AN EXCELLENT COLLECTION OF HEIDEGGER’S ESSAYS
Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) was an influential and controversial German philosopher, primarily concerned with Being, and phenomenology---who was widely (perhaps incorrectly) also perceived as an Existentialist. His relationship with the Nazi party in Germany has been the subject of widespread controversy and debate [e.g., Heidegger and Nazism, Heidegger and the Nazis, Heidegger's Crisis: Philosophy and Politics in Nazi Germany, Heidegger and the Question of National Socialism, etc.]
This volume includes fourteen essays, seven of which are translated here for the first time. The essays were written between 1919 and 1961.
He wrote in the 1927 lecture “Phenomenology and Theology”: “Within the circle of actual or possible sciences of beings---there is between any two only a relative difference, based on the different relations that in each case orient a science to a specific region of beings. On the other hand, every positive science is ABSOLUTELY, not relatively, different from philosophy. Our thesis, then, is that theology is a positive science, and as such, therefore, is absolutely different from philosophy.” (Pg. 41)
Later in the same essay, he says, “faith is an appropriation of revelation that co-constitutes the Christian occurrence, that is, the mode of existence that specifies a factical Dasein’s Christianness as a particular form of destiny. Faith is the believing-understanding mode of existing in the history revealed, i.e., occurring, with the Crucified.” (Pg. 45) He adds, “Formally considered, then, faith as the existing relation to the Crucified is a mode of historical Dasein, of human existence, of historically being in a history that discloses itself only in and for faith. Therefore theology, as the science of faith, that is, of an intrinsically HISTORCAL … mode of being, is to the very core a HISTORICAL science. And indeed it is as unique sort of historical science in accord with the unique historicity involved in faith, i.e., with ‘the occurrence of revelation.’” (Pg. 46)
In another lecture, he states, “We ourselves are the source of the idea of being. But this source must be understood as the transcendence of Dasein as ecstatic. Only on the ground of transcendence is there the articulation of the various ways of being. Determining the idea of being as such is, however, a difficult and ultimate problem.” (Pg. 71)
In the essay ‘What is Metaphysics?” he says: “Da-sein means: being held out into the nothing. Holding itself out into nothing, Dasein is in each case already beyond beings as a whole. Such being beyond beings we call transcendence. If in the ground of its essence Dasein were not transcending, which not means, if it were not in advance holding itself out into the nothing, then it could never adopt a stance toward beings nor even toward itself.” (Pg. 91)
He concludes in this same essay, “Metaphysics is the fundamental occurrence in our Dasein. It is that Dasein itself. Because the truth of metaphysics dwells in this abyssal ground it stands in closest proximity to the constantly lurking possibility of deepest error. For this reason no amount of scientific rigor attains to the seriousness of metaphysics. Philosophy can never be measured by the standard of the idea of science… Philosophy gets under way only by a peculiar insertion of our own existence into the fundamental possibilities of Dasein as a whole. For this insertion it is of decisive importance, first, that we allow space for beings as a whole; second, that we release ourselves from those idols everyone has and to which they take its full course, so that it swings back into the fundamental question of metaphysics that the nothing itself compels: Why are there beings at all, and any not far rather Nothing?” (Pg. 96)
In a later Postscript to this essay, he observes, “Readiness for anxiety is a Yes to assuming a stance that fulfills the highest claim, a claim that is made upon the human essence alone. Of all beings, only the human being, called upon by the voice of being, experiences the wonder of all wonders: that beings ARE. The being that is thus called in its essence into the truth of being is for this reason always attuned in an essential manner.” (Pg. 234)
He states, “Metaphysics is that knowledge wherein Western historical humanity preserves the truth of its relations to beings as a whole and the truth about those beings themselves. In a quite essential sense, meta-physics is ‘physics’…” (Pg. 185)
In his Letter on Humanism, he says: “the decline of language is… already a consequence of, the state of affairs in which language under the dominance of the modern metaphysics of subjectivity almost irremediably falls out of its element. Language still denies us its essence: that it is the house of the truth of being. Instead, language surrenders itself to our mere willing and trafficking as an instrument of domination over beings.” (Pg. 243)
In the same essay, he explains, “the way that the human being in his proper essence becomes present to being is ecstatic inherence in the truth of being. Through this determination of the essence of the human being the humanistic interpretations of the human being as [rational animal], as ‘person,’ as spiritual-ensouled-bodily being, are not declared false and thrust aside. Rather, the sole implication of is that the highest determinations of the essence of the human being in humanism still do not realize the proper dignity of the human being. To that extent the thinking in ‘Being and Time’ is against humanism.” (Pg. 251) But he later adds, “opposition to ‘humanism’ in no way implies a defense of the inhuman but rather opens other vistas.” (Pg. 265)
He concludes this essay, “It is time to break our habit of overestimating philosophy and of thereby asking too much of it. What is needed in the present world crisis is less philosophy, but more attentiveness in thinking; less literature, but more cultivation of the letter.” (Pg. 276)
In another essay, he says, “Metaphysics, however, speaks continually, and in the most various ways of Being. Metaphysics gives, and seems to confirm, the appearance that it asks and answers the question concerning Being. In fact, metaphysics never answers the question concerning the truth of Being, for it never asks this question. Metaphysics does not ask this question because it thinks Being only by representing beings as beings. It means beings as a whole, although it speaks of Being. It names Being and means beings as beings.” (Pg. 281)
This is an excellent selection of Heidegger’s writings; it will be of great interest to both those “new” to his philosophy, and to those who are well-acquainted with him.