When I was a young man maturing in blissfully peaceful 1960s-70s middle-class Australia, Ireland was ever-present in the news, as a darkly exotic war-zone similar, I suppose, to Beirut, and equally mysterious, defying simple understanding. There was a sine-curve of risings and lowerings of violent outbreaks, and I had a broad understanding that this was about three things, Catholicism and Protestantism, and England. I knew that one day I would need to plunge in and seek a more elaborate understanding. A few months ago, my fiction-reading took me to James Joyce and, subsequently Sebastian Barry. Both those authors had sufficient connection to past Irish events that it was now necessary to enlarge my meagre knowledge. A cursory glance in Google suggested that R.F. Foster’s Modern Ireland 1600-1972 was the best direction to take.
As so often, Google’s guidance was invaluable.
I am still trying to resolve all the information from Foster’s work into a form my brain can cope with, but this conundrum is made a little easier by three qualities of the book: its thoroughness in unravelling the tangle of complexities; its use of substantiation, and its impartiality and independence of analysis, and readiness to contest the clichés. On each of those counts, it scores 10/10. By contrast, there is Wikipedia . I am usually positive about Wikipedia as a reliable source but its account of the period 1600-1972 (Foster’s span) is lamentably simplistic and reliant on the clichéd tropes.
I am a little disappointed that Foster chose to begin the book as late as 1600 but, since it already comprises some 600 pages before the appendices, I accept that a limit had to be applied, and I suppose the very end of the Tudors is reasonable.
The first vital point Foster makes is that traditional Irish society (prior to the Normal Conquest) was a puzzlingly fluid affair, both in terms of land ownership and in terms of political authority and power. This meant that the period prior to 1600 saw an ever-changing social structure, with the Normans, breakaway-Normans, and locals (numbers of whom had Viking background!) engaged in transient alliances and hegemonies. It probably also meant that it was uniquely difficult to find some sort of melding of Irish and English ways. Mind you, in these pre-Enlightenment days, there was not much concern about the wishes or needs of dispossessed peoples.
It is evident that the last thousand years has seen a surfeit of individuals, institutions, organisations, and nations passing through Irish history, with very few of them, if any, emerging with unsullied merit.
In the early days, the Normans paid little attention to Ireland, although after the conquest, the conquered Harold Godwinson’s family used it as a base for incursions against William I. It was not until the late twelfth century that the later Normans, under Henry II, started to take Irish land, and they adopted the same methodology as their predecessors had followed in England. These people are now known as Anglo-Normans, although the original English aristocracy had had their lands taken from them and had mostly departed for the Byzantine Empire, so naming these people as “Anglo-Normans” is, strictly speaking, inaccurate. The twelfth century appropriation of Irish lands was carried out by the Normans as an extension of their activities in England and Scotland. (Ironically, their interest in Ireland appears to have begun as a result of a request by Diarmait Mac Murchada, a deposed King of Leinster, to Henry for assistance in recovering his personal kingdom. One suspects that, at this time, a chieftain’s/king’s enemy or friend was simply an enemy or friend depending on alliances, and not on which side of the Irish Sea they inhabited.) King Henry spread his interest from Leinster to most of the island, granting land to his – Norman – knights and barons.) While my quibble about nomenclature might seem pedantic, it is relevant in the light of the fact that the English (as well as Protestants) have frequently been accepted as the root of all Irish problems.
Matters appear to have continued fairly much in stability for the next few centuries with Henry’s legal squatter aristocracy consolidating their authority and wealth while the remainder of the population, the pre-conquest population, continued as either small farmers or as serfs, with the various chieftains free to choose between death, diaspora or acquiescence and ultimate absorption. The next important event was in 1541, when King Henry VIII decided to take a closer interest, and had himself named King of Ireland in addition to his other territorial thrones, having previously had the title of mere Lord of Ireland. By now, the landed classes in Ireland regarded themselves as English, a considerable amount of time having elapsed since the Conquest, and there being good self-preservation reasons for not publicly identifying as French.
The reign of Henry VIII is, of course, the time of the English Reformation. Curiously, Henry does not seem to have expended as much effort in imposing Protestantism in Ireland as he did in England. Edward VI and Elizabeth I both seem to have somewhat neglected enforcement of the Reformation in Ireland as well. One wonders what might have happened if there had been earlier focus on the Reformation there. Either way, the Irish population were almost entirely Catholic when this book begins its analysis in 1600, three years prior to Elizabeth’s death and James Stuart’s accession. And the “almost” is indicative primarily of the Protestants who had left England and taken up Irish land since Henry II’s time. Ireland was not a notable recipient of English recusants. We should remember, however, that the O’Neill family, at the end of the sixteenth century, followed Diarmait Mac Murchada’s model of collaborating with the English for his personal gain, (then subsequently washing on a tint of anti-Englishness to camouflage his own cupidity). As Foster fairly suggests, O’Neill saw himself as fighting for Ulster, rather than for a larger entity of Ireland.
Foster reports that, in 1603, 2% of the Irish population was of Anglo-Scots background, but by 1700, this had grown to 27%. This increase gave the English/Scots/Protestant section much greater heft.
Catholicism remained predominant, and the tradition began of Irish priests studying in Spain. The Spanish proved to be unreliable allies though, with little commitment to O’Neill’s 1600/1601 rebellion which accordingly was routed. One is tempted to imagine that to the average Catholic at this time, just who occupied the big house, and what their origin was, would be largely irrelevant.
According to Foster, at this stage, antipathy to the Protestant English was often piecemeal:
In many areas, discrimination against Catholics is hard to establish, let alone persecution…observance of the Catholic religion was fairly open…there were more Catholic than Protestant landowners; Catholics were made JPs and sheriffs on a large scale.
Subsequent policies of resettling Scots and English in Ireland moved apace, especially in Munster in the south, and Ulster in the north under James I and Charles I. It seems that a major turning point came with the appointment by Charles of Thomas Wentworth, later the Earl of Strafford, as Lord Deputy of Ireland in 1632. He was corrupt, greedy, ruthless and dictatorial, and set in concrete a Protestant versus Catholic framework, as well as a domineering England. In 1641, that dichotomy exploded with a violent attack by Ulster natives on settlers, and the place has never really looked … forward … since. Foster explains that the movement was not of
the dispossessed natives, driven beyond endurance; nor were they frantically Catholic revanchists. They were the Ulster gentry, of Irish origin, but still possessing land: And though their formal demands stressed religious freedom, the statements made by those who joined in… played it down. Throughout, the emphasis fell on threats to land titles, the depredations of the new-style government and – most importantly – a residual loyalty to the King.
This was followed by Oliver Cromwell’s arrival and his massacre of the civilian population at Drogheda, and then his appropriation of land to be distributed as salaries for his forces and sold off for funds. It is interesting that Catholics owned around 60% of land in 1641 and around 9% in 1660, although it rose back to about 20% after the Restoration.
Foster suggests there was initially an accommodation between King William III and the Irish, until 1688 when a Catholic heir was born to James II and dynastic Jacobitism became a long-term threat. William put down the Jacobites. This was concluded with the Treaty of Limerick, by which Catholics would retain the religious liberty they had under Charles II; as long as they swore allegiance to William, they were pardoned, could keep their property and practise a profession and keep civilian arms. However, these accommodations gradually diminished in later years, as they also did, of course, in England. Although, in England the Catholics were a tiny minority; in Ireland, a large majority. I suppose numbers do not matter much when you’re talking about “revealed truth”!
It was at this time that the “Protestant Ascendancy” became prominent, a social elite, whose “descent could be Norman, Old English, Cromwellian or even (in a very few cases) ancient Gaelic”, “an elite who monopolised law, politics and ‘society’, and whose aspirations were focused on the Irish House of Commons.” And they increasingly believed and preached the inferiority of the locals.
Foster makes the central point that “Increasingly, the Ascendancy were prey to fears that England would let them down by breaking their monopoly: resentment of English pressure towards liberalising the laws against Catholics and dissenters remained a constant irritant”. Even when the English parliament recognised the moral and practical need for tolerance of and autonomy for Catholics, even for separation from England, time and time again the Ascendancy pressured them to retain the status quo . They saw this as the means to protect the property they occupied. One of the great qualities of Foster’s work is that he bravely debunks the more extreme – and often more commonly accepted – interpretations of Ireland’s lamentable history. He explains that, while Catholic landowning had been decimated, the Catholic middle class in the towns were prospering. Business-men clannishly supported one another. And anti-Catholic laws, while severe, were rarely executed. Gradually, discrimination was edged back, with the foundation of Catholic colleges, the right to practise at the bar and, finally, the franchise in 1792-3, bearing in mind that English Catholics did not achieve franchise until 1829.
In the late 1700s, the Catholics were becoming more active and organised, with the Catholic Committee and the United Irishmen, and the activist Wolf Tone. Then followed what Foster has described as “probably the most concentrated episode of violence in Irish history. Mass atrocities were perpetrated in circumstances of chaos and confusion”; ultimately Tone orchestrated French involvement in an aborted invasion, with a goal of independence; Tone was captured and suicided before execution. The upshot was not independence but the 1801 Act of Union which consolidated Ascendancy protection, although it had been opposed by Ascendancy politicians who were displeased with the loss of their parliament.
Union, in fact, polarised matters even more. Subsequent years saw the escalation of Catholic agrarian guerilla activity. But there was also the emergence of Daniel O’Connell, a somewhat elitist figure, who sought to impart some structure to Catholic activity. Foster assesses his achievements as “scant” but notes that some Catholics were dismissive of him, others made him the centre of something approaching a “cult”.
One (amongst many) pivotal points was the Irish potato famine of 1845-9. This came to be seen as the epitome of English oppression. Foster notes that there had been several previous famines, most with the potential for tragic outcomes. Yet this one had dire consequences. Part of this was due to on-going restructuring of agrarian practices but part of it was due to a widespread belief amongst the governing class that “Irish fecklessness and lack of economy were bringing a retribution that would work out for the best in the end”. And there was a powerful political philosophy that opposed government welfare, so that there was inadequate institutional provision of relief food in the form that had been successful in other nations also experiencing the famine.
In 1869 Gladstone had the Church of Ireland disestablished, which was presumably one of those trigger points that set off some Ascendancy twitching. There were, perhaps, four other significant matters affecting Catholicism from around this time: one was the start of substantial migration to the United States prior to the potato famine but connected, in legend, to it. The second was the substantial increase in the number of priests and members of orders in the Catholic church. The third was the beginning of the Fenians and the rise of Parnell. In Foster’s words, Fenians’ “central motivation revolved round the view of England as a satanic power upon earth, a mystic commitment to Ireland, and a belief that an independent Irish Republic, ‘virtually’ established in the hearts of men, possessed a superior moral authority.” The Fenians were educated and literate and saw themselves as representatives of “the people”, although their followers were ‘the class above the masses’. And the fourth factor was the appearance of Gaelic Revivalism and Celtic nationalism in literature and mythology amongst the intellectual elite.
The Ulster Ascendancy, once again – or still – worried about their position, stressed their vulnerability as a minority, but also their assumed superiority in wealth, industriousness, enterprise and lawfulness.
Then came the First World War and a focus on militarism. The Ulster Volunteer Force acquired arms and training very quickly. Ironically, as patriotic Anglophiles, many of these men joined the British army, radically diminishing the UVF strength. The Irish Republican Brotherhood took the same path, but without the confusion of patriotism. Indeed, while the English army was in the trenches, the IRB planned the 1916 Easter Uprising, assuming that the Dublin affray would lead to mass, countrywide rejection of the British government. The uprising was far less successful in its goals, (Foster argues that “The reactions of working class Dublin concentrated more prosaically on epic feats of looting in the damaged shops, and those of bourgeois Dublin on appalled repudiation of what was generally seen as a German plot”), but its mythology was – and remains – substantial. (And we should recall here, Roger Casement’s chimerical flirtation with the Germans.)
Given that Britain was at war at the time, it is not surprising that the response was ferocious: there were ninety death sentences, although seventy-five were ultimately commuted. It was also not surprising that, the following year, Sinn Féin started to regroup. And the Black and Tans, auxiliaries to the Royal Irish Constabulary, were formed. In 1916 the Ulster Unionist Council finally agreed to Home Rule if six Ulster counties were excluded.
In 1929 Northern Ireland was granted Home Rule within the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Ireland was then partitioned, forming the Irish Free State in the remainder of the island. Eamon de Valera, who had been a major figure in the Easter Uprising and was court-martialled and sentenced to death but had his sentence commuted, was one of few of the leaders who survived and he became president of the Dáil Éireann parliament. He went on a fund-raising tour to his birthplace, the United States, where the expatriate Irish with an inexhaustible dedication to a country they had long ago left, donated vast sums of money to the Catholic Irish cause, thereby helping to prolong the conflict.
Foster notes that the Irish Free State was “ruthlessly authoritarian” with a severe outlook on social welfare, and gave the Catholic Church the opportunity to retain a highly conservative position on matters such as marriage, birth, state healthcare and mothers working. De Valera was a devout Catholic, at one time having contemplated becoming a religious. “Old-fashioned farming and inadequate sanitation did not, in any case, rank high among de Valera’s targets; his vision of Ireland, repeated in numerous formulations, was of small agricultural units, each self-sufficiently supporting a frugal family; industrious, Gaelicist and anti-materialist.” He also sent a message of sympathy to Germany on Hitler’s death.
By this time, Ireland had really degenerated into the intractable polarised dysfunction that I remember from the 1950s and 60s. There were the bombings, the IRA targeting of policemen, there were Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness, Ian Paisley and Bernadette Devlin, and the apprentice boy marches. There were the images of hatred and passionate partisanship, violence, death and destruction, justified on grounds of religion and ancient accidental events.
RF Foster’s outstandingly comprehensive and balanced study is a magnificent aid to understanding, even although I found myself shaking my head at the actions and words of so many individuals, institutional spokesmen and governments.