Three Victories and a Defeat: The Rise and Fall of the First British Empire, 1714-1783

by Brendan Simms

In the eighteenth century, Britain became a world superpower through a series of sensational military strikes. Traditionally, the Royal Navy has been seen as Britain's key weapon, but in Three Victories and a Defeat Brendan Simms argues that Britain's true strength lay with the German aristocrats who ruled it at the time.

Genres: History, European History, Military Fiction, Military History, Nonfiction, British Literature, Germany

800 pages, Hardcover

First published November 1, 2007

About the author

Brendan Peter Simms is Professor of the History of International Relations in the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Cambridge. Simms studied at Trinity College Dublin, where he was elected a scholar in history in 1986, before completing his doctoral dissertation, Anglo-Prussian relations, 1804-1806: The Napoleonic Threat, at Cambridge under the supervision of Professor Tim Blanning in 1993. A Fellow of Peterhouse, he lectures and leads seminars on international history since 1945

Reviews

[Jerome Otte · Rating 4 out of 5]

An excellent, well-written diplomatic and military history of the British empire from 1714-1783. The book does assume a certain level of background knowledge, but it is more than worth the effort. Simms traces the development of British colonial policy and the whole concept of empire. Simms sheds light on a lot of important topics, such as the attitude of the British to standing armies and the poor state of colonial militia forces. Simms has a good grasp of European politics and its effect on British and colonial attitudes toward empire.

Naturally, the book is centered around the wars of the Spanish and Austrian succession, the Seven Years’ War and the American Revolutionary War. Much of it deals with the diplomacy involved on Britain’s part. In the case of the Revolutionary War, Britain had few diplomatic successes to its credit since its overwhelming victory in the Seven Years’ War made it difficult to find allies that weren’t nursing grievances or coveting lost territory. Her victories made it all but impossible for Britain to make any sort of compromise, leaving it with a massive empire to defend. “The absolute security of Great Britain,” Simms writes, “could only be bought at the price of the absolute insecurity of her rivals.”

One of the more questionable parts of the book deal with Simms’ claim that Europe was the focus of British foreign policy during this time period (a claim annoyingly repeated over and over again), which is not supported well, and in any case, Simms addresses a good number of issues that disprove this claim anyway. Still, Simms injects all kinds of theories into the narrative, some of them well-argued, others not so much. He implies that Britain was following a cohesive grand strategy throughout this entire period, although the chaotic alliance shifts on the continent do not seem to prove this claim. And the book has too many fragmented sentences.

In all, a clearly written picture of Britain’s strategic situation during these years, which despite many pitfalls, made Britain a global superpower.

[William · Rating 4 out of 5]

I've been away for a while...

A cynical practitioner once said that making foreign policy is like making sausage--you don't want to see what that's like! Fortunately, Brendan Simms is not the least bit squeamish as he pulls back the curtain on how foreign policy and grand strategy were crafted in 18th century Britain. "Three Victories and a Defeat" is aptly subtitled "The Rise and Fall of the First British Empire," for it is through empire that Britain becomes an outsized player in European power politics. This rise was a necessity, as Britain had to ensure no further threat of invasion from the Continent.

Simms "begins before the beginning", looking at English grand strategy during the waning years of the Stuart dynasty. Navalism, trade and colonies were the foundations of this outlook, which enriched England, but did not necessarily make it safer from invasion. An independent Scotland was always up for grabs via alliance with any continental power that wanted to check England's strength. Repeated naval clashes with the Netherlands meant having an unfriendly nation well -placed to support an invasion of the home country.

The Glorious Revolution puts an end to the Stuart Outlook, as William of Orange crosses the Channel with his army to take his (invited) -lace upon the throne. The Dutch and English interests converge, as necessity forces an alliance to keep the French out of the Low Countries, the natural springboard for invasion of England.

The outlook broadens and deepens with sophistication upon the rise of the Hanoverian Dynasty and the crowning of George I early in the 18th century. While the notion o f having a German prince sit on the British throne did not go down well with the populace, the British interest in European affairs deepens. Now holding a position in Germany mattered, as this protected the fortress line in the Low Countries from being outflanked by France. The added benefit was forcing France to devote resources to supporting land wars in Europe while depriving its navy of resources needed to surpass Britain's Royal Navy. Savvy British shuffling of continental allies also ensured that neither France nor Spain could ever array overwhelming strength to threaten Britain, thus keeping the home country safe.

George I, and later George II, ruled as "dual-crowned" monarchs. As princes of Hanover and electors of the Holy Roman Empire, they maintained a continental outlook. They could influence, but not dictate, grand strategy. But the continental outlook harmonized very nicely with the Whig faction in parliament, which put into action those influences and interests that made Great Britain an outsized actor in European affairs. Repeated wars throughout the 18th century required changing alliances to suit changing circumstances, sometimes with France, Austria or Prussia. But this played well to Britain's strengths,allowing it to use colonial gains as bargaining chips to enhance its European positions in post-war negotiations. Hanover provided the base of any British military deployment in Europe, while the navy's strength and freedom to operate remained unconstrained by budgetary limitations, thus protecting European and colonial trade. It was a clever system.

The system falls apart with the coronation of George III, whose narrow views on British power were more in harmony with the Tory opposition outlook of navalism, colonies and non-alliance. George III was born and raised in England, didn't travel much and thus had a narrow, small-minded view of British interests being exclusively British. Enemies and allies were snubbed. Diplomacy atrophied. Recent gains in overseas territory, especially in America, increased the expense of military protection at a time of tight budgets. But lacking allies, Britain lost any flexibility through diplomacy to protect its dominions.

The American Revolution became the one critical card, that brought down George III's and the Tory strategy. By avoiding defeat long enough, the Americans secure direct aid an alliance from France, now free to strengthen its fleet without any continental diversion. Spain signs on. So does the Netherlands. Other European countries follow Russia's lead on armed neutrality, basically threatening Britain with war if the Royal Navy interdicts neutral merchantmen which may or may not be carrying cargoes to any of Britain's enemies. After fighting alone for three years, suffering the loss of all colonies in America as well as barely avoiding catastrophic defeat elsewhere, Britain sues for peace.

Simms recitation and analysis are both lengthy and detailed. He parses the 18th century into blocks of 4-6 years, detailing all the micro-moves and ministerial debates that revolved around all foreign policy issues great and small, no matter how vexing the tangle may be. That may bore the reader at first, but from this chaotic tapestry a pattern emerges of sophisticated policy-making, well grounded in facts and sure in national self-knowledge. Yes, crafting a grand strategy is messy work, and Simms will keep no detail of it from the reader. Simms does have an ax to grind by stressing the continental over the colonial outlook in British policy, but he backs up his biased outlook with a surefooted presentation of cause and effect, showing how Britain strengthened when it played to its strengths through diplomacy and weakened when it ignored the diplomats. Influence was backed by power, but power was no substitute for influence. For the American reader of today, that is an important point to ponder while looking back at the past two decades of U.S. foreign policy.

[Erik Champenois · Rating 4 out of 5]

As a history of the First British Empire of the eighteenth century, this book covers the "Three Victories" of Britain in the War of the War of the Spanish Succession, the War of the Austrian Succession, and the Seven Years War (in North America, the French and Indian War) - and then covers the one defeat of the American revolution and separation from Britain. As a history of "the rise and fall of the British Empire," the book is unapologetically focused on Britain in Europe rather than Britain in the colonies. Indeed, anyone wanting to learn more about the history of the British colonies under the First British Empire will have to look elsewhere - for example, India isn't mentioned much more than a handful of times. A history of British colonialism in the eighteenth century would be of great interest to me, but this isn't the book to cover that.

Instead, Simms covers the history of Britain in Europe and then explains how that history made the defeat and loss of the thirteen North American colonies possible. British foreign policy, the author contends, was of significant importance to Parliamentary politics in most of the eighteenth century - with Britain moving from a more naval and colonialist outlook to a continental European outlook, particularly under George I and George II, and then again to a naval and colonialist outlook under George III. The argument is that British foreign policy has been most successful when focused on the balance of power in Europe rather than on being an island (as in Brexit) focused on a global and naval outlook above the relationship to Europe.

The book starts with some introductory coverage of Britain from 1588 through 1714, but the meat of the book begins with George I. As a German and an Electorate of Hanover, George I succeeded Queen Anne under the Act of Settlement, which ensured the succession of a Protestant to the throne. George I kept his territory in Hanover, which was connected under him as a Personal Union, as well as his vote as one of the Electors of the Holy Roman Empire. This gave Britain a significant interest in the dealings of the German Empire and of neighboring European great powers (with recurrent fears of France moving on Hanover to draw Britain into war). Indeed, as the author points out, when Brits spoke of "the Empire" through most of the eighteenth century they were not speaking of Britain but of Germany.

Simms covers the events of the eighteenth century in great detail, usually covering 2-5 years in each chapter. He shows the sometimes convoluted history of allies turning to foes and foes to allies depending on what the general balance of power in Europe. For example, Britain allied with Austria against the Bourbons (France and Spain) in the War on Spanish Succession, and with Austria against France and Prussia in the War on Austrian Succession, but then allies with Prussia against Austria and France in the Seven Years War. Britain also left its allies unaided at the end of both the War of Spanish Succession (Austria and the Netherlands) and at the end of the Seven Years War (Prussia), causing resentment and distrust at the British.

Indeed, "Three Victories and a Defeat" is most useful in understanding how the American Revolution was able to succeed in spite of Britain being the foremost power of Europe. The Americans were successful because British abandonment of its allies, combined with British withdrawal from European affairs in favor of a focus on naval power and the colonies under George III, resulted in Great Britain being left alone with no allies. Indeed, the American Revolution was made possible because much of Europe combined against Britain in support of the American Revolutionaries, seeking to cut British power and pride down a notch. 1763 was the crucial year (at the end of the Seven Years War) that led to 1776 and the final separation with the United States in the 1780s.

[Domhnall · Rating 5 out of 5]

Perhaps British statesmen, and therefore this book, spent more time down German rabbit-holes than was strictly necessary. [p674]

This is a lengthy and dense book, exploring British diplomacy in the 18th century up to the loss of the thirteen American colonies in 1783. It demonstrates that Britain’s performance in a series of wars and confrontations, culminating in the triumph of the Seven Years War, was not primarily determined on the battlefield or in its naval engagements, but rather in its diplomatic agility. As though to test this discovery to destruction, the British proceeded to abandon diplomacy and rely on its naval supremacy alone. Having established its undisputed status as a great power, Britain entered into its war with the American colonies without a single ally of practical significance, and through disastrous misjudgements, found itself in military and/ or naval confrontation with all the key European powers. Britain fought the war with huge popular support within the country, and was able to command greater military, naval and economic resources than it had achieved in any of its earlier wars, but nevertheless was comprehensively defeated.

It had taken some fifteen years to grasp that British security depended on the exchange of favours, and the realization came too late to make up the diplomatic ground lost in the meantime. [p607]

[bkwurm · Rating 4 out of 5]

Excellent review of British foreign policies during the period spanning the War of the Spanish Succession, the War of the Austrian Succession, the Seven Years War and the American Revolution, which comprise the 3 victories and the one defeat in the title.

In essence, the author claims that Britain's successes came when it successfully embroiled its enemies in a continental landwar which diverted them from focussing their resources on naval power so that British naval power was unchallenged. During the American revolution, Britain's foes, France and Spain were not involved in a continental landwar and so were free to build up naval strength to the point where British forces in America had to surrender. Blame for this state of affairs is placed, by the author, on the government of the day.

While the premise is probably true, the author overlooks the fact that in the first war, Britain was allied with Austria against France and Spain. In the second, Britain was allied with Austria against Prussia and France.

In the 7 years' war, Britain was allied with Prussia against Austria and France and although Britain won, it did so largely by abandoning Prussia, an action which made perfect sense at the time.

When the Americans revolted, Britain had no allies in Europe. France and Spain were belligerents and Austria was busy with Turkey and Prussia was still upset about the betrayal.

So while the author is correct in that Britain lost the American colonies because it could not fight all Europe and suppress the rebels at the same time, Britain had no allies in Europe because its interests in Europe required it to keep Europe divided, which meant ensuring that no nation in Europe ever became too powerful. This meant switching its support from one to another and this eventually resulted in general distrust of Britain and its aims among the European powers.

Hence, the government of the time cannot be blamed for the lack of allies which was a consequence of the policies pursued by earlier governments.

[Joelle Lewis · Rating 5 out of 5]

I have read many books about the American Revolution, and early American political thought, but I have never read anything from a British point of view. This book, while factual and packed full of dates, was fascinating. The impact that Great Britain has had upon the European Continent, and the years leading up to the American Revolution, was a subject I was not familiar with.

[Kelly]

On hold b/c SOMEONE stole it from me to read- couldn't argue, I'd paused on this for a month to study for the GRE anyway.

[Ian Racey · Rating 5 out of 5]

A deeply detailed history of eighteenth-century British diplomacy, in which Simms posits that British foreign and colonial policy was fundamentally Euro-centred; that it was this focus on Europe that allowed Britain her exceptional successes in America and at sea; and that it was only when British public opinion became contemptuous of the need to remain engaged on the Continent that Britain then allowed herself to slide into a position to lose in a single war so much of what she had spent the previous century accruing. Looks at events with a formidable level of granularity: chapters of five or six thousand words will cover a period of one to two years, and no year gets skipped over. I was particularly interested in the contextualising of the American Revolutionary War was being the latest link in the chain of British-French rivalry wars going all the way back to the War of the League of Augsburg in the 1690s, rather than presenting the Parliament/Patriot conflict in isolation as is usually the case; and Simms shows that not only the British government but also the colonists themselves looked at the war in those terms. There are times where I think Simms makes a bit of a logical leap or slants the facts toward his preferred conclusion, but overall he defends his thesis well.

[Wieland Wyntin · Rating 5 out of 5]

Indrukwekkend boek dat de opkomst van het Britse Rijk behandelt. Brendan thesis is dat de continentale politiek van de Hannovers (dus gericht op Europa) een belangrijk sleutelelement is om dit succesverhaal te begrijpen. Het mislukken van de Europese politiek leidde volgens Simms tot de nederlaag in de Amerikaanse onafhankelijkheidsoorlog. Een meesterlijk geschreven meta-geschiedenis en een aanrader voor iedereen die in internationale politiek geintreseerd is.

[Peter Crouse · Rating 3 out of 5]

Here at the end of 2019, as the excruciating negotiations over Brexit continue to drag on, the message of this book is remarkably poignant - Great Britain has always had more to gain from engaging with mainland Europe than from retreating into insular isolation.

[Stephen Lavington · Rating 3 out of 5]

A thorough study of British foreign policy in the 18th century. Perhaps a bit too thorough - this really was an almighty slog at times. Also the central thesis - the critical importance of European involvement to British policy at the time - though compelling is rather over-laboured.

[Turgut · Rating 5 out of 5]

Great book on British grand strategy!

[Bill Taylor · Rating 4 out of 5]

Superb diplomatic-political history of England that covers the 18th century up through the conclusion of the American Revolution in 1783. This book manifests
meticulous research, relying on a plethora of primary sources, combined with detailed, well-reasoned, analysis and conclusions. Even though written by an academic expert in this field, the style is accessible and not a deterrent to someone with a marginal knowledge of this period.

[Monolith94 · Rating 4 out of 5]

Unrelentingly dry book of history that rarely fails to deviate from it's unceasing point-scoring in arguing that Whig diplomacy was superior. When Simms does go off on a small human-interest tangent, the results can be bizarre, as when he describes King George III's culinary favorites. The book revolves around diplomatic wrangling's and geopolitical struggles, a sort of old-school history writing that doesn't look terribly in-depth at societal and cultural changes of the period.

Even with the dryness of its scholastic style, Simms can't hide his own leanings: in favor of continental engagement, i.e. the idea that Britain is less of an island and more of a piece of the jigsaw-puzzle that is Europe. Indeed, one gets the sense that he, too, sighs for the loss of the American states as a colony, and this book is his coming to grips with the fact. He almost seems to bemoan the fact that, by 1763, as he notes in his book, ministers no longer had to fear execution for bungling diplomacy.

While these prejudices mean that the book presents a somewhat inherently unbalanced view of the century, the fact is that his perspective allows the American reader to look back on 1760s to 1770s era America from a wholly new angle, somewhat less idealistic than we like to think of it and more pragmatic. The quotations from Benjamin Franklin alone are revealing in this respect. The book is worthy, as it provides a highly persuasive argument which, if not completely convincing, educates the reader in the arguing.

One thing that would have been useful would have been a Dramatis Personae to help keep the extremely large number of miscellaneous British ministers in order.

[Michael · Rating 5 out of 5]

"Three Victories and a Defeat" was an absolute gem. In the book, Brendan Simms traces the history of Britain through seventy some years which include three victories (War of Spanish Succession, War of Austrian Succession and Seven Years War) and one defeat (American Revolution). Simms premise for the book is that England relied not on the English channel to protect it (the Tory point of view) but on the European outworks of the Netherlands and a few allied countries (the Whig point of view) and that involvement in European politics was its hallmark. He proves this through point after point, detailing every political and foreign policy move through a dizzying array of plots, treaties and alliances. All of these were carefully explained by Simms, no small task indeed. the entire situation was then complicated by the succession to the throne of England by George I who was also the ruler of the Electorate of Hannover, part of the Holy Roman (Austrian) Empire and occasionally made decisions in favor of Hannover that harmed the English effort.

After three victories, hubris set in and England alienated all of its allies and, alone, was forced to fight the American uprising. The French took advantage of the situation and temporarily attained parity at sea with the British and aided the American's cause. Particularly interesting to me was the American Revolution as seen from the British point of view.

If you like books of history, English history, politics or just enjoy a good read, I highly recommend "three Victories and a Defeat."

[George Ronczy · Rating 2 out of 5]

Conceptually, an interesting take on the England of the 17th and 18th centuries, especially how it describes the relationship between England and Europe. The ascribing of Hanover as a key link and focus of how England was tied to the European powers, especially in Germany, is thoughtful and developed with nuance.

The writing, however, is abysmal and in need of serious editing. It would be helped immensely by purging 300 of the 800 pages and would also be helped by adding breaks in the narrative. The book has only a handful of chapters and within those chapters are very few shifts. It is common to go forty pages in a particular event, becoming tiresome and distracting to the point of losing focus on the text to wondering when this particular story will ever end.

I can't recommend the book, even though the concept is grabbing.

[Jeffrey · Rating 2 out of 5]

I hate to give Three Victories and a Defeat a measely two stars. It is superb history -- comprehensive, insightful, well-researched, and huge in scope. And yet, I have quit reading it after 70 some pages. Honestly, it is my fault. I was looking for something that would give me some great information on the Duke of Marlborough. This book was not it. If I had paid better attention to the year span in the subtitle, I would have known this. My "It was OK" rating is indicative of my interests, not the quality of the history. Maybe some day I will come back to this one.

[Jason S · Rating 4 out of 5]

A pure (and long) work of political and diplomatic history, Simms traces the Bristish diplomatic history of the eighteenth century. Although a bit forced at times, his argument that Britain's primary foreign policy focus during this time was focused on the continent (and mostly in the Holy Roman Empire because of the Hanoverian succession) not in the Empire is well defended. An amazing detailed account.

[Shaun · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book was a bit of a slog, but still very interesting and worth the effort to establish a sense of the twists and turns taken in British politics during the 18th century. I found it a very helpful background for better understanding the Seven Years War, and the lead up to the American Revolution. I plan to read it again.

[Peter · Rating 3 out of 5]

Good content. Poorly organized. Takes a long time to make the point. Great overview of how Great Britain saws itself in the world from the late 1600s through the American Revolution. Also interesting overview of how the American Revolution played out in the context of the global balance of power.

[Damian]

This book is treeeeemendous. I'm not far through, though. More later...

[Richard · Rating 4 out of 5]

Hard work, very detailed, but massively interesting. If you like British History, anyway.

[John]

Three Victories and a Defeat: The Rise and Fall of the First British Empire, 1714-1783 by Brendan Simms (2008)

[Murray · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very good indeed, but also very detailed.