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La Revolución Rusa
La historia de la Unión Soviética (1917-1991) se transformó de manera vertiginosa en las últimas décadas. Los historiadores, hasta hace poco limitados a usar la escasa información oficial, cuentan ahora con el valioso auxilio de los archivos, admirablemente conservados, que día a día se abren para la investigación. A la vez, el derrumbe del régimen soviético invita a mirar su pasado con una visión menos orientada a buscar en él la prefiguración del mundo futuro que a rastrear, en ese corto siglo de existencia, el desarrollo acelerado de procesos característicos de toda la historia occidental: la industrialización, la urbanización, la transformación agraria, el desarrollo educativo y, sobre todo, la construcción de un estado nacional.
Sheila Fitzpatrick, una de las mayores autoridades sobre historia soviética, autora de estudios innovadores acerca del período estalinista, ha elaborado en LA REVOLUCIÓN RUSA una síntesis comprensiva, sólidamente sustentada en los últimos avances historiográficos, en la que combina viejas y nuevas preguntas. Una de ellas da el título a su libro: ¿cuándo terminó la revolución soviética? La historiadora elige el ambiguo momento de vísperas de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, cuando el régimen estalinista proclamó la victoria de la revolución y el comienzo de la normalidad, en momentos en que iniciaba la más profunda “purga”, que conllevó la matanza de la primera camada de dirigentes revolucionarios.
Sheila Fitzpatrick, una de las mayores autoridades sobre historia soviética, autora de estudios innovadores acerca del período estalinista, ha elaborado en LA REVOLUCIÓN RUSA una síntesis comprensiva, sólidamente sustentada en los últimos avances historiográficos, en la que combina viejas y nuevas preguntas. Una de ellas da el título a su libro: ¿cuándo terminó la revolución soviética? La historiadora elige el ambiguo momento de vísperas de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, cuando el régimen estalinista proclamó la victoria de la revolución y el comienzo de la normalidad, en momentos en que iniciaba la más profunda “purga”, que conllevó la matanza de la primera camada de dirigentes revolucionarios.
240 pages, Paperback
First published November 24, 1982
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About the author
Sheila Fitzpatrick
48 books165 followersSheila Fitzpatrick (born June 4, 1941, Melbourne) is an Australian-American historian. She teaches Soviet History at the University of Chicago.
Fitzpatrick's research focuses on the social and cultural history of the Stalinist period, particularly on aspects of social identity and daily life. She is currently concentrating on the social and cultural changes in Soviet Russia of the 1950s and 1960s.
In her early work, Sheila Fitzpatrick focused on the theme of social mobility, suggesting that the opportunity for the working class to rise socially and as a new elite had been instrumental in legitimizing the regime during the Stalinist period. Despite its brutality, Stalinism as a political culture would have achieved the goals of the democratic revolution. The center of attention was always focused on the victims of the purges rather than its beneficiaries, noted the historian. Yet as a consequence of the "Great Purge", thousands of workers and communists who had access to the technical colleges during the first five-year plan received promotions to positions in industry, government and the leadership of the Communist Party.
According to Fitzpatrick, the "cultural revolution" of the late 1920 and the purges which shook the scientific, literary, artistic and the industrial communities is explained in part by a "class struggle" against executives and intellectual "bourgeois". The men who rose in the 1930s played an active role to get rid of former leaders who blocked their own promotion, and the "Great Turn" found its origins in initiatives from the bottom rather than the decisions of the summit. In this vision, Stalinist policy based on social forces and offered a response to popular radicalism, which allowed the existence of a partial consensus between the regime and society in the 1930s.
Fitzpatrick was the leader of the second generation of "revisionist historians". She was the first to call the group of Sovietologists working on Stalinism in the 1980s "a new cohort of [revisionist] historians".
Fitzpatrick called for a social history that did not address political issues, in other words that adhered strictly to a "from below" viewpoint. This was justified by the idea that the university had been strongly conditioned to see everything through the prism of the state: "the social processes unrelated to the intervention of the state is virtually absent from the literature." Fitzpatrick did not deny that the state's role in social change of the 1930s was huge. However, she defended the practice of social history "without politics". Most young "revisionists" did not want to separate the social history of the USSR from the evolution of the political system.
Fitzpatrick explained in the 1980s, when the "totalitarian model" was still widely used, "it was very useful to show that the model had an inherent bias and it did not explain everything about Soviet society. Now, whereas a new generation of academics considers sometimes as self evident that the totalitarian model was completely erroneous and harmful, it is perhaps more useful to show than there were certain things about the Soviet company that it explained very well."
Fitzpatrick's research focuses on the social and cultural history of the Stalinist period, particularly on aspects of social identity and daily life. She is currently concentrating on the social and cultural changes in Soviet Russia of the 1950s and 1960s.
In her early work, Sheila Fitzpatrick focused on the theme of social mobility, suggesting that the opportunity for the working class to rise socially and as a new elite had been instrumental in legitimizing the regime during the Stalinist period. Despite its brutality, Stalinism as a political culture would have achieved the goals of the democratic revolution. The center of attention was always focused on the victims of the purges rather than its beneficiaries, noted the historian. Yet as a consequence of the "Great Purge", thousands of workers and communists who had access to the technical colleges during the first five-year plan received promotions to positions in industry, government and the leadership of the Communist Party.
According to Fitzpatrick, the "cultural revolution" of the late 1920 and the purges which shook the scientific, literary, artistic and the industrial communities is explained in part by a "class struggle" against executives and intellectual "bourgeois". The men who rose in the 1930s played an active role to get rid of former leaders who blocked their own promotion, and the "Great Turn" found its origins in initiatives from the bottom rather than the decisions of the summit. In this vision, Stalinist policy based on social forces and offered a response to popular radicalism, which allowed the existence of a partial consensus between the regime and society in the 1930s.
Fitzpatrick was the leader of the second generation of "revisionist historians". She was the first to call the group of Sovietologists working on Stalinism in the 1980s "a new cohort of [revisionist] historians".
Fitzpatrick called for a social history that did not address political issues, in other words that adhered strictly to a "from below" viewpoint. This was justified by the idea that the university had been strongly conditioned to see everything through the prism of the state: "the social processes unrelated to the intervention of the state is virtually absent from the literature." Fitzpatrick did not deny that the state's role in social change of the 1930s was huge. However, she defended the practice of social history "without politics". Most young "revisionists" did not want to separate the social history of the USSR from the evolution of the political system.
Fitzpatrick explained in the 1980s, when the "totalitarian model" was still widely used, "it was very useful to show that the model had an inherent bias and it did not explain everything about Soviet society. Now, whereas a new generation of academics considers sometimes as self evident that the totalitarian model was completely erroneous and harmful, it is perhaps more useful to show than there were certain things about the Soviet company that it explained very well."
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 232 reviews
March 11, 2009
This is a critical but not "commie-bashing" view of the leading up to and implementation of the Russian revolution. It's a quick, coherent read. I liked it. Leninists wouldn't. Stalinists would hate it. Here's what I wrote for class:
Fitzpatrick articulates tThe major impediment the Bolsheviks had to grapple with in the lead up to the revolution, and between February and October of 1917, was the teleological nature of Marxism. As capitalism was not well-established in Russia they believed it was necessary for a revolution of the bourgeoisie to take place first in order to bring about widespread capitalism. Only then could a working class revolution occur to implement socialism and then communism.
Yet events did not unfold in that manner. In the face of a teetering Provisional Government, a right-wing coup attempt and an increasingly militant and independently-mobilizing working class, the Bolsheviks had to act. After an internal debate, they opted for insurrection. Once they became the majority party in the soviets, they also had the legitimacy needed to act. In overthrowing the Provisional Government they either carried out a coup (Fitzpatrick) or defended the revolution against liberal and right-wing betrayal (Deutscher).
Now in power, the Bolsheviks consolidated their rule, creating not a dictatorship of the proletariat but a dictatorship of the Bolshevik party, most of whom were part of the proletariat. They were forced to grapple with maintaining and expanding the revolution in the midst of World War One, fighting a civil war, dealing with economic distress and the realization that proletarian revolution in Europe was not right around the corner. This resulted in the New Economic Policy, followed by Stalin’s industrialization drive in order to establish socialism “in one country,” an effort to ensure Russia’s independence, sustainability and progress toward socialism in a time when no other socialist revolutions seemed likely. It also meant a vicious crackdown on opponents outside of the party, a stifling of intra-party dissent, and a tremendous toll on the peasantry in the seemingly never-ending quest for grain, workers, and socialism.
Fitzpatrick articulates tThe major impediment the Bolsheviks had to grapple with in the lead up to the revolution, and between February and October of 1917, was the teleological nature of Marxism. As capitalism was not well-established in Russia they believed it was necessary for a revolution of the bourgeoisie to take place first in order to bring about widespread capitalism. Only then could a working class revolution occur to implement socialism and then communism.
Yet events did not unfold in that manner. In the face of a teetering Provisional Government, a right-wing coup attempt and an increasingly militant and independently-mobilizing working class, the Bolsheviks had to act. After an internal debate, they opted for insurrection. Once they became the majority party in the soviets, they also had the legitimacy needed to act. In overthrowing the Provisional Government they either carried out a coup (Fitzpatrick) or defended the revolution against liberal and right-wing betrayal (Deutscher).
Now in power, the Bolsheviks consolidated their rule, creating not a dictatorship of the proletariat but a dictatorship of the Bolshevik party, most of whom were part of the proletariat. They were forced to grapple with maintaining and expanding the revolution in the midst of World War One, fighting a civil war, dealing with economic distress and the realization that proletarian revolution in Europe was not right around the corner. This resulted in the New Economic Policy, followed by Stalin’s industrialization drive in order to establish socialism “in one country,” an effort to ensure Russia’s independence, sustainability and progress toward socialism in a time when no other socialist revolutions seemed likely. It also meant a vicious crackdown on opponents outside of the party, a stifling of intra-party dissent, and a tremendous toll on the peasantry in the seemingly never-ending quest for grain, workers, and socialism.
January 14, 2015
This book takes a rational, material analysis of the Russian Revolution. This second edition was released after the Soviet Empire was dissolved and the author had access to the newly opened Soviet archives.
It starts off with explaining the political, economic, and social environment which bore the events of 1917. The real meat of the book though is its detailed analysis of the February and October Revolutions and the resulting Civil War. A fair bit of attention is paid to Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin but only as leaders of the Revolution not a romanticization of them which I find is common in similar books. In these two chapters heavy attention is paid to how the party, and with it the state and its policies are shaped by the Bolshevik Revolution.
With this era contextualized in such a light it helps to explain how the transition to Stalin's policies were taken. While Stalinism isn't an ideological conclusion to Leninism and Marxism, the policies that Lenin created were exploited by Stalin's 'Revolution From Above.' The differences between the various oppositions to Stalin's coup d'etat are also thoroughly explained from their ideological and political differences. Whether or not the USSR would have taken a different turn if it were not for Stalin will forever remain unclear and a historical "what-if."
One of the most interesting parts of this book is how the party leaders had such an ambiguous and often times fluctuating definition of words/phrases like "socialism" and "workers' control." This was a flaw that left these things open for interpretation and ultimately misused or abused later on.
All-in-all, a thorough explanation of early Soviet History and an important read for anyone looking to have a clear, materialist understanding of the Revolution and its ideological underpinnings.
It starts off with explaining the political, economic, and social environment which bore the events of 1917. The real meat of the book though is its detailed analysis of the February and October Revolutions and the resulting Civil War. A fair bit of attention is paid to Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin but only as leaders of the Revolution not a romanticization of them which I find is common in similar books. In these two chapters heavy attention is paid to how the party, and with it the state and its policies are shaped by the Bolshevik Revolution.
With this era contextualized in such a light it helps to explain how the transition to Stalin's policies were taken. While Stalinism isn't an ideological conclusion to Leninism and Marxism, the policies that Lenin created were exploited by Stalin's 'Revolution From Above.' The differences between the various oppositions to Stalin's coup d'etat are also thoroughly explained from their ideological and political differences. Whether or not the USSR would have taken a different turn if it were not for Stalin will forever remain unclear and a historical "what-if."
One of the most interesting parts of this book is how the party leaders had such an ambiguous and often times fluctuating definition of words/phrases like "socialism" and "workers' control." This was a flaw that left these things open for interpretation and ultimately misused or abused later on.
All-in-all, a thorough explanation of early Soviet History and an important read for anyone looking to have a clear, materialist understanding of the Revolution and its ideological underpinnings.
November 25, 2017
Although Sheila Fitzpatrick does not speak as a socialist or leftist, she is definitely not malicious towards the Soviet history and her approach is scientific (I can't say ''neutral'', because such a thing in my opinion does not exist). There are interpretive lines with which I disagree (she repeats the story that the Bolshevik takeover was a coup d'etat, there is also too simplistic equalization of party discipline and unity with authoritarian tendencies, she develops a theses of the continuity between Lenin and Stalin etc.) But actually much can be learned from the book and it's very interesting author's reference to the complexity of the situation (for example with regard to the structure of the Bolshevik Party which was not at all homogeneous and in its dynamics showed variations of the stand and the heterogeneous internal factions etc.)
November 17, 2024
چند نکته:
۱) کتاب، همونطور که از اسمش پیداست در مورد «انقلاب روسیه» است و نه حکومت شوروی و از اونجایی که پایان پاکسازی بزرگ را پایان انقلاب میدونه، به وقایع بعد از اون مثل جنگ جهانی دوم، استالینزدایی و فروپاشی شوروی نمیپردازه.
۲) نویسندهٔ کتاب را میشه یک سوسیالیست تجدیدنظرطلب دونست، و کتاب را هم در همین راستا میشه فهمید. بنابراین تاریخ را نه از دیدگاه ضدکمونیسم و نه از دیدگاه یک کمونیست روایت نمیکنه.
۳) ترجمه و ویراستاری نسخهٔ فارسی بدون ایراد نیستند. ضمن اینکه در زمان ترجمهٔ کتاب، ویرایش سوم و چهارم کتاب هم موجود بوده ولی متأسفانه به دلایل نامعلوم ویرایش دوم ترجمه شده.
در مجموع، کتاب مناسبی است برای تکمیل مطالعات در خصوص انقلاب روسیه و شوروی.
۱) کتاب، همونطور که از اسمش پیداست در مورد «انقلاب روسیه» است و نه حکومت شوروی و از اونجایی که پایان پاکسازی بزرگ را پایان انقلاب میدونه، به وقایع بعد از اون مثل جنگ جهانی دوم، استالینزدایی و فروپاشی شوروی نمیپردازه.
۲) نویسندهٔ کتاب را میشه یک سوسیالیست تجدیدنظرطلب دونست، و کتاب را هم در همین راستا میشه فهمید. بنابراین تاریخ را نه از دیدگاه ضدکمونیسم و نه از دیدگاه یک کمونیست روایت نمیکنه.
۳) ترجمه و ویراستاری نسخهٔ فارسی بدون ایراد نیستند. ضمن اینکه در زمان ترجمهٔ کتاب، ویرایش سوم و چهارم کتاب هم موجود بوده ولی متأسفانه به دلایل نامعلوم ویرایش دوم ترجمه شده.
در مجموع، کتاب مناسبی است برای تکمیل مطالعات در خصوص انقلاب روسیه و شوروی.
September 27, 2017
Not exactly a page-turner, but it's concision and detail are impressive. I figured the centenary of the revolutions of 1917 was as good a time as any to begin my own inevitable, inexorable, inevitably temporary slouch towards Marxism (I'm still in my early 20s, after all).
And what a bizarre revolution, by the way. Say what you will about soviet socialism, at least it's an ideology. Russia, man.
And what a bizarre revolution, by the way. Say what you will about soviet socialism, at least it's an ideology. Russia, man.
September 19, 2023
Fascinating look, if broad and short, into the period preceding, during, and after the November Revolution. Although Fitzpatrick moves through the post-Lenin, pre-WWII years extremely quickly, she is able to demonstrate the clear continuities between Lenin and Stalin's thought and method, as well as the differences in situation and scale.
Fitzpatrick sees that the "Thermidorian" interpretation of Stalin does not hold up to academic scrutiny, and even boldly proposes that the excessive Great Purge could ultimately be a result of professional oppositionists like Trotsky ("Trotsky [stated] that, like Clemenceau during the First World War, he would continue active opposition to the country’s leadership even with the enemy at the gates of the capital. (122)"). With the destruction of the party old guard, rooted in non-proletarian intellectuals, and the ideological molding of a new one through the policy of "proletarian promotion," Fitzpatrick states that "Indeed, it is tempting to go further and suggest that, in enacting a terror (which must precede Thermidor, according to the classic revolutionary sequence, not follow it), Stalin may even have felt that he was definitively rebutting Trotsky’s charge that his rule had led to ‘a Soviet Thermidor’. Who could say that Stalin was a Thermidorian reactionary, a betrayer of revolution, after this demonstration of revolutionary terror that dwarfed even that of the French Revolution?" (171) I would perhaps not go as far as Fitzpatrick, but her work shines light on the fickleness of many of Trotsky and the Left Opposition's critiques going into 1927, and the inability of those individuals (including the Center) to put aside petty clashes of personality to work together on policies largely agreed upon. This is put even more into perspective with Trotsky's international critique of the USSR before the Great Purge: Stalin was largely following the very policies that Trotsky was proposing before his exile, of course under different ideological justifications and changed material conditions, but this of course did not matter to Trotsky or other contrarians.
Fitzpatrick does not absolve Stalin—her line is still harsh towards him, but it is equally harsh towards his critics and the political machinations of the Left Opposition. She is softer towards the Right Opposition, particularly Rykov, but goes into spare detail. If anything, the work could serve to be a bit longer, and with more footnotes where she quotes Engels or various other Marxists.
Fitzpatrick sees that the "Thermidorian" interpretation of Stalin does not hold up to academic scrutiny, and even boldly proposes that the excessive Great Purge could ultimately be a result of professional oppositionists like Trotsky ("Trotsky [stated] that, like Clemenceau during the First World War, he would continue active opposition to the country’s leadership even with the enemy at the gates of the capital. (122)"). With the destruction of the party old guard, rooted in non-proletarian intellectuals, and the ideological molding of a new one through the policy of "proletarian promotion," Fitzpatrick states that "Indeed, it is tempting to go further and suggest that, in enacting a terror (which must precede Thermidor, according to the classic revolutionary sequence, not follow it), Stalin may even have felt that he was definitively rebutting Trotsky’s charge that his rule had led to ‘a Soviet Thermidor’. Who could say that Stalin was a Thermidorian reactionary, a betrayer of revolution, after this demonstration of revolutionary terror that dwarfed even that of the French Revolution?" (171) I would perhaps not go as far as Fitzpatrick, but her work shines light on the fickleness of many of Trotsky and the Left Opposition's critiques going into 1927, and the inability of those individuals (including the Center) to put aside petty clashes of personality to work together on policies largely agreed upon. This is put even more into perspective with Trotsky's international critique of the USSR before the Great Purge: Stalin was largely following the very policies that Trotsky was proposing before his exile, of course under different ideological justifications and changed material conditions, but this of course did not matter to Trotsky or other contrarians.
Fitzpatrick does not absolve Stalin—her line is still harsh towards him, but it is equally harsh towards his critics and the political machinations of the Left Opposition. She is softer towards the Right Opposition, particularly Rykov, but goes into spare detail. If anything, the work could serve to be a bit longer, and with more footnotes where she quotes Engels or various other Marxists.
March 8, 2008
I read this because I realized that the Russian Revolution was just a word in my head and I didn't know any of the details of the actual events. Now I do.
Read
September 28, 2015A shorter summary of the Revolution which is extremely readable.
December 31, 2021
Sheila Fritzpatrick – A Revolução Russa
“Se queres conhecer um vilão põe-lhe um pau na mão”. Ditado popular que se aplica bem à revolução russa, muito em particular à questão de Estaline ser ou não uma continuidade de Lenine. Depois de ler o livro de Sheila Fritzpatrick “A Revolução Russa”, a minha resposta é um claro sim.
Os homens são a sua natureza e as suas circunstâncias. Nunca nenhuma delas de forma isolada. Atribuir a Lenine o dom da oratória em que expressões de “morte aos Mencheviques”, “morte à burguesia”, “morte aos inimigos do proletariado”, negação dos princípios do iluminismo (Liberté, Humanité, Fraternité), imposição de um regime ditatorial (ditadura do proletariado), mais não seriam que metáforas ditas no “calor do discurso”, quando na realidade surgiram como eufemismos do que mais tarde veio a acontecer.
Mas como poderia ser de outro modo, quando Lenine (e Trotsky) foi responsável pelo comportamento do exército vermelho no período da guerra civil (de passagem diga-se em abono da verdade que o do exército branco não primou por uma mais refinada ética de conduta), igualmente responsável pela deriva do regime para uma forma ditatorial (a assembleia constituinte de 2017 foi dissolvida ao fim de poucos meses), por manobras políticas conducentes à eliminação de qualquer opositor durante o X congresso em 1921, no que ficou conhecido como a primeira purga, purga a qual apenas não terminou com a eliminação física dos opositores, tendo no geral sido prenúncio das que lhe sucederam. Com este introito, como não ver apena Estaline como continuidade?
Todas as revoluções têm segundo Crane Brinton (Anatomia de uma Revolução) “um ciclo de vida que passa por um fervor e entusiasmo crescente pela transformação radical até alcançarem um pico máximo de intensidade a que se segue uma fase “termirodiana” caracterizada pelo desencanto, o decréscimo do vigor revolucionário, e as iniciativas impulsionadoras para uma transição gradual para o estabelecimento da ordem e da estabilidade”. A revolução russa passou por estas fases mais do que uma vez, sendo possível identificarem-se 3 destes ciclos.
Liberté, Humanité, Fraternité são palavras de ordem que são usadas como estandartes em todas as revoluções. Todos os revolucionários são fanáticos, sonhadores. Todos fantasiam um mundo novo sem injustiça, e onde a desigualdade do velho mundo não mais terá lugar. Tão imbuídos estão nestas suas convicções que não toleram discordâncias, não aceitam compromissos, e são fascinados por objectivos longínquos nem que para isso tenham que ser violentos e transitoriamente renegarem os valores que apregoam. Tudo se resume a estar com eles ou contra eles. Tudo depois termina em decepção e desilusão.
Na Rússia a revolução surge inicialmente como uma revolta contra um regime autoritário que ainda há pouco tinha dado os primeiros passos para abandonar o regime feudal (Lei dos Servos de 1861 e Revolução de 1905). Ela pode ser vista inicialmente como resultado de uma necessidade de modernização (revolução burguesa de Fevereiro de 1917), para depois se assumir como uma revolução de classe (proletariado) em cuja vanguarda esta o partido bolchevique (Partido Comunista em 1918), numa interpretação liderança vanguardista. O terceiro período inicia-se com a guerra civil. É um período de terror em que os inimigos são sucessivamente eliminados. Mencheviques, Brancos, Burgueses, e todos os outros que de uma forma ou outra se tentaram opor à ditadura do proletariado. Segue-se o que é apontado com a degenerescência “termidoriana” em que se interrompe o período “terror” anterior e se tenta reconstruir. Ainda que como em todas as revoluções, destrói-se mais do que se constrói e o que se constrói é claramente diferente do anterior. Neste período que se terá iniciado em 1921, há a necessidade de se reconstruir um estado para o qual técnicos do anterior regime são utilizados (ainda que com muita desconfiança) e onde a propriedade privada é possível tanto no comercio como na agricultura de subsistência.
Já na era de Estaline em 1927 durante o XV congresso, este vê o seu poder formalmente instituído e reforçado, e o primeiro plano quinquenal com o objectivo da industrialização é implementado. Com este plano entra-se de novo num período revolucionário onde como em qualquer um destes os fins justificam os meios.
Com o segundo plano quinquenal (1933 a 1937) a aposta continuou na indústria pesada, mas houve também um aumento significativo da indústria ligeira de bens de consumo e na produção agrícola foi de novo permitido aos camponeses terem usufruto directo de parte do seu trabalho. Este período de alguma acalmia revolucionária foi interrompido em 1936 pelo que ficou conhecido pela grande purga, período durante o qual o estado de terror retornou e aqui com uma violência nunca antes conhecida pela humanidade.
Sheila Fritzpatrick desenvolve aqui um magnifico trabalho. Consegue de forma isenta e não comprometida traçar-nos, caracterizar-nos e encadear os vários períodos da revolução bolchevique, ficando desde logo claro que os acontecimentos foram o resultado dos homens e das suas circunstâncias.
Sem Lenine nunca teria existido Estaline. Sem Marxismo nunca teria havido Leninismo (bem resumido no documento “Que fazer?” de 1902, onde é reforçada e reiterada a importância do centralismo disciplina rigorosa e unidade ideológica). Sem a criação dos sovietes em 1905, 12 anos antes da revolução de outubro, sem um poder bicéfalo dividido entre governo provisório e sovietes (muito particularmente o de S. Petersburgo, liderado por Trotsky, o profeta armado) , complicado ainda pela existência das Dumas, e dos Zemstvos, estes últimos órgãos não eleitos de administração local), sem o movimento abortado da “contra-revolução” liderada por Lavr Kornilov, sem a existência da Primeira Guerra Mundial, sem um conselho de Sovietes onde Menchevique e Socialistas Revolucionários eram maioritários, mas com uma impressionante inabilidade política e recesso apoio ao governo de Kerensky (que basicamente se opunha ao fim da guerra de forma unilateral e à “entrega das terras aos camponeses sem o envolvimento dos “mir” (aldeia camponesa ou comuna), permitiu ao partido bolchevique assumir o poder não em representação do povo mas em nome do povo.
A revolução russa de Sheila Fitzpatrick, uma magnífica lição de história.
“Se queres conhecer um vilão põe-lhe um pau na mão”. Ditado popular que se aplica bem à revolução russa, muito em particular à questão de Estaline ser ou não uma continuidade de Lenine. Depois de ler o livro de Sheila Fritzpatrick “A Revolução Russa”, a minha resposta é um claro sim.
Os homens são a sua natureza e as suas circunstâncias. Nunca nenhuma delas de forma isolada. Atribuir a Lenine o dom da oratória em que expressões de “morte aos Mencheviques”, “morte à burguesia”, “morte aos inimigos do proletariado”, negação dos princípios do iluminismo (Liberté, Humanité, Fraternité), imposição de um regime ditatorial (ditadura do proletariado), mais não seriam que metáforas ditas no “calor do discurso”, quando na realidade surgiram como eufemismos do que mais tarde veio a acontecer.
Mas como poderia ser de outro modo, quando Lenine (e Trotsky) foi responsável pelo comportamento do exército vermelho no período da guerra civil (de passagem diga-se em abono da verdade que o do exército branco não primou por uma mais refinada ética de conduta), igualmente responsável pela deriva do regime para uma forma ditatorial (a assembleia constituinte de 2017 foi dissolvida ao fim de poucos meses), por manobras políticas conducentes à eliminação de qualquer opositor durante o X congresso em 1921, no que ficou conhecido como a primeira purga, purga a qual apenas não terminou com a eliminação física dos opositores, tendo no geral sido prenúncio das que lhe sucederam. Com este introito, como não ver apena Estaline como continuidade?
Todas as revoluções têm segundo Crane Brinton (Anatomia de uma Revolução) “um ciclo de vida que passa por um fervor e entusiasmo crescente pela transformação radical até alcançarem um pico máximo de intensidade a que se segue uma fase “termirodiana” caracterizada pelo desencanto, o decréscimo do vigor revolucionário, e as iniciativas impulsionadoras para uma transição gradual para o estabelecimento da ordem e da estabilidade”. A revolução russa passou por estas fases mais do que uma vez, sendo possível identificarem-se 3 destes ciclos.
Liberté, Humanité, Fraternité são palavras de ordem que são usadas como estandartes em todas as revoluções. Todos os revolucionários são fanáticos, sonhadores. Todos fantasiam um mundo novo sem injustiça, e onde a desigualdade do velho mundo não mais terá lugar. Tão imbuídos estão nestas suas convicções que não toleram discordâncias, não aceitam compromissos, e são fascinados por objectivos longínquos nem que para isso tenham que ser violentos e transitoriamente renegarem os valores que apregoam. Tudo se resume a estar com eles ou contra eles. Tudo depois termina em decepção e desilusão.
Na Rússia a revolução surge inicialmente como uma revolta contra um regime autoritário que ainda há pouco tinha dado os primeiros passos para abandonar o regime feudal (Lei dos Servos de 1861 e Revolução de 1905). Ela pode ser vista inicialmente como resultado de uma necessidade de modernização (revolução burguesa de Fevereiro de 1917), para depois se assumir como uma revolução de classe (proletariado) em cuja vanguarda esta o partido bolchevique (Partido Comunista em 1918), numa interpretação liderança vanguardista. O terceiro período inicia-se com a guerra civil. É um período de terror em que os inimigos são sucessivamente eliminados. Mencheviques, Brancos, Burgueses, e todos os outros que de uma forma ou outra se tentaram opor à ditadura do proletariado. Segue-se o que é apontado com a degenerescência “termidoriana” em que se interrompe o período “terror” anterior e se tenta reconstruir. Ainda que como em todas as revoluções, destrói-se mais do que se constrói e o que se constrói é claramente diferente do anterior. Neste período que se terá iniciado em 1921, há a necessidade de se reconstruir um estado para o qual técnicos do anterior regime são utilizados (ainda que com muita desconfiança) e onde a propriedade privada é possível tanto no comercio como na agricultura de subsistência.
Já na era de Estaline em 1927 durante o XV congresso, este vê o seu poder formalmente instituído e reforçado, e o primeiro plano quinquenal com o objectivo da industrialização é implementado. Com este plano entra-se de novo num período revolucionário onde como em qualquer um destes os fins justificam os meios.
Com o segundo plano quinquenal (1933 a 1937) a aposta continuou na indústria pesada, mas houve também um aumento significativo da indústria ligeira de bens de consumo e na produção agrícola foi de novo permitido aos camponeses terem usufruto directo de parte do seu trabalho. Este período de alguma acalmia revolucionária foi interrompido em 1936 pelo que ficou conhecido pela grande purga, período durante o qual o estado de terror retornou e aqui com uma violência nunca antes conhecida pela humanidade.
Sheila Fritzpatrick desenvolve aqui um magnifico trabalho. Consegue de forma isenta e não comprometida traçar-nos, caracterizar-nos e encadear os vários períodos da revolução bolchevique, ficando desde logo claro que os acontecimentos foram o resultado dos homens e das suas circunstâncias.
Sem Lenine nunca teria existido Estaline. Sem Marxismo nunca teria havido Leninismo (bem resumido no documento “Que fazer?” de 1902, onde é reforçada e reiterada a importância do centralismo disciplina rigorosa e unidade ideológica). Sem a criação dos sovietes em 1905, 12 anos antes da revolução de outubro, sem um poder bicéfalo dividido entre governo provisório e sovietes (muito particularmente o de S. Petersburgo, liderado por Trotsky, o profeta armado) , complicado ainda pela existência das Dumas, e dos Zemstvos, estes últimos órgãos não eleitos de administração local), sem o movimento abortado da “contra-revolução” liderada por Lavr Kornilov, sem a existência da Primeira Guerra Mundial, sem um conselho de Sovietes onde Menchevique e Socialistas Revolucionários eram maioritários, mas com uma impressionante inabilidade política e recesso apoio ao governo de Kerensky (que basicamente se opunha ao fim da guerra de forma unilateral e à “entrega das terras aos camponeses sem o envolvimento dos “mir” (aldeia camponesa ou comuna), permitiu ao partido bolchevique assumir o poder não em representação do povo mas em nome do povo.
A revolução russa de Sheila Fitzpatrick, uma magnífica lição de história.
February 4, 2017
I realised recently that I knew very little about the Russian revolution and then came across this book. The book sets the background to the February and November 1917 revolution. The defeat in the Sino-Russian 1905 was and a home based revolution resulted in the Tsar making a few changes and introduced a parliament in the Duma. However, they were cosmetic and failed to satisfy Lenin and other revolutionaries. Coupled with the WW1 defeats and mutinies by the navy and army the writing was on the walk for the Tsar.
The Civil war and then the introduction of economic policies with limited success until the early 1930s. Then Stalin slowly took over using internal party bickering to cement his leadership. The role the peasants played albeit indirectly and the fixation on industrialisation.
The purges which ultimately resulted in Stalin eliminating all opposition. What was fascinating is that it all could have been a lot different if Stalin had been sidelined. Lenin tried to do but was unable to do it before he died. For someone who knew little about the Russian revolution this booked increased my understanding.
The Civil war and then the introduction of economic policies with limited success until the early 1930s. Then Stalin slowly took over using internal party bickering to cement his leadership. The role the peasants played albeit indirectly and the fixation on industrialisation.
The purges which ultimately resulted in Stalin eliminating all opposition. What was fascinating is that it all could have been a lot different if Stalin had been sidelined. Lenin tried to do but was unable to do it before he died. For someone who knew little about the Russian revolution this booked increased my understanding.
July 21, 2025
A great introduction that I picked because experts recommend it and because it was short. Not unexpectedly it's a little too brief for its own good but gives a really solid and extraordinarily multifaceted overview of the period.
September 15, 2020
I loved it. This is not a nuts and bolts history of the Russian Revolution itself. The book covers the time period of the late 1800s up until World War II. The author is totally unemotional in style. Just describing what took place. A true historian, rather than hysteric. There is no good vs. evil style. Bringing Russia out of backwardness seems never ending.
February 4, 2024
This isn't one of the Pipes- or Figes-esque bricks that histories of the revolution once had to be, but here Fitzpatrick offers the best entry-level book on the subject without dumbing down or being too high level. Accessible, comprehensive, and opening myriad avenues to further reading, this is a great read.
April 18, 2024
Bunch of cool guys having a grand time.
May 5, 2016
An overview of the revolution from an academic perspective.
In the late 1800's, the world perceived Russia as backwards and primitive. Some 80% of the people still lived rural, feudal lives. Feudalism was removed from law only in the 1860's, and yet due to concessions to the landowning class, nothing much had changed.
Tsar Nicholas II had begun programs to modernize and bring Russia into the 20th century, but these measures were slow. Russia's educated professors and academics knew Russia was far behind the times, and there were many ideas for how to fix it faster and better than the current Tsarist autocracy. Many did not like the idea of following in the West's footsteps because they saw capitalism had created a small group of wealthy business owners, and an impoverished working class. Marxism was the only alternative, and many latched onto it as a way to modernize the country without falling into the same pit the West had dug for itself.
But Marxist theory predicts the people would revolt against the factory owners only after those owners (the bourgeoisie) united as a class, took over the government either in secret or outright, and institutionalized the exploitation of the masses. The factory workers would then agree to construct a society in which one person's work did not benefit someone else, and everyone worked for his own enrichment (despite the ban on private property... Marx and Engels were vague on exactly how that would work).
Russia was not even close to that stage; only a tiny minority of people actually worked in factories at the time. Though the poverty wages and dangerous working conditions characterizing industry had taken root in Russia by then, the plight of those workers did not represent the majority of the people yet. Marxist theory predicted the people would not revolt for a very long time.
Nonetheless, Lenin and the Bolshevik party he led (all members of a quasi-class of educated intellectuals who studied Europe and its ways) wanted the people to revolt against the forces that oppressed them. It was an academic conclusion, though, not really something any of them had witnessed in Russia outside the factories. They began by forming, essentially, labor groups at each factory called "soviets," which would represent the will of the people. Their authority came to extend outward into the community as well.
During WWI (perceived as an imperialist war to be boycotted), the Bolsheviks used the soviets to incite a revolt against the factory owners, who they believed oppressed the workers by taking them into pointless wars purely for the benefit of the ruling class.
But they were not the only faction. While the Bolsheviks wanted to dispel with everyone who had benefited from the old system, the "Mensheviks" wanted to compromise with them and rule jointly. In an election, the Bolsheviks lost, but seized power anyway, claiming they had the factory workers on their side, and that's all that mattered. This started a civil war, which devastated the national economy and infrastructure. The peasants sided with the Bolsheviks because the party promised the land the peasants had tilled for generations would now belong to the peasants and not to landowners. The Mensheviks, however, wanted to keep the land ownership more or less as it had been, with all the people in the same place, and they would work with the old guard to take the country in a new direction. The Bolsheviks did not want that compromise.
With victory theirs, Lenin's ruling party inherited a country in ruins. As a temporary solution, they instituted a New Economic policy (NEP), which was a return to capitalism as usual after the wartime policies that had been so unpopular during the civil war. Things seemed to return to normal again for a brief period while the country rebuilt from the revolution and civil war.
Lenin died, and Stalin took power. The Bolsheviks were supposed to rule jointly, but despite their ideals of the will of the people guiding the country, the people had little to do with it. Even at the local level, the good of the people took second place to the real objective. The Bolsheviks had sent official members of the party to lead the individual soviets, and now orders came from above instead of from below. The party had become a bureaucracy with its own agenda, and the will of the people became irrelevant.
Russia needed to catch up to the West, and the Bolsheviks saw communism as a way to achieve this quickly and without the oppression and poverty capitalism had created. The party took over industry for the express purpose of directing its growth. The party wanted to build more factories and export more goods, but didn't want to beg foreign powers for financing. Stalin decided to put the peasants to work. The party collectivized agriculture to produce grain for export so the state could raise money to build factories to produce new goods for export. Stalin's government set quotas for the peasants to meet, giving the peasant farmers only a small share of the total harvest as payment. It felt like feudalism all over again. Feeling betrayed by the party they had supported, the peasants resisted, and the disruptions caused famine across the nation. Those who fled the famine and the collectivization went to the cities and had little choice but to work in the new factories.
After the first couple "Five-year plans," which rapidly built new industry and shed vestiges of the old culture, things became almost normal. The upper echelons of society formed a new class of elites. Those who had been promoted from the peasantry into the new administrative class enjoyed a life of relative ease. Private property was never really eliminated as Marx and Engels outlined, except in the case of the peasants, who often saw their possessions and land confiscated for the good of the country. For the factory workers, things did not improve, and their "dictatorship of the people" did not represent their interests at all. Wages fell, and workers who complained were punished or sent to labor camps.
Though the Bolsheviks rejected the Mensheviks' idea of working with the people who had done well under the Tsar (specialists in mining, agriculture, engineering, etc.), that's exactly what they ended up doing. They did not have the knowledge to do everything themselves, so they had no choice but to reinstate the very people they demonized.
In the 1930's, a party member fell to an assassination, and the old revolutionary paranoia of enemies around every corner surfaced again. The regime took a dark turn.
In short: it was not communism. Marx and Engels never once stated communism could be a vehicle for modernization. They explicitly stated industry is already established, then the workers revolt and form their own society. The intellectuals behind the rebellion wanted to make it happen long before Russia's industry had matured, and they assumed the people would thank them for it. They also expected their revolution to spark worker's rebellions across Europe. When these things did not happen, they had to force people go to along with their plan.
They viewed everyone who was prosperous or had specialized knowledge as a potential enemy of the people and the state, except for themselves. Their goal was never to make everyone equal, but to remove the people who exploited and oppressed other people. They saw the country divided into social classes, and the class above always oppressed the classes below it, but the people themselves did not see things this way. For example, some peasants were more prosperous than others, and the Bolsheviks figured the lesser peasants would welcome the party and unite behind them against the greater peasants, but this did not happen. The peasants viewed themselves as in the same boat, not one person against the other.
The party was against religion because it saw the clergy as partners in the oppression of the people, exploiters who took from the masses and gave nothing back. The Bolsheviks were quick to view people in class terms, and that one class was the natural enemy of the other, but few outside of their educated circle shared this view. They failed to discern whether there was any exploitation going on. That was the central point Marx and Engels made of capitalism: it is a system of economics in which one person rises up and exploits the labor of someone else for personal gain. It wasn't happening in the rural countryside, so when the Bolsheviks tried to appeal to it, it didn't work, and they had to force the peasants to work for the party's larger goals. It was not the way communism was supposed to happen; Marx never stated people would have to be forced into it.
Marx and Engels were very clear that communism was to be an agreement among the working people not to enrich themselves on someone else's labor at that person's expense, and nobody should get rich by making someone else poor. It was never meant to be a means of industrializing, or a method of reaching a larger goal.
The Bolsheviks did not seek to oust an oppressive monarchy and create government by the people for the people, but to organize the people to modernize the country and surpass the West. With a goal like that, the Bolsheviks were doomed to become a totalitarian regime before the first riot ever happened.
We, looking back on the events, tend to oversimplify the Russian Revolution, and communism itself. It's a time in history that cannot be easily summarized, and it requires a more in-depth look. This is a good overview of what happened. It stops with the Great Purges of the 1930's, when Stalin's atrocities against his own people for the purpose of modernizing Russia went from bad to worse, but that era deserves a book by itself.
In the late 1800's, the world perceived Russia as backwards and primitive. Some 80% of the people still lived rural, feudal lives. Feudalism was removed from law only in the 1860's, and yet due to concessions to the landowning class, nothing much had changed.
Tsar Nicholas II had begun programs to modernize and bring Russia into the 20th century, but these measures were slow. Russia's educated professors and academics knew Russia was far behind the times, and there were many ideas for how to fix it faster and better than the current Tsarist autocracy. Many did not like the idea of following in the West's footsteps because they saw capitalism had created a small group of wealthy business owners, and an impoverished working class. Marxism was the only alternative, and many latched onto it as a way to modernize the country without falling into the same pit the West had dug for itself.
But Marxist theory predicts the people would revolt against the factory owners only after those owners (the bourgeoisie) united as a class, took over the government either in secret or outright, and institutionalized the exploitation of the masses. The factory workers would then agree to construct a society in which one person's work did not benefit someone else, and everyone worked for his own enrichment (despite the ban on private property... Marx and Engels were vague on exactly how that would work).
Russia was not even close to that stage; only a tiny minority of people actually worked in factories at the time. Though the poverty wages and dangerous working conditions characterizing industry had taken root in Russia by then, the plight of those workers did not represent the majority of the people yet. Marxist theory predicted the people would not revolt for a very long time.
Nonetheless, Lenin and the Bolshevik party he led (all members of a quasi-class of educated intellectuals who studied Europe and its ways) wanted the people to revolt against the forces that oppressed them. It was an academic conclusion, though, not really something any of them had witnessed in Russia outside the factories. They began by forming, essentially, labor groups at each factory called "soviets," which would represent the will of the people. Their authority came to extend outward into the community as well.
During WWI (perceived as an imperialist war to be boycotted), the Bolsheviks used the soviets to incite a revolt against the factory owners, who they believed oppressed the workers by taking them into pointless wars purely for the benefit of the ruling class.
But they were not the only faction. While the Bolsheviks wanted to dispel with everyone who had benefited from the old system, the "Mensheviks" wanted to compromise with them and rule jointly. In an election, the Bolsheviks lost, but seized power anyway, claiming they had the factory workers on their side, and that's all that mattered. This started a civil war, which devastated the national economy and infrastructure. The peasants sided with the Bolsheviks because the party promised the land the peasants had tilled for generations would now belong to the peasants and not to landowners. The Mensheviks, however, wanted to keep the land ownership more or less as it had been, with all the people in the same place, and they would work with the old guard to take the country in a new direction. The Bolsheviks did not want that compromise.
With victory theirs, Lenin's ruling party inherited a country in ruins. As a temporary solution, they instituted a New Economic policy (NEP), which was a return to capitalism as usual after the wartime policies that had been so unpopular during the civil war. Things seemed to return to normal again for a brief period while the country rebuilt from the revolution and civil war.
Lenin died, and Stalin took power. The Bolsheviks were supposed to rule jointly, but despite their ideals of the will of the people guiding the country, the people had little to do with it. Even at the local level, the good of the people took second place to the real objective. The Bolsheviks had sent official members of the party to lead the individual soviets, and now orders came from above instead of from below. The party had become a bureaucracy with its own agenda, and the will of the people became irrelevant.
Russia needed to catch up to the West, and the Bolsheviks saw communism as a way to achieve this quickly and without the oppression and poverty capitalism had created. The party took over industry for the express purpose of directing its growth. The party wanted to build more factories and export more goods, but didn't want to beg foreign powers for financing. Stalin decided to put the peasants to work. The party collectivized agriculture to produce grain for export so the state could raise money to build factories to produce new goods for export. Stalin's government set quotas for the peasants to meet, giving the peasant farmers only a small share of the total harvest as payment. It felt like feudalism all over again. Feeling betrayed by the party they had supported, the peasants resisted, and the disruptions caused famine across the nation. Those who fled the famine and the collectivization went to the cities and had little choice but to work in the new factories.
After the first couple "Five-year plans," which rapidly built new industry and shed vestiges of the old culture, things became almost normal. The upper echelons of society formed a new class of elites. Those who had been promoted from the peasantry into the new administrative class enjoyed a life of relative ease. Private property was never really eliminated as Marx and Engels outlined, except in the case of the peasants, who often saw their possessions and land confiscated for the good of the country. For the factory workers, things did not improve, and their "dictatorship of the people" did not represent their interests at all. Wages fell, and workers who complained were punished or sent to labor camps.
Though the Bolsheviks rejected the Mensheviks' idea of working with the people who had done well under the Tsar (specialists in mining, agriculture, engineering, etc.), that's exactly what they ended up doing. They did not have the knowledge to do everything themselves, so they had no choice but to reinstate the very people they demonized.
In the 1930's, a party member fell to an assassination, and the old revolutionary paranoia of enemies around every corner surfaced again. The regime took a dark turn.
In short: it was not communism. Marx and Engels never once stated communism could be a vehicle for modernization. They explicitly stated industry is already established, then the workers revolt and form their own society. The intellectuals behind the rebellion wanted to make it happen long before Russia's industry had matured, and they assumed the people would thank them for it. They also expected their revolution to spark worker's rebellions across Europe. When these things did not happen, they had to force people go to along with their plan.
They viewed everyone who was prosperous or had specialized knowledge as a potential enemy of the people and the state, except for themselves. Their goal was never to make everyone equal, but to remove the people who exploited and oppressed other people. They saw the country divided into social classes, and the class above always oppressed the classes below it, but the people themselves did not see things this way. For example, some peasants were more prosperous than others, and the Bolsheviks figured the lesser peasants would welcome the party and unite behind them against the greater peasants, but this did not happen. The peasants viewed themselves as in the same boat, not one person against the other.
The party was against religion because it saw the clergy as partners in the oppression of the people, exploiters who took from the masses and gave nothing back. The Bolsheviks were quick to view people in class terms, and that one class was the natural enemy of the other, but few outside of their educated circle shared this view. They failed to discern whether there was any exploitation going on. That was the central point Marx and Engels made of capitalism: it is a system of economics in which one person rises up and exploits the labor of someone else for personal gain. It wasn't happening in the rural countryside, so when the Bolsheviks tried to appeal to it, it didn't work, and they had to force the peasants to work for the party's larger goals. It was not the way communism was supposed to happen; Marx never stated people would have to be forced into it.
Marx and Engels were very clear that communism was to be an agreement among the working people not to enrich themselves on someone else's labor at that person's expense, and nobody should get rich by making someone else poor. It was never meant to be a means of industrializing, or a method of reaching a larger goal.
The Bolsheviks did not seek to oust an oppressive monarchy and create government by the people for the people, but to organize the people to modernize the country and surpass the West. With a goal like that, the Bolsheviks were doomed to become a totalitarian regime before the first riot ever happened.
We, looking back on the events, tend to oversimplify the Russian Revolution, and communism itself. It's a time in history that cannot be easily summarized, and it requires a more in-depth look. This is a good overview of what happened. It stops with the Great Purges of the 1930's, when Stalin's atrocities against his own people for the purpose of modernizing Russia went from bad to worse, but that era deserves a book by itself.
March 22, 2022
A brilliant short intro to the Russian Revolution, which the author dates from 1905 to the end of Stalin's purges in 1938. there's little new here for anyone who's read a book on the topic before, but the beauty of this one is the clarity and conciseness with which Fitzpatrick writes. The balance is on contextual and structural description at the price of getting to know the characters, but this is exactly as it should be. There are plenty of biographies to choose from should that approach interest more. Finally, the best part of the book is that, despite the first edition coming out in 1982, it is refreshingly free of the cold war warrior prose so common to the topic--even today (see one example here: https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...)
February 9, 2025
claramente possuo opiniões políticas muito diferentes da autora desta obra, levando a que a minha apreciação do livro não seja tão positiva como poderia ser caso Sheila Fitzpatrick apresentasse uma abordagem mais neutra.
para além das considerações depreciativas ao longo da obra, creio que as inúmeras páginas em que o regime soviético é alvo de críticas poderiam ser facilmente substituídas por elogios às mudanças benéficas na sociedade pós-1917 em matérias como os direitos laborais, igualdade de género e reformas no sistema de educação.
apesar de tudo isto, a obra claramente educa os leitores na historia da ‘revolução soviética’ e da europa contemporânea.
para além das considerações depreciativas ao longo da obra, creio que as inúmeras páginas em que o regime soviético é alvo de críticas poderiam ser facilmente substituídas por elogios às mudanças benéficas na sociedade pós-1917 em matérias como os direitos laborais, igualdade de género e reformas no sistema de educação.
apesar de tudo isto, a obra claramente educa os leitores na historia da ‘revolução soviética’ e da europa contemporânea.
April 2, 2024
Antikomünist, en azından Antisovyetik bir yazardan olabildiğince objektif ve akıcı bir Rus Devrimi tarihi. Mevzu hakkında ilk kez okunacaksa iyi bir başlangıç kitabı olmayabilir, en az orta seviye bilgi sahibi okurlar için eleştirel bir analiz imkanı sunuyor diyebiliriz.
August 8, 2024
I REALLY wish I had read this before Russia in Flames. This is a great place to start if you want to learn about the Russian revolution and get a good overview before diving all the way in. Highly recommend. 4.3 stars
May 30, 2021
I had to read this for my General History course and it's nice to enjoy required reading.
May 28, 2023
Fine introduction. Emphasizes modernization, class, terror.
July 26, 2024
Was it as bad as ‘Everyday Stalinism’? No. But that doesn’t mean it was good. I would define Fitzpatrick’s writing style as uniquely uninspired and bland. It is miraculous how she takes fragments of other fantastic historians and political theorists writings (as it is quite clear from her constant reference and quotes of ideology and participants of the revolution that she is well read) and translate it into something so monotonous. It’s truly a talent.
Compared to ‘Everyday Stalinism’ Fitzpatrick seems to have evolved as a writer, seeing as I read the third edition (called the ‘New Edition’) I can only speak on this edition and not the newest fourth edition published in 2017. From writing ‘Everyday Stalinism’ to this book she seems to have finally come to terms with spelling ‘Yagoda’ as such rather than ‘Iagoda’ which drove me endlessly mad (Although she did slip up in ‘Everyday Stalinism’ and spell it ‘Yagoda’ rather than ‘Iagoda’ at one point which gave me a laugh). But for other names such as ‘Yezhov’ (which she spells ‘Ezhov’) and place names such as ‘Yekaterinburg’ (which she spells ‘Ekaterinburg’) she had not yet progressed.
On to the content of the book. Fitzpatrick appears to be afraid to write the word ‘Holodomor’, instead preferring to constantly refer to it as ‘The 1932-33 famine’. She appears to be scared to invoke its name, like it will cause Beetlejuice to appear if she writes it three times. This book seems to be used as an introduction to the Russia Revolution as made clear by other reviewers and by refusing to refer to Holodomor by its proper name she is setting many up for confusion and doing a disservice to the horrific famine.
Additionally, in the introduction of the third addition to the book she appears to be setting up her argument for when she believes the revolution began and where it ended (which she decrees is to be from the February Revolution to the end of the Great Purges). Without the introduction you would not be able to attain this argument from the book alone, aside from a few sentences in the very last chapter. Instead the books content seems to be a confused muddle of information. The book is meant to be Fitzpatrick’s argument for when SHE believes the revolution began and ended, but instead she uses what the Communist Party announced to be the end of part of the Revolution, which in reality wasn’t an announcement of the end of the Revolution but a defeat of class enemies. However, if Fitzpatrick would simply extend herself beyond her usually area of study (the 1930s) and acknowledge WWII and High Stalinism, she would see that her borrowed phrase from Historian Brinton of “a revolution [being] like a fever” essentially means that WWII and High Stalinism could also be considered part of the revolution! Hell, why stop there the whole of soviet history becomes a revolution. There’s no end in sight. Moreover in the introduction she describes the Great Purges as a “unique phenomenon” which is absolutely mind boggling.
I’m going to stop there. In conclusion, read this work with a heavy pinch of salt and read other books in companion. Even Wikipedia pages would be more sufficient.
Compared to ‘Everyday Stalinism’ Fitzpatrick seems to have evolved as a writer, seeing as I read the third edition (called the ‘New Edition’) I can only speak on this edition and not the newest fourth edition published in 2017. From writing ‘Everyday Stalinism’ to this book she seems to have finally come to terms with spelling ‘Yagoda’ as such rather than ‘Iagoda’ which drove me endlessly mad (Although she did slip up in ‘Everyday Stalinism’ and spell it ‘Yagoda’ rather than ‘Iagoda’ at one point which gave me a laugh). But for other names such as ‘Yezhov’ (which she spells ‘Ezhov’) and place names such as ‘Yekaterinburg’ (which she spells ‘Ekaterinburg’) she had not yet progressed.
On to the content of the book. Fitzpatrick appears to be afraid to write the word ‘Holodomor’, instead preferring to constantly refer to it as ‘The 1932-33 famine’. She appears to be scared to invoke its name, like it will cause Beetlejuice to appear if she writes it three times. This book seems to be used as an introduction to the Russia Revolution as made clear by other reviewers and by refusing to refer to Holodomor by its proper name she is setting many up for confusion and doing a disservice to the horrific famine.
Additionally, in the introduction of the third addition to the book she appears to be setting up her argument for when she believes the revolution began and where it ended (which she decrees is to be from the February Revolution to the end of the Great Purges). Without the introduction you would not be able to attain this argument from the book alone, aside from a few sentences in the very last chapter. Instead the books content seems to be a confused muddle of information. The book is meant to be Fitzpatrick’s argument for when SHE believes the revolution began and ended, but instead she uses what the Communist Party announced to be the end of part of the Revolution, which in reality wasn’t an announcement of the end of the Revolution but a defeat of class enemies. However, if Fitzpatrick would simply extend herself beyond her usually area of study (the 1930s) and acknowledge WWII and High Stalinism, she would see that her borrowed phrase from Historian Brinton of “a revolution [being] like a fever” essentially means that WWII and High Stalinism could also be considered part of the revolution! Hell, why stop there the whole of soviet history becomes a revolution. There’s no end in sight. Moreover in the introduction she describes the Great Purges as a “unique phenomenon” which is absolutely mind boggling.
I’m going to stop there. In conclusion, read this work with a heavy pinch of salt and read other books in companion. Even Wikipedia pages would be more sufficient.
October 14, 2009
A serviceable, informative, and even analytical, exercise in concision. Still, I can't help but think something is missing in the text. e.g., "Recent calculations based on Soviet archival data put famine deaths in 1933 at three to four million," (140) is a rather laconic treatment of Stalin's seemingly deliberate policy of mass starvation (i.e., that's quite literally all she says about it).
Further, the psychological angle is completely absent, which is problematic --especially considering the exceptionally, nay, extraordinarily high levels of paranoia and sadism that existed from 1917-1939 (the period she treats). There are complex things that she explains away by simply appealing to Crane Brinton -- very inadequate.
But it's meant to be a history book that tells you about historical stuff: so in this respect I guess it does its job...
Further, the psychological angle is completely absent, which is problematic --especially considering the exceptionally, nay, extraordinarily high levels of paranoia and sadism that existed from 1917-1939 (the period she treats). There are complex things that she explains away by simply appealing to Crane Brinton -- very inadequate.
But it's meant to be a history book that tells you about historical stuff: so in this respect I guess it does its job...
November 17, 2017
excelente síntese de um processo extremamente complexo que marcou o século XX. as principais forças em confronto, a personalidade electrizante e implacável de lenine, a guerra civil, os recuos pragmáticos, a construção do trono de aço de estaline. é uma espécie de versão digest muito bem documentada, capaz de espelhar contradições e processos internos de colisão que demonstram que a revolução não foi monolítica. nenhuma o será, afinal. na terminologia editorial, excelente revolução de outubro para totós.
December 6, 2023
A broad, concise history of the Russian revolution from 1917-32 as the titled states.
My interpretation is that it's clear of both communist and anti-communist dogma and a historian's history.
I highly recommend it to anyone at all interested in the period to come away with a nuanced understanding of the revolution.
My interpretation is that it's clear of both communist and anti-communist dogma and a historian's history.
I highly recommend it to anyone at all interested in the period to come away with a nuanced understanding of the revolution.
November 22, 2023
At the dawn of the 20th century, Russia found itself trailing behind industrial powerhouses like Britain, Germany, and France, primarily due to the delayed impact of the Industrial Revolution. The shackles of feudalism were only cast off in 1860, placing Russia at a disadvantage in terms of economic development.
Fitzpatrick delves into the intellectual landscape of Russia during this time, revealing how Russian intellectuals harbored an idealized vision of industrialization coexisting harmoniously with the traditional rural life. This juxtaposition reflects a unique perspective on modernization, showcasing a blend of progress and cultural preservation.
The intricate dance between socialist and liberal factions within the temporary government is explored, highlighting the strategic use of blame in times of crisis. Fitzpatrick navigates the political intrigue, exposing the intricate alliances and power plays that characterized this period.
Engels' foresight, warning against premature socialist ascension to power, adds a prophetic layer to the narrative. Fitzpatrick engages with this warning, examining how the rush to power can risk the transformation of socialist ideals into dictatorial regimes.
The emotional fervor of revolutionaries and their often irrational hopes are scrutinized, underlining the passion that fuels revolutionary movements. Fitzpatrick suggests that this emotional intensity can both drive and hinder revolutionary pursuits.
The strategic use of labels to criminalize individuals as a means of solidifying ideological control, particularly evident in Stalin's Russia, is analyzed. Fitzpatrick draws attention to the significance of language in shaping political narratives and legitimizing power.
Crane Brinton's analogy of revolution as a fever offers a poignant lens through which to view the revolutionary cycle. Fitzpatrick contemplates how the revolutionary fervor, while subsiding over time, leaves lasting changes in society, akin to the development of immunity after an illness.
The evolution of constitutional rights in Russia, from class-based disparities in the 1918 constitution to a gradual move towards equality, is scrutinized. Fitzpatrick emphasizes the lingering societal resentment toward the bourgeoisie, evident in restrictions such as university admissions. A distinctive feature of Stalin's revolutions is explored — the accountability enforced on local rulers for abuses of authority.
A comparative analysis of the Russian and French Revolutions brings forth intriguing parallels and divergences. Fitzpatrick delves into the contrasting fates of Robespierre and Stalin, emphasizing the enduring cultural impact of the French Revolution compared to the relative forgetfulness surrounding the Russian Revolution.
Lastly, Fitzpatrick reflects on the cyclical nature of history, emphasizing the fluidity of power dynamics and the evolving interpretations of historical events over time. This cyclical pattern becomes a lens through which to understand the shifting tides of history and the reevaluation of past narratives.
Fitzpatrick delves into the intellectual landscape of Russia during this time, revealing how Russian intellectuals harbored an idealized vision of industrialization coexisting harmoniously with the traditional rural life. This juxtaposition reflects a unique perspective on modernization, showcasing a blend of progress and cultural preservation.
The intricate dance between socialist and liberal factions within the temporary government is explored, highlighting the strategic use of blame in times of crisis. Fitzpatrick navigates the political intrigue, exposing the intricate alliances and power plays that characterized this period.
Engels' foresight, warning against premature socialist ascension to power, adds a prophetic layer to the narrative. Fitzpatrick engages with this warning, examining how the rush to power can risk the transformation of socialist ideals into dictatorial regimes.
The emotional fervor of revolutionaries and their often irrational hopes are scrutinized, underlining the passion that fuels revolutionary movements. Fitzpatrick suggests that this emotional intensity can both drive and hinder revolutionary pursuits.
The strategic use of labels to criminalize individuals as a means of solidifying ideological control, particularly evident in Stalin's Russia, is analyzed. Fitzpatrick draws attention to the significance of language in shaping political narratives and legitimizing power.
Crane Brinton's analogy of revolution as a fever offers a poignant lens through which to view the revolutionary cycle. Fitzpatrick contemplates how the revolutionary fervor, while subsiding over time, leaves lasting changes in society, akin to the development of immunity after an illness.
The evolution of constitutional rights in Russia, from class-based disparities in the 1918 constitution to a gradual move towards equality, is scrutinized. Fitzpatrick emphasizes the lingering societal resentment toward the bourgeoisie, evident in restrictions such as university admissions. A distinctive feature of Stalin's revolutions is explored — the accountability enforced on local rulers for abuses of authority.
A comparative analysis of the Russian and French Revolutions brings forth intriguing parallels and divergences. Fitzpatrick delves into the contrasting fates of Robespierre and Stalin, emphasizing the enduring cultural impact of the French Revolution compared to the relative forgetfulness surrounding the Russian Revolution.
Lastly, Fitzpatrick reflects on the cyclical nature of history, emphasizing the fluidity of power dynamics and the evolving interpretations of historical events over time. This cyclical pattern becomes a lens through which to understand the shifting tides of history and the reevaluation of past narratives.
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March 17, 2021This is a very useful overview of the revolutionary era in Russia which evokes the cultural and social as well as political change. In the first place we have the peculiar view of the Bolshevik Party of revolution, their efforts to constrain their own idealism with the idea of being 'scientific' revolutionaries; yet they were for the most part idealists despite themselves. This dynamic makes the Russian Revolution seem quite different from the French Revolution, where the idealists of 1789 were entirely unaware that 1793 lurked around the corner. The Russians had precedent, a kind of script that they expected their own revolution to follow - only it did not.
Then there is the fact that Lenin's decision to seize power in October 1917 contradicts the most widely accepted interpretation of historical materialism at the time: to Lenin's critics on the left, the decision to take power prematurely, before the industrial capitalist phase of development had run its course, placed the party and its cause in greater jeopardy. The post-Civil War New Economic Policy, Lenin's "retreat," in the economic sphere, fits neatly into this context. The Civil War having turned back the clock of industrialisation and urbanisation, Lenin decided that the Party would have to wait longer to win the battle for socialism, even after having consolidated power.
After Lenin's death, Stalin's rise to power and his decision to abolish NEP is characterised as an effort to rejuvenate or recapture the revolutionary energy of October, and to continue the centralising tendencies of industrialisation in this period. The book also considers how much continuity or discontinuity there was between Lenin and Stalin, placing all of these developments in context. The Stalin era in particular saw a turn towards social conservatism (greater restrictions on women's rights, recriminalisation of homosexuality) and away from internationalism towards 'socialism in one country', and the narrative concludes with an exposition of the Great Purges of 1937-8. Would recommend to those interested in this period of Russian history, but note that its focus is specifically Russian history and not the history of other territories of the former Russian Empire.
Then there is the fact that Lenin's decision to seize power in October 1917 contradicts the most widely accepted interpretation of historical materialism at the time: to Lenin's critics on the left, the decision to take power prematurely, before the industrial capitalist phase of development had run its course, placed the party and its cause in greater jeopardy. The post-Civil War New Economic Policy, Lenin's "retreat," in the economic sphere, fits neatly into this context. The Civil War having turned back the clock of industrialisation and urbanisation, Lenin decided that the Party would have to wait longer to win the battle for socialism, even after having consolidated power.
After Lenin's death, Stalin's rise to power and his decision to abolish NEP is characterised as an effort to rejuvenate or recapture the revolutionary energy of October, and to continue the centralising tendencies of industrialisation in this period. The book also considers how much continuity or discontinuity there was between Lenin and Stalin, placing all of these developments in context. The Stalin era in particular saw a turn towards social conservatism (greater restrictions on women's rights, recriminalisation of homosexuality) and away from internationalism towards 'socialism in one country', and the narrative concludes with an exposition of the Great Purges of 1937-8. Would recommend to those interested in this period of Russian history, but note that its focus is specifically Russian history and not the history of other territories of the former Russian Empire.
May 7, 2024
Remarkably deep-reaching for its scope, Sheila Fitzpatrick provides an empathic - though by no means sympathetic, or emphatic - survey into the Revolution(s) of 1917(-37) and the complex internal and external motivations of its actors.
Fitzpatrick's analytical core is historiographical. I greatly appreciated the focus on the Bolsheviks' conceptualization of themselves as students of history (as befitting proper Marxists) and their dialogue with the ghosts and precedents of the French Revolution. (The ellipses of my first paragraph are important here; revolutions, as processes, are hard to pin down in time, their ends a tapering tail. (Or mostly tapering, say, the shape like a snake who has swallowed an elephant.) The Bolsheviks themselves struggled to determine an end to their work of upheaval, their own historiographical conscience in some ways at times pre-determining them (like a figure of Greek tragedy) to try and wage a permanent revolution, an avoidance of a Thermidor. (A fervid, fearful fl(r)ight far from Fervidor, if you will.))
There is also, of course, the meta dialogue all historians' works have with history. The reason for existence: the place of the work within a vaster dialogue, and history's right to touch the matter at all, with its careful, fossilizing, curating fingers. The acknowledged impossibility of ever consigning the past to the past. The struggles born therefrom. Here, too, Fitzpatrick looks to 1789, i.e. the French are still making a fuss about. smh. Ipso facto with October.
(Review of the 4th Edition, publ. 2017, OUP.)
Fitzpatrick's analytical core is historiographical. I greatly appreciated the focus on the Bolsheviks' conceptualization of themselves as students of history (as befitting proper Marxists) and their dialogue with the ghosts and precedents of the French Revolution. (The ellipses of my first paragraph are important here; revolutions, as processes, are hard to pin down in time, their ends a tapering tail. (Or mostly tapering, say, the shape like a snake who has swallowed an elephant.) The Bolsheviks themselves struggled to determine an end to their work of upheaval, their own historiographical conscience in some ways at times pre-determining them (like a figure of Greek tragedy) to try and wage a permanent revolution, an avoidance of a Thermidor. (A fervid, fearful fl(r)ight far from Fervidor, if you will.))
There is also, of course, the meta dialogue all historians' works have with history. The reason for existence: the place of the work within a vaster dialogue, and history's right to touch the matter at all, with its careful, fossilizing, curating fingers. The acknowledged impossibility of ever consigning the past to the past. The struggles born therefrom. Here, too, Fitzpatrick looks to 1789, i.e. the French are still making a fuss about. smh. Ipso facto with October.
(Review of the 4th Edition, publ. 2017, OUP.)
June 11, 2025
3.9/5 stars
Fitzpatrick’s book delves into the history of the Russian Revolution from February 1917 to the Great Purges of 1937-38. Fitzpatrick muses briefly on the meaning of revolution and the impact of the French Revolution, but overall her book is designed to give an overview of the events that make up the Russian Revolution.
Fitzpatrick follows a chronological order of events, marking each important moment, but keeps specific details limited. This book does not provide contextual information on historical figures nor dives deeply into each event that is presented, but rather briefly introduces the reader to these concepts. Therefore, this book is perfect for anyone who wants to get a general grasp on the history of the Russian Revolution without being bogged down by the details.
Still, in avoiding some details, some figures/events are not exactly clear. This book also, while not a difficult read, is not an entirely compelling either. Still, Fitzpatrick gets the job done: a historiography of the Russian Revolution as it happened in Russia.
Fitzpatrick’s book delves into the history of the Russian Revolution from February 1917 to the Great Purges of 1937-38. Fitzpatrick muses briefly on the meaning of revolution and the impact of the French Revolution, but overall her book is designed to give an overview of the events that make up the Russian Revolution.
Fitzpatrick follows a chronological order of events, marking each important moment, but keeps specific details limited. This book does not provide contextual information on historical figures nor dives deeply into each event that is presented, but rather briefly introduces the reader to these concepts. Therefore, this book is perfect for anyone who wants to get a general grasp on the history of the Russian Revolution without being bogged down by the details.
Still, in avoiding some details, some figures/events are not exactly clear. This book also, while not a difficult read, is not an entirely compelling either. Still, Fitzpatrick gets the job done: a historiography of the Russian Revolution as it happened in Russia.
January 15, 2026
“It was the Russian revolution that represented hope of freedom from oppression to some, and provoked nightmares of a worldwide triumph of atheistic communism in others. It was the Russian revolution that established a definition of socialism that hinged on the seizure of state power and its use as an instrument of economic and social transformation.”
Such a concise, easy to read, and remarkably written history of a super complex event. Fitzpatrick explains of lot of where Lenin fucked up, where Stalin fucked up, and why Trotsky was a total loon without dismissing the significance of the revolution and the aspects of good it brought to the world. A new favorite that I will probably revisit in the future.
Such a concise, easy to read, and remarkably written history of a super complex event. Fitzpatrick explains of lot of where Lenin fucked up, where Stalin fucked up, and why Trotsky was a total loon without dismissing the significance of the revolution and the aspects of good it brought to the world. A new favorite that I will probably revisit in the future.
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