At a glance, this book may appear to be a follow-up to the author's mega-hit The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. In fact, this book consists of one 60-page essay on the titular theme, of which about 40 pages is a recapitulation of his well-known general theory of how public opinion properly functions in a constitutional democracy. Another 40 pages of the book consists of an interview and a short essay on related topics that have already been published.
That leaves the author 20 pages to deal in a meaningful way with how the transformation of media culture in the last 50 years has impacted public deliberation. The topic is far too complex to deal with in that space, and the author makes a number of crude generalizations that deform his analysis. For example, he introduces a concept of novel digital media without properly defining what it characterizes, and he does not seem to distinguish consistently between, say, traditional media outlets such as Der Spiegel or The New York Times offered online versus wholly-online media outlets such as Politico or Buzzfeed versus social media posts and completely unedited content that bears a superficial resemblance to traditional news, such as blog posts or Medium articles.
When he goes on to critique digital media for lacking the social and legal responsibility for proper editing and fact-checking, he appears to be referring to a subset of these sources, as The New York Times remains responsible for its content, whether it's provided online or in print.
The general picture is one of very high level generalizations and assumptions, and some of them simply feel to me to be statements of personal preference of a fairly luddite character, such as when he asserts on page 49 that print media "presumably" elicits a greater degree of focus and attention from its reader than online media.
The two primary novel theoretic contributions I extracted from this moderately-jumbled work both have to do with Habermas's reliance on a distinction between an ordered and regulated public sphere, on the one hand, in which self-interested actors compete in the formation of public opinion according to certain understood rules, such as that all actors in principle have equal weight, and that factual claims are susceptible to falsifiability, and the private "life-world" of values and interests, on the other hand, in which people are free to make their own private determinations according to their own dictates.
His first argument is that what has been called "surveillance capitalism", or the procedure of mining information about how online users operate as a kind of product, represents a novel attempt to exploit and capitalize the life-world, which Habermas views as intrinsically objectionable - I am inclined to agree.
His second argument is that the various ways in which the factual presentation of news has become mixed with personal statements of opinion, such as the propagation of news via social media, blurs the public's understanding that the life-world of personal preference and the public sphere must operate according to different rules, and has encouraged the widespread perception that the facts themselves are a matter of personal preference. This has contributed to the rise of competing public spheres which accept different basic facts about the world, such as, for example, whether or not Joe Biden was legitimately elected President of the United States.
A democracy, Habermas argues, cannot properly function with multiple public spheres. The whole point of a public sphere is that it is a commons where everyone comes together to deliberate and advocate for their preferences, and if people find themselves within separate enclosed echo-chambers of deliberation, then the common basis for extending and recognizing equality of rights and for demanding that claims much meet certain standards to qualify as legitimate starts to break down.
That the polity in many modern democracies has become fractured to an unprecedented degree is a simple fact, and it is obvious that digital media is part of the story, but the exact nature of its role is a matter for empirical investigation, and it is not easy to summarize. I don't think Habermas has particularly succeeded in making a case that he has found the story of what has happened, and some of his empirical statements lead me to seriously question his judgment. For example, in the short titular essay he stated not once but twice that the events on January 6 in the United States are ultimately rooted in the widespread perception of the American polity that elite interests no longer hear or represent them.
This strikes me as plainly ignorant, especially in the face of what we've learned from the extensive January 6 hearings conducted by the US House. The Proud Boys did not plan a seditious conspiracy to interrupt the legitimate functioning of American democracy because they felt there was a deficit of representation. On the contrary, they sought to ensure a less representative form of centralized control, and this was in fact what President Trump himself explicitly called for.
As many critics have argued over the years, it's also hard to take Habermas's ideal conditions for a public sphere completely seriously, especially when he contrasts the newfangled media the kids are reading on their phones with what seems to me to be an idealized conception of how things used to operate, when the news was on paper and was produced by professionals with high editorial standards and a commitment to the unbiased truth. Last time I checked, the physical newspaper with the largest readership in Germany was the trash tabloid BILD. It seems to me that there have always been stark differences of opinion regarding the basic facts.
Furthermore, his normative theory would seem to require a degree of epistemic homogeneity in the public that is not feasible in reality, and in fact may not be particularly desirable. To some degree the cacophony we hear today is the result of different points of view crowding in with different assumptions, and some of these voices haven't been locked out historically because they weren't properly reasoned, but because they were articulated by marginalized voices whose views were eo ipso disqualified.
There is a lot that could be said in answer to any of these points, but there was no room to do so in this short, short book. I am a big fan of Habermas, but this essay does not see him at his best.