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Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions
African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999
This book explains why African countries have remained mired in a disastrous economic crisis since the late 1970s. It shows that dynamics internal to African state structures largely explain this failure to overcome economic difficulties rather than external pressures on these same structures as is often argued. Far from being prevented from undertaking reforms by societal interest and pressure groups, clientelism within the state elite, ideological factors and low state capacity have resulted in some limited reform, but much prevarication and manipulation of the reform process, by governments that do not really believe that reform will be effective.
306 pages, Paperback
First published September 1, 2001
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Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews
August 23, 2024
In this book, van de Walle tries to explain why African political independence has not resulted in economic growth in the long term. According to him, the main reason why is what he labels “neopatrimonialism”: state elites parasiting on the public infrastructure to secure rents for themselves. Now, although this is quite a common (liberal) explanation for African lack of growth, he frames it well and coherently and is obviously well informed on African economics and politics. His book enlightens much and, as rent-seeking state elites are important actors in postcolonial African states, one has to include the concept of neopatrimonialism in an analysis of African postcolonial political economy.
For me personally, after reading “A People’s History of the Congo”, it gave a lot of theoretical background to Mobutu’s rule, the politics of anti-democratic “nationalisations”, and the struggle over state control in the 90s. The Congolese case seems to fit perfectly within van de Walle’s framework (although, with some clearly missing links to the international global market, see below).
What makes this book particularly interesting, is that it is essentially an investigation into how neoliberalism and the restructuring of the global financial markets interfered in these neopatrimonial systems, and how they adapted to it. Bartel would love to read this and see how African political systems grappled with the pressure “to break promises”. Here, van de Walle makes a crucial point. He argues that much of the literature so far has assumed that African states had little state autonomy: that is, they were under high pressure from civil society and populist pressures, thus disabling states from “breaking promises” and pushing through austerity. This explains the lack of neoliberal policies implemented in African societies (as a liberal, he labels these policies as “reforms” and essentially approves of them as necessary). Instead, van de Walle argues that, while this was the case for Latin American states, African states had a large autonomy from civil society. In fact, he clearly shows that there was barely any civil society, which is according to him a relic of harsh colonial regimes in the region. It, in theory, enabled state elites to push through austerity.
Still, they didn’t, even though there were pressures from international financial institutions to implement changes. The most important reason is a lack of state capacity: states were just not in a position to force change. They were only focused on wealth grabbing for the ones in power, and they had no real tools to implement change. The only policies they could implement were related to the sectors they themselves controlled (where the public and private are mixed up), and pushing through reform here (privatization, devaluation of the currency etc.) would mean they essentially lost wealth. They thus resisted change and reform, despite international pressure.
It eventually gave way to what he calls “partial reform syndroms”, where African economies and politics stumbled further with no real change and growth in sight.
When the state gave in to neoliberal policies, state elites first cut their developmental ambitions and social policies for the people, while retaining there grip on the state for rent-seeking purposes. It kept the elites in place, while a new generation of NGO’s and donors stepped in and tried to avoid the worst social disasters. These donors soon changed strategy from aiding the state directly (in their economic planning) to building their own social infrastructure. State capacity to implement economic and social change thus further declined, due to a complex dynamic of domestic state elites holding on to what they got and international donors trying to alleviate the worst possible outcomes.
Van de Walle is in this sense very critical to international aid (which had never been higher in the ‘80s and ‘90s) for giving fresh lifeblood to the neopatrimonial states, who are the big villains here. While market forces, or disciplinary measures from the international institutions, could have forced the hands of these elites, international aid was, when push comes to shove, not that disciplinary at all. In van de Walle’s framework, liberalising an economy obstructs rent-seeking mechanisms, which would lead to the fall of these patrimonial states. Instead, international aid has perpetuated them, and as state elites adapted, they took advantage of these flows for their own good.
Still, and this is particularly interesting for the Congolese case, neoliberalisation was still necessary for states who were in deep trouble, and “partial” reform still means there were moves into privatisation and austerity. Here, van de Walle gives an enlightening interpretation of so-called “ethnic” violence of the ‘90s. According to him, when neopatrimonial states were not able to push austerity onto those state functions not linked to state elites rent-seekers, the losses had to be divided among them. This created tensions within the ruling bloc, and eventually sparked fights over state control (and thus rent-control). A fascinating account of how the restructuring of the global financial markets resulted in endemic violence in the ‘90s which still haunts Congo today.
Then we come to my biggest problem with this book: the advent of “the crisis”. Van de Walle sporadically comments on the causes of the crisis, which is according to him a mix of failed planning, falling commodity prices, but most of all, the state elites. If you’re talking about the ‘80s crisis and you’re not even mentioning the Volcker shock, it proves that you haven’t incorporated the international context into your domestic story very well. It seems quite obvious to me that African neopatrimonial systems were deeply influenced by the 70s crisis and the American FED’s turn to monetarism. When interest rates are skyhigh, African states are forced into a crisis, see their investment options diminish (as capital is sucked back to New York), and are forced to default/go to the IMF. The restructuring of the global market is what changed the game for neopatrimonial systems, not their inherent malfunctioning or contradictions. Other than that, this book is a great theory to see how this international context interfered with the national, how African elites handled the advent of neoliberalism, and explains well the rise of violence in Africa, and the postponed political and economic change.
For me personally, after reading “A People’s History of the Congo”, it gave a lot of theoretical background to Mobutu’s rule, the politics of anti-democratic “nationalisations”, and the struggle over state control in the 90s. The Congolese case seems to fit perfectly within van de Walle’s framework (although, with some clearly missing links to the international global market, see below).
What makes this book particularly interesting, is that it is essentially an investigation into how neoliberalism and the restructuring of the global financial markets interfered in these neopatrimonial systems, and how they adapted to it. Bartel would love to read this and see how African political systems grappled with the pressure “to break promises”. Here, van de Walle makes a crucial point. He argues that much of the literature so far has assumed that African states had little state autonomy: that is, they were under high pressure from civil society and populist pressures, thus disabling states from “breaking promises” and pushing through austerity. This explains the lack of neoliberal policies implemented in African societies (as a liberal, he labels these policies as “reforms” and essentially approves of them as necessary). Instead, van de Walle argues that, while this was the case for Latin American states, African states had a large autonomy from civil society. In fact, he clearly shows that there was barely any civil society, which is according to him a relic of harsh colonial regimes in the region. It, in theory, enabled state elites to push through austerity.
Still, they didn’t, even though there were pressures from international financial institutions to implement changes. The most important reason is a lack of state capacity: states were just not in a position to force change. They were only focused on wealth grabbing for the ones in power, and they had no real tools to implement change. The only policies they could implement were related to the sectors they themselves controlled (where the public and private are mixed up), and pushing through reform here (privatization, devaluation of the currency etc.) would mean they essentially lost wealth. They thus resisted change and reform, despite international pressure.
It eventually gave way to what he calls “partial reform syndroms”, where African economies and politics stumbled further with no real change and growth in sight.
When the state gave in to neoliberal policies, state elites first cut their developmental ambitions and social policies for the people, while retaining there grip on the state for rent-seeking purposes. It kept the elites in place, while a new generation of NGO’s and donors stepped in and tried to avoid the worst social disasters. These donors soon changed strategy from aiding the state directly (in their economic planning) to building their own social infrastructure. State capacity to implement economic and social change thus further declined, due to a complex dynamic of domestic state elites holding on to what they got and international donors trying to alleviate the worst possible outcomes.
Van de Walle is in this sense very critical to international aid (which had never been higher in the ‘80s and ‘90s) for giving fresh lifeblood to the neopatrimonial states, who are the big villains here. While market forces, or disciplinary measures from the international institutions, could have forced the hands of these elites, international aid was, when push comes to shove, not that disciplinary at all. In van de Walle’s framework, liberalising an economy obstructs rent-seeking mechanisms, which would lead to the fall of these patrimonial states. Instead, international aid has perpetuated them, and as state elites adapted, they took advantage of these flows for their own good.
Still, and this is particularly interesting for the Congolese case, neoliberalisation was still necessary for states who were in deep trouble, and “partial” reform still means there were moves into privatisation and austerity. Here, van de Walle gives an enlightening interpretation of so-called “ethnic” violence of the ‘90s. According to him, when neopatrimonial states were not able to push austerity onto those state functions not linked to state elites rent-seekers, the losses had to be divided among them. This created tensions within the ruling bloc, and eventually sparked fights over state control (and thus rent-control). A fascinating account of how the restructuring of the global financial markets resulted in endemic violence in the ‘90s which still haunts Congo today.
Then we come to my biggest problem with this book: the advent of “the crisis”. Van de Walle sporadically comments on the causes of the crisis, which is according to him a mix of failed planning, falling commodity prices, but most of all, the state elites. If you’re talking about the ‘80s crisis and you’re not even mentioning the Volcker shock, it proves that you haven’t incorporated the international context into your domestic story very well. It seems quite obvious to me that African neopatrimonial systems were deeply influenced by the 70s crisis and the American FED’s turn to monetarism. When interest rates are skyhigh, African states are forced into a crisis, see their investment options diminish (as capital is sucked back to New York), and are forced to default/go to the IMF. The restructuring of the global market is what changed the game for neopatrimonial systems, not their inherent malfunctioning or contradictions. Other than that, this book is a great theory to see how this international context interfered with the national, how African elites handled the advent of neoliberalism, and explains well the rise of violence in Africa, and the postponed political and economic change.
September 30, 2019
This book on politics in Africa is almost 2 decades old, but still so amazingly relevant today. I learned lots of things, on neopatrimonialism, on autonomous but incapable states, on how political elites use low state capacity to safeguard their access to state resources. I understand better why civil service doesn’t perform well and why good statistics are so hard to get by.
Most fascinating though are the parts on structural adjustment, on how the reform process was/is instrumentalized by regimes, not for developmental purposes, but to remain in power and especially how the dubious role donors play help them to do so. Insightful as well how the democratization of the 1990s did hardly change anything: it is only a first step in the good direction.
And today? I have the feeling things did not really evolve: the same mechanisms of neopatrimonialism, economic crisis, poverty and counterproductive aid continue as they did before.
In conclusion, a very insightful and nuanced book on the state of politics in Africa. Still worth reading today!
Most fascinating though are the parts on structural adjustment, on how the reform process was/is instrumentalized by regimes, not for developmental purposes, but to remain in power and especially how the dubious role donors play help them to do so. Insightful as well how the democratization of the 1990s did hardly change anything: it is only a first step in the good direction.
And today? I have the feeling things did not really evolve: the same mechanisms of neopatrimonialism, economic crisis, poverty and counterproductive aid continue as they did before.
In conclusion, a very insightful and nuanced book on the state of politics in Africa. Still worth reading today!
December 7, 2024
Not an elegant book -- it's hard to distill a pithy lesson from it -- but probably the best one-volume descriptive account of African political economy from independence to the late 90s. The chapter on foreign aid is particularly good.
May 11, 2017
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Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews