What do you think?
Rate this book
The German Way of War: A Lesson in Tactical Management
The German Army lost two consecutive wars and the conclusion is often drawn that it simply wasn't able to cope with its opponents. This image is constantly reinforced in literature and in the media, where seemingly brainless operating German units led by fanatical officers predominate. Nothing was as far from the truth. The records show that the Germans consistently outfought the far more numerous Allied armies that eventually defeated their relative battlefield performance was at least 1.5 and in most cases 3 times as high as that of its opponents.
The central question in this book is why the German Army had a so much higher relative battlefield performance than the opposition. A central element within the Prussian/German Army is Auftragstaktik, a tactical management concept that dates from the middle of the nineteenth century and is still very advanced in terms of management and organization.
Using more than fifty examples to illustrate the realities of the battlefield, from North Africa to Arnhem and the Hürtgen Forest, the author explains why the Prussian/German Army was such an unprecedented powerful fighting force. And why Auftragstaktik – under other guises – is still the basic form of operation for many European armies, with even the US Army introducing certain elements of Auftragstaktik into its organization, more than 150 years after its conception.
The central question in this book is why the German Army had a so much higher relative battlefield performance than the opposition. A central element within the Prussian/German Army is Auftragstaktik, a tactical management concept that dates from the middle of the nineteenth century and is still very advanced in terms of management and organization.
Using more than fifty examples to illustrate the realities of the battlefield, from North Africa to Arnhem and the Hürtgen Forest, the author explains why the Prussian/German Army was such an unprecedented powerful fighting force. And why Auftragstaktik – under other guises – is still the basic form of operation for many European armies, with even the US Army introducing certain elements of Auftragstaktik into its organization, more than 150 years after its conception.
240 pages, Paperback
Published April 15, 2024
63 people are currently reading
73 people want to read
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews
January 26, 2025
In The German Way of War, Jaap Jan Brouwer examines how World War II was fought by the German army and compares that to the two main Allied armies in the West: Britain and the United States. The Germans, Brouwer finds, adopted a command concept known as Auftragstaktik that diffused decision-making and initiative down through the ranks. That system compared favourably with the Americans and British in all the important aspects of infantry fighting, including army structure, leadership, training, and morale. Brouwer tests his thesis using examples mostly from the Italian, North African, and Western Fronts, with the Germans attempting to stave off Allied onslaughts in all three. In the end, he argues that the Allied victory was principally one of quantity over quality.
To make his case, Brouwer compares the strengths of the Germans to his perceived weaknesses of the Allies. Although based on the evidence, it is a selective approach open to counter-examples and contextual argument. In addition, Brouwer gives the Eastern Front little attention, and his argument that the German rank-and-file displayed little ideological motive is questionable. Thus, Brouwer’s thesis is not as strong as it first appears, but it is an interesting one to consider.
To make his case, Brouwer compares the strengths of the Germans to his perceived weaknesses of the Allies. Although based on the evidence, it is a selective approach open to counter-examples and contextual argument. In addition, Brouwer gives the Eastern Front little attention, and his argument that the German rank-and-file displayed little ideological motive is questionable. Thus, Brouwer’s thesis is not as strong as it first appears, but it is an interesting one to consider.
April 14, 2023
Anyone familiar with the history of the German Army will know the term "Auftragstaktik" or "decentralized command", a kind of flexibility granted to lower-ranking officers by those who defined a battle plan. In simplistic terms it is equivalent to "It doesn't matter how you do it, the important thing is to reach the goal". Today's book, the interesting volume that I present to you, written by Jaap Jan Brouwer for the Pen & Sword house, goes into the explanation of this concept by analyzing both the principles and the practical application. But not only...
The volume also analyzes the other organizations and tactical management of the battle by the British and American military institutions in a comparative way.
The result, for those new to these topics can be revolutionary. In fact, the idea that one has of the German army is that, deriving from the mass media, in particular from cinema, even recently. The idea is obviously that of a "stiff" organization, which looks after the form and not the substance, which marches well, which drills well to have "automaton" reactions in battle. One particular scene is the one that comes to mind at the moment, among the dozens, if not hundreds of war films I've seen, or the final scene of the assault by dozens of Waffen SS on the Sherman tank of the movie "Fury. ". Well, if you are not familiar with the true tactics and psychology of the German army, you will most likely believe it is possible that it went like this, or, rather, that it could go like this.
Today's book, on the other hand, tends to demolish these certainties with the support of data and an excellent bibliography, obviously combined with several concrete examples (in particular in chapter 7 dedicated to the fighting near Overloon, in Holland at the end of the war) of actions in which those principles of flexibility have been highlighted. In reality, the stereotypical idea of the German Army, or rather "Prussian" has true foundations , but refers to the perfect organization set up by Frederick the Great, and which lasted (albeit with substantial debacles) until 1806 , the year in which there were a series of terrible defeats that cast doubt on any certainty of the Prussian military planners. From that moment the war was objects of scientific study throughout the 19th century, with a series of treatises (first of all the famous Von Clausewitz) which restored strategic tactical pre-eminence to the Prussians (and the united Germany , created in 1870) and which it was the basis of the two World Wars.
Not only a doctrine of decentralized command in which the decision-making capacity of lower officers and non-commissioned officers was exalted, but also notable other revolutionary ideas such as the massive use of psychology, collaboration between various arms, socialization between officers and soldiers, a sense of community and many others that brought the German Army to the forefront of competing armies.
To this was added in part what happened after the end of the Great War, in which the German Army took advantage of the experiences and learned from them for the future war. In fact, its reduction, after the Treaty of Versailles to 100,000 effective and 4000 officers, determined a selection in which only the best prevailed, which thus formed the basis for the expansion resulting from the rearmament of Nazi Germany.
Even the discipline in training, the "drill", was not an end in itself, but aimed at creating an inner discipline that served in critical moments to maintain the organicity of a military institution (in the book this experience is compared with situations of American and British crisis).
The book I am presenting to you therefore stands out for the substantial depth of analysis of the German military organization and its merits, which was demonstrated in the exemplary performance on all fronts of its troops, even those with little training. The flexibility and unity of the concepts taught meant that even variegated units could be temporarily united as "Kampfgruppen" (this organizational concept is also analyzed) that in their performance in battle would have had nothing to envy to organic units. The book also examines the values and psychology of the forces at play, the Germans' often mistaken for "fanaticism", but in reality only a very high professionalism in carrying out what was a task. Thus the book is extremely interesting and valid and cannot miss on the shelves of fans and historians of the Second World War and beyond.
The volume also analyzes the other organizations and tactical management of the battle by the British and American military institutions in a comparative way.
The result, for those new to these topics can be revolutionary. In fact, the idea that one has of the German army is that, deriving from the mass media, in particular from cinema, even recently. The idea is obviously that of a "stiff" organization, which looks after the form and not the substance, which marches well, which drills well to have "automaton" reactions in battle. One particular scene is the one that comes to mind at the moment, among the dozens, if not hundreds of war films I've seen, or the final scene of the assault by dozens of Waffen SS on the Sherman tank of the movie "Fury. ". Well, if you are not familiar with the true tactics and psychology of the German army, you will most likely believe it is possible that it went like this, or, rather, that it could go like this.
Today's book, on the other hand, tends to demolish these certainties with the support of data and an excellent bibliography, obviously combined with several concrete examples (in particular in chapter 7 dedicated to the fighting near Overloon, in Holland at the end of the war) of actions in which those principles of flexibility have been highlighted. In reality, the stereotypical idea of the German Army, or rather "Prussian" has true foundations , but refers to the perfect organization set up by Frederick the Great, and which lasted (albeit with substantial debacles) until 1806 , the year in which there were a series of terrible defeats that cast doubt on any certainty of the Prussian military planners. From that moment the war was objects of scientific study throughout the 19th century, with a series of treatises (first of all the famous Von Clausewitz) which restored strategic tactical pre-eminence to the Prussians (and the united Germany , created in 1870) and which it was the basis of the two World Wars.
Not only a doctrine of decentralized command in which the decision-making capacity of lower officers and non-commissioned officers was exalted, but also notable other revolutionary ideas such as the massive use of psychology, collaboration between various arms, socialization between officers and soldiers, a sense of community and many others that brought the German Army to the forefront of competing armies.
To this was added in part what happened after the end of the Great War, in which the German Army took advantage of the experiences and learned from them for the future war. In fact, its reduction, after the Treaty of Versailles to 100,000 effective and 4000 officers, determined a selection in which only the best prevailed, which thus formed the basis for the expansion resulting from the rearmament of Nazi Germany.
Even the discipline in training, the "drill", was not an end in itself, but aimed at creating an inner discipline that served in critical moments to maintain the organicity of a military institution (in the book this experience is compared with situations of American and British crisis).
The book I am presenting to you therefore stands out for the substantial depth of analysis of the German military organization and its merits, which was demonstrated in the exemplary performance on all fronts of its troops, even those with little training. The flexibility and unity of the concepts taught meant that even variegated units could be temporarily united as "Kampfgruppen" (this organizational concept is also analyzed) that in their performance in battle would have had nothing to envy to organic units. The book also examines the values and psychology of the forces at play, the Germans' often mistaken for "fanaticism", but in reality only a very high professionalism in carrying out what was a task. Thus the book is extremely interesting and valid and cannot miss on the shelves of fans and historians of the Second World War and beyond.
December 26, 2021
Examination of “the German way of war” and German tactical/operational superiority over the British and US through WWI & II. The author, a business consultant and author, claims the Germans battlefield superiority over the British and US derived from its embrace of Auftragstakrik and related military culture of boldness and flexibility. The author emphasizes “the concert of battle” (factors shaping battlefield success) as Impact= Exploration x Preparation x Focus x Cooperation x Speed x Mass x Continuation. Ultimately, he assesses that despite outfighting the US & UK Germany lost the war(s) due to Allied advantages in mass and firepower.
The author approaches his study by contrasting the German and US/UK in terms of leadership, training, and values & morale. The inclusion of short case studies or battlefield examples helps to illustrate the authors key points and makes for interesting reading. The authors analysis is interesting but his criticism of the American approach to conflict is overstated and based on selective use of historical examples. Specifically, I believe his claim that the US Army was too reliant on detailed planning and rigid in execution runs counter to American adaptability at the small unit level (dealing with hedgerows in Normandy). That said there is truth to his claim that the US relied heavily on mass and firepower but that is/was an asymmetric advantage the US would use that to their advantage.
Ultimately this is an interesting analysis that rightly emphasizes the importance of empowering subordinates, initiative, and boldness in military operations and as key to an organization's ability to seize opportunities in uncertainty. As any good business consultant would do the author closes with a list of seven conditions for success which can apply equally to the business and military professions:
- Trust your people
- Accept mistakes
- Formulate realistic goals
- Give room to maneuver
- Make sure your subordinates assume responsibility with pleasure
- There can be only one leader (unity of command)
- Make sure that there is a common vision and focus on cooperation
Authors own discussion of highlights can be found at: https://www.pen-and-sword.co.uk/blog/...
The author approaches his study by contrasting the German and US/UK in terms of leadership, training, and values & morale. The inclusion of short case studies or battlefield examples helps to illustrate the authors key points and makes for interesting reading. The authors analysis is interesting but his criticism of the American approach to conflict is overstated and based on selective use of historical examples. Specifically, I believe his claim that the US Army was too reliant on detailed planning and rigid in execution runs counter to American adaptability at the small unit level (dealing with hedgerows in Normandy). That said there is truth to his claim that the US relied heavily on mass and firepower but that is/was an asymmetric advantage the US would use that to their advantage.
Ultimately this is an interesting analysis that rightly emphasizes the importance of empowering subordinates, initiative, and boldness in military operations and as key to an organization's ability to seize opportunities in uncertainty. As any good business consultant would do the author closes with a list of seven conditions for success which can apply equally to the business and military professions:
- Trust your people
- Accept mistakes
- Formulate realistic goals
- Give room to maneuver
- Make sure your subordinates assume responsibility with pleasure
- There can be only one leader (unity of command)
- Make sure that there is a common vision and focus on cooperation
Authors own discussion of highlights can be found at: https://www.pen-and-sword.co.uk/blog/...
December 12, 2021
I Wish I knew enough to love this book as much as I do!
I wish I knew enough to like this book as much as I do. Something for every Germanophile and every amateur World War Two buff. A must read for both of those categories.
I wish I knew enough to like this book as much as I do. Something for every Germanophile and every amateur World War Two buff. A must read for both of those categories.
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews