Clausewitz, a Prussian General who fought in the Napoleonic Wars, is considered the founder of modern military strategy. This book is based on Vom Kriege, published in 1832 and translated into English in 1908. An important work of influence on American military strategists for more than a century, the present leadership consider it a primary text for our current wars.
Carl Philipp Gottlieb von Clausewitz was a Prussian soldier, military historian and military theorist. He is most famous for his military treatise Vom Kriege, translated into English as On War.
Clausewitz has served in the Rhine campaign (1793–1794), when the Prussian army invaded France during the French revolution and in the Napoleonic Wars from 1806 to 1815.
Clausewitz helped negotiate the Convention of Tauroggen where Russia, Prussia and the United Kingdom formed an coalition that later defeated Napoleon Bonaparte.
This doctrine of war exerted great influence in the decades after its writing. Clausewitz noted the link between political policy and war. For him, War was politics by other means and an extension of policy. He also noted a development that had transformed warfare in his time: emotional and physical investment by a nation's people increased the likelihood of victory. That insight continues to be relevant and explains the ability of poorly armed insurgents to withstand forces with superior weaponry and technology. The advent of nuclear weapons and other technology advances has tempered the applicability of Clausewitz's theories, but his work still remains important for understanding the brutal nature of war and the rationale for military/political decision-making in the past and present.
When readership finally gets to On War proper on page 100 the incomparable Anatol Rapoport already given pages II-80 the Editor’s Introduction. Rapoport’s work Prisoner’s Dilemma stood on its own. Then some colonel F.N. Maude a West Point graduate gives his take On War. In Notes section, note 3. R.R. Palmer writes, ‘Desertion was the nightmare of all nineteenth century commanders, especially in disorganized Germany, where men of the same language could be found on both sides in every war. In 1744 Frederick the Great had to stop his advance to Bohemia because his army began to melt away.’ (In E.E. Earle [ed.], Makers of Modern Strategy, Chapter 3.) The bright conspicuous uniforms of the period are partly explained by the desertion problem. It was more important to prevent the men from leaving the field of battle (by making them highly visible) than to make them less conspicuous targets. Palmer (op cit.) cites Frederick the Great: ‘…therefore (since honour has no effect on them), they must fear their officers more than any danger.’ And again: ‘If a soldier during an action looks about as if to flee, or so much as sets foot outside the line, the non-commissioned officer standing behind him will run him through with his bayonet…’ The national people’s army of the French Revolutionary War encountered by the Austrians; Prussians; Piedmontese-Savoy; Spaniards; Dutch and; Russians, opposed to their professional armies of more limited numbers initially told in the victories set the natural boundaries of France to the Rhine, the Alps and, the Pyrenees, as any nationalistic Frenchman will say.
“War therefore is an act of violence intended to compel… the compulsory submission of the enemy is the ultimate object … philanthropists may easily imagine there is a skillful method of disarming and overcoming an enemy without great bloodshed and [that] this is the proper tendency of the Art of War … it is an error which must be extirpated; for in such dangerous things as War, the errors which proceed from a spirit of benevolence are the worst.” - Book 1: On the Nature of War, Ch.1