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الإمبراطورية الصينية الجديدة وما تعنيه للولايات المتحدة الأمريكية
لما كانت أوضاع الصين مجتمعًا وثقافةً ودولةً ، ووزنها المتزايد بقوة فى العلاقات الدولية تلقى الاهتمام من جانب مجتمعات النخبة والمثقفين والرأى العام على المستوى الدولى، فإن الأدبيات التى تتناول مثل هذه الموضوعات المتشعبة والمعقدة والمتشابكة صارت تلقى على المستوى الدولى والثقافى رعاية واهتمامًا وتشجيعًا. ولما كانت المكتبات العربية تعانى نقصًا فى مثل هذه الدراسات الصينية، فإن الاهتمام بترجمة ما يصدر منها على يد متخصصين يتميزون بالجدية والرصانة حاجة ملحة على المستوى الثقافى.
378 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2003
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80 people want to read
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Displaying 1 - 14 of 14 reviews
June 11, 2016
This is a deadly boring book.
The title leads one to think it's about recent economic changes in China, NOT!
The author spends most of the time talking about things from more than 50 years ago.
Some events like Nixon's trip to China are covered several times,
like the author forgot he already covered that.
And some things are just plain WRONG
p127
author says in 1958 Mao shelled Quemoy & matsu "for no reason other than to signal to china, moscow, and the rest of the world that he was embarked on a militant new domestic policy, the great leap forward."
Other authors have said, and I believe, that when Mao came to power he wanted the Soviets to build about 1800 factories that'd make military weapons from rifles to tanks to jets & warships.
The russians liked selling goods to china, but were reluctant to build factories over which they'd have no control.
So Mao would shell quemoy or do something else to irritate US politicians,
finally one would say something about how we had nukes & china didn't,
and Mao would send an envoy to moscow saying he needed more factories to thwart us.
Russia would agree & Mao would get a few more factories, & then play the game again.
Politicians in both russia & the US were too stupid to understand how they were being played.
The title leads one to think it's about recent economic changes in China, NOT!
The author spends most of the time talking about things from more than 50 years ago.
Some events like Nixon's trip to China are covered several times,
like the author forgot he already covered that.
And some things are just plain WRONG
p127
author says in 1958 Mao shelled Quemoy & matsu "for no reason other than to signal to china, moscow, and the rest of the world that he was embarked on a militant new domestic policy, the great leap forward."
Other authors have said, and I believe, that when Mao came to power he wanted the Soviets to build about 1800 factories that'd make military weapons from rifles to tanks to jets & warships.
The russians liked selling goods to china, but were reluctant to build factories over which they'd have no control.
So Mao would shell quemoy or do something else to irritate US politicians,
finally one would say something about how we had nukes & china didn't,
and Mao would send an envoy to moscow saying he needed more factories to thwart us.
Russia would agree & Mao would get a few more factories, & then play the game again.
Politicians in both russia & the US were too stupid to understand how they were being played.
May 23, 2017
أولاً: الترجمة سيئة تجعل قراءة الكتاب عملية مزعجة.
ثانياً: الكتاب نفسه لا يقدم الكثير سواء من المعلومات أو التحليل، فالقارئ المتابع للشأن الصيني خلال السنوات السابقة لن يضيف إليه الكتاب أي جديد.
الموضوع هام للمهتم بالشأن السياسي العالمي لكن الكتاب ليس المناسب لتغطية هذا الموضوع فأنا أفضل عن نفسي فراءة الموضوع من وجهة نظر صينية.
ثانياً: الكتاب نفسه لا يقدم الكثير سواء من المعلومات أو التحليل، فالقارئ المتابع للشأن الصيني خلال السنوات السابقة لن يضيف إليه الكتاب أي جديد.
الموضوع هام للمهتم بالشأن السياسي العالمي لكن الكتاب ليس المناسب لتغطية هذا الموضوع فأنا أفضل عن نفسي فراءة الموضوع من وجهة نظر صينية.
January 3, 2024
Is This An Overview?
Ancient Chinese architecture might not have survived the ravages of time, but the way of ruling, thinking and behaving has endured. Chinese traditions did not end with a fall of a government. The traditions were rebuilt by forthcoming governments. The methods were flexible, and could be adapted to by supporting or opposing them. The autocratic elements of the traditions were used by the Chinese Communist Party for social engineering purposes.
Rather than a religion, Chinese ethics philosophy of Confucianism was used to coordinate people’s behavior. A malleable system that enabled its various interpretations throughout Chinese history, that provided an understanding on how to treat others. Deference was needed for superiors. Chinese sense of superiority was evident by foreign governments throughout history, which created a variety of misinterpretations from each perspective. China was portrayed as virtuous, no matter their actions. That China’s interventions in other regions were for the benefit of the others, to civilize the barbarians.
China uses history as a weapon by disregarding unfavorable events, and changing events to favor Chinese views. During the 20th century, China turned away from Dynasty and monarchy, but the methods were similar. The government only accepted as true what they wanted to, and blamed others for that which could not be denied. Using philosophy that enabled people’s deference to society over their own interests. Inventing new methods to deal with problem, using prior methods differently, and applying foreign ideas in their own way.
How Does China’s Philosophy Effect Behavior?
Confucianism is an ethic, rather than a religion. Confucianism had mixed qualities, but what Confucianism did was provide an ethics that brought government and people together. The ethics coordinated behavior. Confucianism was malleable and could represent different ideas to different people and contexts. Confucian claims of virtue could be misused and favor the individual who does the action.
Heaven was favorable to people, but had imperatives. To have virtue, humans need to be filial, respectful, and obedient. Confucius and Mencius logical systems overlapped with religious views and law-and-order Legalism. Ordinary Chinese carefully paid deference to the Gods, emperor, and their immediate superiors.
Confucianism was made possible by government enforcement, through Legalism and institutions of governance. A legal framework that could use physical force. Emperor had a practical interest in statecraft, rather than the supernatural.
How Does China Think About Others?
China has an enduring us-and-them system, a distinction between Chinese and Barbarian. That China is the civilizing force and natural rulers of barbarians who are a lesser breed. That the barbarians should be grateful to be influenced by China. These views create a tendency to overlook what China learned from other people. Foreign agents that interacted with the Chinese court, commented on Chinese sense of superiority.
The emperor was the representative of Heaven and Earth. Giving justifications and virtue to any decisions made by the emperor. When China attacked neighboring states, or governments who sought independence, China maintained a claim of virtue for their actions. That their actions were justified and meant for the betterment of the people they were intervening in, to rid them of an oppressive regime. Attacking a neighbor was a favor to lesser people, as that enabled Heaven to reestablished a proper order. Chinese like to pretend that barbarians have accepted China’s reign of virtue rather than admit how regularly China had to use force against barbarians.
Given their superiority attitude, China has a history of making political gifts given to them, be seen as tribute. In this way, the supposed gifting party appears to have submitted to China, and China accepted them as a vassal. These views caused conflict. What is rarely referenced are the times that China had given gifts and tribute to others.
China has a large Han majority who do not have much territory. With minority nationalities who have the vast territory and resources.
How Is History Turned Into Politics?
For China, history is a political tool. Changing and interpreting what happened to fit political goals. Even archaeology is a political project. Myths about history are used as political weapons.
Chinese history does reference events in which China was not the superior force. Does not reference when China could not get its way. Does not reference when others did not accept Chinese ways with China not being able to do anything about the situation. This occurred when negotiating with semi-equal forces.
One China has become the ideology, but Mao thought that China was to be divided into 27 countries. China believes that any territory that has come into contact with China, has become part of China and is part of China’s history. While other states that lost territory do not dispute the loss of the territory, China does dispute their prior losses. Even the territories that were part of the conquerors of China are considered to be Chinese history and territory.
What Was The Succession Plan?
Emperors had a succession problem as they needed to designate a child, but they had many children. Conflict and power struggles threatened the stability of the polity. Gaining power through murder was common in ancient China and in the Communist Party. Legitimacy and succession are perpetual problems.
What Was China’s 20th Century Experience?
After the collapse of the monarchy, China has been trying to reconcile the methods of monarchy and fitting into the different political understandings. They have kept much the same, while the changes have not made them into an effective state that manages the different social expectations of the era. Unlike a democratic state whose political system is shaped and reshaped continuously by the citizens decisions. China’s imperial components remain even if the imperial structure was removed. China still relies on imperial repression and myths to hold together the diverse cultures.
During the early 20th century, when the Qing Dynasty was failing, many provinces declared independence. Their reasons for independence were diverse, but they could not apply different political systems than those already used. The revolutionaries had immediate success, but could not provide a constructive agenda afterwards.
Mao wanted China to be neutral to foreign governments. But the Chinese Communist Party saw central power as a tool for China’s advancement. Provincial autonomy and federalism were dismissed. The feudalism that emerged after Qing Dynasty, was party new and partly a continuation. New western tools such as the railroad, were used as methods of power to control the kingdom. Bolshevism offered China a way to be progressive and anti-Western, while also provide quick solutions to Western influence on China.
One party state meant that no alternative political parties were allowed, no elections, or free press. A system akin to an emperor, authoritarian, political tutor. CCP’s reach was greater than prior governance structures. CCP branches existed in every county. A surveillance network meant to foster benevolent paternalism and work. The party controlled communication and what everyone was able to do. Socialism was omnipresent, with class categories separating various peoples, and how the individual was meant to subordinate to the collective purpose. Truth was what the CCP wanted truth to be. There needed to be unfailing loyalty in the leader, who was infallible and needed to be constantly studied. Death was an accepted means of punishment to maintain the collective morality.
Mao recognized that very little information came to Mao. Mao chose what to hear which were only favorable information about the Great Leap. Information that could not be denied, Mao blamed the problems on scapegoats which were class enemies. Mao could not accept socialism as a flawed political system, therefore did not accept outcomes that indicated the flaws.
Ideology began to be reduced during Deng’s changes, but that did not allow for plurality of ideologies. There was no individual independence, nor was criticizing China an option. People were trusted with their money, but not their minds. What was allowed was what the Communist Party found acceptable. Publishers were shut down for politically incorrect viewpoints.
China is oppressive and afraid of its own people. Freedoms have been experimented with, giving some freedoms to people, but the government has generally opted for repression when disorder was a perceived threat. The legal system remained harsh and was attached to the wants of the political party rather than justice and proportioned appropriate punishment. The state depends on confessions, false confessions, to justify the system.
Marketization under Deng enabled private firms, and joint ventures between the foreign and local capital. The private business and joint ventures crowded out state factories. State factories began to produce less share of the market, and they were mainly losing money. Banks were closely attached to the government that lead to the subsidization of state factories, which made profit and loss meaningless. China’s socialism is enduring, transforming into market socialism rather than becoming capitalistic.
Caveats?
The focus of the book is on China during the 20th century. There is a lot of information on China’s history before that era, but that information is sporadic and is used to provide evidence for a claim. The reader would need to research more Chinese history for a better understanding of the events.
The struggle between a changing and changeless China is part of the myth structure that the author describes, disagreeing with, but applies as a theme in the book. The problem is that appearances of similarity, does not represent similarity in anything but appearance. There were ideas and methods that appear to be a theme, but what makes them similar is their association with China rather than the core claims being consistent. The ideas and methods were influential, but as the author recognizes, they have been misused and reinterpreted.
The author expresses Chinas flexibility and creativity, and criticism when considering China as perpetually stagnant, changeless, and isolated, as those views were formed by the end of the Qing Dynasty which had become rigid. But throughout the book the author considers various themes in China to have been reused, used differently, but still considered consistent even if much has changed. Alternatively, the author provides the impression that other states have more completely changed their political systems. Other states also have used their historic methods to legitimize their own political structures through support or disagreement with the prior methods. Just as Chinese governments had chosen how to use their historic methods to legitimize their rule.
Ancient Chinese architecture might not have survived the ravages of time, but the way of ruling, thinking and behaving has endured. Chinese traditions did not end with a fall of a government. The traditions were rebuilt by forthcoming governments. The methods were flexible, and could be adapted to by supporting or opposing them. The autocratic elements of the traditions were used by the Chinese Communist Party for social engineering purposes.
Rather than a religion, Chinese ethics philosophy of Confucianism was used to coordinate people’s behavior. A malleable system that enabled its various interpretations throughout Chinese history, that provided an understanding on how to treat others. Deference was needed for superiors. Chinese sense of superiority was evident by foreign governments throughout history, which created a variety of misinterpretations from each perspective. China was portrayed as virtuous, no matter their actions. That China’s interventions in other regions were for the benefit of the others, to civilize the barbarians.
China uses history as a weapon by disregarding unfavorable events, and changing events to favor Chinese views. During the 20th century, China turned away from Dynasty and monarchy, but the methods were similar. The government only accepted as true what they wanted to, and blamed others for that which could not be denied. Using philosophy that enabled people’s deference to society over their own interests. Inventing new methods to deal with problem, using prior methods differently, and applying foreign ideas in their own way.
How Does China’s Philosophy Effect Behavior?
Confucianism is an ethic, rather than a religion. Confucianism had mixed qualities, but what Confucianism did was provide an ethics that brought government and people together. The ethics coordinated behavior. Confucianism was malleable and could represent different ideas to different people and contexts. Confucian claims of virtue could be misused and favor the individual who does the action.
Heaven was favorable to people, but had imperatives. To have virtue, humans need to be filial, respectful, and obedient. Confucius and Mencius logical systems overlapped with religious views and law-and-order Legalism. Ordinary Chinese carefully paid deference to the Gods, emperor, and their immediate superiors.
Confucianism was made possible by government enforcement, through Legalism and institutions of governance. A legal framework that could use physical force. Emperor had a practical interest in statecraft, rather than the supernatural.
How Does China Think About Others?
China has an enduring us-and-them system, a distinction between Chinese and Barbarian. That China is the civilizing force and natural rulers of barbarians who are a lesser breed. That the barbarians should be grateful to be influenced by China. These views create a tendency to overlook what China learned from other people. Foreign agents that interacted with the Chinese court, commented on Chinese sense of superiority.
The emperor was the representative of Heaven and Earth. Giving justifications and virtue to any decisions made by the emperor. When China attacked neighboring states, or governments who sought independence, China maintained a claim of virtue for their actions. That their actions were justified and meant for the betterment of the people they were intervening in, to rid them of an oppressive regime. Attacking a neighbor was a favor to lesser people, as that enabled Heaven to reestablished a proper order. Chinese like to pretend that barbarians have accepted China’s reign of virtue rather than admit how regularly China had to use force against barbarians.
Given their superiority attitude, China has a history of making political gifts given to them, be seen as tribute. In this way, the supposed gifting party appears to have submitted to China, and China accepted them as a vassal. These views caused conflict. What is rarely referenced are the times that China had given gifts and tribute to others.
China has a large Han majority who do not have much territory. With minority nationalities who have the vast territory and resources.
How Is History Turned Into Politics?
For China, history is a political tool. Changing and interpreting what happened to fit political goals. Even archaeology is a political project. Myths about history are used as political weapons.
Chinese history does reference events in which China was not the superior force. Does not reference when China could not get its way. Does not reference when others did not accept Chinese ways with China not being able to do anything about the situation. This occurred when negotiating with semi-equal forces.
One China has become the ideology, but Mao thought that China was to be divided into 27 countries. China believes that any territory that has come into contact with China, has become part of China and is part of China’s history. While other states that lost territory do not dispute the loss of the territory, China does dispute their prior losses. Even the territories that were part of the conquerors of China are considered to be Chinese history and territory.
What Was The Succession Plan?
Emperors had a succession problem as they needed to designate a child, but they had many children. Conflict and power struggles threatened the stability of the polity. Gaining power through murder was common in ancient China and in the Communist Party. Legitimacy and succession are perpetual problems.
What Was China’s 20th Century Experience?
After the collapse of the monarchy, China has been trying to reconcile the methods of monarchy and fitting into the different political understandings. They have kept much the same, while the changes have not made them into an effective state that manages the different social expectations of the era. Unlike a democratic state whose political system is shaped and reshaped continuously by the citizens decisions. China’s imperial components remain even if the imperial structure was removed. China still relies on imperial repression and myths to hold together the diverse cultures.
During the early 20th century, when the Qing Dynasty was failing, many provinces declared independence. Their reasons for independence were diverse, but they could not apply different political systems than those already used. The revolutionaries had immediate success, but could not provide a constructive agenda afterwards.
Mao wanted China to be neutral to foreign governments. But the Chinese Communist Party saw central power as a tool for China’s advancement. Provincial autonomy and federalism were dismissed. The feudalism that emerged after Qing Dynasty, was party new and partly a continuation. New western tools such as the railroad, were used as methods of power to control the kingdom. Bolshevism offered China a way to be progressive and anti-Western, while also provide quick solutions to Western influence on China.
One party state meant that no alternative political parties were allowed, no elections, or free press. A system akin to an emperor, authoritarian, political tutor. CCP’s reach was greater than prior governance structures. CCP branches existed in every county. A surveillance network meant to foster benevolent paternalism and work. The party controlled communication and what everyone was able to do. Socialism was omnipresent, with class categories separating various peoples, and how the individual was meant to subordinate to the collective purpose. Truth was what the CCP wanted truth to be. There needed to be unfailing loyalty in the leader, who was infallible and needed to be constantly studied. Death was an accepted means of punishment to maintain the collective morality.
Mao recognized that very little information came to Mao. Mao chose what to hear which were only favorable information about the Great Leap. Information that could not be denied, Mao blamed the problems on scapegoats which were class enemies. Mao could not accept socialism as a flawed political system, therefore did not accept outcomes that indicated the flaws.
Ideology began to be reduced during Deng’s changes, but that did not allow for plurality of ideologies. There was no individual independence, nor was criticizing China an option. People were trusted with their money, but not their minds. What was allowed was what the Communist Party found acceptable. Publishers were shut down for politically incorrect viewpoints.
China is oppressive and afraid of its own people. Freedoms have been experimented with, giving some freedoms to people, but the government has generally opted for repression when disorder was a perceived threat. The legal system remained harsh and was attached to the wants of the political party rather than justice and proportioned appropriate punishment. The state depends on confessions, false confessions, to justify the system.
Marketization under Deng enabled private firms, and joint ventures between the foreign and local capital. The private business and joint ventures crowded out state factories. State factories began to produce less share of the market, and they were mainly losing money. Banks were closely attached to the government that lead to the subsidization of state factories, which made profit and loss meaningless. China’s socialism is enduring, transforming into market socialism rather than becoming capitalistic.
Caveats?
The focus of the book is on China during the 20th century. There is a lot of information on China’s history before that era, but that information is sporadic and is used to provide evidence for a claim. The reader would need to research more Chinese history for a better understanding of the events.
The struggle between a changing and changeless China is part of the myth structure that the author describes, disagreeing with, but applies as a theme in the book. The problem is that appearances of similarity, does not represent similarity in anything but appearance. There were ideas and methods that appear to be a theme, but what makes them similar is their association with China rather than the core claims being consistent. The ideas and methods were influential, but as the author recognizes, they have been misused and reinterpreted.
The author expresses Chinas flexibility and creativity, and criticism when considering China as perpetually stagnant, changeless, and isolated, as those views were formed by the end of the Qing Dynasty which had become rigid. But throughout the book the author considers various themes in China to have been reused, used differently, but still considered consistent even if much has changed. Alternatively, the author provides the impression that other states have more completely changed their political systems. Other states also have used their historic methods to legitimize their own political structures through support or disagreement with the prior methods. Just as Chinese governments had chosen how to use their historic methods to legitimize their rule.
April 8, 2020
Hakkasin seda raamatut lugema enne koroonaviiruse pandeemiat lihtsalt sellepärast, et näha, kuidas nähti Hiina rolli maailmas ca 15 aastat tagasi ehk ammu enne seda, kui Xi Jinping ennast Hiina põhiseadusesse kirjutas. Hiina kontekstis ei saaks sõna "ammu" siiski kasutada, sest sealne pikk plaan tähendab aastakümneid või isegi -sadu.
Ross Terrill nägi Hiinat tsentraliseeritud impeeriumina, mis tahab maailmapoliitikas esile tõusta, kuid autori toon oli selles osas kahtlev. Ehkki ta seda otseselt välja ei toonud, vaid kirjutas hunnikust erinevatest stsenaariumitest nii sisepoliitikas, välispoliitikas kui üleüldse impeerimi tuleviku osas.
Selle raamatu puhul juhtus see, mis vahel liiga tarkade autorite puhul võib juhtuda - liiga palju erinevaid asju tahetakse panna samade kaante vahele. Kõigepealt pikk ülevaade erinevatest dünastiatest, sekka kogemused enda Hiina käikudest või hiinlastega kokkupuudetest Austraalias ja USA-s, kohalike ja rahvusvaheliste väljaannete tsiteeringud, mõtlejate ja autorite arvamused, siis jälle ajalooline perspektiiv, tulevikuväljavaated ning isiklik hinnang. Ja see kõik on omavahel segi puistatud.
Ehkki peatükid olid hästi teemadeks struktureeritud, oli mul tõsiseid raskusi peatükkide sees olevate tekstide struktuuri mõistmisega. Kui huvi Hiina vastu on ja aega raamatu mõttega läbitöötamiseks samuti, siis on see kindlasti suurepärane lugemine. Aga eelduseks on siiski Mingi eelteadmiste olemasolu (pun intended), sest päris algajale sinoloogile see raamat pole.
Ross Terrill nägi Hiinat tsentraliseeritud impeeriumina, mis tahab maailmapoliitikas esile tõusta, kuid autori toon oli selles osas kahtlev. Ehkki ta seda otseselt välja ei toonud, vaid kirjutas hunnikust erinevatest stsenaariumitest nii sisepoliitikas, välispoliitikas kui üleüldse impeerimi tuleviku osas.
Selle raamatu puhul juhtus see, mis vahel liiga tarkade autorite puhul võib juhtuda - liiga palju erinevaid asju tahetakse panna samade kaante vahele. Kõigepealt pikk ülevaade erinevatest dünastiatest, sekka kogemused enda Hiina käikudest või hiinlastega kokkupuudetest Austraalias ja USA-s, kohalike ja rahvusvaheliste väljaannete tsiteeringud, mõtlejate ja autorite arvamused, siis jälle ajalooline perspektiiv, tulevikuväljavaated ning isiklik hinnang. Ja see kõik on omavahel segi puistatud.
Ehkki peatükid olid hästi teemadeks struktureeritud, oli mul tõsiseid raskusi peatükkide sees olevate tekstide struktuuri mõistmisega. Kui huvi Hiina vastu on ja aega raamatu mõttega läbitöötamiseks samuti, siis on see kindlasti suurepärane lugemine. Aga eelduseks on siiski Mingi eelteadmiste olemasolu (pun intended), sest päris algajale sinoloogile see raamat pole.
September 4, 2019
While this was published 15 years ago I found it pretty spot on in understanding the mindset of the Chinese government. The book provides some hints to the outcome of current Hong Kong/ China skirmishes and the US/ Chinese trade war. While a good portion of the Terrill's predictions about China's future after 2007 did not happen, his characterization of the Chinese government as a multi-plural empire with roots in multiple autocratic dynasties veiled as a nation-state is meaningful and well researched. The book ends on the eve of China's membership into the WTO, and foreshadows China entering an economic downturn caused by an inability to support itself under increased international scrutiny/regulation. Two things I think Terrill missed in his predictions about China's outlook include the substantial economic effects of the post-iphone tech surge in buffering a new middle class and an unexpected loyalty of the Chinese citizenship to its government. I liked the book.
September 24, 2020
Published in 2003, one might reasonably ask of its relevance today. Yet, time and again Terrill's analysis of the China of 2002 just as it is entering the WTO, addresses issues of China remain relevant today.
Terrill has no crystal ball and cannot forsee the economic growth of China, its success under the WTO or the financial catastrophe of 2008.
But one should not hold this against him when his comments on Xinjiang, Tibet, Taiwan, the South China Sea and Chinese politics remain as relevant now as then.
I was particularly struck by the idea that outside of North Korea, China has not had a single international ally over the 70 year history of the PRC.
Terrill has no crystal ball and cannot forsee the economic growth of China, its success under the WTO or the financial catastrophe of 2008.
But one should not hold this against him when his comments on Xinjiang, Tibet, Taiwan, the South China Sea and Chinese politics remain as relevant now as then.
I was particularly struck by the idea that outside of North Korea, China has not had a single international ally over the 70 year history of the PRC.
February 8, 2012
Good book. I love how Terrill kept comparing Modern China to Ancient China.
September 26, 2012
كتاب رائع أعطاني فكرة مبسطة عن تاريخ الصين, ثقافته و نشأته الحديثة
Want to read
January 3, 20242003
DS779.2 T47 2003 Memorial Library
DS779.2 T47 2003 Memorial Library
Read
May 20, 2011A fascinating read on the future of China in the international community. Terrill puts forward several interesting scenarios for China's territorial integrity and political evolution. He suggest ultimately that China will evolve into a federation focussed toward devolving power away from the center, stripping the Leninist-Marxist ideology of its power and moving forward with a new sense of individualism.
May 2, 2010
about chinese imperial policies within its current borders and neighboring countries, the policies of cultural transformation and sinification
September 5, 2010
Read this in June prior to my dad and I going to China in April 2009. We took at 15 day tour with a group and had just a great time.
July 28, 2011
"A little dated by now but a good perspective on how the "Red Dynasty" fits in with the whole Imperial history of China."
February 26, 2015
الكتاب رائع, أختصر برشاقة وضع الصين الحالي و علاقته بالإمبراطورية القديمة.
الكتاب في أوله كان مكررا بشكل واضح, "الصينيون مراوغون" فقط.
الترجمة سيئة للغاية, بعض الجمل كانت بلا معني من الأساس.
الكتاب في أوله كان مكررا بشكل واضح, "الصينيون مراوغون" فقط.
الترجمة سيئة للغاية, بعض الجمل كانت بلا معني من الأساس.
Displaying 1 - 14 of 14 reviews