Singapore Burning: Heroism And Surrender In World War II

by Colin Smith

Churchill's description of the fall of Singapore on 15 February 1942, after Lt-Gen Percival's surrender led to over 100,000 British, Australian and Indian troops falling into the hands of the Japanese, was no wartime exaggeration. The Japanese had promised that there would be no Dunkirk in Singapore, and its fall led to imprisonment, torture and death for thousands of allied men and women. With much new material from British, Australian, Indian and Japanese sources, Colin Smith has woven together the full and terrifying story of the fall of Singapore and its aftermath. Here, alongside cowardice and incompetence, are forgotten acts of enormous heroism; treachery yet heart-rending loyalty; Japanese compassion as well as brutality from the bravest and most capricious enemy the British ever had to face.

Genres: History, World War II, Nonfiction, Military Fiction, Asia, War, Japan

688 pages, Paperback

First published April 28, 2005

About the author

Colin Smith, author of ’England’s Last War Against France', ‘Singapore Burning’ and most recently collaborator in Andrew Borowiec's Warsaw Boy,was brought up in the British Midlands.
At 18 he had the chance to join the Guernsey Evening Press as a cub reporter.
Jobs on several other provincial newspapers followed and in 1968, after working on the Birmingham Post and the Daily Sketch, he joined David Astor’s Observer.

Smith lives with his wife Sylvia in Nicosia where, in the late 1970’s, he was first based as The Observer’s Middle East correspondent. In more recent years he has concentrated on writing books, both fiction and non-fiction but mostly the same school of narrative history.

Smith's first book was Carlos - Portrait of a Terrorist, which came out of a three part Observer series following the Venezuelan’s 1976 raid on OPEC’s Vienna headquarters and the kidnapping of the oil ministers. Revised after Carlos’ capture in 1995 and published as a Mandarin Paperback, in 2012, after a Paris court sentenced the terrorist to a second term life imprisonment for bombings in France in the 1980's, it was revised yet again.

He has pubished three novels, all with Palestinian themes. Spies of Jerusalem is set in the Ottoman Palestine of 1917 as outnumbred Turkish and German forces do their best to thwart Britain's General Allenby as his army advances on Jerusalem; Let Us Do Evil takes place in Mandate Palestine during World War Two where some Jews see the British as their main enemy and make a pact with the Devil; his thriller Collateral Damage sees a vengeful widower on the trail of the man who killed his wife as the Cold War terrorism that plagued Western European capitals in the 1970's becomes a very hot war indeed in Beirut and southern Lebanon.

Reviews

[Jill H. · Rating 5 out of 5]

I can't possible do credit to this book with a review........instead I will just point out a few of the facts that made for a superb history.
*We get a short history of Singapore, the "Pearl of the Orient", which was helpful in understanding that this was not a fortress, If Japan took Malaya, which they did, the city was a sitting duck.
*The capital ships, Prince of Wales and Repulse which were important to the defense of Singapore were sunk, leaving the city without naval protection.
*Air defense was almost non-existent.
*As Japan moved down the Malayan peninsula, most communication lines to Singapore and among the British troops attempting to stop the invasion were cut; therefore, troops were practically on their own as to what the battle plans were.
*British leadership could not agree as to exactly how they wanted to address the defense of Singapore and frankly, some of these men bordered on incompetency. Although history has blackened the name of Lt. General Arthur Percival for the eventual surrender, the blame should not rest totally on his shoulders.
*The author gives the reader a picture of both the British and the Japanese POV which adds some interesting perspectives.
*Good maps!

This is a slow read as the author covers so many of the individual battles on the Malay peninsula but I felt it was well worth it. I highly recommend this book which will dispel some of the myths that have surrounded this largest British surrender in the 20th century.

[Chin Joo · Rating 4 out of 5]

Many books on the Malayan Campaign tend to use 'Singapore' in part of the title rather than 'Malayan' (compare the number of books listed under the search string 'fall of Singapore' to that under 'Malayan campaign' in Goodreads). The fact is the fighting in the Malayan Peninsula lasted 55 days and that in Singapore no more than a week. But it could be that Singapore was given the rather undeserving title of a fortress that made its fall all the more dramatic. Still, reading books on this campaign, one gets the distinct feeling that the word 'Singapore' is something of a misnomer. It is no different in this book of 560 pages, of which perhaps only the last 100 were on the fighting in Singapore itself.

Hair-splitting aside, this book is an invaluable one for anyone who wants to learn about the Malayan Campaign. That it is well-researched cannot be disputed, one only needs to look at the amount of references at the end of the book to know. What is more challenging is to organise this amount of information and facts and to write it in such a way that would keep the reader going. This, the author did admirably. While the beginning of the book is a little slow because it was more a description of the expatriates' life in Singapore, this part of the book is important for it sets the context and contrast that would come later. Once the reader gets through it, the action starts, and it would not stop until the end of the book.

Some events were given more detailed treatment than others and rightly so. The part on the sinking of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse was most heart-wrenching; the description of the aftermath of Parit Sulong made one seethe with hate. The all-too-few successes against the Japanese gave some reprieve and consolation to the fighting Commonwealth soldiers and also to this reader (pg 243); the inaction and lost opportunities left the reader holding his head in despair [I really want to quote this one on pg 311: The fate that anticipated for these sitting ducks (Japanese soldiers) is not hard to imagine. Nothing happened.] The footnotes, thrown sparingly about the book played an equally important role, take for example the one on how 'missing' in North Africa often meant taken prisoner but in Malaya really meant 'missing' (pg 403). Not only does it paint the picture of the terrain for the reader, it even reminded me of how we got lost in our own small jungle during national service.

Like other books on this campaign, the author asked the important question - whose fault was it? Had one started reading this book keeping this question in view, he would be brought along the whole campaign changing his mind several times. The author did not state his views explicitly but gave a good summary of the possible factors on page 484. However, whether by accident or by design, these were all just before General Gordon Bennett put the 8th Australian Division into action defending Singapore. The calamity that followed and the description of the almost zombie-like deserters following that gave a hint as to what he thought. But then there was also this oblique reference that could easily escape one's notice: this Indian lady by the name of Lakshmi Swaminadhan was featured in Chapter 2, early in the book, and then the book ended with a mention of the INA. Could that be what the author attributes to the defeat of the British/Australian forces?

All in all, a very informative and entertaining book which I highly recommend. While some may complain about the amount of details, I think the casual reader does not have to remember all the regiments and battalions that were engaged in the theatre. Those who are want to know more will find their interest well-served.

(P.S. Lee Kwan Yew was Singapore's Prime Minister, not President as said on page 550.)

Some thoughts I have on reading books on the fall of Singapore can be found here.

[Liam Ostermann · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a really first rate history, it is fascinating, well written and its immense research is awe inspiring. I read every page of it and it contains many great things but unfortunately I have to withhold one star because for all its brilliance it has some flaws, and some of them are serious, and in part some of the flaws are inescapable bound up in its strengths.

Not so much a history of what happened, or failed to happen, at Singapore at the outset of the war with Japan as a tale built out of the of personal accounts given in interviews and found in unpublished, as well as published sources. There are enormous resources and insights here but the very richness of these personal voices inevitably reminds us of the voices that are underrepresented, barely there, or absolutely missing - Japanese voices from almost every level but in particular ordinary soldiers; ordinary British or Australian soldiers are very few and those of Indian soldiers entirely absent.

To be blunt I wanted to hear from the soldiers, airmen and support troops who so needlessly abandoned Kota airbase under the impression it was about to be over run at the start of the campaign; an event which set in motion withdrawals which were often barely concealed precipitous flights. What would have been even more interesting would have been to have heard from any of the Indian troops that were providing the ground support to the airbases and found, after fruitlessly trying to get in touch with the base, that it had been forgotten when the base was abandoned (evacuated would be to polite a term). No one thought to inform them and this became a regular occurrence as ill trained and badly led, very young Indian troops found themselves again and again guarding the flanks of invariably white UK or Australian troop positions which were abandoned without telling them.

Of course by the time Colin Smith began seriously speaking with the remaining witnesses, the logistics, never mind the expense, to find those voices was probably insurmountable. Even if he had there is also the matter of speaking with those who had survived years in Japanese captivity, working on the Burma railways and watching friends and compatriots die in hideous circumstances. I* don't know if I would have had the courage to ask questions to these survivor that would have revealed that I was pursuing a line of enquiry revolving around demonstrating that they had run away from the Japanese.

I don't blame Colin Smith for the missing voices, it is not due to any bias, but the absence inevitably distorts the story.

Smith does tell the story through the multitude of voices brilliantly, but their sheer number tends to mitigate against understanding, sometime a single anecdote properly used can say more then anything else. Often in Smith's book quantity threatens to bury the most significant revelations. One example is the story told by a British woman who discovered, once the bombing of Singapore had begun, that one of her servants, the Chinese 'boy', had been injured in the bombardment and taken to hospital. It took a long time for her to find him because she, like every other white woman (and man) in Singapore, only knew her boy as 'Boy', and had no idea what his name was. That like all 'Boys' he was in fact a middle aged man with a family only makes the underlying racism and cultural blindness more horrifying and recalling that black men in the USA were almost invariably referred to as 'boy' by white men only makes it worse. But this understanding of the racism of empire is entirely lost amongst the multitude of voices describing experiences and events but not necessarily providing anything new.

Aside from often burying the most salient and interesting information Smith's mountain of personal testimony has the disadvantage of leaving very little room from proper historical analysis or narrative. This is probably the work's greatest failure because while readers learn a great deal of what it was like to be in Singapore in 1941 they don't really get a chance to understand why the disaster happened.

To understand why Britain's Asian empire and stronghold collapsed so completely and quickly requires an examination of British imperial/colonial policy after WWI which at its most simple was largely a matter of bluff, a grand facade that was all smoke and mirrors, to try and hang on to power were they still had it and influence were they no longer exercised direct rule, such as in Australia and New Zealand. Part of the understanding of subjects of the empire or dominions was that the empire was there to protect and defend them. That was why Britain could call on their resources and man power. But it was a lie, Britain did not have the ability to defend its empire and once the 1902 UK/Japanese alliance lapsed after WWI knew they were dependent on USA naval support in the far east. They never told anyone this and proceeded through the pre-WWII years to expensively construct at Singapore a massive naval base for a Pacific fleet that didn't exist. The impression was given/hinted at/suggested that when the crisis arose ships from the British navy would be made available and based there. The reality was, and all pre war planning was based on the understanding, that once a European war broke out every ship in the navy would be required to protect the UK. Protection of Pacific waters was to be the job of the USA, but of course that meant they had to be at war as well.

The other areas where a more concentrated use of sources and personal accounts would have helped was in describing and explaining the absolute chaos and shambles surrounding planning for war. Although it was accepted that the army might have to make a fighting retreat down the peninsula to Singapore it was only after everyone who could had withdrawn onto Singapore island and the causeway blown that it was realised that they had blown up not simply a causeway but the islands only connection to its freshwater reservoirs which were all on the mainland. When planning the defence of Kota Baharn in Northern Malaya and the most likely spot for the Japanese invasion forces the army wanted to drop a boom across the river mouth but was unable to because there wasn't any steel cable (vast amounts captured in the naval base when it surrendered but that sort of mistake? chaos? screw up? and the reasons for it is another u explored area)). While the Japanese spent two hours establishing their beach-head upon invading Northen Malaysia the army was unable to raise an air force response because there was only one secure line and that was permanently engaged. The army found itself distributed in penny packets about the Malay peninsula defending airbases, whose sole point was to prevent an invasion which was now successfully established and roaring down the main north-south highway. The army was constantly trying, and failing, to establish a defensive line.

The lack of coordination between the various services, the Australian, Indian and UK armies, and military and civilian planners was grotesque. When the first Japanese aeroplanes started bombing Singapore no one could find the keys to turn the street lights off, they were only extinguished after the last plane left and the delays in turning them back on simply hindered the inadequate rescue efforts. There were virtually no air raid precautions in place least it 'alarm' the native population. Considerably more alarm was caused when the entire white population was quietly evacuated from Penang and the Malay and Chinese simply abandoned. That the Japanese took immediate ruthless steps to liquidate all Chinese who had supported Chang Kai Shek in his fight against the Japanese came as a surprise only to the British. Although the British empire tended to forswear the more obvious Jim Crow type legislation to enforce or define racial separation or categorisation and broadcast a propaganda that everyone irrespective of skin colour were members of the British empire and everyone was all in it together war time quickly made clear what fatuous nonsense that was.

The loss of Malaya and Singapore was almost inevitable and in large part it was the result of decisions taken in London. Churchill and the war cabinet were ruthlessly focused on the UK and were willing to do anything, sacrifice anyone or anyplace to that priority. The Australian government was deeply suspicious of, if ultimately cowed by, London. They insisted on Australian troops being withdrawn from the Middle East theatre and diverted, in some cases, back into Singapore so they would be available to defend Australia. The irony of the thousands of men who marched off their troopships and into captivity after only a few weeks would be funny if their fate wasn't so tragic. Churchill was not willing to devote the material (planes and tanks that might have made some difference at Singapore were diverted to Russia were there tiny number was irrelevant - but good publicity) or time to dealing with Singapore's problems. His contributions, such as sending the ridiculous Duff and Lady Cooper as his personal envoy only complicated the hopelessly tangled inter-service and military-civilian command structure. Once Malaya was lost and the siege of Singapore had begun Churchill's exhortations to Percival for a 'Gotterdammerung' no surrender, do or die and blown your brains out
last stand are way too similar with Hitler's ones to Paulus at Stalingrad for comfort.

Singapore and Malaya were lost because it wasn't worth spending the time, the resources and most importantly the skilled men, in terms of officers, it would have needed to save it. No one wanted to lose it, but the risk was taken that the sham of power that had allowed so few British men (well they were all men so let them the blame, I have no intention or retrospectively foisting on powerless women) to rule so much of the World for so long would continue to work. The arrogance and lack of self awareness, never mind awareness of anyone else is truly astounding.

I must make clear that this book is also full of the most incredible and moving stories of bravery, sacrifice and selflessness. The civilian and military men who failed in their plans to defend Malaya and Singapore were not bad men nor were they stupid. They operated within parameters laid down for a completely different set of circumstances. They were overwhelmed and did their best and if Churchill is allowed to take credit for what went right elsewhere he must shoulder the blame for what went horribly wrong here. He promised full investigations, royal commissions, etc. once the war was over to investigate and reveal the truth of what happened but they never happened and they never would have. There were to many truths no one to wanted to admit, both the lies of Britain's pre-war imperial policy and about the disgraceful way that many poorly trained and officered UK, Indian and particularly Australian troops behaved once under fire. The almost complete collapse of so many units, the unauthorised, reckless withdrawals, the way men found themselves defending outlaying positions after everyone else had retreated, and the tens of thousands of troops who were to be found aimless wandering about Singapore armed and mutinous, attempting, and often succeeding, in forcing their way onto ships before women, children and the wounded was a scandal no one wanted to admit. So it was hushed up, buried and forgotten and the men who survived the Japanese labour camps were pitied but otherwise ignored**.

But while bravery and heroism was apparent in bucket fulls, so was incredible stupidity. When the Japanese had spotted the Prince of Wales admiral Philips refused to break radio silence to summon air support. After the PoW was repeatedly torpedoed and sinking fast he tried to stop other ships coming alongside to rescue the crew. When the ship was in its death throws and all equipment for steering, or communication was destroyed Admiral Philips remained on the shattered bridge sending out orders and commands with a Morse lamp until almost the last moment. Except of course it wasn't the admiral sending out the messages, admirals don't operate Morse lamps, it was sixteen year old boy sailor, the PoW carried a dozen or more of them, who actually operated that lamp almost up to the battleships final moments. I know which of them I think is the true hero.

*I never knew a former prisoner of the Japanese in WWII, but my mother did. She told me a number of stories about boys who had left Dublin to go fight (Ireland may have been neutral but many Irish men and boys went and fought in the British Army) and the few who returned were hideously 'broken'.
**I can't help mentioning here that while in prison camp soldiers were supposed to be paid a portion of their wages by the Japanese, which they didn't but this theoretical amount was deducted from their arrears of pay which they received at liberation. That the UK treasury insisted on deducting those sums even though the Japanese had never paid because they were not signaturs to the treaties that made them liable to pay these sums says something very important and unattractive about government.

[Ian Chapman · Rating 5 out of 5]

Very well researched, with much from personal interviews with elderly survivors. The author was a professional journalist, and it may be that his research shows journalistic elements of looking for the exciting story, which adds to the sense of immediacy in the book. Also, as a reporter he covered the 1975 fall of Saigon, which may add to the way he interprets the earlier events in Singapore. The book includes much on the immediate pre-war situation and the Malaya battle, and continues through captivity and liberation. The solid research, well referenced, combined with the immediacy of style, makes for an excellent work.

[Cropredy · Rating 4 out of 5]

Although I stayed up past my bedtime to read this, not 5 stars for reasons given below.

The loss of Malaya-Singapore December 1941-February 1942 is a well-told and well-known story to any WW II history buff. The prevailing narrative is that the Brits were out-generaled and out-fought by a better-trained Japanese force despite the Brits (Commonwealth really) having a numerical advantage in troops. Combined with the catastrophic loss of the Repulse and Prince of Wales in a belated attempt to destroy the Japanese landing fleet and an RAF whose top-line fighter was the lamentable Brewster Buffalo and offensive striking power in the even more lamentable Vickers Vildebeest it was foreordained that things were going to go swimingly for the Japanese. Even after retreating to the island of Singapore with a 2:1 advantage in soldiers, it took less than a week for the Japanese to force a humiliating surrender.

So, does this book reinforce that narrative or counter it?

What made this book extremely interesting is that it was based on numerous author interviews with surviving participants as well as a deep dive into published and unpublished memoirs. As such, the reader is taken directly into various milieu: pre-war Singapore, Japanese planning headquarters, the beach at Kota Bharu, desperate bombing attacks by RAF Hudsons, the sinking of the two capital ships, and more. And that's just the first 25% of the book.

As previously mentioned, the prevailing narrative is that Commonwealth forces were routed from successive positions from the far north in Malaya all the way down to the Straits. But as the book makes clear, this is too simplistic.

Not every soldier was hapless or every general / colonel feckless.
There was plenty of bravery, sometimes even cunning. Japanese troops could be ambushed and repelled. The pitifully few anti-tank guns occasionally bloodied the armored columns. In general, defensive positions were wisely chosen but, with a lack of air power, ineffective radios, and no navy to counter outflanking by sea, each position was quickly broken and retreat ensued.

The book is predominantly, daresay, exclusively accounts of individual units and men (and sometimes women) as they fought, died or were captured over the course of 10 weeks. Every so often, a Japanese diary gives the reader the other side of the picture. Smith writes quite well and the book holds up with the best battle narrative non-fiction.

Now, why 4 stars despite reading past my bedtime?

Basically, Smith provides only a light touch on the greater strategic picture, omitting almost entirely the fuming by Aussie PM at having his countrymen squandered in hopeless battles while the his nation was defenseless. What Churchill, Alan-Brooke, Wavell, and even the Japanese High Command was thinking during the campaign gets only glancing references - in a book of 500+ pages.

Furthermore, Percival's decisions are told not from his headquarters' perspective but rather as a narrative device to support decisions made by the Commonwealth corps and division commanders.
You never felt like you were at the command table. Percival is almost a cipher once the campaign starts.

At the end of the book, one would have thought Smith would do an analysis of the campaign, why it went as it did, could things have been done differently, and so on. Instead, the reader is left with a yawing gap of explanation, peppered with details that could/did explain things but scattered about the chapters (example, the 50 Hurricanes that arrived were outfitted for air-to-ground, not air superiority and the ground crew was unfamiliar with the type).

That said, I give Smith credit for excoriating decisions made on December 8 that prevented offensive action into Thailand that if done with alacrity could have made a difference. That said, given the rusty nature of the Commonwealth forces, it is unlikely this would have made a decisive difference. These units just weren't trained well-enough.

Bottomline, to me, the collapse of the Commonwealth in Malaya was similar to the collapse in the Philippines -- a lack of prewar imagination that the enemy would be competent and have control of the air and sea. No preparations were made in advance to fight and win under those circumstances.

All in all, a sad tale, not a hero's journey but just the relentless defeat after defeat leading to death, disaffection, desertion, and finally surrender.

Many photos and a few maps, some of which were excellent. There should have been more maps especially for the early battles in the north of Malaya.

An interesting final chapter and epilogue that describes escape attempts by sea in the last days, massacres, imprisonment, liberation (1945), and finally justice for atrocities.

Recommended for the Commonwealth WWII enthusiast who wants a deep dive on the Malayan campaign.

See also Trial by Battle, a novelization by a Brit officer who served in an Indian unit that captures the on-the-ground feel and confusion of Malayan fighting against the Japanese.

[Justin · Rating 5 out of 5]

This was an incredibly interesting book that was hard to put down. After reading “The Tiger’s Revenge” by Evan Morris which whet my appetite, I wanted to find a comprehensive history of the fall of Malaya in 1941-1942. I struggled to find what I wanted, until I came across this volume tucked away in my library, and it proved to be exactly what I was after. This 2005 book by Colin Smith is comprehensively researched, including lots of Japanese perspectives, and frankly thrillingly told. It is also an incredible tragedy. It was a total disaster for the British and Commonwealth.

The attack on Malaya and Singapore actually preceded the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor by a number of hours, but the international dateline meant that they took place on 8 December rather than Pearl Habor’s 7 December. And just over two months later, Singapore would surrender, with the British and Commonwealth forces driven relentlessly down the Malayan peninsula.

Needless to say, the British and Commonwealth completely underestimated the Japanese. Racism meant that they assumed the Japanese couldn’t fight at night as they supposedly weren’t able to see in the dark, and they were unable to produce modern aircraft. The Japanese attained air supremacy very quickly as a result, with the obsolete British and Commonwealth aircraft completely outmatched.

The Japanese gained naval supremacy very quickly too with the sinking of HMS Prince of Wales, the most modern battleship in the Royal Navy, and HMS Repulse. This was partly down to bad luck (the first torpedo hit where the propeller shaft exited the hull), arrogance (the Japanese did not have torpedo bombers), and stupidity (maintaining radio silence an hour into the attack long after they had been located by Japanese reconnaissance aircraft instead of asking for air cover). Several chapters were devoted to this dramatic battle between the two British capital ships and about 90 Japanese bombers.

The Japanese dominated on land too. Their general, Yamashita, had spent a lot of time in Germany learning about blitzkrieg, and attacked aggressively with tanks and infantry and amphibious landings, bypassing holdups and advancing relentlessly, sowing confusion and panic among his enemy. The British and Commonwealth forces mostly disintegrated in the face of this. The standard response to a Japanese attack was to retreat, usually in disarray, too often abandoning heavy equipment, and thereby losing the one advantage they had with their initial artillery superiority. And defensive positions were rarely prepared in advance because it was considered bad for morale.

And it was really interesting to see how variably the British and Commonwealth forces performed. Sometimes they fought really well, and sometimes they collapsed immediately, and sometimes the same units could do both at different times - it seems largely to have been a question of leadership.

The final chapters deal with the “besiegement” itself - it was bad for morale to refer to a siege of Singapore, so “siege” was censored, but “besiegement” was okay. There was really no way to recover by this point, but collapse happened very quickly, and after some tough fighting by some units, but with some - the Australians - disintegrating almost immediately. Gangs of drunk Australian deserters roamed the city and tried to hijack ships to escape on at gunpoint. But this largely seems to have come down to bad leadership.

And then the tragedy of capture, surrender, and imprisonment followed. The Japanese were variable in their handling of captives. Often there were massacres, but occasionally prisoners were well-treated.

And given the complete inability for the British to protect Malaya and its non-white citizens, it was clear that it would only be a matter of time before postwar British rule would end.

A fascinating, riveting and dramatic story. This book is highly recommended.

[Monty Milne · Rating 5 out of 5]

Superb stuff, although it gets off to a slow start with some slightly over-detailed personal accounts of life in the pre-war colony. But the account of the campaign is utterly gripping and very easy to follow.

The fall of Singapore was the worst and most humiliating defeat suffered by the British Empire in the whole of the twentieth century. This made me think very deeply about who was really responsible. I had always imagined General Percival to be the villain of the piece – even as a child, I remember feeling angry as I looked at photographs of this odd looking, lanky, buck toothed man with his spindly legs in unflattering shorts. He cannot be absolved of all blame, but the real picture is more nuanced. Yes, we had three times as many men as the Japanese, but our entire logistic tail was bunched up in Singapore, whereas Yamashita’s stretched out for hundreds of miles. In numbers of effective combatants, the discrepancy was not quite so great. And the Japanese had complete air superiority.

The role of Indian nationalists in undermining morale in some Indian regiments is considered. I think it is more remarkable that so many Indian soldiers fought with such bravery and tenacity, given the political situation in India. Some regiments had a long and proud tradition, but others were the household troops of princely maharajahs, teenage boys with inadequate training and equipment. No wonder that sometimes their morale was brittle.

The bravery and determination of the Japanese is given its due. For me, the real villain became clear: General Gordon Bennett, commander of the 8th Australian Division. The rapid collapse of Singapore island was entirely due to his disastrous dispositions, deliberate disobeying of Percival’s orders, appointment of useless subordinates, and sacking of good subordinates he disliked. He compounded this by running away and abandoning his men. For this he was promoted. He should have been shot.

This humiliating episode was painful to read about, but it gave me a much clearer understanding of the conflict. Despite the book’s considerable length, at no point – except perhaps in the opening chapters – did I feel things drag. The maps and illustrations are also excellent.

[James Holtby · Rating 5 out of 5]

The second book I read in China was Colin Smith's 'Singapore Burning'. Smith's book follows what is commonly seen as the worst defeat in British military history, as a sizable force of Commonwealth soldiers, supported by some of the most famous ships of the Royal Navy, were humiliated by a smaller, but more determined, Japanese force. However, as with all infamous events, there are many misconceptions about the fall of Singapore. Smith takes aim at these myths, as he not only highlights the factors that are commonly overlooked, such as Japanese air superiority and the political concerns that clouted British decision making in the first days, but he also methodically explores why those on the ground made the decisions they did. It serves as a useful reminder for us armchair historians, who commonly use the benefit of hindsight to judge too harshly the war-weary warriors who were forced to make snap-decisions.

I have to say that this one of the best books I have ever read; I found myself racing through several chapters at a time. Whereas other non-fiction books will briefly set the scene with a succinct outline of the environment, Smith is unbashful with his enthralling descriptions of Singapore's open vistas and claustrophobic jungles. Playing on the farcical mishaps, some befitting of a Greek tragedy, that plagued the British forces in their defeat at the 'Gibraltar of the East', Smith is able to create a compelling narrative, which acknowledges both tragedy and black comedy.

I would highly recommend this somewhat intimidating looking book for anyone who has previously struggled to engage with non-fiction. It is truly a hidden gem of Second World War non-fiction.

[Ash · Rating 4 out of 5]

Its a fine book, excellent account of the British side of the conflict. Talking about the various engagements, the chaos surrounding the men and the terrors they faced. How they were let down by various factors which demonstrated why they lost.

However, it really is a book just about the british. There is close to no deliberate attempts at exploring the planning of the Japanese or the thoughts, behaviour or attitude of the locals. Such case are like Lt Adnan Said who was given only a short paragraph. I was disappointed as the book is about 500 odd pages long and some parts could be repurposed to explore other areas of the battle.

This is also by no means a light read and does get draggy at times. I wouldnt recommend this book to someone who is looking for a comprehensive overview of the battle. But if you are looking to explore the British view, this would be an excellent read.

[Chris Royals · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellently written and a real page turner. Smith clearly explains that Perceval’s force was likely doomed from the moment Japan declared war, its fate sealed by the destruction of Force Z and the obsolescence of the RAF. The collapse at Singapore is told in vivid detail, and Gordon Bennett gets the shoeing he so richly deserves

[Steven Wong · Rating 3 out of 5]

A very detailed account on the fighting in Malaya and Singapore.
A hard read most times though as the prose is abit long and confusing.
Still definitely a worthwhile read for the historical perspective.

[Ian Willey · Rating 4 out of 5]

Good account though painful to read of the mistakes and blunders at times

[Sue Maycock · Rating 4 out of 5]

Having read a number of other books on the fall of Singapore, to date I found this one different in that the author had researched the Japanese perspective from accounts noted by those involved on their side, presenting the facts in a well balanced way. There was also a lot more detail on specific sorties that took place during the fall of Malaya prior to that of Singapore, and the names of the various regiments and individuals involved. However nothing can change the fact that this was one of the more heinous chapters in recent history and is reflected in every book and account I have read. The steadfastness and bravery of so many people during this time is truly humbling and should never be forgotten.

[Lachlan Gunn · Rating 5 out of 5]

I have long had an interest in what happened in Malaya and Singapore during the WW2 campaign, and have read numerous books on the subject, many of which are now out of print. I enjoyed this book because of the freshness of its approach - it is incredibly well-researched, and really does bring history back to life. Highly recommended for those with an interest in military history and/or in what really happened in Malaya and Singapore as they fell to the Japanese Army.

[Jason · Rating 4 out of 5]

Tremendous account of the "worst disaster."

[Trinity · Rating 3 out of 5]

Gripping story but the brutal ness made it a difficult book to read. The emotions came through strongly.

[Fredrick Danysh · Rating 3 out of 5]

An interesting history of the development, growth, and fall of Singapore as a British colony. The lives of men who had a great influence on the colony are examined. This was an interesting read.