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World of the Right
220 pages, Paperback
Published June 27, 2024
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About the author
Rita Abrahamsen
9 books8 followersRita Abrahamsen is in the Department of International Relations, University of Wales, Aberystwyth.
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
February 8, 2025
global hierarchy and conflict seminar, good read.
July 27, 2025
World of The Right is about said world in two senses of the word. It is about the political and intellectual sociology of the radical right, especially that realm populated by intellectuals and entrepreneurs of ideas- those who write and print books, and those who run think tanks. This is also a book about the ‘worlding’ efforts undertaken by the radical right, that is, their Gramscian ‘war of position’ to challenge the globalist liberal multicultural status quo. Abrahamsen & co argues that it is this global social network of the radical right and its attention to metapolitics that underlies its surge in the contemporary world. By metapolitics, the authors refer to a politics that aims to “denaturalise’ the egalitarian categories and universalist claims of the Left, and reshape public debates on a theoretical meta-level by rearticulating the ideas, concepts, and meanings which people use to make sense of and define the world around them” (p. 49). In other words, contrary to the anti-intellectual branding of many populist leaders (e.g., Trump, Bolsonaro, or Duterte), the undercurrents that led to their rising is nothing but intellectual. The radical right fought the culture wars not because they think it's the best distraction or they don’t have capital elsewhere (as some smug liberals put it), but that they believe the purpose of whole exercise is about changing “the predominant common sense” (p. 108).
This very compact book also makes two other overarching arguments. First, the radical right is global, in that the global “is a crucial part of the radical Right’s intellectual foundations and political strategies” (p. 3). The second is that, the global right is disparate and may have ideological or interest incompatibilities, but what drew them together is a common opposition to a global managerial regime that produces the globalisation of liberal and ‘hedonistic’ norms, as well as a liberal managerial elite class that usurp national vales, traditions, and interests because they owe no allegiance to any of those. These arguments are convincing and true, especially from an Anglo-European angle. The radical right there bounces off each other’s energy, relishes in mounting a networked counter-movement, and definitely sees the globalist technocrats as their sworn enemy (hence the anti-vax movement is also strongest in places that made the best vaccines, for exp).
But reading it as someone from a Muslim state setting, the picture is a bit messier. Sure, anti-liberal globalism is very much part of the intellectual fabric of the Islamists or Muslim nationalists. Still, as a political strategy it’s not entirely clear they wish to, or even have the space to, connect with the broader right that is patently Islamophobic. For the Muslim far right, the ‘global’ is still very much something they must retreat from, even if the global right’s fortune is on the rise.
Second, it’s not entirely the case that in the Global South the technocratic elites can be so easily categorisable as a distinctive object of right-wing animus. Movements such as India’s BJP, which have captured a substantial part of the middle-class support, have, by definiton, won over many of the technocrats. This is because the formation of the technocratic class in many postcolonial states is gradually severed from a liberal sociology. For example, the Islamisation of Malaysia’s professional class (many of whom received a Western education) meant the technocracy became an asset instead of a liability for far-right elements. They are routes to institutional capture, means for social respect, and the basis for revenue generation (middle-class jobs pay better, naturally). In these settings, being conservative does not preclude one from enjoying the comforts of technocrat life, and certainly not an obstacle to the pursuit of ultra right-wing goals.
Unsurprisingly, DOGE is not a thing in many of these settings. It certainly did not happen after the BJP got into power in India (in Turkiye, Erdogan’s post-2016 purge was also more about weeding his former ally, the Gulenists). Many of these societies do not distrust the state like the American radical right does. Formation of the conservative technocratic elite In Malaysia, for example, are very much dependent on the state’s largesse. The only similarity across the global right is really this: the relentless taming of the university. Malaysia has done this since 70s. Both Modi and Erdogan have done this more recently. It is as if the radical right knew (rightly) the only way it could sustain its epistemic dominance is through demolishing places that can check them for rigour. The fact that most of the institutional reforms pushed by progressives did not involve safeguarding rigour at the university (admittedly, many ‘decolonial’ scholarship are lacking in it too) is a massive oversight.
Not wanting to keep this review too long, I guess the final question to ask is where to go from this book’s meticulously documented, beautifully written, and globally expansive insights? On the political question of what is to be done, it is hard to say. The book never pretends to have a definitive answer as to why the global right is rising. This is, after all, a book about the world of the right and not the victory of it. If it’s all about the metapolitics, is it merely a case of better organisation and messaging, or is it something truly meta-, that liberal modernity has to be ditched for something else because it’s deemed not fit-for-purpose by so many? Is the way forward structural change that already has its intellectual basis in many strands of progressive thought, or do the sociology or ideology of progressivism itself need to change? Do we (the Left) need to convince the (left-liberal) elites of the need for social change, or do we achieve social change by changing the elites?
On the intellectual question of where to go from this perceptive and comprehensive analysis, I can suggest two, none of which is a critique of the book. First, if this book is about how the global right conjures a united front despite its incoherence and incompatibilities, future works should be about unpacking the disjointedness within the radical right. Given the rapid expansion of its base, not least the transnational and even cross-racial and cross-class nature of its appeal, surely differences exist, even if they are suppressed. How they are suppressed and at what cost is key to explaining the rise, and perhaps even the downfall, of the radical right.
Second, I would love to see this portrayal of the radical right- “a consciously traditionalist and reactionary anti-Enlightenment current that emerged as a response to the breakdown of pre-modern visions of political order underpinned by Providence” (p. 23), which appears to be a feature that truly defines the radical right globally, being stress-tested. One may ask, does it explain every aspect of the radical right, including technolibertarianism (which fulfils the radical right label by being both illiberal and right-wing in thought) that emerges as a potent force, especially in the US (Thiel, Musk, Andreessen) and the UK (Cummings)? If not, how do we account for these forces that are so facilitative of the radical right’s political fortune?
Another point to consider is what role religion plays in all this. Traditionalism (with a capital ‘T’) can be reverential to some religions and dismissive of others. Certain radical right-wing movements come with upsurges in piety; see the Hindu and Muslim nationalists. But others, even as they invoke a religious heritage (such as Christianity amongst the Western right), are 'paganistic' in their icons, followers, and even conduct.
Finally, if anti-Enlightenment is truly the goal, where does this lead us? With supercharged developments in tech and AI, and radical right power players (even if not their bases or intellectuals) seemingly hatred of the degrowth movement, are the limits of anti-Enlightenment really just about the smashing of the humanities and vaccination? And the rest of it is just racism and misogyny? If that’s the case, the world of the right isn’t very different from the world many of us have been living in.
This very compact book also makes two other overarching arguments. First, the radical right is global, in that the global “is a crucial part of the radical Right’s intellectual foundations and political strategies” (p. 3). The second is that, the global right is disparate and may have ideological or interest incompatibilities, but what drew them together is a common opposition to a global managerial regime that produces the globalisation of liberal and ‘hedonistic’ norms, as well as a liberal managerial elite class that usurp national vales, traditions, and interests because they owe no allegiance to any of those. These arguments are convincing and true, especially from an Anglo-European angle. The radical right there bounces off each other’s energy, relishes in mounting a networked counter-movement, and definitely sees the globalist technocrats as their sworn enemy (hence the anti-vax movement is also strongest in places that made the best vaccines, for exp).
But reading it as someone from a Muslim state setting, the picture is a bit messier. Sure, anti-liberal globalism is very much part of the intellectual fabric of the Islamists or Muslim nationalists. Still, as a political strategy it’s not entirely clear they wish to, or even have the space to, connect with the broader right that is patently Islamophobic. For the Muslim far right, the ‘global’ is still very much something they must retreat from, even if the global right’s fortune is on the rise.
Second, it’s not entirely the case that in the Global South the technocratic elites can be so easily categorisable as a distinctive object of right-wing animus. Movements such as India’s BJP, which have captured a substantial part of the middle-class support, have, by definiton, won over many of the technocrats. This is because the formation of the technocratic class in many postcolonial states is gradually severed from a liberal sociology. For example, the Islamisation of Malaysia’s professional class (many of whom received a Western education) meant the technocracy became an asset instead of a liability for far-right elements. They are routes to institutional capture, means for social respect, and the basis for revenue generation (middle-class jobs pay better, naturally). In these settings, being conservative does not preclude one from enjoying the comforts of technocrat life, and certainly not an obstacle to the pursuit of ultra right-wing goals.
Unsurprisingly, DOGE is not a thing in many of these settings. It certainly did not happen after the BJP got into power in India (in Turkiye, Erdogan’s post-2016 purge was also more about weeding his former ally, the Gulenists). Many of these societies do not distrust the state like the American radical right does. Formation of the conservative technocratic elite In Malaysia, for example, are very much dependent on the state’s largesse. The only similarity across the global right is really this: the relentless taming of the university. Malaysia has done this since 70s. Both Modi and Erdogan have done this more recently. It is as if the radical right knew (rightly) the only way it could sustain its epistemic dominance is through demolishing places that can check them for rigour. The fact that most of the institutional reforms pushed by progressives did not involve safeguarding rigour at the university (admittedly, many ‘decolonial’ scholarship are lacking in it too) is a massive oversight.
Not wanting to keep this review too long, I guess the final question to ask is where to go from this book’s meticulously documented, beautifully written, and globally expansive insights? On the political question of what is to be done, it is hard to say. The book never pretends to have a definitive answer as to why the global right is rising. This is, after all, a book about the world of the right and not the victory of it. If it’s all about the metapolitics, is it merely a case of better organisation and messaging, or is it something truly meta-, that liberal modernity has to be ditched for something else because it’s deemed not fit-for-purpose by so many? Is the way forward structural change that already has its intellectual basis in many strands of progressive thought, or do the sociology or ideology of progressivism itself need to change? Do we (the Left) need to convince the (left-liberal) elites of the need for social change, or do we achieve social change by changing the elites?
On the intellectual question of where to go from this perceptive and comprehensive analysis, I can suggest two, none of which is a critique of the book. First, if this book is about how the global right conjures a united front despite its incoherence and incompatibilities, future works should be about unpacking the disjointedness within the radical right. Given the rapid expansion of its base, not least the transnational and even cross-racial and cross-class nature of its appeal, surely differences exist, even if they are suppressed. How they are suppressed and at what cost is key to explaining the rise, and perhaps even the downfall, of the radical right.
Second, I would love to see this portrayal of the radical right- “a consciously traditionalist and reactionary anti-Enlightenment current that emerged as a response to the breakdown of pre-modern visions of political order underpinned by Providence” (p. 23), which appears to be a feature that truly defines the radical right globally, being stress-tested. One may ask, does it explain every aspect of the radical right, including technolibertarianism (which fulfils the radical right label by being both illiberal and right-wing in thought) that emerges as a potent force, especially in the US (Thiel, Musk, Andreessen) and the UK (Cummings)? If not, how do we account for these forces that are so facilitative of the radical right’s political fortune?
Another point to consider is what role religion plays in all this. Traditionalism (with a capital ‘T’) can be reverential to some religions and dismissive of others. Certain radical right-wing movements come with upsurges in piety; see the Hindu and Muslim nationalists. But others, even as they invoke a religious heritage (such as Christianity amongst the Western right), are 'paganistic' in their icons, followers, and even conduct.
Finally, if anti-Enlightenment is truly the goal, where does this lead us? With supercharged developments in tech and AI, and radical right power players (even if not their bases or intellectuals) seemingly hatred of the degrowth movement, are the limits of anti-Enlightenment really just about the smashing of the humanities and vaccination? And the rest of it is just racism and misogyny? If that’s the case, the world of the right isn’t very different from the world many of us have been living in.
March 10, 2025
Excellent and comprehensive overview of the roots, reasoning, and links between the global radical-right/conservatism movement. My favourite aspect is how it illustrated the ins/outs of contemporary right-wing populist movements. Namely, that despite massive differences in national visions, conservative movements share similar discursive framings of the ‘people’ vs the ‘elite.’ Right-wing movements have often been described as going against internationalism, which is true in their messaging but as this book shows, not in practice. Rather, the rise of conservatism is deeply tied with a global imaginary and a vision of where the nation fits into that vis-a-vis other states and international organizations. Took me a while to read because I didn’t have my kindle, and picking it back up post inauguration was somewhat depressing…
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews