The Elusive Quest for Growth by William Easterly is a depressing book. Not only is it a consistent reminder of the dire state of a large portion of humanity, but it's also a stunning indictment of the best and brightest of economics. See, economists have been trying for decades to make countries grow, and they can't seem to figure it out. Every approach has basically failed. The book's first half goes through these failed theories. Easterly's central thesis always looms in the background - people respond to incentives. Theoretically, it's a simple idea, but one that has been ignored for the past century.
The first victim of Easterly's scathing critique is the investment gap approach. The idea is that with enough foreign investment and aid, countries can reach self-sufficient growth stages. There's one immediate red flag with this, though. Mere investment can't lead to long-term growth because of diminishing marginal returns. Plus, countries with a lot of unskilled labor will likely not use this influx of money to buy high-tech capital. They will instead use it to buy lots of low-tech equipment for their large supply of unskilled workers. If there is no incentive to invest in the future, people will not invest.
He then discusses Solow's model, which is slightly better but still deeply flawed. Solow rightly points out the diminishing returns problem and suggests that technology can alleviate diminishing returns in the short run. Again though, this doesn't exactly escape the problem of diminishing marginal returns. These countries usually have a very small return to investment which doesn't indicate the fantastically high initial growth that economists predicted.
The next attempt was an amended version of Solow’s model by adding human capital to the mix. Did this work? Human capital is undoubtedly important for growth, but enrolling a bunch of kids in school won’t magically fix any country’s problems. If the kids have no incentive to learn, they won’t. In some instances, this can actually make growth worse because families rely on their children to produce output, and school takes them away from their productive capacities. If there isn’t a high demand for skills, then you will end up just having highly skilled people in low-skilled jobs.
Another mistaken idea is one with a distinctly Malthusian sound to it. It says that we need to limit population growth by introducing contraception to developing countries. This, of course, ignores incentives. People aren’t having many kids because they don’t have condoms; they are having kids because they need them. They need workers for the business or a retirement plan. More people also increase the chances of a genius being born. The best contraceptive is GDP growth if one looks at the developed world.
The next two targets are loans and debt forgiveness. Loans were usually adjustment loans, but the developing nations usually didn’t accept the changes that the loans were contingent on, but the loans were still given. It actually creates two bad incentives. One is that the governments get more money for how bad they are doing. Two, and this is similar to problems with aid and investment, is that it makes developing nations more beholden to foreign donors than their own citizens. Okay, why not forgive their debt to let them use the money for more productive purposes. Turns out that the countries will just keep borrowing in anticipation of future debt forgiveness. These aid and loan programs should be contingent on genuine, prior reforms. This way, they are only given to countries who have shown that they are willing to improve on their own accord.
The next part discusses some promising new ideas, but I found these to be much less interesting since they weren’t specific action plans. Instead, they were more general musings. Technology, for one, is incredibly important for growth because it can actually lead to increasing returns to scale. Technology also leaks, so countries should adopt foreign technology when applicable and open themselves to trade. This leads right into creative destruction, where Easterly says governments should institute strong property rights and create incentives to innovate and invest. Unfortunately, as chapter 11 tells us, a lot of growth ultimately comes down to luck. Pure, contingent happenings that nobody can predict.
Governments, of course, are important, and they can absolutely kill growth by having high inflation, protectionist trade policies, negative real interest rates, and high budget deficits. Corruption also hurts, but centralized, coordinated corruption isn’t as bad, though still not good by any means. Polarized government and population can also hurt because people are unwilling to compromise and work together. Governments should subsidize the future, invest in infrastructure, create incentives, and open themselves to trade.
The book itself is data-heavy, and while this serves as good evidence for what Easterly says, it doesn’t make for an engaging read. The second half is much less interesting than the first but still important. Anyone interested in economic growth or global development should give this book a read. It’s essential.