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The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil–Military Relations
In a classic work, Samuel P. Huntington challenges most of the old assumptions and ideas on the role of the military in society. Stressing the value of the military outlook for American national policy, Huntington has performed the distinctive task of developing a general theory of civil–military relations and subjecting it to rigorous historical analysis.
Part One presents the general theory of the "military profession," the "military mind," and civilian control. Huntington analyzes the rise of the military profession in western Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and compares the civil–military relations of Germany and Japan between 1870 and 1945.
Part Two describes the two environmental constants of American civil–military relations, our liberal values and our conservative constitution, and then analyzes the evolution of American civil–military relations from 1789 down to 1940, focusing upon the emergence of the American military profession and the impact upon it of intellectual and political currents.
Huntington describes the revolution in American civil–military relations which took place during World War II when the military emerged from their shell, assumed the leadership of the war, and adopted the attitudes of a liberal society. Part Three continues with an analysis of the problems of American civil–military relations in the era of World War II and the Korean the political roles of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the difference in civil–military relations between the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, the role of Congress, and the organization and functioning of the Department of Defense. Huntington concludes that Americans should reassess their liberal values on the basis of a new understanding of the conservative realism of the professional military men.
Part One presents the general theory of the "military profession," the "military mind," and civilian control. Huntington analyzes the rise of the military profession in western Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and compares the civil–military relations of Germany and Japan between 1870 and 1945.
Part Two describes the two environmental constants of American civil–military relations, our liberal values and our conservative constitution, and then analyzes the evolution of American civil–military relations from 1789 down to 1940, focusing upon the emergence of the American military profession and the impact upon it of intellectual and political currents.
Huntington describes the revolution in American civil–military relations which took place during World War II when the military emerged from their shell, assumed the leadership of the war, and adopted the attitudes of a liberal society. Part Three continues with an analysis of the problems of American civil–military relations in the era of World War II and the Korean the political roles of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the difference in civil–military relations between the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, the role of Congress, and the organization and functioning of the Department of Defense. Huntington concludes that Americans should reassess their liberal values on the basis of a new understanding of the conservative realism of the professional military men.
560 pages, Paperback
First published December 1, 1957
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About the author
Samuel P. Huntington
70 books672 followersSamuel Phillips Huntington was an American political scientist who gained prominence through his "Clash of Civilizations"(1993, 1996) thesis of a new post-Cold War world order. Previously, his academic reputation had rested on his analysis of the relationship between the military and the civil government, his investigation of coups d'etat and for his more recent analysis of threats posed to the U.S. by contemporary immigration.
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May 10, 2020
Written in the mid-1950s, this study of how American military culture interfaces with the broader society still seems relevant. Samuel P. Huntington's project is monumentally ambitious but succeeds decisively.
He works from the premise that any state's military needs to be made up of professionals. Certainly the complexities of our armies after the War of 1812 necessitated that. He explains how a professional officer class arises from those who bear responsibility and have the necessary expertise coupled with dedication to the service. The early republic realized these needs. Most of the central chapters form a history of the development of military and governmental relations from that original concept, from civil control of the military as set out in the Constitution through the shift from an Army primarily engaged in civic projects to one focused on security in the Civil War era and after. He explains the necessary tension between a conservative military and a liberal democracy. The ideas of Admiral Alfred Mahan and General Leonard Wood were instrumental during the transition around the turn of the century leading to WWI. A long chapter covers WWII, and the closing chapters deal with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the organization of the Defense Department within the government.
The ideas Huntington writes seem complete even today. Yet one has to wonder what significant tidal shifts have occurred since the 1950s, particularly after 2 watershed eras, the Vietnam War which brought the end of conscription and 9/11 which in a way seemed to validate a time of perpetual war. Huntington, for instance, notes the U. S. fought wars to preserve the balance of power. He couldn't have foreseen the corruption of the ideal.
Some of the book is dry reading, like the chapter describing ways Congress allocates funds to the military and oversees them. But there's much more here to fascinate than to bore. One aspect of the Army I was unfamiliar with was the rivalry between the Macs and the Ikes following WWII. There were 2 traditions within the Army supporting either the imperious, cold leadership qualities of Douglas MacArthur or the folksy, inspirational leadership of Dwight Eisenhower. Huntington even discusses 3 great war novels at the end of WWII--by Mailer, Wouk, and James Jones--which illustrate the main tenets of his discussion. But he leaves the reader with the important point that in a Babylonian society there must be maintained a Spartan institution separate yet responsible to it, the military.
I've had this book a couple of years, unread because the moment never seemed right. I don't even remember the impulse behind my obtaining it. But the spark to reading came when I read a few weeks ago that almost every West Point cadet owns a copy. So I read to discover its relevance.
He works from the premise that any state's military needs to be made up of professionals. Certainly the complexities of our armies after the War of 1812 necessitated that. He explains how a professional officer class arises from those who bear responsibility and have the necessary expertise coupled with dedication to the service. The early republic realized these needs. Most of the central chapters form a history of the development of military and governmental relations from that original concept, from civil control of the military as set out in the Constitution through the shift from an Army primarily engaged in civic projects to one focused on security in the Civil War era and after. He explains the necessary tension between a conservative military and a liberal democracy. The ideas of Admiral Alfred Mahan and General Leonard Wood were instrumental during the transition around the turn of the century leading to WWI. A long chapter covers WWII, and the closing chapters deal with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the organization of the Defense Department within the government.
The ideas Huntington writes seem complete even today. Yet one has to wonder what significant tidal shifts have occurred since the 1950s, particularly after 2 watershed eras, the Vietnam War which brought the end of conscription and 9/11 which in a way seemed to validate a time of perpetual war. Huntington, for instance, notes the U. S. fought wars to preserve the balance of power. He couldn't have foreseen the corruption of the ideal.
Some of the book is dry reading, like the chapter describing ways Congress allocates funds to the military and oversees them. But there's much more here to fascinate than to bore. One aspect of the Army I was unfamiliar with was the rivalry between the Macs and the Ikes following WWII. There were 2 traditions within the Army supporting either the imperious, cold leadership qualities of Douglas MacArthur or the folksy, inspirational leadership of Dwight Eisenhower. Huntington even discusses 3 great war novels at the end of WWII--by Mailer, Wouk, and James Jones--which illustrate the main tenets of his discussion. But he leaves the reader with the important point that in a Babylonian society there must be maintained a Spartan institution separate yet responsible to it, the military.
I've had this book a couple of years, unread because the moment never seemed right. I don't even remember the impulse behind my obtaining it. But the spark to reading came when I read a few weeks ago that almost every West Point cadet owns a copy. So I read to discover its relevance.
February 11, 2016
Read it for class, a real slog. Huntington's main point is that there's a major conflict throughout American history between our liberal, anti-militarist culture and the imperatives of military professionalism. According to Huntington's version of military professionalism, the military is supposed to be completely divorced from politics and is only supposed to advise the president on purely military questions and then carry out his orders. If this works, the state has achieved objective civilian control. If the state tries to control the military by getting it to become more like society or more politically involved, it has achieved subjective political control, which Huntington finds dangerous and flawed. The supporting ethos of military professionalism is essentially a form of realism: war will always occur because of flaws in human nature, we do not want it but we must be ready for it, we must remain separate from the weakness and materialism of the rest of society. Huntington sees this tension as the key problem in American civil military relations.
Huntington has a mix of interesting and bizarre conclusions and this book. He presents an interesting model of how civil military relations should work, a compelling definition of military professionalism, and a fascinating survey of German and Japanese military traditions. However, he argues at the end that the best way to resolve the civil-military tension is for American society to become less liberal and more like the military. This seemed to be a total reversal of the point of having a military, which is to protect the nation and allow it continue its way of life and government. This goal of a free society may have to be adjusted at times (such as wartime drafts) in order to make the military means more effective, but Huntington wants an unnecessarily dramatic change that confuses ends and means. In the conclusion, you can see that he basically fetishizes the military way of life (especially West Point, which he did not attend) and wants the rest of society to mold to it. I thought of Huntington as a big thinker before, so I was pretty disappointed by this glaring flaw. It was really just a reflection of his personal bias. There are also just a lot of really boring passages about departmental structure and budgetary stuff from the early 50's.
This book did make me think about a lot of arguments about the all-volunteer force, however. One of the arguments against the AVF is that it has separated military service too much from ordinary civilian life, freeing up the government for "imperialism" or at least a more adventurous foreign policy. However, in line with Jefferson Cowie's idea of "the long exception," this book suggests that the military has always been alienated from civilian life with only brief exceptions (usually in wartime when volunteers flood in). So is the 1940's-1970's period a model for military-society relations? Or was it an adjustment to a vastly expanded global role and to 3 major, manpower-intensive conflicts that became less necessary when we planned to avoid these kinds of commitments post-Vietnam? I'm pointing out this problem even though I'm not quite sure what to make of it yet. I'd love to hear people's thoughts.
In any event, I wouldn't really recommend this book to anyone other than people involved in civil-military relations scholarship or practice. If you want to learn about the history of the US military as a profession, there are much better works out there. I wouldn't mind seeing this book drop of the radar screen of scholarship in general.
Huntington has a mix of interesting and bizarre conclusions and this book. He presents an interesting model of how civil military relations should work, a compelling definition of military professionalism, and a fascinating survey of German and Japanese military traditions. However, he argues at the end that the best way to resolve the civil-military tension is for American society to become less liberal and more like the military. This seemed to be a total reversal of the point of having a military, which is to protect the nation and allow it continue its way of life and government. This goal of a free society may have to be adjusted at times (such as wartime drafts) in order to make the military means more effective, but Huntington wants an unnecessarily dramatic change that confuses ends and means. In the conclusion, you can see that he basically fetishizes the military way of life (especially West Point, which he did not attend) and wants the rest of society to mold to it. I thought of Huntington as a big thinker before, so I was pretty disappointed by this glaring flaw. It was really just a reflection of his personal bias. There are also just a lot of really boring passages about departmental structure and budgetary stuff from the early 50's.
This book did make me think about a lot of arguments about the all-volunteer force, however. One of the arguments against the AVF is that it has separated military service too much from ordinary civilian life, freeing up the government for "imperialism" or at least a more adventurous foreign policy. However, in line with Jefferson Cowie's idea of "the long exception," this book suggests that the military has always been alienated from civilian life with only brief exceptions (usually in wartime when volunteers flood in). So is the 1940's-1970's period a model for military-society relations? Or was it an adjustment to a vastly expanded global role and to 3 major, manpower-intensive conflicts that became less necessary when we planned to avoid these kinds of commitments post-Vietnam? I'm pointing out this problem even though I'm not quite sure what to make of it yet. I'd love to hear people's thoughts.
In any event, I wouldn't really recommend this book to anyone other than people involved in civil-military relations scholarship or practice. If you want to learn about the history of the US military as a profession, there are much better works out there. I wouldn't mind seeing this book drop of the radar screen of scholarship in general.
January 29, 2020
Huntington argues that a professional military took longer to develop in America because of traditions of citizen soldiers, the exceptional military hero theory and the split in power between Congress with the purse and the President with the control. A professional military man is not interested in the politics, and is solely concerned with the job at hand.
Why I started this book: I was a little wary about reading this book, as this author wrote The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order but it's on my Professional Reading list and I found an audio version.
Why I finished it: To be fair, this book was written in 1957 and covers a very important topic. I'm done being fair. Southern isn't a mindset, its a location. And I can't tell you how many times the southern military mindset was compared to Jefferson's anti-military liberalism and Jackson's populist militarism. Somehow it escaped Huntington's notice that both Jefferson and Jackson own slaves and came from the south. Also, calling two military professional theorist southern and then trying to down play that one of the two fought for the Union because he was born in the north... I get it, terms shift and I wouldn't have struggled as much if he had used Realpolitik or pragmatism instead of the terms southern military. But the whole book was filled with persnickety mistakes like this. Little bits of sand, in his larger oyster theory that bugged me. I would love to read an update argument about what is civilian control in the American experience, how our memories of WWII, Korea and Vietnam have shifted the definition and practice.
Bring it forward to Iraq and Afghanistan.... Obama's Wars argued that Obama and his military advisors struggled because the military would provide three options, two extremes and the one that military favored. Obama wanted more options. Trump on the other hand, shocked the military recently by choosing an extreme option and killing Qasem Soleimani in Iraq and thus risking a war with Iran. Why they thought that he would pick a moderate option is another issue.
This is a fascinating topic covered poorly. When can a soldier just knuckle down and say these are my orders... and when should he/she argue about the legality of said orders or effectiveness of same? We have extremes on both ends with the German Army vs. the Nazis; or Col. Hackworth saying that we were losing the war in Vietnam...
Side note: It was harder to listen about how much more prepared the military mindset is for conflict after recently reading About Face: Odyssey Of An American Warrior and Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917-1945. In the build up to WWII it was Roosevelt pushing the military and the country to rearm and get ready, not the other way around.
Why I started this book: I was a little wary about reading this book, as this author wrote The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order but it's on my Professional Reading list and I found an audio version.
Why I finished it: To be fair, this book was written in 1957 and covers a very important topic. I'm done being fair. Southern isn't a mindset, its a location. And I can't tell you how many times the southern military mindset was compared to Jefferson's anti-military liberalism and Jackson's populist militarism. Somehow it escaped Huntington's notice that both Jefferson and Jackson own slaves and came from the south. Also, calling two military professional theorist southern and then trying to down play that one of the two fought for the Union because he was born in the north... I get it, terms shift and I wouldn't have struggled as much if he had used Realpolitik or pragmatism instead of the terms southern military. But the whole book was filled with persnickety mistakes like this. Little bits of sand, in his larger oyster theory that bugged me. I would love to read an update argument about what is civilian control in the American experience, how our memories of WWII, Korea and Vietnam have shifted the definition and practice.
Bring it forward to Iraq and Afghanistan.... Obama's Wars argued that Obama and his military advisors struggled because the military would provide three options, two extremes and the one that military favored. Obama wanted more options. Trump on the other hand, shocked the military recently by choosing an extreme option and killing Qasem Soleimani in Iraq and thus risking a war with Iran. Why they thought that he would pick a moderate option is another issue.
This is a fascinating topic covered poorly. When can a soldier just knuckle down and say these are my orders... and when should he/she argue about the legality of said orders or effectiveness of same? We have extremes on both ends with the German Army vs. the Nazis; or Col. Hackworth saying that we were losing the war in Vietnam...
Side note: It was harder to listen about how much more prepared the military mindset is for conflict after recently reading About Face: Odyssey Of An American Warrior and Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917-1945. In the build up to WWII it was Roosevelt pushing the military and the country to rearm and get ready, not the other way around.
March 20, 2020
The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations by Samuel Huntington is much too long for its primary objective, which is arguing that the military has become a profession onto itself, so that non-military leaders cannot claim expertise over them in how they accomplish their aims. Civilian control over the military is laid out as objective vs. subjective, or the degree to which a civilian leader has the ability to shape military strategy and policy. One is that the civilian may choose who to go to war with, and can give out high level directives, but everything else is the military doing its job because only they are qualified to do it.
In order to establish this there is a fairly lengthy discourse on history of the military both inside of and outside of the military. Its interesting, but could likely have been substantially abridged without causing any harm to the key point of the text. The sheer length comes across as an attempt to show erudition and overwhelm with knowledge, so that one is less likely to doubt any individual subpoint he puts across. In that, it becomes a mixture of camouflage and support. It is natural to defer to an expert when one lacks knowledge, and feel skeptical when one possesses some small foundation of that knowledge. Huntington generalizes too much, and his narrative is too forced. For those bits that I knew a great deal, I was not entirely sold on what he was saying. My trust in his narrative increased with my ignorance, and that is not a good sign.
The text has a few period-centered complaints. The first is his tension between liberal thought and conservative thought, whereby he regards institutions as naturally conservative in orientation. The military, with its hierarchy, discipline, and values, being the most natural partner to conservative thought. This is placed in tension with the liberal thought of the day, which can best be described as a form of left-wing libertarianism that was popular when this text was written, and about to grow considerably more popular. Liberal thought is at odds with the professionalism of the military, and thus the American sentiments are at odds with that which underpins the security and defense of the nation. Here the military is the victim of unjust criticism by people who know little about it.
Now there's always some truth to the complaint that any professional has about someone who knows nothing about you or your discipline beyond what they feel like they need to know telling you what to do. Someone who never held a wrench in their life can lecture down to a mechanic, and this book is written in such a way to suggest that the military is being lectured down by intellectuals and popular philosophical sentiments. There might have been something to that, as I have come across quite a few people who know little about the military (or any other government institution for that matter) who come in with ideas about how to change everything, and often cannot name a single specific thing they want changed outside of the most vapid of generalities.
The principle issue that can be made against this claim is that there's an entire professional civilian apparatus that is now the companion to a professional military. Not only is there the Department of Defense, but the Defense apparatus has numerous adjacent organs within and without of government, and an entire policy thinking community that operates as quasi-spectator, quasi-practitioner. The military isn't alone in the defense business anymore, and there are plenty of civilian areas that get close to the means and mechanisms of war. While they may not be enough to interfere with tactics, and may not even be able to do more than guide operations, for strategy and most of the higher level operations of the military, there are trained professionals in civilian roles that can work with them.
Sure, they are not the same. And those people will often not know as much about the nature of war on the ground. But they will know plenty about organization, structure, culture, and act as a watchdog and support framework for them.
I should know, I'm in a school that is a feeder for the civilian side of things.
This book, which was a landmark for its time, rests entirely on the ground that the US military apparatus stood alone. Or, as Huntington put it, an island of Sparta in the midst of Babylon.
That may have been true, if unfair at one point.
Now it is simply a fiction.
And its history, which was so exhaustively put, is in dire need of at least half a century's worth of updating, for even basic knowledge of what has occurred since then will fundamentally rewrite the book on this subject. And many people have done so, to varying degrees of success.
Some of this books points will remain true.
Military professionalism is a thing that still exists, and outsiders should be cautious about how to approach that. DOD Civilians can be good companions in shaping policy, but the further one gets away from the civilian organs of defense policy, the less capable they will be to actually be a partner in policy and war planning.
Others will need to be updated.
Military professionalism may look conservative, but the liberal thought Huntington was talking about has fractured into many different parts, some remaining hostile, some becoming more hostile, and others mellowing out. Most modern day liberals are supportive of the military institution and of its professionalism, which is quite the change of pace.
I have no idea how I feel about Huntington associating the military identity and professionalism with the South. I'm inclined to doubt it is as important as it used to be, but it is true that a large number of soldiers and officers come from the South when compared to other parts of the country.
Overall, however, this book is awkwardly placed. Too certain about a world that no longer exists, if it ever did, the Soldier and the State puts forward a theory about Civil-Military relations that no longer carries the validity that it should. I can readily acknowledge that within military circles it remains widely read, and even among civilians it forms part of the canon of key texts to be read and distributed. It is just that now it reads like out of place advocacy for a group no longer as isolated nor as criticized as it once was, whereas before it might have been a stalwart voice of defense for an institution that was derided on all sides.
88/100
In order to establish this there is a fairly lengthy discourse on history of the military both inside of and outside of the military. Its interesting, but could likely have been substantially abridged without causing any harm to the key point of the text. The sheer length comes across as an attempt to show erudition and overwhelm with knowledge, so that one is less likely to doubt any individual subpoint he puts across. In that, it becomes a mixture of camouflage and support. It is natural to defer to an expert when one lacks knowledge, and feel skeptical when one possesses some small foundation of that knowledge. Huntington generalizes too much, and his narrative is too forced. For those bits that I knew a great deal, I was not entirely sold on what he was saying. My trust in his narrative increased with my ignorance, and that is not a good sign.
The text has a few period-centered complaints. The first is his tension between liberal thought and conservative thought, whereby he regards institutions as naturally conservative in orientation. The military, with its hierarchy, discipline, and values, being the most natural partner to conservative thought. This is placed in tension with the liberal thought of the day, which can best be described as a form of left-wing libertarianism that was popular when this text was written, and about to grow considerably more popular. Liberal thought is at odds with the professionalism of the military, and thus the American sentiments are at odds with that which underpins the security and defense of the nation. Here the military is the victim of unjust criticism by people who know little about it.
Now there's always some truth to the complaint that any professional has about someone who knows nothing about you or your discipline beyond what they feel like they need to know telling you what to do. Someone who never held a wrench in their life can lecture down to a mechanic, and this book is written in such a way to suggest that the military is being lectured down by intellectuals and popular philosophical sentiments. There might have been something to that, as I have come across quite a few people who know little about the military (or any other government institution for that matter) who come in with ideas about how to change everything, and often cannot name a single specific thing they want changed outside of the most vapid of generalities.
The principle issue that can be made against this claim is that there's an entire professional civilian apparatus that is now the companion to a professional military. Not only is there the Department of Defense, but the Defense apparatus has numerous adjacent organs within and without of government, and an entire policy thinking community that operates as quasi-spectator, quasi-practitioner. The military isn't alone in the defense business anymore, and there are plenty of civilian areas that get close to the means and mechanisms of war. While they may not be enough to interfere with tactics, and may not even be able to do more than guide operations, for strategy and most of the higher level operations of the military, there are trained professionals in civilian roles that can work with them.
Sure, they are not the same. And those people will often not know as much about the nature of war on the ground. But they will know plenty about organization, structure, culture, and act as a watchdog and support framework for them.
I should know, I'm in a school that is a feeder for the civilian side of things.
This book, which was a landmark for its time, rests entirely on the ground that the US military apparatus stood alone. Or, as Huntington put it, an island of Sparta in the midst of Babylon.
That may have been true, if unfair at one point.
Now it is simply a fiction.
And its history, which was so exhaustively put, is in dire need of at least half a century's worth of updating, for even basic knowledge of what has occurred since then will fundamentally rewrite the book on this subject. And many people have done so, to varying degrees of success.
Some of this books points will remain true.
Military professionalism is a thing that still exists, and outsiders should be cautious about how to approach that. DOD Civilians can be good companions in shaping policy, but the further one gets away from the civilian organs of defense policy, the less capable they will be to actually be a partner in policy and war planning.
Others will need to be updated.
Military professionalism may look conservative, but the liberal thought Huntington was talking about has fractured into many different parts, some remaining hostile, some becoming more hostile, and others mellowing out. Most modern day liberals are supportive of the military institution and of its professionalism, which is quite the change of pace.
I have no idea how I feel about Huntington associating the military identity and professionalism with the South. I'm inclined to doubt it is as important as it used to be, but it is true that a large number of soldiers and officers come from the South when compared to other parts of the country.
Overall, however, this book is awkwardly placed. Too certain about a world that no longer exists, if it ever did, the Soldier and the State puts forward a theory about Civil-Military relations that no longer carries the validity that it should. I can readily acknowledge that within military circles it remains widely read, and even among civilians it forms part of the canon of key texts to be read and distributed. It is just that now it reads like out of place advocacy for a group no longer as isolated nor as criticized as it once was, whereas before it might have been a stalwart voice of defense for an institution that was derided on all sides.
88/100
February 20, 2019
As an Army Officer an elected official I've given tremendous thought to the proper Civil-Military relationship. Samuel Huntington articulates and masterful work on the proper balance, the history of the balance and why it's important. The application of the principles is more important now than ever. As populism rises on both the right and the left it's important the Soldier (and Officers) retain professionalism, preserve the institutions and credibility and maintain stability and the nation's security in times of transition. This book is on the Army Chief of Staff Reading List. Would recommend for everyone interested in history, government and of course military. The principles are applicable to the state level in addition to the federal level because of the need to maintain a robust and professional National Guard.
August 31, 2013
A dry arduous read, but well worth it in the end. This one is a scholarly account with relevance not only in the American context but for civil military relations in other modern democracies as well. Unlike its better known sibling, this creation of Huntington's is very well researched, nuanced and sticks to facts...
July 29, 2016
This is the core text on civil-military relations and is the necessary foundation before pursuing any other research on the topic.
December 29, 2016
So sleep inducing .... zzz ...
August 24, 2024
It’s a classic. Read it! Dammit!
June 22, 2020
I wanted to cover this book as a gap in my professional knowledge.
In civ-mil relations, Huntington receives criticism for the concept of "objective control" of the military - or, allow military leaders to focus on military topics while civilians handle policy decisions. The thought process is: the military is better suited towards military-pure topics. He criticizes the outsized role the Joint Chiefs of Staff fill in contemporary (post-World War 2) timeframe and offers that a stark division of labor (or divergence) between policy and military might be a better option.
I just started Janowitz' The Professional Soldier and he makes the case that convergence is already happening between civilians and the military and it's best for the U.S. to come to terms with it.
For me, I enjoyed reading the history of the military profession and what aspects actually make it a profession. This book came along at a time when I start to fully realize my place as a professional over merely being a member of the profession.
From a historical perspective, I wish the author had spent more time covering civ-mil relations in cultures outside of Europe and America. Except for the rise of Imperial Japan, Huntington handwaves over other traditions.
Overall, I think I read the book at the right time in my career. It filled a knowledge gap and sent me on a path to study other scholars of the topic (Janowitz, Cohen, Schake, Brooks, etc).
In civ-mil relations, Huntington receives criticism for the concept of "objective control" of the military - or, allow military leaders to focus on military topics while civilians handle policy decisions. The thought process is: the military is better suited towards military-pure topics. He criticizes the outsized role the Joint Chiefs of Staff fill in contemporary (post-World War 2) timeframe and offers that a stark division of labor (or divergence) between policy and military might be a better option.
I just started Janowitz' The Professional Soldier and he makes the case that convergence is already happening between civilians and the military and it's best for the U.S. to come to terms with it.
For me, I enjoyed reading the history of the military profession and what aspects actually make it a profession. This book came along at a time when I start to fully realize my place as a professional over merely being a member of the profession.
From a historical perspective, I wish the author had spent more time covering civ-mil relations in cultures outside of Europe and America. Except for the rise of Imperial Japan, Huntington handwaves over other traditions.
Overall, I think I read the book at the right time in my career. It filled a knowledge gap and sent me on a path to study other scholars of the topic (Janowitz, Cohen, Schake, Brooks, etc).
Read
May 24, 2023I was interested in a couple of chapters of this book only so I am in no position to review this book as a whole.
It is no wonder that Huntington became so popular. He is this prototype of scientist that can be extremely convincing. He knows how to use easy and catchy arguments; he does enough research to make an impression of well-educated and well-informed researcher and he has strong positions. To put it simply- his high self-esteem is contagious.
I respect him for waking up the research on civil-military relations and for trying to develop a theoretical background for this important field of study. At the same time, I am not a fan. I don’t agree with the majority of his theses in this book (especially when you compare his work to the work of Morris Janowitz) and it the world-famous book that comes after this. What’s more, I don’t like his preaching style.
Nevertheless, this is an important and interesting book.
It is no wonder that Huntington became so popular. He is this prototype of scientist that can be extremely convincing. He knows how to use easy and catchy arguments; he does enough research to make an impression of well-educated and well-informed researcher and he has strong positions. To put it simply- his high self-esteem is contagious.
I respect him for waking up the research on civil-military relations and for trying to develop a theoretical background for this important field of study. At the same time, I am not a fan. I don’t agree with the majority of his theses in this book (especially when you compare his work to the work of Morris Janowitz) and it the world-famous book that comes after this. What’s more, I don’t like his preaching style.
Nevertheless, this is an important and interesting book.
June 30, 2020
Huntington wrote this book when he was just 32 years old. It is more than a book about military-civilian relationship; it extends to public administration, government, social issues. In short, the book argues that only the UK got the balance in civil-military relation right, while other countries (including the US) failed to do so for various historical and political reasons. As a result there is more politicization of the military and political influence of military in public life in the USA. Among other key points, his solution is ‘objective civilian control’ and ‘professionalism of military’ - strict institutional separation of functions (not only power) between military and civilian realms. It is a great lesson for developing counties, like mine.
March 8, 2021
A magnificent primer on civil-military relations. In the Soldier and the State, Huntington presents his theoretical argument for the optimum relationship between the professional military and civilian government. He substantiates this with acute analyses of military history.
The book is divided into three parts, the first of which is dedicated to introducing his theories. Here, Bismarckian Prussia and Imperial Japan are used as historical examples. The second and third parts are focused on American Military History, which he uses to flesh out his argument and explain why the United States has historically fallen short of the optimum balance of civil-military relations.
Academic, but well worth the read if you are interested in military affairs.
The book is divided into three parts, the first of which is dedicated to introducing his theories. Here, Bismarckian Prussia and Imperial Japan are used as historical examples. The second and third parts are focused on American Military History, which he uses to flesh out his argument and explain why the United States has historically fallen short of the optimum balance of civil-military relations.
Academic, but well worth the read if you are interested in military affairs.
July 19, 2023
Huntington presents a compelling case for the correlative relationship between the quality of military professionalism and types civilian control, but his classic tome is otherwise encumbered with his endless, and ultimately, irrelevant obsession with the ways in which U.S. civil society is inherently hostile to military thinking. His assertions are bold, and often unsubstantiated; his methodology sloppy and anecdotal; and, worse, most of his hypotheses have not born out as correct. It is a shame that this is the work upon which so much foundational thinking of America civil-military relations is based.
August 30, 2024
I read this after reviewing the “commissioning” of military officers. Officers a commissioned for life and serve at the pleasure of the President. I was thinking when Trump was attempting to get the military persons to one for him. I know the have a voting officer as an additional duty but votes don’t happen until usually after the election so most don’t vote. What would it matter the modern officer at least the ones I know don’t buy in and out of their oath. Now perhaps wealthy families buy their way into appointments and positions, into West Point or the Citadel, you get the point.
Can you really search in the military and still run of office how is Gabby doing it?
Can you really search in the military and still run of office how is Gabby doing it?
December 30, 2022
A seminal work on civil military relations. It does a good job of straddling the line between dense academic literature and mass market readable works. It provides a solid theoretical grounding in the relevant bureaucractic constructs, provide useful historical background, and provides a solid understanding of the evolution of the topic from the founding of the republic through the 1950s. One can only imagine what Huntington would have written on the topic weee he still around today.
June 22, 2017
A groundbreaking and foundational scholarly examination of the relationships between military professionals and civilian officials. Some of Huntington's definitions of professionalism fall short and not all of his arguments are perfect but he set the stage for all subsequent examinations of the topic through his methodical and thoughtful approach.
March 17, 2018
Huntington provides some fantastic insights in The Soldier and the State. This book is probably the most thorough study of civ-mil relations available. That said, you've got to really want to read this book to make it through many of the dry arduous sections. I believe the sum of the fantastic insights is well worth the time invested.
May 4, 2020
Importance of Civil Military Relations (CMR) have direct effect on countries fate. Samuel in his book soldier and state tried and succeeded in highlighting how these relations can effect country’s progress. His explanation of Mil Officers as professional and then mentioning the causes which effects CMR, by giving practical examples from diff countries is impressive. This is an old book, and it will be encouraging, if he produce the. The latest edition and mentions CMR importance in rapidly changing environment of 21 century.
October 5, 2018
I think this is the best work of Samuel Huntington. Political scientist is better to analyze something in the past, instead of trying to predict the future. This book is relevant to Indonesia's militarism. A good book, a classic one that everybody should read.
June 22, 2020
Over time
Good book to set a base but definitely history since it is from 1957. Good primer in the relationship of American liberalism tradition and military conservatism/professionalism. Just wish there is an update.
Good book to set a base but definitely history since it is from 1957. Good primer in the relationship of American liberalism tradition and military conservatism/professionalism. Just wish there is an update.
November 15, 2021
If you want to have an overview of the history of the military and what it is to be a military professional, this is a valuable text. Not for the feint of heart. Lots of detail. And, with an original copyright in 1957, it's not written with gender diversity in mind.
February 17, 2020
A difficult read. It was published in the late 59s, it would be interesting to see what Huntington would say today.
June 17, 2020
Must read for all officers, especially now.
October 6, 2020
Interesting for theory, has too much history that isn't necessarily relevant to the points he is trying to make.
October 22, 2023
The book on the theory of civil-military relationships in the United States. Incredible historical perspective on the civil-military relationship. A must-read for all officers, Major and above.
February 20, 2024
While dated in places, Huntington provides the foundational study in civil-military relations in the US.
April 28, 2025
个人年度之一了。
January 15, 2026
This would be the one for those who want to read 5 books about war.
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