Caryl's narrative history focuses on the pivotal year of 1979, skillfully wending back and forth between five different locales where history turned on a diamond hinge: China, where Deng Xiaoping took political power and decisive action in favor of economic liberalization; Afghanistan, where a Marxist coup collapsed, precipitating a hamfisted Soviet attempt at repression and the rise of a jihadist islamism; Poland, where the advent of a crusading young Pope inspired an uprising against Communism in the name of human rights; Iran, where the collapse of the Shah's legitimacy opened the door to Ruhollah Khomenei's imposition of a Shia theocracy; and Great Britain, where Margaret Thatcher's election heralded the end of the postwar consensus in favor of state- and union-based collective control over the commanding heights of the British economy. The strength of the book resides in its balancing of an account which shows the deep and unique structural fissures that were in play in each country that were all but forcing crucial changes, on the one hand, against stories that emphasize the great importance of individual actors in determining the particular way that these tensions resolved themselves. In each case, Caryl makes clear, things could have turned out very differently had different decisions been made by the leaders in question.
Two central points become clear on reading this account, even though Caryl himself is never quite explicit about either point. The first is that the thread interlinking all five of these crises is the ideological collapse of the idea (or perhaps ideal) of socialist modernity—that is, of the idea that the goal of politics is to achieve material prosperity and that collectivist models of political economy represent the best way to achieve that end. By focusing on these five cases and their divergent responses to what comes "after" socialist modernism, Caryl implicitly undermines the simplistic narrative that casts the 1970s as nothing more than the birth time of "neoliberalism." Yes, neoliberalism was one possible response (the one arrived at in Britain), but in these other cases different choices were made. In Afghanistan and Iran, the rejection was of modernism as such, in favor of making the purpose of statecraft to enforce an invigorated (or arguably invented) set of religious traditions. In China, on the other hand, Deng was committed not to rejecting but to realizing sociotechnical modernity, and aimed to do so by moving decisively away from collectivism in favor of economic flexibility and openness, while retaining an unwavering commitment to the primacy of the Communist Party as China's political lodestone. Poland, by contrast, went precisely the opposite direction, rejecting the Communist Party (rightly seen as a foreign imposition) in favor of civil society institutions, again in the name of realizing rather than rejecting modernity. (Poland's turn towards economic (neo)liberalization would only come much later, in the 1990s, when Jeffrey Sachs and his IMF confreres decided to make the Polish people the subject of a mass "shock therapy" experiment unbounded by human subjects limitations -- policies unimagined by either the Pope or Solidarity in 1979-80.)
The second key point the follows implicitly from Caryl's narrative of the diverse ways that various socialisms were collapsing in 1979 is that the end of the Cold War was not decided in Washington or Moscow. Although it is a work of journalistic rather that academic history, Strange Rebels in this respect exemplifies the recent globalist turn in international history, which has tended to question the causal primacy of the Great Powers and traditional diplomatic leaders in shaping world historical outcomes. Though Caryl never says so, the metahistorical point that he makes is that Reagan deserves credit for the end of the Cold War in the same way that the rooster deserves credit for the coming of daybreak. Indeed, Reagan's role in Caryl's narrative is almost non-existent, cast as a minor follower of Thatcher.
Caryl's selection of key episodes ignores other events of this year that might have complicated the narrative. Why not also focus on the dramatic events in 1979 in Nicaragua, where the Sandanistas took power from a terrible forty year right wing dictatorship? Or Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia that same year, which put an end to the Khmer Rouge's genocide? Or on Cuba's adventures in Angola? Such stories, which were just as dramatic in their moment as the ones Caryl chose, would have complicated the picture of 1979 as the year that socialism died.
What this latter point suggests is that it is not quite so simple to find "the seeds of our times" in the dramatic events across the periphery in 1979. Yes, it's true that the various forms of post-socialist utopianisms that are dominant in our own time did come to dramatic form in that year, it is also true that these alternatives were not yet sure to emerge as the keystones to the geopolitics of the early 21st century. For that to happen, it took the even more dramatic events of 1989-1991, as Caryl himself acknowledges by having the last five chapters of the book address revise this period in each of these countries. For it was in this crucial moment that the possibilities embedded in the events of 1979 found themselves consolidated. In Afghanistan, Communists continued to rule through the 1980s, and it was only the departure of the Soviet Union in 1989 that led in due course to the collapse of heir puppets and the ascension of the Taliban, providing a hinterland for global jihadis. In Poland, likewise, Solidarity appeared to have been repressed, as a military dictatorship under Jaruzelski held sway through the 1980s; only the collapse of the Soviet Union made possible he shock therapy that would ensure the inability of Communism ever to return. In China the decisive moment in favor of economic liberalization under continued CCP hegemony was only settled in the Tienanmen bloodbath in 1989. In Iran, it was only with the death of Khomenei (on the very same night as the Tienanmen massacre) that would reveal that the Iranian Revolution had succeeded in institutionalizing its form of Shiite theocracy. Indeed, it was only in Britain where the neoliberal die cast in 1979 can be said to have been definitively consolidated prior to the 1990s.
None of this is to dispute Caryl's identification of 1979 as a decisive turning point in history, an argument that he makes in wonderful, fluent prose. Rather, it is to say that he seedlings that first emerged in different sites in 1979 only really flowered after 1989, when the indubitable institutional collapse of the Soviet alternative to democratic capitalism prompted Fukuyama to declare the end of history. Throughout the 1980s, Thatcher and her sympathizers had declared that There Is No Alternative, but this claim had found plenty of dispute among western intellectuals who could continue to point to "actually existing socialism" as an "actually existing" alternative. What Caryl shows, however, is that while the collapse of the Soviet alternative in 1989 led to the perception in the West that Thatcher had been prophetic and Fukuyama was right, elsewhere in the world the end of the Soviet antinomian alternative cleared the field to allow other forms of radical alterity to emerge in full flower without rival.