Counterinsurgency Field Manual - Tactics, Intelligence, Host Nation Forces, Airpower

by David H. Petraeus

Author Introduction: With our Soldiers and Marines fighting insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is essential that we give them a manual that provides principles and guidelines for counterinsurgency operations. Such guidance must be grounded in historical studies. However, it also must be informed by contemporary experiences.

Genres: Military Fiction, War, Nonfiction, History, Reference, Politics, International Relations

520 pages, Kindle Edition

First published January 1, 2006

About the author

David Howell Petraeus is an American former military officer and public official. He served as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency from September 6, 2011, until his resignation on November 9, 2012. Prior to his assuming the directorship of the CIA, Petraeus was a four-star general serving over 37 years in the United States Army. His last assignments in the Army were as commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A) from July 4, 2010, to July 18, 2011. His other four-star assignments include serving as the 10th Commander, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) from October 13, 2008, to June 30, 2010, and as Commanding General, Multi-National Force - Iraq (MNF-I) from February 10, 2007, to September 16, 2008. As commander of MNF-I, Petraeus oversaw all coalition forces in Iraq.

Petraeus has a B.S. degree from the United States Military Academy, from which he graduated in 1974 as a distinguished cadet (top 5% of his class). He was the General George C. Marshall Award winner as the top graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College class of 1983. He subsequently earned an M.P.A. in 1985 and a PhD degree in International Relations in 1987 from the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University. He later served as Assistant Professor of International Relations at the United States Military Academy and also completed a fellowship at Georgetown University.

Petraeus has repeatedly stated that he has no plans to run for elected political office. On June 23, 2010, President Barack Obama nominated Petraeus to succeed General Stanley McChrystal as commanding general of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, technically a step down from his position as Commander of United States Central Command, which oversees the military efforts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Central Asia, the Arabian Peninsula, and Egypt.

On June 30, 2011, Petraeus was unanimously confirmed as the next Director of the CIA by the U.S. Senate 94-0. Petraeus relinquished command of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan on July 18, 2011, and retired from the U.S. Army on August 31, 2011.[18] On November 9, 2012, General Petraeus resigned from his position as Director of the CIA, citing an extramarital affair that was reportedly discovered in the course of an FBI investigation.

Reviews

[Steven Peterson · Rating 4 out of 5]

The context for this important work (John Nagl's Foreword, Page xiii): ". . .the sad fact is that when an insurgency began in Iraq in the late summer of 2003, the Army was unprepared to fight it." In the "Introduction," Sarah Sewall observes the critical point of counterinsurgency (COIN) (Page xxiii):

". . .although it is military doctrine, the field manual emphasizes the multiple dimensions of COIN: `those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency.'" Traditional US COIN policy was unwisely military only--ignoring the many other dimensions.

Obviously, one of the most arresting features of this volume is one of its authors--General David Petraeus. At the outset, this book emphasizes the competitive learning struggle between insurgent and counterinsurgent. The manual says that (Page lii) ". . .the side that learns faster and adapts more rapidly--the better learning organization--usually wins."

The first chapter explores insurgency and counterinsurgency, concluding with a series of lessons for governments as they "take on" an insurgency. Page 51 features a Table outlining successful operational practices (e.g., emphasize intelligence, isolate insurgents from the population, protect key infrastructure, provide amnesty for those willing to support the new government) and those that are not normally successful (e.g., overemphasizing killing and capturing the enemy as opposed to engaging the populace as a whole, ignore peacetime processes, including legal procedures). The first chapter also features a number of pithy points that might seem counterintuitive (e.g., "if a tactic works this week, it might not work next week"; "sometime doing nothing is the best reaction").

Other key chapters focus on the need to have unity between civilian and military activities (counterinsurgency fails if it is carried out as a military approach only), the requirement for good intelligence, leadership and ethics in counterinsurgency.

Some of the more interesting aspects of this book are located in the several appendices. One focuses on the support of linguists in COIN; intriguing, too, is a section on legal considerations in COIN.

For some readers, this might be uncomfortable reading, given its focus on warfare. On the other hand, COIN is a reality and a method for combating insurgencies. The book is pretty well written; for the most part, it is also clearly written. It is fascinating to see the author rise in the ranks, partly as a result of his perspective as laid out in this work.

[Autodidact · Rating 4 out of 5]

Beautifully written for anyone

I wanted to read it for my international relations study. It has covered all the aspects related to COIN and military strategy.

[Jennifer · Rating 2 out of 5]

Did this really work out for us? Really?

[David Watts · Rating 4 out of 5]

My 16th of 78 books on Gen. Mattis’ reading list. I read Kilcullens Counterinsurgency before this, realizing now I should have read this first as this is for leaders and planners at the battalion level and above, while Kilcullen addresses at the small unit level. I thought the section on Social Network Analysis was the most noteworthy.

[Ironypoisoned]

A fascinating look into the self-image of global counterterrorist and anticommunist occupation. You could desrcibe its ideology as "managerial imperialism". Also extremely funny which words it feels the need to define in depth; it implies the authors or editors expected many of the target readers to not understand terms like "culture" and "society" in any meaningful theoretical sense.

[Drew DeYoung · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is by military for military. If you want dry doctrine and procedure from some of the world’s leading experts in the field, this is for you.
That being said, if you’re not in the field yourself, this might be a slow and frustrating read.

[Brianna Herndon · Rating 2 out of 5]

What a piece of colonial work.

[Brian Elwood · Rating 4 out of 5]

Dry at times but many good lessons within. Felt it was best read in segments and reflected on

[Dhruv · Rating 4 out of 5]

Questionable if it actually worked, but worth a look just for the historical value to the last two decades.

[Oran Fieldhouse · Rating 3 out of 5]

Great if you want to do some counter-insurgence but unfortunately I do not

[Anthony · Rating 4 out of 5]

A must read for anyone in the military or any civilian trying to understand the complexities of counterinsurgency. I enjoyed the introductions from well respected military and non-military experts on this topic. These quickly seek to introduce a new way of thinking and analysing an old tactic of war in the modern era. The chapters referencing the paradoxes of counterinsurgency warfare are the most useful and each interesting bullet makes the reader really think about the problems at hand and how to approach the myriad of situations which occur on the battlefield.

I liked the focus of this manual centering on winning the support of the population and not merely killing the insurgents. The military is needed for security so that economic development can take place.

The quote by JFK sums up the difficulties for a soldier operating in this type of environment when he said, "You [military professionals] must know something about strategy and tactics and...logistics, but also economics and politics and diplomacy and history. You must know everything you can know about military power, and you must also understand the limits of military power. You must understand that few of the important problems of your time...have finally solved by military power alone."

There is plenty of great advice taken from lessons learned during the recent conflicts and some from the past. This book highlights the main topics and high level strategy for counter insurgent warfare yet this should just be a gateway to other books about this topic. Anyone who is interested in American strategy in likely conflicts during the next 50 years should read this and take the lessons to heart. At the very least I think the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have proved to politicians that military might alone is not enough to win a war and much more thought and preparation for economic stability must be considered before American soldiers are asked to occupy foreign land.

[Shawn · Rating 3 out of 5]

Fascinating sections on social network analysis but the veterans know some things can't be learned from a manual. In the back of my mind, military manuals marketed as mainstream bestsellers seems sanitized for public consumption and to avoid political fallout. FM 31-20-3 (Foreign Internal Defense Tactics) from 1994 has a more cynical and in my opinion, realistic view of occupation and guerrilla psychology. Moreover, manuals are by their very nature abstract and concepts and theories need to be backed up by past experiences. While excellent examples from history are explored in capsules and sidenotes, commanders who handle the political side would be better served by hard study of how narcs recruit informers and how mafiosi clans vie for influence.

[Rachel Brune · Rating 3 out of 5]

I'm not sure how such a hotly contested tome was ultimately so boring ... oh wait, it's military doctrine. My purpose in reading was to be able to join informed conversation re: COIN vs NO COIN. There was good information in here, although much of it was pretty theoretical. Possibly because the successful application of COIN doctrine (I said the *SUCCESSful* application, people) is still theoretical. I am glad to have read it, as the debate continues. Like some buddies of mine and I were discussing, as long as there are insurgencies, there will still be a need for counterinsurgency, even if we're not that good at it.

[Jared · Rating 4 out of 5]

I prefer Galula's COIN (counterinsurgency) Warfare, however this manual was still interesting. It's light on specifics, but due to the nature of COIN this is to be expected, for me I found the appendices to be the most useful. If you are looking for a great introduction to COIN and something to set your framework, then this is it. If you're looking for specifics, head straight to the appendices.

[R. · Rating 5 out of 5]

I read this about five years ago and wish that it was current enough in my memory that I could write a detailed description but alas, I cannot. I do remember that I liked it and feel like I learned a lot from reading it straight through. I would highly recommend it to anyone and I think that it's one that officers and NCOs should definitely own a copy of.

[Archana · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book is amazing, especially the many forewards and introductions (not all by military people). You will not regret reading it - opened my eyes to the change in the world happening right now, moving from traditional warfare to counterinsurgency operations...

[Wendy · Rating 3 out of 5]

If you vote, you should read this book. If you are interested in how to restructure the way we handle our military budgets, and what our current military really needs(guess what, it isn't more nuclear subs) then you should read this book.

[Weloytty · Rating 3 out of 5]

David Petraeus should be listed as an author of this book, it's one of the reasons he got put in command of the Iraq War. It's not bad reading either, and well worth your time if you're interested in how the war in Iraq is being fought.

[Ryan · Rating 4 out of 5]

Important for a number of reasons, but not the panacea for counterinsurgency some think it is. Make sure to read David Kilcullen's "Counter-insurgency Redux" and Frank Hoffman's "Neo-Classical Counterinsurgency?" if studying this book.

[SA · Rating 4 out of 5]

The core of the thing, if you will. This became the bedrock of '08-'12 military strategy and represented one of the first contemporary field manuals of its time. There is a lot to learn here. And there is a lot to revisit, as we now have the history of the thing in implementation, too.

[Pejman Yousefzadeh · Rating 4 out of 5]

http://www.chequer-board.net/story/20...

[Dutcher · Rating 4 out of 5]

The Chicago edition is worth the price for the introduction. Understand what Pretaeus is thinking.

[Alice · Rating 3 out of 5]

Yup, it's pretty good. Not great. Good.

[ABona · Rating 3 out of 5]

Very slowly reading.... it's a military FM (field manual)

[Adam · Rating 3 out of 5]

One of the better political campaign manuals for strategy and field in heavily Republican held districts.

[Dennis · Rating 4 out of 5]

Interesting view on the topic. Was curious why we are making the choice we make in Iraq and Afgan. in the GWOT. Interesting if you are interested in this type of thing.

[Sean Rife · Rating 4 out of 5]

The COIN-FM is essential reading for anyone who wants to understand what winning the current conflict entails. As a social scientist, I found its social-psychological/sociological insights profound.

[Kyle]

Fun stuff

[Cmcglynn · Rating 3 out of 5]

Che's book is much more readable

[Levi · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very dry, but interesting institutional take on some universal truths.