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People's War People's Army: The Viet Cong Insurrection Manual for Underdeveloped Countries
Vo Nguyen Giap, Southeast Asia's most successful Communist general, Minister of Defense and Commander in Chief of North Vietnam's army, shares with Premier Khrushchev a conviction that the future holds many "just wars of national liberation." This volume stresses the climate of Asia, Africa, and Latin American, torn today by anticolonial, economic, and political upheavals. It is General Giap's purpose in this book, originally published in 1962, to guide these struggles to the desired "socialist" victory. The speeches and essays that comprise this key document provide not only the tactical doctrine for effective insurgency operations, but also the political guidelines for enlisting the people in the insurgents' side.
232 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1961
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About the author
Võ Nguyên Giáp
51 books44 followersGeneral in the Vietnam People's Army and a politician. Giap is considered one of the greatest military strategists of all time. He first grew to prominence during World War II, where he served as the military leader of the Viet Minh resistance against the Japanese occupation of Vietnam. Giap was a principal commander in two wars: the First Indochina War (1946–54) and the Vietnam War (1960–75). He participated in the following historically significant battles: Lạng Sơn (1950), Hòa Bình (1951–52), Điện Biên Phủ (1954), the Tết Offensive (1968), the Easter Offensive (1972), and the final Ho Chi Minh Campaign (1975).
Giap was also a journalist, an interior minister in President Hồ Chí Minh's Việt Minh government, the military commander of the Viet Minh, the commander of the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN), and defense minister. He also served as a member of the Politburo of the Vietnam Workers' Party, which in 1976 became the Communist Party of Vietnam.
He was the most prominent military commander, beside Ho Chi Minh, during the Vietnam War, and was responsible for major operations and leadership until the war ended.
Giap was also a journalist, an interior minister in President Hồ Chí Minh's Việt Minh government, the military commander of the Viet Minh, the commander of the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN), and defense minister. He also served as a member of the Politburo of the Vietnam Workers' Party, which in 1976 became the Communist Party of Vietnam.
He was the most prominent military commander, beside Ho Chi Minh, during the Vietnam War, and was responsible for major operations and leadership until the war ended.
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Displaying 1 - 11 of 11 reviews
April 11, 2020
People’s War People’s Army is a short collection of General Giap’s speeches and essays, primarily concerned with (Vietnamese) history, politics, and guerrilla and conventional warfare. Overall, it was well worth reading, if for no other reason than that you get inside the head of one of the most formidable military strategists of the last century.
The foreword by Roger Hilsman, on the other hand, was extraordinarily, often idiotically jingoistic (think America, fuck yeah!), replete with such utter garbage as the following:
You can certainly afford to skip that noise.
The profile of Giap provided by Bernard B. Fall, however, was concise yet illuminating, and even rather balanced, politically speaking. (His Street Without Joy: The French Debacle in Indochina was likewise refreshingly levelheaded.)
Giap’s material itself contained a liberal amount of Communist Party dogma and inflammatory rhetoric (Vietnam, fuck yeah!), but his insights into tactics and strategy were quite interesting. His historical details were, uh, somewhat less than accurate at times, and this presumably occurred more frequently than I was able to detect, not being a historian/terribly knowledgeable about some of the events in question. And then there was an abundance of statements such as “The Vietnamese people’s war of liberation was victorious because it was a just war” and “Unity has welded all the members of our army into an unbreakable monolithic block,” which were either grossly hyperbolic or just plain absurd. Repetitiveness was also a minor issue.
All that said, as I previously stated, I believe this was worthwhile; in my opinion, it’s always best to go straight to the source. Just, you know, take all the Vietnam, fuck yeah! bullshit with a heaping teaspoon of salt. Then you too can learn more about the awe-inspiring story of the peaceful, humble, benevolent people’s titanic gripping struggle and ultimate shining victory against the aggressive imperialists and their lackey running dog allies. Hmm, it’s just possible that some of that rhetoric rubbed off on me after all...
The foreword by Roger Hilsman, on the other hand, was extraordinarily, often idiotically jingoistic (think America, fuck yeah!), replete with such utter garbage as the following:
“It is essential to realize that in Southeast Asia, there is no pervasive national spirit.”
“The battle for the villages demands the best of American skills and tradition. We can help those who are now struggling against discouragement. They are trying to find their way to freedom.”
You can certainly afford to skip that noise.
The profile of Giap provided by Bernard B. Fall, however, was concise yet illuminating, and even rather balanced, politically speaking. (His Street Without Joy: The French Debacle in Indochina was likewise refreshingly levelheaded.)
Giap’s material itself contained a liberal amount of Communist Party dogma and inflammatory rhetoric (Vietnam, fuck yeah!), but his insights into tactics and strategy were quite interesting. His historical details were, uh, somewhat less than accurate at times, and this presumably occurred more frequently than I was able to detect, not being a historian/terribly knowledgeable about some of the events in question. And then there was an abundance of statements such as “The Vietnamese people’s war of liberation was victorious because it was a just war” and “Unity has welded all the members of our army into an unbreakable monolithic block,” which were either grossly hyperbolic or just plain absurd. Repetitiveness was also a minor issue.
All that said, as I previously stated, I believe this was worthwhile; in my opinion, it’s always best to go straight to the source. Just, you know, take all the Vietnam, fuck yeah! bullshit with a heaping teaspoon of salt. Then you too can learn more about the awe-inspiring story of the peaceful, humble, benevolent people’s titanic gripping struggle and ultimate shining victory against the aggressive imperialists and their lackey running dog allies. Hmm, it’s just possible that some of that rhetoric rubbed off on me after all...
March 5, 2016
I loved it because it was about guerilla insurgency from one of the masters.
October 25, 2022
always a pleasure to read this amazing work. long love the socialist republic of vietnam <3
June 26, 2015
If you liked this book, you either didn't actually read it, or you're a Communist.
The logic in here is always circular. The People's Army won because it was the People's Army! We won because we channeled the will of the people. We won because the enemy was unsupported and because they lost. We won because the Politburo was wise. There were problems with recruitment, but we gloriously solved them in the name of the revolution!
I read moronic reviews on here of this book that this was "a great book by the master of guerrilla warfare" - and he very well may be the master, but this book is horrid. It's 200 pages of propaganda that's largely unreadable, uninteresting, and devoid of insight, uniqueness or value.
It has the same stale taste as Communist everything. Food, architecture, art, streets, you can taste its blandness on every page. Because that system enforces such rigid orthodoxy and conformity, its devoid of any surprises, any insight, anything other than the tick-mark that Giap wrote another book. In a way, it's horrifying to think that this is marketed as a "manual" for anything, because the only thing you can do is decide to uphold Giap as a icon and cultish figure as someone worthy of praise.
For a philosophy that supposedly spends so much time on dialectic, it's amazing how boring it usually is due to the mindless conformity.
If you actually read this book and liked it, you're a moron. I suspect that every single person who ranked this higher than, to be charitable, two stars, is lying about having read it.
The logic in here is always circular. The People's Army won because it was the People's Army! We won because we channeled the will of the people. We won because the enemy was unsupported and because they lost. We won because the Politburo was wise. There were problems with recruitment, but we gloriously solved them in the name of the revolution!
I read moronic reviews on here of this book that this was "a great book by the master of guerrilla warfare" - and he very well may be the master, but this book is horrid. It's 200 pages of propaganda that's largely unreadable, uninteresting, and devoid of insight, uniqueness or value.
It has the same stale taste as Communist everything. Food, architecture, art, streets, you can taste its blandness on every page. Because that system enforces such rigid orthodoxy and conformity, its devoid of any surprises, any insight, anything other than the tick-mark that Giap wrote another book. In a way, it's horrifying to think that this is marketed as a "manual" for anything, because the only thing you can do is decide to uphold Giap as a icon and cultish figure as someone worthy of praise.
For a philosophy that supposedly spends so much time on dialectic, it's amazing how boring it usually is due to the mindless conformity.
If you actually read this book and liked it, you're a moron. I suspect that every single person who ranked this higher than, to be charitable, two stars, is lying about having read it.
March 9, 2023
Viet Nam embodies the word “resistance” from Lady Trieu to the 21st Century. They have fought time and time again against imperialist ls like the Americans, French, Chinese, and Japanese. Unlike the Soviet Union that had the framework of a socialist revolution in an industrialized nation or China’s prolonged war from a semi-colonial nation, Viet Nam experienced a prolonged war of liberation and an anti-feudal, anti-capitalist revolution all at once. Not just once but three times.
Giáp and Minh’s Initiatives like agrarian reform in the middle of the Peoples War of Liberation against the French showed that in the face of a powerfully cruel enemy, victory is only possible when uniting the workers and peasants together in a United front. Giáp was revolutionary in making the People’s Army a modern one but nonetheless backed by the people. He armed the peasants and imbued soldiers with proletarian ideals all helping Viet Nam not to only beat the French but to eventually fight off the US. In an upset that shook the world, but did not shock Communists who know, “the Vietnamese people won because their war of liberation was a people’s war.”
Because it is a collection of two of Giáp’s writings, it does tend to repeat the same history, tactics, and theories. Though it still holds to be an excellent work that relates to how to build a proper People’s Army even now. Even against insurmountable odds, as long as your strong points lie in the people and the enemies’ weak points lie in imperialism, you will have every chance to succeed.
Giáp and Minh’s Initiatives like agrarian reform in the middle of the Peoples War of Liberation against the French showed that in the face of a powerfully cruel enemy, victory is only possible when uniting the workers and peasants together in a United front. Giáp was revolutionary in making the People’s Army a modern one but nonetheless backed by the people. He armed the peasants and imbued soldiers with proletarian ideals all helping Viet Nam not to only beat the French but to eventually fight off the US. In an upset that shook the world, but did not shock Communists who know, “the Vietnamese people won because their war of liberation was a people’s war.”
Because it is a collection of two of Giáp’s writings, it does tend to repeat the same history, tactics, and theories. Though it still holds to be an excellent work that relates to how to build a proper People’s Army even now. Even against insurmountable odds, as long as your strong points lie in the people and the enemies’ weak points lie in imperialism, you will have every chance to succeed.
April 13, 2020
Good read, a bit repetitive!
This book is a compilation of original journals of Gen Giap, translated into English by publisher. The writing is simple, but many chapters have same lines repeated again and again. Light read, 250 pages medium books with few photos and maps. It also included preface, brief about gen giap and summed up with appendix.
This book is a compilation of original journals of Gen Giap, translated into English by publisher. The writing is simple, but many chapters have same lines repeated again and again. Light read, 250 pages medium books with few photos and maps. It also included preface, brief about gen giap and summed up with appendix.
July 29, 2023
The staggering volume of Marxist-Leninist claptrap precludes easily extracting strategic lessons. Or perhaps that is one of the lessons.
January 30, 2016
I was thoroughly disappointed by this book. I was expecting it to be a treatise on guerrilla warfare akin to those by Mao and Che, but it was nothing of the kind. Instead, its merely a poor adaptation of Mao's writing. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the majority of the book is cheap propaganda praising the Vietnamese Communist Party rather than an exploration of strategy. the subtitle "Insurrection manual for the developing world" is grossly inaccurate. I have been trying to get ahold of this book for almost five years, finally found it and read it, and am thoroughly disappointed.
November 29, 2010
amazing what people will believe
November 10, 2025
Very repetitive but we dont read this for literary prowess. Good nuggets in here on strategy and politics.
April 6, 2017
We had to deal with a much stronger enemy.In a word, it was impossible for us to defeat the enemy swiftlyIt was only by a long and hard resistance that we could wear out the enemy forces little by little while strengthening ours, progressively turn the balance of forces in our favour and finally win victory.The application of this strategy of long-term resistance required a whole system of education, a whole ideological struggle among the people and Party members, a gigantic effort of organisation in both military and economic fields, extraordinary sacrifices and heroism from the army as well as from the people, at the front as well as in the rear.
Displaying 1 - 11 of 11 reviews