What do you think?
Rate this book


636 pages, Paperback
First published June 1, 1999
Having recently read the three volumes of The History of the Russian Revolution by Trotsky, I was not sure I was going to get a lot out of this book. That said, I did not mind the repetition, considering how much I enjoy Alan Woods’ writing. To my surprise, the whole process was approached from a completely different angle, focusing specifically on the history of the Bolshevik Party itself — the internal debates, the organizational work being carried out, and the concrete methods employed. This was incredibly enlightening.
What might seem on the surface to be merely a history book about the Bolshevik Party really isn’t. This is a manual, a guide, a blueprint for building a revolutionary party — not for a hundred years ago, but for today. In the burning fire of the recent revolutionary wave in Sri Lanka, Kenya, Indonesia, Nepal, and elsewhere, we can all see what is lacking. These movements experienced their February revolutions, but there was no October — precisely because there was no party like the Bolsheviks capable of playing that role. That is the ultimate lesson of this book.
The biggest lesson I personally took from reading this book is the importance, when reading Lenin and other revolutionary leaders, of taking the time to make a proper distinction regarding who a text is addressed to. Is it addressed to the broader masses of workers, peasants, and soldiers? Is it addressed to the party? To another faction? Or even more narrowly, to the leadership of the party? This distinction is absolutely decisive if one wants to understand Lenin in context — and therefore to grasp revolutionary policy and tactics at a much deeper level.
This is especially clear during the period of revolutionary defeatism, when Lenin appears to be saying two seemingly contradictory things at the same time. In reality, he was addressing different layers for tactical reasons, deliberately bending the stick far enough in one direction in order to make a sharp point to the cadres:
"Even the defeat of Russia was a lesser evil than support for the Russian bourgeoisie and its predatory war. It was necessary to instil this idea into the minds of the cadres, to inoculate them against the disease of chauvinism. On the other hand, Lenin was too much of a realist not to understand that it is a fatal error to confuse the way revolutionaries see things with the confused and contradictory consciousness of the masses."
And yet, at the same time:
"We are prepared to fight against the German imperialists," he explained. "We are not pacifists. But we have no confidence in the bourgeois Provisional Government. We demand that the Menshevik and SR leaders break with the bourgeoisie and take power. Then we can wage a revolutionary war against German imperialism, calling on the German workers to follow our example."
Written beautifully, as always. I cannot recommend this book enough to anyone genuinely interested in revolutionary politics and organization.