What do you think?
Rate this book
The U-Boat Commander's Handbook
120pp - Photos - US Navy translation of 1943 German handbook - BRAND NEW Softcover
120 pages, Paperback
First published October 1, 1989
4 people are currently reading
38 people want to read
About the author
U.S. Department of the Navy
2,755 books32 followersThe United States Department of the Navy (DoN) was established by an Act of Congress on April 30, 1798, to provide a government organizational structure to the United States Navy, the United States Marine Corps and, when directed by the President (or Congress during time of war), the United States Coast Guard, as a service within the Navy, though each remain independent service branches. The Department of the Navy was an Executive Department and the Secretary of the Navy was a member of the President's cabinet until 1949, when amendments to the National Security Act of 1947 changed the name of the National Military Establishment to the Department of Defense and made it an Executive Department. The Department of the Navy then became, along with the Department of the Army and Department of the Air Force, a Military Department within the Department of Defense: subject to the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews
July 20, 2019
I learned a lot from this little book, which confirmed some insights about U-boats, as told by the Germans themselves. Written in 1943, this book attempts to provide advice to U-boat captains. However, read critically and perhaps aided by the distance of time, the book unwittingly reveals the absurdity of the U-boat captain's task.
A submarine's main advantage tactically is that it can go underwater and not be seen. One of the myths surrounding U-boats is that they were stealthy killers, that once they submerged, they could slink away like an underwater ninja.
The truth, as revealed starkly here, is that once submerged. a U-boat was terribly vulnerable, that going underwater meant that the U-boat was even weaker. The handbook acknowledges this a couple times. In one key passage on night surface attacks, the book advises U-boat captains to remain on the surface for as long as possible, to better observe the situation and engage other targets. "Do not go deep down unless it is necessary; going down renders you blind and helpless. ... The submarine should, therefore, only submerge when compelled to do so by direct pursuit."
This reveals the essential paradox of the U-boats: Once a U-boat becomes seen, it becomes a target. The problem is that its only defense, really, is to dive, which actually makes it "blind and helpless." And yet, most U-boat sailed and attacked on the surface, which seems to run contrary to the entire purpose of the submarine: its ability to go underwater. And yet, as this passage and similar ones in this book reveal, going underwater is not really an advantage after all.
The handbook presents other paradoxes for the U-boat commander. The book notes, "The chief value of the submarine is its characteristic ability, which it possesses in an exceptional degree, to attack without being seen, and thus achieve the element of surprise." Underscoring, perhaps unintentionally, the difficulty of that task, the book advises that "before and during the attack, the submarine must be neither sighted, nor sound-located, nor detected by ASDIC." This sounds like a tall order, especially in the face of convoy escorts and Allied air patrols.
Among other detection methods, the point about ASDIC is significant, because the book provides long passages in an attempt to offer "advice" on this chief Allied advantage for which the Germans really had no technical countermeasure. As a default countermeasure, the book tries to buck up the courage of the U-boat captain. The handbook notes that the quality of Allied ASDIC detection depends on "the nature of the water," "the speed of the enemy, and "the attentiveness of personnel," among other factors. In other words: all factors outside the U-boat captain's control.
The truth is that once detected by ASDIC, the odds of surviving a sustained depth charging were slim. Even so, the book helpfully notes that, "The danger to be anticipated from the sound location and ASDICs of the enemy should not be allowed to prevent the carrying out of a fatal attack at short range." This seems to be encouraging suicide at worst, or at best the exchange of a merchant ship for the captain, his crew, and his U-boat.
Confirming other books, it becomes clear in reading this contemporaneous record from 1943 that the Germans did not realize that the Allies could mount HF/DF detectors on ships. As the handbook notes, "The enemy probably has at his disposal, at least in his homeland, a well-developed and efficient D/F (direction-finding) system." The ability of Allied ships to detect radio transmissions while at sea proved to be a key tactical advantage, one that the Germans apparently didn't know that their enemies had. The German intelligence failures even made it into their guidance for commanders, who were just as ill-informed as the people who wrote this.
It's interesting to think about the fact that Allies captured U-boats, which led to key intelligence breakthroughs (capturing this book, for one; capturing an Enigma and related code books, another); the U-boats seldom (if ever) captured an Allied escort ship or a ship-borne HF/DF set. This may seem strange to say, but it highlights one more of the many handicaps of the main weapon system with which the Kriegsmarine fought its major campaign of the war.
On top of all these tactical and technical challenges, the book makes other points about even basic seamanship that must have seemed confusing to the reader. Perhaps this is the fault of the translation. Even so, the book notes that range finding must be practiced often, because visibility made the real range difficult to determine. "In clear weather, and with the sun behind one's back, the distance is liable to be underestimated; in poor visibility, against the sun, in conditions of twilight (dusk or dawn), and by moonlight, to be overestimated." How helpful. On top of all the other challenges he's facing, the U-boat captain can't even trust his own eyes.
I have often wondered why U-boat captains fired multiple, "fan" shots of firing several torpedoes at a single target. I guess this seemed wasteful to me, and I had thought that (well-functioning) torpedoes were more precise. The handbook actually encourage this practice. This was true, the book, says, even at short range, in which case "all of the torpedoes should hit the mark in order to ensure the annihilation of the enemy." At longer range, the idea "is to make sure of one hit. It is better to score only one hit than to miss the target with each of several consecutive shots." This is hardly a "one shot, one kill" approach, as the U-boat captain had to fire multiple times to ensure success. In other words, hitting and sinking a moving target with torpedoes was no sure thing. Everything the U-boat captain did was fogged in doubt and uncertainty, especially at the point of enemy contact. The U-boat was not always the lethal "sniper" I had once imagined.
Thus, in the process of trying to help the U-boat captain, the handbook actually reveals how difficult his job was to be. It provides a wide-ranging assembly of cautions that, taken together, are potentially confusing and even dispiriting. It's no wonder that some U-boat captains scored no kills or broke contact; as this book makes clear to a thoughtful reader, the captain's job seems almost impossible. Indeed, after reading this, it's no surprise that the U-boat arm suffered 75% casualties to sink only 2% of merchant shipping during the entire war (as Clay Blair, in particular, showed in his tw0-volume account).
I bought this some years ago and read it only recently. Among the many books I've read on The Battle of the Atlantic, I would read this one again and again. The only flaw in this printed edition was a duplicated page, which didn't affect my reading at all. I also noticed an online copy, available for free, but I'm glad I have it in my library in any case. The book also contains a strange homage to a German U-boat captain who died not at sea, but in US captivity. This most likely was not in the US Navy translation, and so it seems (at best) out of place here; interestingly, the handbook focuses on attack and provides no guidance on what to do when facing capture. In any event, in 115 pages with pictures, the book provides much for WWII naval history buffs to consider.
(I have made minor edits to a few quotes from the book for readability here).
A submarine's main advantage tactically is that it can go underwater and not be seen. One of the myths surrounding U-boats is that they were stealthy killers, that once they submerged, they could slink away like an underwater ninja.
The truth, as revealed starkly here, is that once submerged. a U-boat was terribly vulnerable, that going underwater meant that the U-boat was even weaker. The handbook acknowledges this a couple times. In one key passage on night surface attacks, the book advises U-boat captains to remain on the surface for as long as possible, to better observe the situation and engage other targets. "Do not go deep down unless it is necessary; going down renders you blind and helpless. ... The submarine should, therefore, only submerge when compelled to do so by direct pursuit."
This reveals the essential paradox of the U-boats: Once a U-boat becomes seen, it becomes a target. The problem is that its only defense, really, is to dive, which actually makes it "blind and helpless." And yet, most U-boat sailed and attacked on the surface, which seems to run contrary to the entire purpose of the submarine: its ability to go underwater. And yet, as this passage and similar ones in this book reveal, going underwater is not really an advantage after all.
The handbook presents other paradoxes for the U-boat commander. The book notes, "The chief value of the submarine is its characteristic ability, which it possesses in an exceptional degree, to attack without being seen, and thus achieve the element of surprise." Underscoring, perhaps unintentionally, the difficulty of that task, the book advises that "before and during the attack, the submarine must be neither sighted, nor sound-located, nor detected by ASDIC." This sounds like a tall order, especially in the face of convoy escorts and Allied air patrols.
Among other detection methods, the point about ASDIC is significant, because the book provides long passages in an attempt to offer "advice" on this chief Allied advantage for which the Germans really had no technical countermeasure. As a default countermeasure, the book tries to buck up the courage of the U-boat captain. The handbook notes that the quality of Allied ASDIC detection depends on "the nature of the water," "the speed of the enemy, and "the attentiveness of personnel," among other factors. In other words: all factors outside the U-boat captain's control.
The truth is that once detected by ASDIC, the odds of surviving a sustained depth charging were slim. Even so, the book helpfully notes that, "The danger to be anticipated from the sound location and ASDICs of the enemy should not be allowed to prevent the carrying out of a fatal attack at short range." This seems to be encouraging suicide at worst, or at best the exchange of a merchant ship for the captain, his crew, and his U-boat.
Confirming other books, it becomes clear in reading this contemporaneous record from 1943 that the Germans did not realize that the Allies could mount HF/DF detectors on ships. As the handbook notes, "The enemy probably has at his disposal, at least in his homeland, a well-developed and efficient D/F (direction-finding) system." The ability of Allied ships to detect radio transmissions while at sea proved to be a key tactical advantage, one that the Germans apparently didn't know that their enemies had. The German intelligence failures even made it into their guidance for commanders, who were just as ill-informed as the people who wrote this.
It's interesting to think about the fact that Allies captured U-boats, which led to key intelligence breakthroughs (capturing this book, for one; capturing an Enigma and related code books, another); the U-boats seldom (if ever) captured an Allied escort ship or a ship-borne HF/DF set. This may seem strange to say, but it highlights one more of the many handicaps of the main weapon system with which the Kriegsmarine fought its major campaign of the war.
On top of all these tactical and technical challenges, the book makes other points about even basic seamanship that must have seemed confusing to the reader. Perhaps this is the fault of the translation. Even so, the book notes that range finding must be practiced often, because visibility made the real range difficult to determine. "In clear weather, and with the sun behind one's back, the distance is liable to be underestimated; in poor visibility, against the sun, in conditions of twilight (dusk or dawn), and by moonlight, to be overestimated." How helpful. On top of all the other challenges he's facing, the U-boat captain can't even trust his own eyes.
I have often wondered why U-boat captains fired multiple, "fan" shots of firing several torpedoes at a single target. I guess this seemed wasteful to me, and I had thought that (well-functioning) torpedoes were more precise. The handbook actually encourage this practice. This was true, the book, says, even at short range, in which case "all of the torpedoes should hit the mark in order to ensure the annihilation of the enemy." At longer range, the idea "is to make sure of one hit. It is better to score only one hit than to miss the target with each of several consecutive shots." This is hardly a "one shot, one kill" approach, as the U-boat captain had to fire multiple times to ensure success. In other words, hitting and sinking a moving target with torpedoes was no sure thing. Everything the U-boat captain did was fogged in doubt and uncertainty, especially at the point of enemy contact. The U-boat was not always the lethal "sniper" I had once imagined.
Thus, in the process of trying to help the U-boat captain, the handbook actually reveals how difficult his job was to be. It provides a wide-ranging assembly of cautions that, taken together, are potentially confusing and even dispiriting. It's no wonder that some U-boat captains scored no kills or broke contact; as this book makes clear to a thoughtful reader, the captain's job seems almost impossible. Indeed, after reading this, it's no surprise that the U-boat arm suffered 75% casualties to sink only 2% of merchant shipping during the entire war (as Clay Blair, in particular, showed in his tw0-volume account).
I bought this some years ago and read it only recently. Among the many books I've read on The Battle of the Atlantic, I would read this one again and again. The only flaw in this printed edition was a duplicated page, which didn't affect my reading at all. I also noticed an online copy, available for free, but I'm glad I have it in my library in any case. The book also contains a strange homage to a German U-boat captain who died not at sea, but in US captivity. This most likely was not in the US Navy translation, and so it seems (at best) out of place here; interestingly, the handbook focuses on attack and provides no guidance on what to do when facing capture. In any event, in 115 pages with pictures, the book provides much for WWII naval history buffs to consider.
(I have made minor edits to a few quotes from the book for readability here).
September 25, 2008
After touring the only captured WWII German u-boat, U-505, at Chicago's Museum of Science & Industry, I had to get this book. It is an English translation of a captured u-boat commander's instruction book for how to use the submarine. Although it is an authentic military book, it is remarkably clear and easy to read. Plenty of illustrations.
December 31, 2016
Not the flexible document the commander's actually used but a fixed in time good sample.♒
September 29, 2020
Not technical enough for me but I can't find another book that is so its total worth keeping around.
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews