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Publications of the German Historical Institute
A World at Total War: Global Conflict and the Politics of Destruction, 1937–1945
Presenting the results of a fifth, and final, conference on the history of total war, this volume is devoted to the Second World War, which many scholars regard as the paradigmatic instance of total war. In considering the validity of this proposition, the contributors address a broad range of analytical problems that this vast conflict posed in its European and Asian theaters. They analyze modes of combat, mobilization of economies and societies, occupation regimes, noncombatant vulnerability, and the legal and moral issues raised by mid-twentieth century industrialized warfare.
- GenresNonfictionHistory
408 pages, Hardcover
First published December 20, 2004
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
December 18, 2023
This is the 5th and final volume of Stig Förster and Roger Chickering's series on 'total war'. Which means I started at the end and will very likely, at least partially work my way back through the series.
What this volume does not do is tell the comrehensive and consistent story of WW2. No, this is a semi-theoretical collection of articles from leading historians on the concept of total war. Each article focuses on a different aspect of WW2 and contextualize said aspect within the confines of the total war concept. While some articles provide a very interesting narrative on the war itself, if you're looking for a definitive WW2 history, this isn't the book for you.
What this volume also does not do is provide a singular and ultimate definition of total war. Indeed there are multiple definitions, and most of the articles are founded upon a mutual understanding of the concept, but there are more than one definition and some contributors are apprehensive towards others' definitions and understandings of total war. Which is yet another instance where scientists fail to converge and agree on a seemingly very simple thing, but that's how the academia works, and any kind of intellectual output works, really.
There is, however, a general consensus that while an ideal type, a perfect demonstration of a perfect definition of total war may not in fact exist in history, the second world war came as close to being this real life demonstration of an ideal total war as possible. Or in other words, if there is such a thing as total war, it was WW2. This point is made across several articles and does appear to be an efficient compromise to find a common ground upon which to erect this particular body of work.
As in every kind of academic collection, some articles are more interesting, some are more technical and some are much better written than others. For example, Richard Overy's article, while his prose isn't as gripping as some others' are, incredibly comprehensive with excellent use of original documents. Overy appears to have stolen the show just a bit.
What's particularly worthy of note is how well the collection seems to be designed and constructed. Bringing more than 20 academics together for a project in which some do not agree on the most basic definition and building a comprehensive, semi-theoretical article collection cannot have been easy, but in this book it was achieved without a doubt.
So, I read this out of an obligation, enjoyed it more than I anticipated I would, I'm very glad to have read it, I will likely read the rest of the series.
What this volume does not do is tell the comrehensive and consistent story of WW2. No, this is a semi-theoretical collection of articles from leading historians on the concept of total war. Each article focuses on a different aspect of WW2 and contextualize said aspect within the confines of the total war concept. While some articles provide a very interesting narrative on the war itself, if you're looking for a definitive WW2 history, this isn't the book for you.
What this volume also does not do is provide a singular and ultimate definition of total war. Indeed there are multiple definitions, and most of the articles are founded upon a mutual understanding of the concept, but there are more than one definition and some contributors are apprehensive towards others' definitions and understandings of total war. Which is yet another instance where scientists fail to converge and agree on a seemingly very simple thing, but that's how the academia works, and any kind of intellectual output works, really.
There is, however, a general consensus that while an ideal type, a perfect demonstration of a perfect definition of total war may not in fact exist in history, the second world war came as close to being this real life demonstration of an ideal total war as possible. Or in other words, if there is such a thing as total war, it was WW2. This point is made across several articles and does appear to be an efficient compromise to find a common ground upon which to erect this particular body of work.
As in every kind of academic collection, some articles are more interesting, some are more technical and some are much better written than others. For example, Richard Overy's article, while his prose isn't as gripping as some others' are, incredibly comprehensive with excellent use of original documents. Overy appears to have stolen the show just a bit.
What's particularly worthy of note is how well the collection seems to be designed and constructed. Bringing more than 20 academics together for a project in which some do not agree on the most basic definition and building a comprehensive, semi-theoretical article collection cannot have been easy, but in this book it was achieved without a doubt.
So, I read this out of an obligation, enjoyed it more than I anticipated I would, I'm very glad to have read it, I will likely read the rest of the series.
May 11, 2023
Good. Not as thorough as his other too. I didn’t feel like this one did Justice to the topic of Total War. There could’ve been a better balance on the Pacific where, second to the Eastern Front, Total War was most prevalent.
November 19, 2011
In his essay, Robert Messer makes two points that are worth pondering.
First, the United States had only two atomic bombs in the Summer of 1945 but many stockpiles of poison gas. Marshall supported the use of gas on Japanese cities, but Truman, Stimson, and Byrnes had "other priorities and perspectives." (p. 300, fn 5.) If cities were legitimate strategic targets, why would Truman approve atomic bombs but not gas? Truman witnessed the effects of gas in World War I (p. 306). Was gas really any worse than atomic bombs?
Second, and perhaps in answer to the question above, Messer provides convincing evidence that Truman was misinformed about the bomb by his advisers. (p. 303-4) Nobody told Truman about radioactivity and the physicists assumed that anybody exposed to lethal levels of radiation would immediately die. The president's advisers grossly underestimated the population of Hiroshima and the number of casualties and assumed that most residents would be protected by shelters. Stimson kept the Frank Report hidden from Truman.
Had Truman known more about the bomb, would he have decided differently? Truman later told an aide that the bomb "was not a military weapon, that it kills woman and children and thus could never be used again." (p. 311)
Irrespective of Truman's feelings, such was the bureaucratic, military, and political pressure that no other choice than to use the weapon was possible. That is hardly an excuse, however, for America using indiscriminate weapons of mass destruction against non-combatants.
First, the United States had only two atomic bombs in the Summer of 1945 but many stockpiles of poison gas. Marshall supported the use of gas on Japanese cities, but Truman, Stimson, and Byrnes had "other priorities and perspectives." (p. 300, fn 5.) If cities were legitimate strategic targets, why would Truman approve atomic bombs but not gas? Truman witnessed the effects of gas in World War I (p. 306). Was gas really any worse than atomic bombs?
Second, and perhaps in answer to the question above, Messer provides convincing evidence that Truman was misinformed about the bomb by his advisers. (p. 303-4) Nobody told Truman about radioactivity and the physicists assumed that anybody exposed to lethal levels of radiation would immediately die. The president's advisers grossly underestimated the population of Hiroshima and the number of casualties and assumed that most residents would be protected by shelters. Stimson kept the Frank Report hidden from Truman.
Had Truman known more about the bomb, would he have decided differently? Truman later told an aide that the bomb "was not a military weapon, that it kills woman and children and thus could never be used again." (p. 311)
Irrespective of Truman's feelings, such was the bureaucratic, military, and political pressure that no other choice than to use the weapon was possible. That is hardly an excuse, however, for America using indiscriminate weapons of mass destruction against non-combatants.
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews