Beast and Man: The Roots of Human Nature

by Mary Midgley

` Beast and Man is a brilliant and persuasive attempt to set us in our animal context, ... and to indicate a morality for a society without religious absolutes - a morality of which we see the rudiments in our brother species.' - The Observer

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction, Science, Psychology, Anthropology, Biology, Animals

424 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1978

About the author

Mary Beatrice Midgley (née Scrutton; 13 September 1919 – 10 October 2018[1]) was a British philosopher. She was a Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at Newcastle University and was known for her work on science, ethics and animal rights. She wrote her first book, Beast And Man (1978), when she was in her fifties. She has since written over 15 other books, including Animals and Why They Matter (1983), Wickedness (1984), The Ethical Primate (1994), Evolution as a Religion (1985), and Science as Salvation (1992). She has been awarded honorary doctorates by Durham and Newcastle universities. Her autobiography, The Owl of Minerva, was published in 2005.

Midgley strongly opposed reductionism and scientism, and any attempts to make science a substitute for the humanities—a role for which it is, she argued, wholly inadequate. She wrote extensively about what philosophers can learn from nature, particularly from animals. A number of her books and articles discussed philosophical ideas appearing in popular science, including those of Richard Dawkins. She also wrote in favour of a moral interpretation of the Gaia hypothesis. The Guardian described her as a fiercely combative philosopher and the UK's "foremost scourge of 'scientific pretension.'"

Reviews

[Joseph Yue · Rating 4 out of 5]

After having witnessed the madness of "You can be whoever you want" of the modern time, Mary Midgley, who is in no way religious, is also evidently fed up. She picks up a mere pen, and strikes a billion-Newton blow on the head of the so-called "blank paper theory". The core of this notorious theory is, as the existentialists have insisted, that we really have no innate human nature, just like blank sheets of paper, anything can be written on it. And, of course, things already written (by the culture and society) can be erased or changed at will. The analogy immediately fails when we realise that even blank sheets of paper possess the innate nature of, obviously, being blank and being paper. In other parts of the book, Dr. Midgley extends her philosophical brilliancy, as well as immense biological knowledge, to discussing a wider range of topics related to human nature, animals, genes, cultures and behaviours. On the negative side, she emphasises too much on the animal origin of human nature and seemingly diminishes the uniqueness of human being, a danger almost inevitable as the overreaction to its counterpart.

[J. · Rating 5 out of 5]

My God, what a brain! What a pen! Examines human behavior in continutiy with the rest of anumal behavior and presents a powerful counter argument to sociobiological and genetic theories of morality. In Midgley's own words, "In exposing these rhetorical attempts to turn science into a comprehensive ideology, I am not attacking science but defending it against dangerous misconstructions."

[Daniel Crews · Rating 5 out of 5]

The smartest book I've ever read by the lady I believe to be the smartest person in the world. Human nature and nurture integrated and applied to religion, philosophy, ethology, etc. Brilliant work.

[Luke McCarthy · Rating 5 out of 5]

As good a summation of my own general sense of the world, people, life as I’ve found. Just really beautiful. Human’s makes their own culture, but they do not make it from a nature of their own choosing.

[Istvan Zoltan · Rating 3 out of 5]

An excellent piece of philosophy. Midgley explains how 1. throughout the history of philosophy and Christianity people have created a myth of Beasts, 2. attributed all that is judged bad about human behavior to Beastly nature, and 3. claimed that animals are beasts, that is 4. humans are bad only insofar as they are animals. Midgley gives several examples of this kind of thinking, and relying on recent discoveries in sociology, ethology, biology and other disciplines she offers a more reasonable picture of the variety of animal natures and of human nature. In the course of doing so she also addresses some other radical views, especially those of Desmond Morris, who makes exaggerated claims about the aggression and lack of systematicity in human behavior, and those of existentialist philosopher and behaviourist psychologist who reject that there is any human nature at all.

[Alexei · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book is a bit dated because the nurture vs. nature dispute has moved on since this was written, albeit the nature camp is for the most part unyielding and unrepentant. Moreover, it was written right after E. O. Wilson’s Sociobiology appeared with all the attending scandal, and the scandal has now settled down somewhat. In a way, the book was more revolutionary than it seems forty years on, and some long passages impress me now as a bit tedious or insufficiently argued. Still, on the whole I liked it very much. Not only does Midgley argue that man is the product of the biological evolution on equal terms with other animals, she also asserts that the evolution was seamless with no special place for the humanity and that all animals deserve moral treatment. This is very close to what I myself think, will probably read more of her.

[Peter Blair · Rating 5 out of 5]

A really wonderful and helpful book. Some written out thoughts to follow

[Victoria McMillen · Rating 3 out of 5]

5 Word Review:

Am I smart or what

[J.D. Steens · Rating 3 out of 5]

Midgley wrote this book at the tail end (1978) of the “culture-is-everything” approach in the social sciences. This book follows Wilson’s Sociobiology (1975) who, too crudely perhaps, argued for the genetic basis for human behavior. Though Midgley was critical of Wilson in many respects, she agreed with him fully about human continuity with the animal world: Human behavior, as with all of life, has a fundamental genetic foundation.

For human freedom types, this raises a huge alarm flag as this means instinct, which boxes in genetic determinism, the antithesis of freedom. In addressing that issue, Midgley helpfully makes a distinction between closed and open instincts. The former consists of a tight unity among the motive for behavior, a relevant +/- object, and the behavior toward the object as it relates to the motive. In contrast, open instincts allow for degrees of freedom. Depending where in the evolutionary ladder a species falls, there are gaps between the motive force and the behavior toward the relevant object. Though the general motive tendencies remain, the specific behavior emphasized via-a-vis the relevant objects are filled in by learning and experience. (1)

The gap between motive force and behavior is greatest in humans. Here, Midgley says there's a tradeoff between instinctual structures and general intelligence, with the latter increasingly taking on the role of freedom to choose what type of behavior is required vis-a-vis the motive force and the relevant object.

Importantly, Midgley sees neither intelligence nor culture replacing (open) instinct. Rather, they supplement it. In effect, intelligence (in a means-end coordination sense) tells the motive force how to accomplish its job. This is the key takeaway from the book, though I don’t think her argument is as clearly stated as it could be. While she is clear that motivation is absolutely central to the biological view of human behavior, her argument gets lost in the detail of what she puts forward.

I think what she’s saying in a nutshell is this: Overall, we are moved to do what it takes to survive-adapt. Specific needs are fixed (generally, within the categories of nurture, security, sex). (2) These are invariant and are manifested as instinctive tendencies and dispositions via the emotions of desire (seeking) and fear-anger (defending). The objects and behavior related to those needs are variable and this is where general intelligence, culture and experience fill in the gaps. The flip side of the (open) instinctual program is fear against threat, harm, and anger against annoyances and being thwarted in getting what is needed to survive or, later, what is wanted. The specific threats, harms, annoyances and thwarting are variable as is resisting behavior relating to the same. This distinction between invariant nature and variable nurture is seen clearly in the relationship between the individual and its group: We are instinctually driven to be part of a group for that’s how we survive. But we are also products of our culture where “We pick up any belief that is current.”

While Midgley systematically picks apart the pre-1980s arguments against biology’s role in human behavior, she is not shy about the criticism of biology’s overreach. In this regard, she calls out the argument under kin selection (that we are altruistic toward our non-direct kin relatives so that we get some small percentage of our genes to survive). I believe she does not state her criticism clearly. Her counter is that, as the body is a vehicle for reproduction, the parents are programmed to do what it takes for their direct offspring to survive, and the group (usually, initially, a kin group) is just an extension of the same motive force. Per Darwin, with the group, the individual survives; without it, the individual dies. This is the basis of tribalism and this is the origin of reciprocal altruism: One has to give in order to get.

Midgley is also critical of scientific types who reject value and stick to facts, yet they struggle to finesse this distinction by smuggling in subtle terms for value or they conveniently forget that the world of facts is filled with subjective interpretation (what is a fact, how to classify facts, and what are the implications of fact). Again, Midgley is not particularly clear here, but what she seems to be saying is that we, who are (in an open instinctive way) about survival and living well, do this by the twin motive forces of need-desire (toward objects of need) and fear-anger (toward threat and harm). For Midgley, these are biological facts that we, as species members, ought to be doing in our behavior. “We can and must reason from facts to values,” she states.

Midgley clarifies that Lorenz’s concept of aggression that got many social scientists up in arms was about getting space and to drive away what is not wanted; it was not about some generalized aggression. Sometimes, this need to defend ones space results in physical harm and even death. But generally, the signalling to drive away is sufficient, especially in dominant-inferior relationships where the inferior signals submission by “making itself small” (i.e. not threatening). On the social science side, Midgley states that Locke’s blank slate reference is about knowledge only. It was not that Locke didn’t believe that humans had no instinctive tendencies. Seen this way, Locke is consistent with Midgley’s “open instinct” argument. While Hume’s famous quote that reason serves the passions, Midgley comments that Hume sought to be the Newton of psychology. For Hume, passions ruled in a mechanistic sense. I also think Midgley misreads Schopenhauer by stating that the Will fulfills the role of the non-god designer as the governor of human behavior, whereas I think Schopenhauer’s “Will-to-survive” is, clearly, about life’s motive force, i.e. the cosmic energy embodied by life’s survival impulse.

Midgley is critical of Spinoza and the existentialists. Importantly, just as each species has its own character, the same applies with innate individuality. It is something that the existentialists are particularly blind to. As she writes, “To describe people of different tastes from one's own as unreconstructed is the language of open tyranny; what could possibly justify it in people championing freedom? It seems often to be supported by an odd assumption that the masses do not know their own minds, and are helpless victims of cultural conditioning, whereas the reconstructors are fully autonomous. This is just one aspect of an intellectual snobbery common to all Existentialist morality, an exaltation of positions that in fact are open only to intellectuals as the only morally respectable ones, and an ignoring of the characteristic forms of self-deception which the intellectual life encourages.”

Such snobbery supports a dominance hierarchy where those with capacity stand over those of lesser capacity: “Obsessed with success, with examinations, tests, and record-breaking, with competitive sport, trade, and manufacture, we have drifted into behaving as if life were not living except at the top of the dominance hierarchy, as if that place alone marked excellence. This is expressed in extraordinary words like meritocracy which means the rule of those who pass exams, but claims to mean the rule of those with merit.

“The natural effect of this state of things is that groups lower down struggle sharply upward, kicking each other in the face as they do so. At the top, however, there are only a limited number of places. Most people, therefore, will still be at the middle or bottom, however hard they kick. And if this is allowed to destroy their self-respect - if they are given reason to think they are being despised for being what they are - they will be miserable, and will make those above them miserable as well.”

For Midgley, Spinoza’s “Egoism” sharply separates humans from the animal world. In his Ethics, Spinoza states: “‘It is plain that the law against the slaughtering of animals is founded rather on vain superstition and womanish pity than on sound reason. The rational quest of what is useful to us further us the necessity of associating ourselves with our fellow-men, but not with beasts, or things, whose nature is different from our own; we have the same rights in respect to them as they have in respect to us. Nay, as everyone’s right is defined by his virtue, or power, men have far greater rights over beasts than beasts have over men. Still I do not deny that beast feel; what I deny is, that we may not consult our own advantage and use them as we please, treating them in the way that best suits us; for their nature is not like ours, and their emotions are naturally different from human emotions.’”

In the attempt to bridge the gap between humans and animals, Midgley brings in Kant’s feeling for the sublime. We do not respect animals as ends because they are not rational as humans are. Rather, we respect them because they are part of the natural world. (3) In contrast to Spinoza’s egoism, these take us outside ourselves by creating awe and wonder. It’s not the objects themselves, but what they symbolize: “what is sublime is not the objects themselves, but what they stand for….They tell us we are not only small, but they are great.” From here, Midgley includes other animal life as part of this otherness: “We are receptive, imaginative beings, adapted to celebrate and rejoice in the existence, quite independent of ourselves, of other beings on this planet. Not only does our natural sympathy reach out beyond the barrier of species but we rejoice in the mere existence of plants and lifeless bodies - not regarding them just as furniture provided to stimulate our pampered imagination.”

This attempt by Midgley to bridge the animal-human connection falls flat. Given human variability, which she notes but does not cover in depth, a good part of humanity could care less about extending their good will to non-tribal member humans, let alone to the non-species members. They are driven by the here-now immediacy of Schopenhauer’s Will and not by awe and wonder of the natural world, including especially animals when they conflict with our needs for food and habitat. Other life is collateral damage. It is not that we wish for their destruction. It is, rather, that we need their subservience to our needs.

Given human variability, some of humanity can and do extend their natural respect to animal life. They identify with the essential continuity with all of life - their need to be free to seek and defend, to survive and not to die. They respect animal life out of a feeling of identification with life itself. Animal pleasure is their pleasure. Animal pain is their pain. Those who advocate for animal freedom are under no illusions about humans being persuaded to respect animal life. There’s a war of sorts between those who identify with animal life, and those who are Spinoza’s children: Animals are beasts that are meant to service humankind.


(1) Within this general framework, Midgley writes that there are highly directive, specific instincts, and general groupings of instinct that operate hierarchically toward one unitary end - the survival and well-being of the organism.

(2) In arguing that “we need to understand our motives better,” Midgley states that the main strands of motivation are attention, fear, aggression, dominance, sex, and laziness. These general motives “are groupings of particular impulses.” Later, she writes that “Human needs are multiple….we have to follow that deep need for unity which is luckily to be found at the center of them.” Or this: “our nature, in spite of its conflicts, is not radically and hopelessly and finally plural, but essentially one.”

(3) The sublime is that which “impresses us….by their vastness and total disregard of our needs - in a word, by their absolute Otherness.”

[Sharad Pandian · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is one of my favorite books, because it brings a refreshingly common-sense view to the study of human beings, offering am overall picture of "human nature" that manages to not be a procrustean mess. By "nature", Midgley refers to a set of instincts (some open, some closed) organized together in complex ways, which we share with animals. I quote parts of it below, but this isn't in any way a summary as much a taste. This is a dense book, but you learn something on every page.

Somewhere in the book, Midgley says "Psychology did not and does not need a Newton. It needed, and still needs, a Darwin—a careful, patient, thorough observer, who would distinguish the various forms of motivation, relate and compare them, and eventually work out concepts suitable for classifying and explaining them, rather than imposing in slapdash fashion an unsuitable model from an alien science." In many ways, her book is exactly such a Darwin-esque study, carefully reviewing key texts from fields like sociobiology, ethology, and behaviourism to help work out what makes sense and what does not, and what they entail about human beings. For her human motivation is not reducible to a single impulse, but is the mosaic we're used to in everyday life.

Her study is motivated by the view that what philosophy does best is recognize the presence and value of various domains of knowledge and discourse and then work to help sort out the relationships between them. For example, she argues that ethology has much to teach us about human nature, but only if pursued carefully: "If we are to compare the basic elements of human social life with those of any other species, we need to use analogies, because many of the functions these elements serve simply are not served in any other primate species. Primates do not have big cooperative enterprises, nor therefore the loyalty, fidelity, and developed skills that go with them. Nor do they have fixed homes and families. But the hunting carnivores do. And neither apes nor wolves have anything like the human length of life, nor therefore the same chance of accumulating wisdom and of deepening relationships. But elephants do. And no mammal really shares the strong visual interest that is so important both to our social life and to our art, nor perhaps needs to work as hard as we do to rear our young. But birds do. This is why it is vacuous to talk of “the difference between man and animal” without saying which animal."

Her method is not one of analytically examining small parts but rather to examine things against their background. This logic applies to her study of humans too, and she thinks the current wide-spread tendency to fetishize freedom in human beings gives an incredibly warped picture: "Western thought has long occupied itself with prising individuals loose from their surroundings in this way, with making them autonomous. Initially the process is enormously liberating. But, carried through systematically, it comes to a point where it means severing all personal bonds. At this point the program, like all simple moral programs pursued in isolation, becomes crazy, because it takes us into a temperature that will not support human life...Aspiring to be free from any culture is in one way like trying to be skinless. Our skin does indeed come between us and the world—but it is what makes it possible for us to touch it."

Finally, for all the insistence on taking man's context seriously, this book is also a call to recognize that the presence of different Others is vital to understanding how and why we behave the way we do, and to deny this is to mutilate our understanding of ourselves and what we love:

"Man is not adapted to live in a mirror-lined box, generating his own electric light and sending for selected images from outside when he happens to need them. Darkness and a bad smell are all that can come of that. We need the vast world, and it must be a world that does not need us; a world constantly capable of surprising us, a world we did not program, since only such a world is the proper object of wonder. Any kind of Humanism which deprives us of this, which insists on treating the universe as a mere projection screen for showing off human capacities, cripples and curtails humanity...In truth, as I have suggested, wonder, the sense of otherness, is one of the sources of religion (not the other way around), but it is also the source of curiosity and every vigorous use of our faculties, and an essential condition of sanity...As I understand Humanism, this is its message. Humanism cannot only mean destroying God; its chief job is to understand and save man. But man can neither be understood nor saved alone."

[Helen · Rating 4 out of 5]

Clear tone, established frame of thoughts, great referencing to prior notions and simple transition of science to conceivable circle of ideas are unique characteristics of this book.
Initially, seeking to find an answer for another philosophical/moral dilemma, I came across this book and though I couldn't find what I was looking for, I enjoyed Midgley's challenging of human's nature.

[Zach · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book is the best kind of philosophy, or any interdisciplinary work. Some of the particular arguments Midgley makes against the reductionism of Freudians or sociobiologists (Wilson, Dawkins) are a bit dated, and I think the strict separation between emotions and intelligence has been eroded by people like Damasio and Kahneman. Still, I think the central problem Midgley deals with is still with us, namely whether or not we have a nature and what the point of studying that nature could tell us. It has been 10 years since I've spent much time in a university setting, but I suspect that that the 'blank paper' argument is at an all-time high, since the suggestion that we have a nature implies that some groups of people are naturally more X than others, and that we don't have complete freedom to choose who we want to be. But without discussion of drives, motives, or instincts, it is hard to understand what the humanities could tell us about how we should live our lives. Universities shouldn't just aim at the abstract goal of improving critical thinking but should help people understand what a life well-lived looks like.

There are many ways to study the good life. Movies, novels, theater, etc. help us see how other people live their lives, what kinds of problems they run into, and how they try to solve them. We can see ourselves, our friends, and loved ones in the people we read about or watch. Beast and Man suggests that studying animals can do the same thing, and we shouldn't be surprised at this, since we're animals too. We sometimes think animals don't have emotions as sophisticated as we do, or that they are simply reactive to stimuli, but neither is true. The book is strongest when it cites ethologists. One example (which was particularly relevant to me as I was wondering why my dog barks at everything):

Aggression is by no means a tendency to destroy. It is primarily a driving away, a demand for space, commonly on behalf of those belonging to one as well as of oneself. And this is something essential for most advanced creatures and deeply connected with the higher development of feelings--with social responsiveness and also with affection, loyalty, persistence, and enthusiasm.

So much human tribalism can be understood as an evolutionary extension of the barking dog.

Another example is when the instincts of birds can be hacked. When ethologists give large fake eggs to herring gulls, they sit on them and ignore their own eggs.

This is sad, we think, and bizarre, but, naturally, nothing to do with homo sapiens. But isn't it? Might not a species that cannot stop stuffing itself with chocolates, drinking spirits, racing fast cars, gambling, wasting resources, competing, fighting, and watching Miss World on television have something to learn from that unlucky gull? Chocolates are in fact an interesting example. A taste for sweetness has some selective values for fruit eaters, because it leads a creature to prefer ripe but not rotten fruit. And of course, in the wild, other sweet things are rare, so no firm safety-stop on sweetness is necessary. This is why, given a supply of sugar, human teeth and human figures are in such danger.

Studying human and animal nature is useful because the things that seem obvious to us are actually evolutionary adaptations. They're so natural that we think we can simply pick and choose whatever we want. But it's actually nonsense to think we can choose a life that doesn't work within the bounds of caring for young, sexual partnership, aggression etc. This is a mistake that philosophers from Plato to Sartre have made and is possibly not as common in non-philosophers. But aliens from another planet could not understand what seems 'rational' to us if they didn't have a similar emotional schema, and it makes no sense to talk about Artificial Intelligence if that intelligence isn't guided by emotions or drives (and thus required to synthesize and balance them in some way).

I was surprised that Midgley doesn't provide some kind of list of instincts, but perhaps this is not possible or she felt the study of human ethology is too nascent. Still, when arguing against reductionism, I'd expect some kind of long list--look at all the things that motivate us! In any case, I'm interested to read more and think more about animals, including the human animal.

[Shyam Sundar Sridhar · Rating 5 out of 5]

One of the best books I've ever read on human nature. It is so good that I feel like downgrading all the other books I've read in my life. It is a highly difficult read, but also very enlightening. One needs to understand Western Philosophy at an intermediate level to get a sense of what she talks about in most places. Her critique of EO Wilsons's Sociobiology is highly interesting, as is her critique of Egoism and Behaviorism. Must be made a compulsory reading for all students of the Humanities, just to drum out all the nonsense in their heads.

[Domhnall · Rating 5 out of 5]

Mary Midgely was one of at least four women who studied philosophy at Oxford in the years of World War 2 and reacted against the prevailing Moral Philosophy which in England was centred on Logical Positivism and in France on Existentialism, in both cases generating the Romantic image of a heroic man standing alone before the infinite abyss and forced to choose whatever arbitrary system of values most appeals. A system in which any value is as good as any other did not impress these women and they each produced their own scathing critiques of their male colleagues’ work.
https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...

What is outstanding in Mary Midgely’s work is that she went on to develop an alternative moral philosophy which she set out in this extraordinary book, published in 1979. Over the intervening years she had raised a family and explored topics outside the specialism of academic philosophy, but in particular she became fascinated by empirical research into animal behaviour in field studies rather than laboratories, by such names as Konrad Lorenz and Jane Goodall. They not only transformed our understanding of animal psychology but, at the same time, demonstrated the extent to which humans share the same qualities, because humans are not merely like animals, we are animals. She examines the widespread divorce in moral philosophy between nature and nurture, feeling and reasoning, body and soul, facts and values and shows this to be unsustainable. We need to understand the psychology of animals and humans, and we need to understand the natural motivational drives in humans as in any other species without which language, reasoning or culture would have no meaning or significance.

In contradiction to the conventional wisdom that there can be no empirical or factual basis for morality, such that no moral principle can claim objective superiority to any other, Midgely argues here that there are valid, empirical criteria to distinguish the moral from the immoral, the ethical from the unethical, the good life from the bad, and we can establish them by investigating what will best meet our needs as individuals with a specific, human nature and as members of an evolved species. This in turn reveals a range of requirements for any moral philosophy. We need to get rid of nonsensical beliefs about animals and nature, we need to get rid of mistaken ideas about what it means to have a nature, or what it means to have an instinct or a genetic disposition. Most of all, she argues, we need to get rid of over simplified models and learn to appreciate and take proper account of complexity.

Quotes:

The only picture that makes evolutionary sense is the Aristotelian one where matter fits form – not the Platonic one where matter is bare negation, surd, irrational, resistant, indeed the root of all evil. The structure of feeling demands a corresponding structure of thought to complete it… When human beings reason practically about what would be best to do, they are wondering what would be best “for such a creature as man.” The range of possible aims is given within the species… For once the nature of a species (or any other system) is given, there are limits to the ways in which you can hope to make sense of it… Computers are not rational. They do not know what matters; they are only consistent. The people programming them must be able to see the priorities among human needs. .. Human needs are actually very complex. So any system of thought that is to organize them must admit their complexity. … as Lorenz says… “Man as a purely rational being, divested of his animal heritage of instincts, would certainly not be an angel – quite the opposite.” [pp270, 271]

There are those who think we cannot compare even our emotional nature with that of other species… The main purpose of this book is to deal with the initial problem of whether and how we can compare, not with the details of comparison… The book will have done its job if it convinces readers that there are such particular needs, for our species as for every other, and that they form a system that can guide us. People disagreeing about what they are can start a separate argument later. [p309, 310]

[Christina · Rating 4 out of 5]

“Awful though other people may be, most of the activities that we really care about must involve them. Solitude is necessary for many parts of our life, but it cannot be the climate of the whole.”

Mary Midgley is, I think, an overlooked/under-read philosopher. She was a close friend & contemporary of Iris Murdoch, which, since I’m a huge admirer & reader of Murdoch, is how I first heard of her. Like Murdoch, she philosophizes in (mostly) plain language, is incredibly engaging, often amusing.

Here she strongly opposes Blank Paper/Slate theory, Sartrean-style Existentialism, narrow ethical & scientific concepts & pitting Reason against Passion. Granting that humans have a nature, she examines how we can try to understand it. We need to admit that ours is an animal nature, but also need to be careful in examining how we compare ourselves with non-human animals. All animals deserve thoughtful moral treatment. Ethics needs to be informed by biology, but sciences needs to build bridges with other disciplines. She addresses a whole range of things in a very readable way.

In Plato’s moralist notion of The Beast within, which represents our more unpleasant desires, he wrote, “The Wild Beast in us…in phantasy will not shrink from intercourse with a mother or anyone else, man, god or brute, or from forbidden food or any deed of blood.” Midgley’s response is, “Why not say, ‘I have these thoughts in my off moments?’ Why not at least the Other Man within?”

[Toby Newton · Rating 5 out of 5]

What a brilliant mind. Midgley slowly, carefully, humorously, wryly dismantles the thoughtlessness of man that puts man on a pedestal. Gently, we're reminded of our creatureliness, and of the legacies that that entails (microbial - arthropodic - amphibian - mammalian - primate - hominid). Gather enough respect for Life in your subsequent reflections, which is Midgley's wont, and you're left with something simultaneously humbling and ennobling.

"Man is not adapted to live in a mirror-lined box, generating his own electric light and sending for selected images from outside when he happens to need them. Darkness and a bad smell are all that can come of that. We need the vast world, and it must be a world that does not need us; a world, constantly capable of surprising us, a world we did not program, since only such a world is the proper object of wonder."

With the storm clouds gathering, one senses the time allotted for this lesson to sink in, let alone for us to do something with it, is dwindling.

[Mat Davies]

I read the section about language an animals. It was very interesting and there are some very good research that is highlighted about apes and language. There are some thought-provoking critiques of Marx, Decartes, Kant and to a lesser degree Chomsky. All of the aforementioned arguably downplay or diminish the similarities between humans and animals according to the author.

[B · Rating 3 out of 5]

Not bad, but I think the impact of this book was muted, given that most of what the author argued is something I already (tacitly) accept as true. Also, the formatting in my Kindle version was slightly off in some places, making it annoying to read.

[Hannah Allen · Rating 3 out of 5]

Skimmed some of it- but it was good. I wouldn’t have liked it as much if I wasn’t actively talking about it with people rn at Veritas BUT the last couple of chapters were pretty fire- maybe it’s cause I read them during Institute week but either way I liked it more

[Dominic Hashem · Rating 5 out of 5]

The first book i found that did a sufficient account of human nature that does not include reductivism or traditional pitfalls aka “the myth of the beast” (skipped the middle part about socio-biology cause not super relevant)

[Niamh Chaparro · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent book

[average Nietzsche enjoyer · Rating 5 out of 5]

No longer an average Nietzsche enjoyer

[Mateo Placebo · Rating 3 out of 5]

kinda disagree with a lot but she seems cool

[Georgie · Rating 5 out of 5]

great but lots of chimpanzee science which i was not expecting lol

[Gavin · Rating 4 out of 5]

I have a bad habit when reading philosophy; I sometimes get deeply impressed by a book, so that it changes my view, but then forget that I ever thought otherwise. Midgley is so good I am prevented from this: I know I couldn't have come up with that.

This is her engaging with evolutionary biology and ethology, as they speak to the old ancient questions. Enormous thoughts, all expressed with perfect wryness and tact. I get the same feeling of mental grinding from Midgley as I do from Wittgenstein or Anscombe - too dense with thought to skim - but Midgley is actually readable.

Full review, anatomising the arguments, forthcoming.

[Suellen Rubira · Rating 4 out of 5]

O mais interessante desse livro é como Midgley vai repensar vários conceitos já muito usados e muitas vezes sem a devida contextualização: instinto, motivação, adaptação, competitividade, evolução etc. Rejeitando muitas das ideias de Edward O. Wilson (principalmente no que tange à obra Sociobiology) e abraçando as ideias de Konrad Lorenz (principalmente o maravilhoso A agressão), Midgley vai mostrando como nosso comportamento pode - e deve - ser pensado a partir de outros seres vivos, no nosso caso os mamíferos e como somos primitivos em relação a outros animais em vários aspectos. Comparar homem e (outro) animal deve conter a pergunta: qual deles? Não há uma diferenciação direta entre a espécie humana e todos os outros animais, como se eles pudessem ser colocados em um sacola com a etiqueta "animais" - e isso é uma coisa que o Derrida já falava em O animal que logo sou e outros ensaios nos quais ele defendeu a especificidade de cada animal. Um gato é diferente de um cão, de um lagarto, de um tubarão. Portanto, não há como estabelecer certas diferenciações dessa forma.
Além disso, ela coloca a cultura como parte fundamental do ser humano e não uma limitação, uma prisão. Ataca veementemente o existencialismo e as noções de egoísmo propostas por muitos estudiosos.

[Kåre · Rating 3 out of 5]

Irish Murdoch anbefalede den som en af de bedste filosofibøger.

Den er fra 1975 og er måske ikke så relevant, som den har været. Den argumenterer for, at man kan sammenligne dyr og mennesker - mennesker er et dyr. Der er store tæsk til især en Willson. Det virker slet ikke relevant i dag. Selvom mange af kritikpunkterne og diskussionerne er næsten meget interessante.
Meget handler om forvirring omkring niveauer. Stor kritik af, at man tror, at survival af arten er det samme som survival af individet.
Ofte argumenteres der for, at modsætninger er falske. F.eks er menneske - dyr ingen modsætning.
Midley er vel konservativ i den betydning, at hun tager udgangspunkt i den foreliggende natur, som kan udvikles. Ikke noget med revolution og den slags her. Især i kapitlet om kultur bliver dette lidt for meget. Men selvfølgelig også i orden at påpege, at verden ikke er helt så foranderlig, som man kan bilde sig ind.

[Chris]

A brilliant attempt to define what it means to be human given all that we now know about the "higher" animals, social insects, and other species. This is Midgley at her most brilliant, but also her most pedantic and obsessed. She spends too much of the book riding her usual hobby horses, making it an especially difficult read in patches if you've already read her _Evolution As a Religion_. Still, highly relevant and highly recommended.

[Liam Bratley · Rating 5 out of 5]

what a wonderfully witty writer, and although although the writing can be passionately prickly at times Beast and Man strikes a nice balance between scientific research and accessibility. but its not just the philosophy that makes this book excellent; its constant allusory 'dictionary of life' moments, combined with a swathe of good humour make this a must for any beast or man with even the slightest affiliation to philosophy.

[Annerieke · Rating 5 out of 5]

Five stars because she writes so well, without losing her philosophical edge. There are some parts where Midgley seemed to focused on her own solution to really appreciate the complexity of the problem she is discussing (esp. the parts on language). But overall brilliant. I will buy the book for the chapter on culture alone. And finally a intelligent discussion of some of the hard questions concerning evolution, without an agenda.