Moral Psychology, Volume 3: The Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Brain Disorders, and Development

by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Editor)

For much of the twentieth century, philosophy and science went their separate ways. In moral philosophy, fear of the so-called naturalistic fallacy kept moral philosophers from incorporating developments in biology and psychology. Since the 1990s, however, many philosophers have drawn on recent advances in cognitive psychology, brain science, and evolutionary psychology to inform their work. This collaborative trend is especially strong in moral philosophy, and these three volumes bring together some of the most innovative work by both philosophers and psychologists in this emerging interdisciplinary field. The neuroscience of morality is in its infancy, with the first brain imaging studies of moral development undertaken only in 2001. The contributors to volume 3 sample the best work in this very new field, discussing a variety of approaches, including functional imaging, lesion studies, abnormal psychology, and developmental neuroscience. Each chapter includes an essay, comments on the essay by other scholars, and a reply by the author(s) of the original essay. Topics include the neural basis of moral emotions and moral judgments as well as comparisons of normal adult moral judgments with those made by children, adolescents, and people with psychopathy, brain damage, and autism.
Contributors to Volume 3
Abigail Baird, William Casebeer, Cordelia Fine, Nathan Fox, Uta Frith, Jordan Grafman, Joshua Greene, Catherine Hynes, Fatima Azavedo Ignacio, Richard Joyce, Jerome Kagan, Leonard Katz, Kent Kiehl, Jeanette Kennett, Melanie Killen, Daniel Lapsley, Heidi Maibom, Victoria McGeer, John Mikhail, Jorge Moll, Shaun Nichols, Ricardo de Oliveira-Souza, Adina Roskies, Jana Schaich Borg, Katrina Sifferd, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Michael Smith, Mark Timmons, Frederick de Vignemont, Paul Whalen, Roland Zahn

Genres: Philosophy, Psychology, Neuroscience

569 pages, Paperback

First published October 19, 2007

About the author

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (born 1955) is an American philosopher specializing in ethics, epistemology, neuroethics, the philosophy of law, and the philosophy of cognitive science. He is a Professor of Practical Ethics in the Department of Philosophy and the Kenan Institute for Ethics at Duke University.

Reviews

[Miles · Rating 5 out of 5]

This was probably my favorite volume in this three-part series. I find moral psychology fascinating, and these books provided an excellent introduction to the field. I now feel like I have a fair grasp on the central issues that will shape future inquiries about the nature of moral assertions, systems, and judgments.

This particular volume, which focuses on neuroscience, did a great job of bringing the conversation on to concrete, empirical grounds. The implications of psychopathy and autism for morality were especially fascinating, as were the articles that described the moral development of children and adolescents. One of the issues I still don't feel like I understand is the problem of internalism: whether or not the act of making a moral judgment is both necessary and sufficient to motivate the agent to moral action. I think I understand the general idea, but I'm unable to figure out why it is a central subject of debate. The proposition that moral judgments should or could be enough to motivate moral behavior seems, to me, obviously false. I also don't buy the suggestion that if a judgment is not motivating, it cannot be moral. The contradictions between our judgments and actions in moral life seem too conspicuous and widespread to miss, which leads me to conclude that perhaps I am missing something about why the issue of internalism, which seems wildly implausible to me, would be such an important part of the discussion.

I was intrigued by the idea of moral skepticism, which arrives toward the end of this volume. Should we simply give up searching for any kind of objective morality because the word "moral" it too problematic, or should we strive to curb our use and understanding of the term to better suit our continuing discoveries about the way humans make moral decisions and operate as moral agents? I tend toward the latter proposal, but I can understand why skeptics may want to abandon "morality," especially given my sympathies with the notion that the universe is amoral and all "values" are constructed. Still, I also feel inclined to accept the program of using hedonic principles to ground terrestrial value systems. I definitely balk at the suggestion that simply knowing another being will experience pain is enough to motivate me to do everything (or anything) I can to alleviate that pain, but I also concede that such thoughts play a key role in the constructions and maintenance of healthy human communities. So I am genuinely conflicted here.

Favorite articles:

"The Secret Joke of Kant's Soul"––Joshua D. Greene
"Varieties of Moral Agency: Lessons from Autism (and Psychopathy)"––Victoria McGeer
"Morality and Its Development"––Jerome Kagan
"Adolescent Moral Reasoning: The Integration of Emotion and Cognition"––Abigail A. Baird
"What Neuroscience Can (and Cannot) Contribute to Metaethics"––Richard Joyce