. I find the analogy of this concept to the collapse of the wave function in quantum mechanics quite apt in the following way: the process by which a quantum system (Notion) transitions from its multiple potential states to a single observed state upon measurement (limit set by the physical realm). Moreover, Hegel calls these forms of the notion “Bad” as they never fully actualize the notion and, for this reason, they are not “Real.” The most important notion for Hegel is, of course, Freedom. He states that “Freedom, in turn, presupposes reason, for it is comprehending knowledge, alone, that enables the subject to gain and to wield this power.” This point effectively addresses the arguments around freedom being the ability to act as you will. The idea of freedom is necessarily tied to reason. Therefore, any act taken without reason is not truly free!
Moreover Hegel explains how, ‘everything has to be understood in relation to other things, so that these relations become the very being of that thing.’ In my view, Hegel attempts to introduce a temporal element to Spinoza's philosophy through the dialectical method, setting it into motion. However, this error accuses Spinoza’s system of being static. Pierre Macherey deals with this issue with the utmost scrutiny in his amazing book 'Hegel ou Spinoza'.
Through his 'Science of Logic', Hegel aims to demonstrate how the ultimate goals of science are achieved. The examples provided make it clear that Hegel's views on actualizing a system's potentials precede, and perhaps influence, Marx's ideas of capital. In the chapter on the philosophy of right, Marcuse explores how Hegel views the state as the actualization of the individual's will. He contrasts this with fascist ideology, pointing out significant differences. Concluding the first section, Marcuse addresses the philosophy of history, Hegel's major work that employs his dialectical structure in the context of history. However, I find myself opposed to Hegel's idea of a final goal, particularly the consciousness of the Volksgeist.The second part is the genealogy of sociology and its traces, starting from the early 18th century up to the late 19th century. Marcuse succinctly explains how Hegelian dialectics, especially negativity, gave rise to two schools of thought. His remarks on Feuerbach are illuminating, while the chapter on alienation and Marx places the evolution from Hegel to communism as the most advanced societal mode into perspective. Marcuse's analysis of the labor process brilliantly encapsulates Marx's mature ideas, quoting key passages from 'Kapital' volumes I and III. Concepts such as surplus value, use value, exchange value, and the turmoil of capitalism through accumulation and overproduction are addressed with clarity.
Finally, he examines positivism, presenting a concise account of its historical formation. The contrast between revolutionary philosophies and compliance-oriented positivism becomes very apparent. Positivism's misleading “scientific approach” to sociology is particularly critiqued. The chapter closes with von Stein's work, where he acknowledges dialectical social conflicts but views them as inherent societal qualities rather than steps toward freedom. Ultimately, von Stein's conclusions are deemed anti-revolutionary and conformist; a clear departure from Hegel's transformative ideals.
If I can close the book with one sentence, it is the following:
“The realization of reason is not a fact but a task.”
April 24, 2018
Much of the book is Marcuse explaining and interpreting Hegel. Marcuse has a nice academic manner to his writing, and the book is instructive. In the latter part of the book, he also considers other philosophers such as Marx and Comte, etc. Overall, it reminds me why my philosophical interests are eclectic, and not just about one or two schools.
May 16, 2019
Philosophically rigorous, but also eminently applicable to the social sciences, Marcuse's Reason and Revolution is a classic of 20th century social theory. Recommended to students of philosophy, history, sociology, and politics interested in developing an interdisciplinary account of how the Enlightenment shaped the world.
March 30, 2022
This was actually quite a good analysis & description of the social theories of Hegel and Marx. Plenty of holes (plotholes? I guess? can you have a plothole in a non-fiction book?) and what he argues is... interesting, to say the least, but I would still recommend this one to someone who wants an introduction to dialectics.
October 7, 2019
مهم جدا قراءته..
September 15, 2024
I am honestly impressed by this book. The first half explained Hegel's opus in the clearest fashion I have ever seen and situated his thought in the context of Germany's economic and political circumstances as well as in the scheme of German philosophy since Kant. I think I sort of understand what "spirit' means in Hegel, which was something that I was always confused about. Marcuse argues that Hegel's method lived beyond the bounds of his system and this allowed some to go beyond what Hegel built understood to be human emancipation.
Second half is fascinating as well and examines the "afterlife" of Hegelianism represented by different readings on his theories by Marx, positivists, Nazis, etc. And how different aspects of Hegel's thought informed the responses. I will probably have to reread it again at some point, but it was still quite good.
Second half is fascinating as well and examines the "afterlife" of Hegelianism represented by different readings on his theories by Marx, positivists, Nazis, etc. And how different aspects of Hegel's thought informed the responses. I will probably have to reread it again at some point, but it was still quite good.
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October 27, 2023Thought this was really good- I don’t know too much about Hegel but I feel like this was a really comprehensive view of his philosophy in ~250 pages. It’s necessarily dense and took me forever to read but I feel like it was worth it. Once he moves on from Marx I kinda skimmed the third part but it gets really interesting again when he talks about the incompatibility of Hegelian philosophy and Fascism. Would recommend 👍
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