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Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry
Some have claimed that "War is too important to be left to the generals," but P. W. Singer asks "What about the business executives?" Breaking out of the guns-for-hire mold of traditional mercenaries, corporations now sell skills and services that until recently only state militaries possessed. Their products range from trained commando teams to strategic advice from generals. This new "Privatized Military Industry" encompasses hundreds of companies, thousands of employees, and billions of dollars in revenue. Whether as proxies or suppliers, such firms have participated in wars in Africa, Asia, the Balkans, and Latin America. More recently, they have become a key element in U.S. military operations. Private corporations working for profit now sway the course of national and international conflict, but the consequences have been little explored. In this book, Singer provides the first account of the military services industry and its broader implications. Corporate Warriors includes a description of how the business works, as well as portraits of each of the basic types of companies: military providers that offer troops for tactical operations; military consultants that supply expert advice and training; and military support companies that sell logistics, intelligence, and engineering. In an updated edition of P. W. Singer's classic account of the military services industry and its broader implications, the author describes the continuing importance of that industry in the Iraq War. This conflict has amply borne out Singer's argument that the privatization of warfare allows startling new capabilities and efficiencies in the ways that war is carried out. At the same time, however, Singer finds that the introduction of the profit motive onto the battlefield raises troubling questions—for democracy, for ethics, for management, for human rights, and for national security.
361 pages, Kindle Edition
First published January 1, 2003
69 people are currently reading
1750 people want to read
About the author
P.W. Singer
14 books647 followersPeter Warren Singer is Strategist and Senior Fellow at the New America Foundation. He previously was Director of the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence at the Brookings Institution and the youngest scholar named Senior Fellow in Brookings's 101-year history. Described in the Wall Street Journal as “the premier futurist in the national- security environment," has been named by the Smithsonian as one of the nation’s 100 leading innovators, by Defense News as one of the 100 most influential people in defense issues, by Foreign Policy to their Top 100 Global Thinkers List, and as an official “Mad Scientist” for the U.S. Army’s Training and Doctrine Command. He has consulted for the US Military, Defense Intelligence Agency, and FBI, as well as advised a range of entertainment programs, including for Warner Brothers, Dreamworks, Universal, HBO, Discovery, History Channel, and the video game series Call of Duty, the best-selling entertainment project in history. Peter’s award winning books have been endorsed by people who range from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to the co-inventor of the Internet to the writer of HBO Game of Thrones.
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April 22, 2015
This book turned out to be much deeper and expansive than I expected. From the beginning I attempted to maintain neutral expectations towards this subject after only being exposed to negative coverage of companies such as Blackwater (now known as Academi) in the press.
I was surprised to learn that there has been a very long history of private military forces that had been used for centuries in Europe. It turns out that the use of PMFs (private military forces) is hardly a new issue and the morality of which has been debated and tested for a long time, well before Iraq war and Dick Cheney was born.
Additionally, for a very long time in human history private forces and mercenaries were actually more common than purely-state backed armies. As they were more efficient and effective than anything the disorganized governments at the time could put together.
PMFs even played a critical role in early American wars in the 1800s, notably when 1/4 of the British army were German mercenaries who ended up defecting to America because they liked it so much once they arrived off the boat.
This book gets really interesting when it fasts-forwards to modern times when it explains how PMFs played a key role in Yugoslavia/Croatia conflicts and many African conflicts during the 1980s-2000s. Whole chapters are dedicated to the stories of companies such as Executive Outcomes (famous in the Clinton era), MPRI, and even the much-attacked Halliburton.
Whenever PMFs were brought into wars they almost always played a critical role in the outcome of the war - often doing more than the government armies they worked with. But the public was almost never informed about the use of PMFs as they kept a low profile, so it's not surprising they became shocked when a company like Blackwater became so prominent. Blackwater was hardly the first PMF but the public had never really considered the implications, nor were they particularly well informed the stories started coming out.
Which is why I find this book so interesting, as it provides that historical perspective missing from the media.
This book was written before Iraq/Blackwater controversies but a short afterword was added in the updated version of the book. This made me want to learn more about newer PMFs so I went out and bought Erik Prince's book about the founding of Blackwater and "Civilian Warriors".
I was also left very curious about what implications PMFs will have on cyber warfare in the future. Because the context of using PMFs has always been that the countries that employ them did not possess sufficient capability in modern warfare. Free markets options offered far superior capabilities at better prices. This is arguably the case for many countries who lack strong information security skills at the moment. So I wonder if we'll start seeing cyber versions of DynCorp/MPRI/Academi.
I was surprised to learn that there has been a very long history of private military forces that had been used for centuries in Europe. It turns out that the use of PMFs (private military forces) is hardly a new issue and the morality of which has been debated and tested for a long time, well before Iraq war and Dick Cheney was born.
Additionally, for a very long time in human history private forces and mercenaries were actually more common than purely-state backed armies. As they were more efficient and effective than anything the disorganized governments at the time could put together.
PMFs even played a critical role in early American wars in the 1800s, notably when 1/4 of the British army were German mercenaries who ended up defecting to America because they liked it so much once they arrived off the boat.
This book gets really interesting when it fasts-forwards to modern times when it explains how PMFs played a key role in Yugoslavia/Croatia conflicts and many African conflicts during the 1980s-2000s. Whole chapters are dedicated to the stories of companies such as Executive Outcomes (famous in the Clinton era), MPRI, and even the much-attacked Halliburton.
Whenever PMFs were brought into wars they almost always played a critical role in the outcome of the war - often doing more than the government armies they worked with. But the public was almost never informed about the use of PMFs as they kept a low profile, so it's not surprising they became shocked when a company like Blackwater became so prominent. Blackwater was hardly the first PMF but the public had never really considered the implications, nor were they particularly well informed the stories started coming out.
Which is why I find this book so interesting, as it provides that historical perspective missing from the media.
This book was written before Iraq/Blackwater controversies but a short afterword was added in the updated version of the book. This made me want to learn more about newer PMFs so I went out and bought Erik Prince's book about the founding of Blackwater and "Civilian Warriors".
I was also left very curious about what implications PMFs will have on cyber warfare in the future. Because the context of using PMFs has always been that the countries that employ them did not possess sufficient capability in modern warfare. Free markets options offered far superior capabilities at better prices. This is arguably the case for many countries who lack strong information security skills at the moment. So I wonder if we'll start seeing cyber versions of DynCorp/MPRI/Academi.
July 24, 2019
This book has quickly smashed my naïf presumption that warfare and military actions are privileges of states and their armies only. The proliferation of privatized military firms (‘PMFs’) since the end of the Cold War and the decisive role they played in numerous local conflicts are eye-opening. Wars in Angola, the former Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone or Ethiopia-Eritrea are exemplary of how effective can be a relatively small but experienced and well-equipped PMF personnel in delivering to their local patron the desired military outcome. The book provides a unique insight into the unscrupulous and profit-oriented world of PMFs, let them be providers, consultants or supporters. The most fascinating aspect is the legal vacuum in which PMFs operate. Since PMFs are destined to be hired by weak governments which struggle to maintain security and laws, PMFs tend to operate in war zones where ‘laissez-faire’ prevails. They are only subject to the law of markets and some of them did not hesitate to offer their services for the right price to jihadist groups or the Colombian / Mexican drug cartels. Current international laws are painfully outdated to effectively tackle the PMF industry and it's hard to stomach that rogue PMF employees may conduct war crimes and go on a killing spree in blurry war zones with impunity. The book was written in 2002 with a closing chapter added on the Iraqi experience in 2007. It's pretty evident that the PMF phenomenon has gained huge traction over that short period and PMFs shall stick around, perhaps with an ever increasing relevance, for the long term.
August 26, 2013
An excellent tour de horizon from the early Aughts of the rise of the private military contracting (PMC) business, detailing the underlying drivers, the contours of the current businesses, as well as the ambivalent implications of this transformation.
Singer's vantage point is from a baseline assumption that military action and security is an "essentially governmental" function, to be provided in equal measure to all citizens within the contiguous sovereign space of the state. "Traditionally, the government provides all its citizens with certain services, which are genrally paid for through taxation. This takes place in what is known as the public sector." Security is the paramount "unprivatizable" service -- "providing for national, and hence their citizens', security was one of the most essential tass of a government" -- since in theory it is "nonexcludable." The central innovation of the PSCs and PMCs is that they have figured out how to create a micro-topography of security provisioning, such that they can in fact exclude some parties from receiving the "service" of security. (7)
The rationale for this sort of privatization follows the same logic as other forms of privatization, Singer argues. Governments may find it "expedient to transfer some of their responsibilities to the private sector. They may do so because of issues of cost, quality, efficiency, or changing conceptions of governmental duties."
Singer points out that mercenaries are of course a venerable tradition, as soldiers for hire were a common feature of late medieval and early modern statecraft. It was only with the rise of the post-Napoleonic modern military, with its levee en masse, that the mercenary became an untoward figure. The return of the mercenary in the post-Cold War world is thus a rather shocking development that is yet another piece of evidence that statecraft is undergoing a fundamental transformation, as the traditional "modernist bundle" of state functions is disaggregated, both functionally and spatially. (This periodization dovetails with the observation that much post-modern statecraft has a feeling of "neo-Medievalism," to use the phrase Stephen Korbin used in his 1997 essay "Back to the Future: Neomedievalism and the Postmodern Digital World Economy.") As Singer concludes, "The start of the 21st century has begun to see the Weberian monopoly of the state slowly break down." (18) Singer takes a characteristicly nuanced view of this shift: "Although some argue that the trend toward privatization is part of a more general societal fragmentation, resulting from the deterioration of communal connections, the move is better characterized as a normative shift in worldview." (69) It is worth asking, however, whether the normative shift is a leading for lagging variable to the societal breakdown, or perhaps a circularly reinforcing pattern/
According to Singer, the two key historical factors in the rise of the PMC industry: on the supply side, the post-Cold War demobilization of many militaries meant that there were lying around many highly trained military men (and fancy kit), with little gainful employment opportunities in their traditional specialty; on the supply side, the emergence of many conflicts (esp. "failing states") that the Great Powers wished to intervene in but for which there was little political support meant that the ability to hire guns rather than deploy citizen-soldiers became politically attractive. (38) Of course, the PMCs support all sorts of different clients: protection for firms and humanitarian organizations, logistical support for the uniformed military, advising & training of militaries, and (in fact most rarely) actual warfighting.
A large section of the book consists of empirical descriptions of the shape and geography of the PMC industry, which is centered in the US, London, with key nodes also in Israel and South Africa. The PMCs firms tend to constantly reshape themselves to meet the needs to specific clients, in much the same way that every movie today is made by a bespoke corporate vehicle, even as it the same players repeatedly turn up to play key roles in these legally sui generis organizations. This corporate hyper-morphology helps avoid structures and regulations that more stable corporate forms might be subject to.
While Singer maintains a dispassionate assessment, he notes the many problems that the rise of the industry may create, including:
1) A talent drain from the uniformed military (especially with adverse selection problems, given the greater financial rewards available in the private sector). In essence the government is paying to train highly skilled workers, and the PMCs are cashing in on it.
2) A lack of regulation can lead to human rights and humanitarian violations. The sorts of workers attracted to PMC work are not always the nicest people, and abuses have certainly occurred. "Privatized military assistance can bypass Congressional oversight and provide political cover to the White House if something goes wrong." (207)
3) The lowering of the political cost of military interventions by having them largely or wholly executed by PMCs may encourage greater military adventurism by states. Singer describes this as the "Say's Law" of the private security market: "the mere existence of a supply of firms will call forth added demand for their services." (231)
4) The blurring of the distinction between civilian and military may allow adversaries to justify targetting "real" civilians.
5) It creates a group of people who have a vested interest in the continuation and even worsening of military conflicts, rather than their successful conclusion or termination. "They directly benefit from the existence of war and suffering." (216) "One of the fundamental issues from a normative standpoint is that the public good and the private firm's good are not always identical. The organizing intent of a private is to generate internal profit. whereas public agencies are concerned with wider demands. That is, private companies as a rule are more interested in doing well than doing good." (217)
6) Some firms may "go rogue" in the "low rent district" of the industry, serving unsavory governments, or even deviant nonstate actors such as drug lords. An Israeli PMC, Spearhead, has been indicted for serving the FARC, for example. There is no metric or standard or regulatory authority governing who is a "legitimate" client.
7) Most profoundly, "When the government delegates out part of its role in national security through the recruitment and maintenance of armed forces, it is abdicating an essential responsibility. When the forms of public protection are hired through private means, the citizens of society do not enjoy security by right of their membership in the state.... When marketized, security is often not about the collective good, but about private means and ends." (226) As Singer points out, this process can have further deleterious knock-on effects: "When government is no longer responsible for aspects of security, the rationale for citizen loyalty is weakened [possibly leading] to a breakdown of respect for governmental authority" and a deligitimation of the state. (226)
8) This process is most visible in the "enclavization" of security in much of Africa and Latin America. In the end, it represents a decline of a sense of collective or social responsibility. "Creating closed-off 'enclaves' involves the setting of internal boundaries. Such privatized enclaves are in a sense an abandonment of the public realm in security. They represent a 'secession of the successful' from the rest of society." (227) PMC's are the natural security analog to the idea that there is no such thing as society
Singer's vantage point is from a baseline assumption that military action and security is an "essentially governmental" function, to be provided in equal measure to all citizens within the contiguous sovereign space of the state. "Traditionally, the government provides all its citizens with certain services, which are genrally paid for through taxation. This takes place in what is known as the public sector." Security is the paramount "unprivatizable" service -- "providing for national, and hence their citizens', security was one of the most essential tass of a government" -- since in theory it is "nonexcludable." The central innovation of the PSCs and PMCs is that they have figured out how to create a micro-topography of security provisioning, such that they can in fact exclude some parties from receiving the "service" of security. (7)
The rationale for this sort of privatization follows the same logic as other forms of privatization, Singer argues. Governments may find it "expedient to transfer some of their responsibilities to the private sector. They may do so because of issues of cost, quality, efficiency, or changing conceptions of governmental duties."
Singer points out that mercenaries are of course a venerable tradition, as soldiers for hire were a common feature of late medieval and early modern statecraft. It was only with the rise of the post-Napoleonic modern military, with its levee en masse, that the mercenary became an untoward figure. The return of the mercenary in the post-Cold War world is thus a rather shocking development that is yet another piece of evidence that statecraft is undergoing a fundamental transformation, as the traditional "modernist bundle" of state functions is disaggregated, both functionally and spatially. (This periodization dovetails with the observation that much post-modern statecraft has a feeling of "neo-Medievalism," to use the phrase Stephen Korbin used in his 1997 essay "Back to the Future: Neomedievalism and the Postmodern Digital World Economy.") As Singer concludes, "The start of the 21st century has begun to see the Weberian monopoly of the state slowly break down." (18) Singer takes a characteristicly nuanced view of this shift: "Although some argue that the trend toward privatization is part of a more general societal fragmentation, resulting from the deterioration of communal connections, the move is better characterized as a normative shift in worldview." (69) It is worth asking, however, whether the normative shift is a leading for lagging variable to the societal breakdown, or perhaps a circularly reinforcing pattern/
According to Singer, the two key historical factors in the rise of the PMC industry: on the supply side, the post-Cold War demobilization of many militaries meant that there were lying around many highly trained military men (and fancy kit), with little gainful employment opportunities in their traditional specialty; on the supply side, the emergence of many conflicts (esp. "failing states") that the Great Powers wished to intervene in but for which there was little political support meant that the ability to hire guns rather than deploy citizen-soldiers became politically attractive. (38) Of course, the PMCs support all sorts of different clients: protection for firms and humanitarian organizations, logistical support for the uniformed military, advising & training of militaries, and (in fact most rarely) actual warfighting.
A large section of the book consists of empirical descriptions of the shape and geography of the PMC industry, which is centered in the US, London, with key nodes also in Israel and South Africa. The PMCs firms tend to constantly reshape themselves to meet the needs to specific clients, in much the same way that every movie today is made by a bespoke corporate vehicle, even as it the same players repeatedly turn up to play key roles in these legally sui generis organizations. This corporate hyper-morphology helps avoid structures and regulations that more stable corporate forms might be subject to.
While Singer maintains a dispassionate assessment, he notes the many problems that the rise of the industry may create, including:
1) A talent drain from the uniformed military (especially with adverse selection problems, given the greater financial rewards available in the private sector). In essence the government is paying to train highly skilled workers, and the PMCs are cashing in on it.
2) A lack of regulation can lead to human rights and humanitarian violations. The sorts of workers attracted to PMC work are not always the nicest people, and abuses have certainly occurred. "Privatized military assistance can bypass Congressional oversight and provide political cover to the White House if something goes wrong." (207)
3) The lowering of the political cost of military interventions by having them largely or wholly executed by PMCs may encourage greater military adventurism by states. Singer describes this as the "Say's Law" of the private security market: "the mere existence of a supply of firms will call forth added demand for their services." (231)
4) The blurring of the distinction between civilian and military may allow adversaries to justify targetting "real" civilians.
5) It creates a group of people who have a vested interest in the continuation and even worsening of military conflicts, rather than their successful conclusion or termination. "They directly benefit from the existence of war and suffering." (216) "One of the fundamental issues from a normative standpoint is that the public good and the private firm's good are not always identical. The organizing intent of a private is to generate internal profit. whereas public agencies are concerned with wider demands. That is, private companies as a rule are more interested in doing well than doing good." (217)
6) Some firms may "go rogue" in the "low rent district" of the industry, serving unsavory governments, or even deviant nonstate actors such as drug lords. An Israeli PMC, Spearhead, has been indicted for serving the FARC, for example. There is no metric or standard or regulatory authority governing who is a "legitimate" client.
7) Most profoundly, "When the government delegates out part of its role in national security through the recruitment and maintenance of armed forces, it is abdicating an essential responsibility. When the forms of public protection are hired through private means, the citizens of society do not enjoy security by right of their membership in the state.... When marketized, security is often not about the collective good, but about private means and ends." (226) As Singer points out, this process can have further deleterious knock-on effects: "When government is no longer responsible for aspects of security, the rationale for citizen loyalty is weakened [possibly leading] to a breakdown of respect for governmental authority" and a deligitimation of the state. (226)
8) This process is most visible in the "enclavization" of security in much of Africa and Latin America. In the end, it represents a decline of a sense of collective or social responsibility. "Creating closed-off 'enclaves' involves the setting of internal boundaries. Such privatized enclaves are in a sense an abandonment of the public realm in security. They represent a 'secession of the successful' from the rest of society." (227) PMC's are the natural security analog to the idea that there is no such thing as society
October 1, 2013
The problem with being ahead of the curve is that once the corner is rounded, everything predicted now seems obvious. That's the problem with Singer's Corporate Warriors, we've rounded the curve. Singer even acknowledges it in a new chapter in the updated edition about the Iraq war and how the private military industry exploded beyond even his projections.
I loved Wired for War, but might have the same criticism if I had read it ten years from now. That's not to undermine the quality of the book, the writing, or the author. I just think that at this point, there are more current books out there on this topic. However, there are some great chapters on the history of hired mercenaries through the ages that are still informative and very interesting to read.
I loved Wired for War, but might have the same criticism if I had read it ten years from now. That's not to undermine the quality of the book, the writing, or the author. I just think that at this point, there are more current books out there on this topic. However, there are some great chapters on the history of hired mercenaries through the ages that are still informative and very interesting to read.
January 20, 2009
This is an academic study of the history and implications of private companies providing defense services traditionally associated with governments. I recommend this book to anyone who wants a decent academic discussion about the hazards of such companies, as well as their intrinsic value (generally leaning towards the hazards). It was written in 2004, before Blackwater became a household name, so it avoids the pitfalls of recent books on the defense industry which vastly inflate the roll and influence of companies like Blackwater while ignoring other far more entrenched, profitable, and influential defense contractors (SAIC, Booz Allen Hamilton, MPRI, DynCorp Intl., General Dynamics, Boeing, Lockheed Martin, etc.). However, it instead spends too much time on a little known, controversial, and short lived company called Executive Outcomes. EO is certainly noteworthy because it is the most extreme example of a private company selling military services (it literally sold full-scale kinetic combat operations to African governments and rebel groups - think the movie Blood Diamond), but a study of EO does not help anyone understand modern defense service companies under contract with legitimate governments, especially for the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan. Also, when I read the section for which I have first-hand knowledge, I was very disappointed and it made me question the veracity of other parts of the book. When I was able to look at the information with a truly critical eye (not easy with most of the historical information presented in the book because the details are classified and/or of a proprietary nature), I found the sourcing to be weak and the narrative to be inaccurate, confusing companies, their roles, all while interweaving a heavy dose of undocumented rumor (the author admitted the weakness of the section; however, he did so in a manner that leaves the reader with the impression that whatever the author doesn't know must be truly sinister when really the section is just poorly researched). It also suffers from being the first attempt at an academic study in this field, thus not having the ability to draw on others' research and ideas.
May 4, 2009
One of the first in-depth works looking at the role of private military contractors and security firms in the early 21st century. Well-written and thoughtful, and far more an analysis than an expose. Singer asks a few key questions: why do private military contractors exist today? how effective are they? how are they controlled? what effect will their use have on the way force is employed and war is waged in the future? Singer rightly questions the level of training and screening of personnel employed by many private contractors and questions a key ("deniability") factor in the way governments employ such firms. But he avoids the use of the simplistic and pejorative term "mercenary" and recognises the economic and political forces that make private contractors so attractive to governments and corporations. Singer's book was released before the Blackwater scandals in Iraq, but it is a key starting place for anyone interested in the topic.
May 14, 2011
Reading this book was like eating a burrito full of nutrient-fortified sawdust-- I can't remember the last time I learned so much from a book but failed so badly to enjoy it. I had been expecting something a little more glamorous (both for better and for worse) than the bland truth that I was served-- which is that for all of the mental imagery of swashbuckling mercenaries that the subject matter might immediately bring to mind, in fact the privatized military industry combines all of the mind-numbing humdrum of both the military-industrial complex and boring old private business. In retrospect this should have been apparent to me from the start, I suppose, but I'm still going to stick with my final judgment that this is a painfully dull book.
October 26, 2007
This is the primer on private military companies. Singer was one of the first people to comprehensively examine the origins, structure, and operations of this industry. Required reading for anyone who wants to understand these organizations.
June 15, 2011
It has been much too long in coming, but I finally finished P.W. Singer's
Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry
. It is, quite simply, excellent.
Singer is one of the most intriguing defense/security writers out there, as his "thing" is basically finding heavily underrreported - yet crucial - developments occurring in the U.S. military. He seems to always be one of the first to really study in a comprehensive and coherent manner certain evolutionary changes in the way war is fought, and Corporate Warriors is no exception. His other works deal with heady subjects like robotics in war and child soldiers, and here he is at the forefront of yet another startling trend.
Corporate Warriors is an attempt to trace the lineage of the Private Military Firm (PMF) from early mercenaries to today's corporate arrangements, and in doing so, to fit them into a theoretical framework for better understanding and predicting industry developments. Published on the eve of the Iraq War in 2003, the book mostly deals with the 1990s, though to fully explain the rise of the PMF it jumps back to earlier examples in the 1970s and 80s.
Much of Corporate Warriors is couched in the language of IR theory, but Singer never slavishly tries to fit all of his findings into a rigid framework. Chapter 2 is an excellent historical survey of privatized military history, ranging from mercenaries in the service of King Shulgi of Ur to Syracusan hoplites to the first "companies" of the Hundred Years War. Singer fully explains the 'state as monopoly on violence' and the prominence that mercenaries enjoyed from the dawn of history until the nineteenth century, explaining that the odd little gap between roughly 1860 and 1950 in which the state's monopoly was the only game in town. But he is never overly concerned with the theoretical framework. Chapter 11, "Market Dynamism and Global Security Disruptions," opens with an epigraph from Professor R.B.J. Walker:
Nevertheless, there is a basic terminology to sort out the different functions that these PMFs perform. Broadly, they can be slotted into the categories of "provider firm" (actual, boots-on-the-ground fighting forces, like Airscan, DynCorp, and Executive Outcomes), "consulting firm" (providing everything but combat troops, including training, intelligence, and logistical planning; see MPRI, Ronco, and CACI), and the "support firm" (logistics such as transportation, maintenance, and catering; see KBR, Serco, and General Dynamics). While the categories are relatively firm, their companies are not - most have sub-units, spinoffs, and subcontractors that define themselves fluidly and often shift between functions.
Singer performs an admirable job of pointing out obvious absurdities in the way contracts are awarded and over the very functions that are now being outsourced and privatized. When the ostensible point of outsourcing to private companies is to save money, it makes little sense to award no-bid contracts, or to ask for bidding when less than a handful of companies exist that are even capable of performing the job. As Singer notes, "such arrangements forget that the efficiency of privatization comes from greater competition, rather than simply that it is private."
A good amount of space is devoted to some of the less obvious problems that arise from private militarization. Instead of a traditional arms race, the Ethiopian-Eritrean War saw an actual bidding race, as both sides rushed to secure the most in-demand services before their opponent could do the same. In this sense, more than any military build-up might be, a PMF race between adversarial nations represents a truly zero-sum situation. Whereas a country can attempt to increase spending, conscription, and overall arms procurement to match another country (such as the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War), every PMF that is hired by one party leaves one less to be hired by the other. This, Singer warns, can have serious unforeseen and destabilizing effects on future conflicts.
Other surprising issues are at stake. One such example of PMFs and the civil-military balance is particularly fascinating, and deserves to be quoted in full:
Another hitherto unforeseen situation is the potential for "good" NGOs and humanitarian groups to hire a PMF. Singer writes that during the early days of Rwanda, the United Nations at one point considered hiring mercenary groups to avoid a prolonged negotiation between its own member countries as to the composition of a peacekeeping force, and because a PMF could deploy much sooner. Groups like Worldvision in Sierra Leone and other agencies of the UN (including the High Commission for Refugees) have hired firms for protection and security advice. The world of private military capabilities is a complex one, and there are both objectively "good" and positive contingent outcomes that are hard to predict in advance.
While a book on the private military industry written on the eve of the invasion of Iraq might seem like it would be woefully outdated, it's held up surprisingly well. This is helped, of course, by Singer's new 2007 postscript - "The Lessons of Iraq" - which makes a compelling case for his own arguments. Sadly, the moderation and careful consideration he proscribed in his earlier conclusion was nowhere in sight during the following decade, and in fact the his most dire assessments of the real dilemmas with private military contracting were somehow outdone by reality. Vast quantities of money were funneled to contractors with little-to-no oversight, much of which simply vanished. Contractors were unaccountable, belonging neither to the military chain of command (and thus subject to the UCMJ) nor to civilian courts - always walking away free.
Singer's final proscription is that perhaps we had best take a step back and ask ourselves whether some of the functions we are now privatizing would be best left to our own military. Are we losing core functions and capabilities to the private sector? And are we paying the cost of training soldiers, only to see them leave and sell those same services back to us at twice the cost? Until such questions are answered publicly and definitely, the hazy, murky world of military contracting will continue to flourish. And while that in itself may not be a bad thing for now, if left to grow rampant and unchecked the blowback will become more than we can possibly imagine.
Corporate Warriors sought to analyze a new and growing trend, and since its writing that trend has increased exponentially. Like Singer's other work, it found a military development on the edge of mass awareness and firmly planted itself in the public mind. He foresaw the problems with PMFs and anticipated their logical extreme, to which they went in the five years after initial publication. Let us hope that in the future, if his next books contain such dire predictions, that they are wrong on those counts.
Singer is one of the most intriguing defense/security writers out there, as his "thing" is basically finding heavily underrreported - yet crucial - developments occurring in the U.S. military. He seems to always be one of the first to really study in a comprehensive and coherent manner certain evolutionary changes in the way war is fought, and Corporate Warriors is no exception. His other works deal with heady subjects like robotics in war and child soldiers, and here he is at the forefront of yet another startling trend.
Corporate Warriors is an attempt to trace the lineage of the Private Military Firm (PMF) from early mercenaries to today's corporate arrangements, and in doing so, to fit them into a theoretical framework for better understanding and predicting industry developments. Published on the eve of the Iraq War in 2003, the book mostly deals with the 1990s, though to fully explain the rise of the PMF it jumps back to earlier examples in the 1970s and 80s.
Much of Corporate Warriors is couched in the language of IR theory, but Singer never slavishly tries to fit all of his findings into a rigid framework. Chapter 2 is an excellent historical survey of privatized military history, ranging from mercenaries in the service of King Shulgi of Ur to Syracusan hoplites to the first "companies" of the Hundred Years War. Singer fully explains the 'state as monopoly on violence' and the prominence that mercenaries enjoyed from the dawn of history until the nineteenth century, explaining that the odd little gap between roughly 1860 and 1950 in which the state's monopoly was the only game in town. But he is never overly concerned with the theoretical framework. Chapter 11, "Market Dynamism and Global Security Disruptions," opens with an epigraph from Professor R.B.J. Walker:
The disjunction between the seriousness of international politics and the triviality of international relations theory is quite startling.
Nevertheless, there is a basic terminology to sort out the different functions that these PMFs perform. Broadly, they can be slotted into the categories of "provider firm" (actual, boots-on-the-ground fighting forces, like Airscan, DynCorp, and Executive Outcomes), "consulting firm" (providing everything but combat troops, including training, intelligence, and logistical planning; see MPRI, Ronco, and CACI), and the "support firm" (logistics such as transportation, maintenance, and catering; see KBR, Serco, and General Dynamics). While the categories are relatively firm, their companies are not - most have sub-units, spinoffs, and subcontractors that define themselves fluidly and often shift between functions.
Singer performs an admirable job of pointing out obvious absurdities in the way contracts are awarded and over the very functions that are now being outsourced and privatized. When the ostensible point of outsourcing to private companies is to save money, it makes little sense to award no-bid contracts, or to ask for bidding when less than a handful of companies exist that are even capable of performing the job. As Singer notes, "such arrangements forget that the efficiency of privatization comes from greater competition, rather than simply that it is private."
A good amount of space is devoted to some of the less obvious problems that arise from private militarization. Instead of a traditional arms race, the Ethiopian-Eritrean War saw an actual bidding race, as both sides rushed to secure the most in-demand services before their opponent could do the same. In this sense, more than any military build-up might be, a PMF race between adversarial nations represents a truly zero-sum situation. Whereas a country can attempt to increase spending, conscription, and overall arms procurement to match another country (such as the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War), every PMF that is hired by one party leaves one less to be hired by the other. This, Singer warns, can have serious unforeseen and destabilizing effects on future conflicts.
Other surprising issues are at stake. One such example of PMFs and the civil-military balance is particularly fascinating, and deserves to be quoted in full:
Given the checkered history of the soldiers who had served in the elite units of the apartheid-era South African military [and who now worked for PMF Executive Outcomes (EO)], the new African National Congress (ANC) government in South Africa led by Nelson Mandela had a particular incentive to see that these soldiers stayed out of domestic trouble, especially during the first multiracial elections in 1994. This may in part explain the lack of sanctions when EO first fought in the Angolan civil war. In public, the Mandela government was decidedly against the firm's activities, as EO was acting in contravention of the "new" South Africa's attempt to become a responsible regional power. However, in private, it quietly tolerated and even facilitated early EO recruitment of these forces. The rationale was the government's belief that "it would remove from South Africa a number of personnel who might have had a destabilising effect on the forthcoming multiracial elections." The ultimate outcome was the the South African elections went off without a hitch, while hundreds of potential agitators, with high levels of military skills, were kept busy making money abroad.
Another hitherto unforeseen situation is the potential for "good" NGOs and humanitarian groups to hire a PMF. Singer writes that during the early days of Rwanda, the United Nations at one point considered hiring mercenary groups to avoid a prolonged negotiation between its own member countries as to the composition of a peacekeeping force, and because a PMF could deploy much sooner. Groups like Worldvision in Sierra Leone and other agencies of the UN (including the High Commission for Refugees) have hired firms for protection and security advice. The world of private military capabilities is a complex one, and there are both objectively "good" and positive contingent outcomes that are hard to predict in advance.
While a book on the private military industry written on the eve of the invasion of Iraq might seem like it would be woefully outdated, it's held up surprisingly well. This is helped, of course, by Singer's new 2007 postscript - "The Lessons of Iraq" - which makes a compelling case for his own arguments. Sadly, the moderation and careful consideration he proscribed in his earlier conclusion was nowhere in sight during the following decade, and in fact the his most dire assessments of the real dilemmas with private military contracting were somehow outdone by reality. Vast quantities of money were funneled to contractors with little-to-no oversight, much of which simply vanished. Contractors were unaccountable, belonging neither to the military chain of command (and thus subject to the UCMJ) nor to civilian courts - always walking away free.
Singer's final proscription is that perhaps we had best take a step back and ask ourselves whether some of the functions we are now privatizing would be best left to our own military. Are we losing core functions and capabilities to the private sector? And are we paying the cost of training soldiers, only to see them leave and sell those same services back to us at twice the cost? Until such questions are answered publicly and definitely, the hazy, murky world of military contracting will continue to flourish. And while that in itself may not be a bad thing for now, if left to grow rampant and unchecked the blowback will become more than we can possibly imagine.
Corporate Warriors sought to analyze a new and growing trend, and since its writing that trend has increased exponentially. Like Singer's other work, it found a military development on the edge of mass awareness and firmly planted itself in the public mind. He foresaw the problems with PMFs and anticipated their logical extreme, to which they went in the five years after initial publication. Let us hope that in the future, if his next books contain such dire predictions, that they are wrong on those counts.
December 31, 2020
Bulundurduğum ve de Jeremy Scahill'in yazmış olduğu "Blackwater" kitabını okumadan P. W. Singer'in "Paralı Ordular" kitabını okumamın nedeni paralı orduların ne olduğunu akademik bir çalışmadan tarafsızlıkla yazılmış olarak öğrenme isteğiydi. Zira Singer her ne kadar eleştirel yazmışsa da özel askeri şirketlerin tarihini ve de geleceğine bakışı güzelce anlatmış. Ve ben de karşı koyamadım tabii. Bu kitabı çok beğendim. Bugünün askeri dünyasında yer alan değişimleri de ele alan bu çalışma alanında ilklerden biri ve de benim gibi bu türden konulara ilgi duyan herkesin herhangi bir özel askeri şirketi araştırmadan okumalı olduğu ilk kitap. Herkese iyi okumalar !
February 19, 2013
Unlike much of the literature documenting Private Military Companies/Firms, this book appears to be more of an objective analysis of PMCs/PMFs than a critique of them (although the author does provide plenty of examples of these companies forgoing morals and national loyalties for the sake of profit).
Even though the book's premise centers around the proliferation of mercenary companies since the fall of the USSR, the author does a great job of displaying how the use of mercenaries is hardly a new occurrence. Throughout the Medieval Ages, the hiring of mercenaries was in fact more of a norm than an exception. This being the result of the fact that the Medieval gentry typically used their armies to suppress peasant revolts; therefore, making it impractical for them to conscript their own peasantry in the formation of an army (the high amount of training needed to use weapons like swords is another reason why kings preferred mercenaries, and also a reason why the development of guns —which required less training to use— led to the decreased use of mercenaries). Along with this, the author provides accounts of how mercenary companies were involved in the development of capitalism in Europe. For example, mercenary companies could be considered to be some of the earliest joint-stock enterprises: a person would be hired to organize and train an army with the expectation that they would be entitled to a share in the loot acquired by the army through pillaging.
I would recommend this book to anyone wishing to learn more about the current and past role of Private Military Firms, and I think it could be worth reading for someone wanting to research primitive accumulation/the development of capitalism. The book provides plenty of information on mercenary involvement in conflict today as well as information that it not exactly necessary but still helpful. (The book's appendix provides a list of PMFs and their web addresses alongside a copy of a contract between the Sandline International private military company and the government of Papua New Guinea to serve as an example of what a contract between a government and PMF might look like.)
Even though the book's premise centers around the proliferation of mercenary companies since the fall of the USSR, the author does a great job of displaying how the use of mercenaries is hardly a new occurrence. Throughout the Medieval Ages, the hiring of mercenaries was in fact more of a norm than an exception. This being the result of the fact that the Medieval gentry typically used their armies to suppress peasant revolts; therefore, making it impractical for them to conscript their own peasantry in the formation of an army (the high amount of training needed to use weapons like swords is another reason why kings preferred mercenaries, and also a reason why the development of guns —which required less training to use— led to the decreased use of mercenaries). Along with this, the author provides accounts of how mercenary companies were involved in the development of capitalism in Europe. For example, mercenary companies could be considered to be some of the earliest joint-stock enterprises: a person would be hired to organize and train an army with the expectation that they would be entitled to a share in the loot acquired by the army through pillaging.
I would recommend this book to anyone wishing to learn more about the current and past role of Private Military Firms, and I think it could be worth reading for someone wanting to research primitive accumulation/the development of capitalism. The book provides plenty of information on mercenary involvement in conflict today as well as information that it not exactly necessary but still helpful. (The book's appendix provides a list of PMFs and their web addresses alongside a copy of a contract between the Sandline International private military company and the government of Papua New Guinea to serve as an example of what a contract between a government and PMF might look like.)
March 22, 2015
I don't know what to say about this book. Mainly because I have been up to my eyeballs in the subject matter. Some of these organizations ARE our government and just hiding behind their corporate shield, and others are just that contractors providing services to our government. I would warn you that its gotten worse since this book was written, turning over our military, intelligence, and foreign policy to these people is a mistake. They are not accountable or answerable to our citizens, yet they are us, at least as far as the rest of the world is concerned. You as American citizens have absolutely no idea what these people are doing in your name. Recently, some of the more in the dark ones have surfaced into public view but even that surfacing into public view you have not been made aware enough of. Let me put it to you, --this year 2015, who is the largest DOD contractor to our government? What to they do? Unlike previous #1 DOD contractors, the current one doesn't build, make, or construct anything at all and never has. One of the founders of that corporation though was pals with James Forrestal in 1941 prior to Pearl Harbor, and believe me, that should give you pause. They are not the benign outfit they sometimes might try to make you think.
March 6, 2014
A strong foundational resource for those interested in the evolution of modern-day warfare and security. Privatized military companies are currently in operation throughout the world, based not only in the United States but in Britain, Russia and South Africa as well. These companies have been contracted to assist in the prosecution of war, to train the fighting forces of drug cartels and jihadists, and to protect charitable organizations functioning in high-risk environments. Lacking any legislative restriction or international form of checks and balances, this under-monitored industry is dangerously susceptible to putting the dollar before the thought of any possible moral complication arising in the course of its contracted service. Singer's work is cogent, well-researched and balanced in terms of pro and con. A worthwhile read for the foreign policy crowd.
October 30, 2017
Very informative book on the private military industry. A few instances made me question the author's understanding of certain military capabilities. Overall, it is a fascinating read, both in setting the historical context for the contemporary situation, but also in describing recent activities and current trends (as of 2004). One of the most fascinating parts is an appendix featuring an actual contract between a PMC and a client government.
Would love to see a new edition analyzing what has changed over the last decade, as well as new material featuring interviews with a number of individuals with past or current employment in this area, and samples of individual employment contracts.
Would love to see a new edition analyzing what has changed over the last decade, as well as new material featuring interviews with a number of individuals with past or current employment in this area, and samples of individual employment contracts.
May 30, 2018
Singer wrote this book to promote the use of mercenaries by the USA. Instead of being in praise of it he shows how it is an evil where ever used, giving specific examples in the Yugoslavian conflict as well in multiple conflicts in Africa.
Of course Singer does not make it easy to see in a straight line the cause and effect, but with a critical eye you can piece together the complete picture. Mercenaries do not solve conflicts but make conflicts far worse. Where there is a profit motive there is a sabotage on the public interest, whether true or not is certainly true with the use of mercenaries by governments.
Of course Singer does not make it easy to see in a straight line the cause and effect, but with a critical eye you can piece together the complete picture. Mercenaries do not solve conflicts but make conflicts far worse. Where there is a profit motive there is a sabotage on the public interest, whether true or not is certainly true with the use of mercenaries by governments.
Read
March 11, 2014I should have read this years ago; it would have had enormous practical value in thinking about this phenomenon in several of my previous jobs. While some of the specifics are dated, it provides examples of how a few of the pioneering firms evolved, and provides a general framework for how this phenomenon touches a number of areas.
July 7, 2019
A profound look at Private Military Firms (PMFs) in the context of Agency Theory and ethics — with ethics largely defined as political will and the UCMJ. Singer admits bias later in the book, but it is clear that he sees PMFs as amoral or immoral, and the military leadership as moral. Once the reader accepts these premises, this investigation and eventual argument is tremendously valuable from a political and military leadership perspective. I have personally seen the conflict that arises from PMF private interest, protection from liability, and military utility. Too often, PMFs can operate within a contract but contrary to tactical and operational commander intent without consequence.
On the other hand, policy makers should be the ones to be held accountable, not military leaders (as Singer suggests). There is great benefit to policy makers for their districts to host PMFs, job security for military retirees/separatees, and ultimately, influence into military operations through private firms. Furthermore, at the strategic level, PMFs offer yet another opportunity for political maneuver — the confusion offers some level of plausible deniability to either avoid liability or prosecute less-supported/viable operations. This is an area that requires further analysis — policy makers have intentionally limited the number of military authorizations while increasing military application, thereby incentivizing the need for PMFs.
I’m disappointed to see this book lose prominence in military academies and senior service schools. Hopefully, Singer would consider a significant update to pull in the far more complex nature of today’s political environment.
Great book — highly recommend!
On the other hand, policy makers should be the ones to be held accountable, not military leaders (as Singer suggests). There is great benefit to policy makers for their districts to host PMFs, job security for military retirees/separatees, and ultimately, influence into military operations through private firms. Furthermore, at the strategic level, PMFs offer yet another opportunity for political maneuver — the confusion offers some level of plausible deniability to either avoid liability or prosecute less-supported/viable operations. This is an area that requires further analysis — policy makers have intentionally limited the number of military authorizations while increasing military application, thereby incentivizing the need for PMFs.
I’m disappointed to see this book lose prominence in military academies and senior service schools. Hopefully, Singer would consider a significant update to pull in the far more complex nature of today’s political environment.
Great book — highly recommend!
January 17, 2018
P.W Singer is not a well known author nether are any of his books that have been written. But picking up this book for the first time changed my perception and understanding of what real privatized military is. The writing is rich and clear, and does a great job of getting a point across trying to explain what this topic is really about. It's written in a direction that allows everyone to pick up this book and have an understanding. Corporate Warriors tries to focus on large corporations that are allowed to have and provide private military services. It goes through how many of those involved are currently serving in places like Afghanistan and Iraq. This book does not just pertain to those interested in War books or military focused books. Its a story and topic that can interest anyone willing to learn something about individualized military and how it works.
May 13, 2020
Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry by P.W. Singer is a very compelling book that introduced me to a sector of American Defense Policy that I was critically under-informed regarding. Though the book is prefaced to be aimed at a Political Science audience, I found it to be very accessible. The content raises important concerns regarding the use of private military firms, the ungoverned and unsupervised nature of their operations, and their proliferation in recent wars. The edition I read added a chapter on Iraq after the conclusion, and it confirmed many of the suspicions I was entertaining as I read through it earlier (since the book was published in 2003). I'm left with a few lessons learned that lead me to believe that we're heading into troubled waters, particularly in light of renewed Great Power Competition.
93/100
93/100
December 20, 2016
★ - Most books with this rating I never finish and so don't make this list. This one I probably started speed-reading to get it over with.
★★ - Average. Wasn't terrible, but not a lot to recommend it. Probably skimmed parts of it.
★★★ - Decent. A few good ideas, well-written passages, interesting characters, or the like.
★★★★ - Good. This one had parts that inspired me, impressed me, made me laugh out loud, made me think - it got positive reactions and most of the rest of it was pretty decent too.
★★★★★ - Amazing. This is the best I've read of its genre, the ones I hold on to so I can re-read them and/or loan them out to people looking for a great book. The best of these change the way I look at the world and operate within it.
★★ - Average. Wasn't terrible, but not a lot to recommend it. Probably skimmed parts of it.
★★★ - Decent. A few good ideas, well-written passages, interesting characters, or the like.
★★★★ - Good. This one had parts that inspired me, impressed me, made me laugh out loud, made me think - it got positive reactions and most of the rest of it was pretty decent too.
★★★★★ - Amazing. This is the best I've read of its genre, the ones I hold on to so I can re-read them and/or loan them out to people looking for a great book. The best of these change the way I look at the world and operate within it.
February 4, 2020
Really it's a great, if limited, history of a poorly understood industry, but as the events in the book for the most part span a shorter time period than the time since the book was published, it's almost impossible to know how relevant anything is to the present. Obviously things got much worse during the Iraq / Afghanistan conflicts, but where have they gone in the decade or more since then?
Inquiring minds must know.
Also, the book is dry.
Inquiring minds must know.
Also, the book is dry.
June 6, 2021
An interesting look into the world of Private Military Companies. Easy to understand and laying out the motivational and moral issues that surround the industry.
I liked that a fair approach was taken to the topic, while controversial, it demands an objective analysis and this book demonstrates this. While I think Singer is ultimately skeptical about the use of PMCs he offers a balanced view, noting their benefits as well as their considerable problems.
I liked that a fair approach was taken to the topic, while controversial, it demands an objective analysis and this book demonstrates this. While I think Singer is ultimately skeptical about the use of PMCs he offers a balanced view, noting their benefits as well as their considerable problems.
September 1, 2022
A good survey of Private Military Firms written before the Iraq War, particularly interesting is reading the post script which was written during the occupation of Iraq. Good read if you’re interested in international relations and security.
September 29, 2025
Шкода, що робота була написана понад 20 років тому. Дещо вже не зовсім актуальне, а інші речі треба дивитись вже по новому. Подібних академічних праць мало та й сам автор до цього й після цього писав художку
August 10, 2019
In the coming years this books' conclusions are a must read for policy makers or anyone with moral reservations regarding the use of private military contractors.
November 15, 2019
Solid base
Good read if a bit dated on the topic. The scholarship is good and research well done. Leaves a lot of questions like how did we get here?
Good read if a bit dated on the topic. The scholarship is good and research well done. Leaves a lot of questions like how did we get here?
November 12, 2022
I found it very interesting, its information that is never mentioned anywhere else. This should be common learning material in school or in some form.
January 26, 2016
The book that I am currently reading is "Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry" intrigued me because it provided a honest look into the operations and politics of the Privatized Military Industry. The book is about PMCs (Private Military Contractors) that do the same job as armed services but they get paid more. PMCs are primarily ex-military and ex-law enforcement.
Since PMCs are not part of a nations military, but a privatized military company,they do not have to deal with the scrutiny oversight as an armed service. Private Military Companies are contacted by nations, and sometimes individuals from around the world. PMCs are also hired by the U.S. People that are PMCs are paid about $100,000-$250,000 a year. People that are in the armed service, such as the US Marines that do combat are paid 20,000$-40,000$ a year. As stated by Singer, "privatized military services can also result in added incentives and potential for far more negative consequences than their proponents would like to admit"(Singer 229). The Obama Administration contracted the group Academi to provide services to the CIA for $250 million. Academi was formerly called Blackwater.
Blackwater got head line news in 2007 for an incident that involved four agents killing 17 civilians and injuring 20 others in Nisour Square Baghdad. The four agents were convicted. One was sentenced to life in prison for murder and the three others for thirty years for man slaughter. There are many other incidents involving Blackwater, and other private military firms. However there are benefits of the use Privatized Military Industry.
In the 90's Sierra Leone, a small country in Africa, had a rebellion that involved the use of child soldiers, civilians casualties, rape, and torture. The rebel group was named the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). Sierra Leone, being the size of South Carolina, did not have the resources to stop the RUF. The U.N. was incapable of intervening. Also the country had no close allies, and none of the super power nations were interesting in aiding Sierra Leone. In time it was discovered that the soldiers and pilots that help turn the tide of the battle were not members of the nation's armed service, but PMCs from a private firm called Executive Outcomes based in South Africa.
I personal like this book because it I see private military contracting as a future career for me. The reason is simple...it pays a lot more. Also I emailed the head director of Academi which has a location in San Diego, and it only takes four to eight years experience in military or law enforcement. I like that the author includes examples of PMCs being used by different nations around the world. I would recommend this book to somebody who is interested in the military or law enforcement careers. I am giving this book five star because it is focused on topics I am currently interested in.
Since PMCs are not part of a nations military, but a privatized military company,they do not have to deal with the scrutiny oversight as an armed service. Private Military Companies are contacted by nations, and sometimes individuals from around the world. PMCs are also hired by the U.S. People that are PMCs are paid about $100,000-$250,000 a year. People that are in the armed service, such as the US Marines that do combat are paid 20,000$-40,000$ a year. As stated by Singer, "privatized military services can also result in added incentives and potential for far more negative consequences than their proponents would like to admit"(Singer 229). The Obama Administration contracted the group Academi to provide services to the CIA for $250 million. Academi was formerly called Blackwater.
Blackwater got head line news in 2007 for an incident that involved four agents killing 17 civilians and injuring 20 others in Nisour Square Baghdad. The four agents were convicted. One was sentenced to life in prison for murder and the three others for thirty years for man slaughter. There are many other incidents involving Blackwater, and other private military firms. However there are benefits of the use Privatized Military Industry.
In the 90's Sierra Leone, a small country in Africa, had a rebellion that involved the use of child soldiers, civilians casualties, rape, and torture. The rebel group was named the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). Sierra Leone, being the size of South Carolina, did not have the resources to stop the RUF. The U.N. was incapable of intervening. Also the country had no close allies, and none of the super power nations were interesting in aiding Sierra Leone. In time it was discovered that the soldiers and pilots that help turn the tide of the battle were not members of the nation's armed service, but PMCs from a private firm called Executive Outcomes based in South Africa.
I personal like this book because it I see private military contracting as a future career for me. The reason is simple...it pays a lot more. Also I emailed the head director of Academi which has a location in San Diego, and it only takes four to eight years experience in military or law enforcement. I like that the author includes examples of PMCs being used by different nations around the world. I would recommend this book to somebody who is interested in the military or law enforcement careers. I am giving this book five star because it is focused on topics I am currently interested in.
November 25, 2013
An outstanding work on private military companies from practical point of view. The author provided both positive and negative ramifications of employing private military firms. Specifically it comes to legal regulations when we have issues with the wrongdoings of the PMC(F)s. It has been widely accepted to send PMCs to the zones where and when governments seek to avoid accountability and to provide less clarifications over their decisions. Liberalism and free markets targeted also the monopoly over violence, ie state's control over security and defence matters. If under state's responsibility legislative control and oversight mechanisms do matter, under operations of PMCs this control simply evaporates on purpose or without. Only free market laws remain to regulate the process. However, the latter are incapable of doing so, as PMCs are too flexible, especially when it comes to front and proxy companies. One thing is however central. If your state has strong professional military and there are no issues on civil-military level, then PMCs can significantly benefit the purpose. It also matters for what purpose one hires PMCs: military providing, consulting or supporting. If, however, a state is weak and tries to bypass the core military functions by substituting the traditional role of the military with private mil companies, the PMCs will fail themselves and will fail the client state. Not to forget, they always benefit from conflict and they do act for profit, and their profit generates new conflict.
December 10, 2008
Having read "Blackwater," I was expecting a bit more of an excoriating critique within "Corporate Warriors." This author, however, manages to maintain a scholarly distance and fleshes out a thorough and objective analysis of the subject from a variety of perspectives. Initially I thought that the authors' detachment was tantamount to a tacit approval of the companies being studied, but, after a while, realized that it was my own bias looking for complicity in the authors' statements where there were none.
The book itself follows the rise of the "era of Corporate Warriors" in the post-cold war world; The organization and operation of the military services and certain noteworthy corporations; implications of contractual dilemmas, and the balance of power, law and morality within the global spheres of operations; among many other things.
Its a very serious subject and worthy of an in-depth debate on the extent to which privatization of traditionally government-only responsibilities is reasonable.
* If anyone can recommend other books on this subject please feel free to contact me.
The book itself follows the rise of the "era of Corporate Warriors" in the post-cold war world; The organization and operation of the military services and certain noteworthy corporations; implications of contractual dilemmas, and the balance of power, law and morality within the global spheres of operations; among many other things.
Its a very serious subject and worthy of an in-depth debate on the extent to which privatization of traditionally government-only responsibilities is reasonable.
* If anyone can recommend other books on this subject please feel free to contact me.
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