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Cosa si prova ad essere un pipistrello?
Cosa si prova ad essere un pipistrello? È la paradossale domanda che fa da titolo a uno dei più influenti e originali pamphlet del filosofo Thomas Nagel, pubblicato per la prima volta sulla “Philosophical Review” nell’ottobre del 1974. Nagel sostiene che le teorie di taglio materialista sul funzionamento e i modi del pensiero umano omettono la componente essenziale della coscienza, un elemento per definizione mobile, elastico, reattivo agli stimoli, che ci permette di vedere e giudicare le cose attraverso la lente discorsiva della percezione, attraverso la nozione insuperabile della nostra realtà di essere umani. Ciò che noi vediamo, capiamo, analizziamo non è mai svincolato dalla percezione coscientizzata della nostra appartenenza di specie. E allora, forse, la realtà non sarebbe quella che crediamo se per un giorno potessimo essere, ad esempio, pipistrelli.
56 pages, Paperback
First published October 1, 1974
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About the author
Thomas Nagel
78 books517 followersThomas Nagel is an American philosopher, currently University Professor and Professor of Philosophy and Law at New York University, where he has taught since 1980. His main areas of philosophical interest are philosophy of mind, political philosophy and ethics. He is well-known for his critique of reductionist accounts of the mind in his essay "What Is it Like to Be a Bat?" (1974), and for his contributions to deontological and liberal moral and political theory in The Possibility of Altruism (1970) and subsequent writings.
Thomas Nagel was born to a Jewish family in Belgrade, Yugoslavia (now Serbia). He received a BA from Cornell University in 1958, a BPhil from Oxford University in 1960, and a PhD from Harvard University in 1963 under the supervision of John Rawls. Before settling in New York, Nagel taught briefly at the University of California, Berkeley (from 1963 to 1966) and at Princeton University (from 1966 to 1980), where he trained many well-known philosophers including Susan Wolf, Shelly Kagan, and Samuel Scheffler, who is now his colleague at NYU. In 2006, he was made a member of the American Philosophical Society.
Nagel is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and a Corresponding Fellow of the British Academy, and has held fellowships from the Guggenheim Foundation, the National Science Foundation, and the National Endowment for the Humanities. In 2008, he was awarded a Rolf Schock Prize for his work in philosophy, the Balzan prize, and the honorary degree of Doctor of Letters from Oxford University.
Thomas Nagel was born to a Jewish family in Belgrade, Yugoslavia (now Serbia). He received a BA from Cornell University in 1958, a BPhil from Oxford University in 1960, and a PhD from Harvard University in 1963 under the supervision of John Rawls. Before settling in New York, Nagel taught briefly at the University of California, Berkeley (from 1963 to 1966) and at Princeton University (from 1966 to 1980), where he trained many well-known philosophers including Susan Wolf, Shelly Kagan, and Samuel Scheffler, who is now his colleague at NYU. In 2006, he was made a member of the American Philosophical Society.
Nagel is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and a Corresponding Fellow of the British Academy, and has held fellowships from the Guggenheim Foundation, the National Science Foundation, and the National Endowment for the Humanities. In 2008, he was awarded a Rolf Schock Prize for his work in philosophy, the Balzan prize, and the honorary degree of Doctor of Letters from Oxford University.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 148 reviews
August 21, 2020
Philosopher least likely to secretly be Batman: Thomas Nagel.
"Our own experience provides the basic material for our imagination, whose range is therefore limited. It will not help to try to imagine that one has webbing on one's arms, which enables one to fly around at dusk and dawn catching insects in one's mouth; that one has very poor vision, and perceives the surrounding world by a system of reflected high-frequency sound signals; and that one spends the day hanging upside down by one's feet in an attic. In so far as I can imagine this (which is not very far), it tells me only what it would be like for me to behave as a bat behaves. But that is not the question. I want to know what it is like for a bat to be a bat."
Dude wrote a classic paper called "What is it like to be a bat", at the end of which he concludes he doesn't really know. But if consciousness is, as Nagel put it, the experience of “what it is like to be something,” can we just agree that we would all rather be unconscious than to be Donald Trump?
Not related, but this reminds me of a study performed by Gerald Wilkinson on Vampire Bats. Vampire bats require feeding almost every night and with missing just a few meals they will starve. If one of the bats is unable to find any food than others will regurgitate food up for them to eat. The bat performing the vomiting is getting nothing from this, and is in fact losing sustenance that would make them more fit. However, there is the expectation that if the tables are reversed some time in the future that that bat will receive food in a similar manner.
The bat that was fed does not need to be the one that "repays" the favor, it could very well be another within the group. It is also not even necessary for the favor to ever be repaid.
link to paper
November 23, 2023
Mit etwa fünf Jahren erfuhr ich, dass ich farbenblind bin. Wir fuhren in unserem VW-Käfer zum Forellenfischen an den damals noch idyllisch unverbauten Inn, vorbei an einer im Sonnenlicht leuchtenden Wiese. Meine Mutter war entzückt und rief: schaut wie schön, die vielen Mohnblumen! Ich schaute aus dem Fenster: Wo? Ich sehe keine Mohnblumen!
Ich sah sie tatsächlich nicht. Meine Eltern waren schockiert und testeten mich mit den verschiedensten Gegenständen. Was ist das für eine Farbe, und das? Es stellte sich zweifelsfrei heraus, dass ich rot und grün nicht unterscheiden konnte und auch bei gemischten Tönen wie Braun, Lila, Rosa oder Türkis meistens daneben lag.
Wie sieht rot denn aus? wollte ich wissen, aber das konnte mir keiner erklären, was mich sehr nachdenklich stimmte. Es war ja nicht so, dass ich nichts sah. Kann es sein, dass jeder sein eigenes Rot sieht? Und dass natürlich die Erwachsenen bestimmen, welches richtig ist? Aber erklären können sie es nicht. Genauso gut könnte mein Rot das richtige sein.
Als Kind erkannte ich ganz intuitiv, was der Bewußseinsforscher Christof Koch 60 Jahre später so ausdrückt: die Erste-Person-Perspektive des Bewußtseins ist eine singuläre Eigenschaft des Geistes. Ich weigerte mich vorerst farbenblind zu sein, musste es aber trotzdem zur Kenntnis nehmen, spätestens als ich mich für Elektronik zu interessieren begann und die Farbcodes auf den Widerständen nicht lesen konnte.
Wenn keiner erklären kann, wie rot aussieht, ist es erst recht unmöglich, sich die Wahrnehmung einer Fledermaus vorzustellen, die durch Echos von Ultraschallsignalen erzeugt wird.
Qualia, also die erlebte Qualität der durch die Sinne wahrgenommenen Phänomene, ein sattes Ultramarinblau, das Brennen einer Brennnessel auf der Haut oder eben das Raumempfinden der Fledermaus, dieses Erleben wird heute als das hard problem (D.J. Chalmers) der Bewusstseinsforschung bezeichnet. Bei anderen Funktionen des Geistes wie Erinnerung, Abstraktion oder Assoziation ist man zumindest auf gutem Wege, sie zu verstehen, sie gehören zu den easy problems.
Wir können rot objektivieren, indem wir es in der Perspektive des Beobachters als elektromagnetische Welle mit einer Wellenlänge von ~700nm beschreiben, das Erleben in der Ersten-Person Perspektive kann die Physik jedoch nicht erklären. Die Anmutung von rot entsteht erst im Gehirn und sie ist alles andere als ein 1:1 Abbild unserer Umwelt, sondern etwas völlig eigenes. Aber auch die genaueste Untersuchung der Nervenzellen und ihrer Vernetzung, der Neurotransmitter und Aktionspotentiale ergibt keinerlei Hinweis auf das Zustandekommen der Qualia.
Die Verbindung von Materie und Geist, früher als Leib-Seele-Problem bekannt, beschäftigt die Menschheit wahrscheinlich solange sie denken kann. Thomas Nagels berühmter Essay von 1974 bringt das Problem pointiert und sehr anschaulich auf den Punkt. Er ist fast 50 Jahre später, trotz oder gerade wegen der bahnbrechenden Erkenntnisse, welche die einschlägige Forschung in den letzten Jahren gewonnen hat, aktueller denn je.
Für mich war und ist das Rätsel der Beziehung zwischen Materie und Geist der eigentliche Grund, mich eingehend mit Psychologie, Philosophie, Neurobiologie und Informatik zu befassen und wahrscheinlich war die kindlich naive Erkenntnis meiner Farbenblindheit der entscheidende Auslöser dafür.
Ich sah sie tatsächlich nicht. Meine Eltern waren schockiert und testeten mich mit den verschiedensten Gegenständen. Was ist das für eine Farbe, und das? Es stellte sich zweifelsfrei heraus, dass ich rot und grün nicht unterscheiden konnte und auch bei gemischten Tönen wie Braun, Lila, Rosa oder Türkis meistens daneben lag.
Wie sieht rot denn aus? wollte ich wissen, aber das konnte mir keiner erklären, was mich sehr nachdenklich stimmte. Es war ja nicht so, dass ich nichts sah. Kann es sein, dass jeder sein eigenes Rot sieht? Und dass natürlich die Erwachsenen bestimmen, welches richtig ist? Aber erklären können sie es nicht. Genauso gut könnte mein Rot das richtige sein.
Als Kind erkannte ich ganz intuitiv, was der Bewußseinsforscher Christof Koch 60 Jahre später so ausdrückt: die Erste-Person-Perspektive des Bewußtseins ist eine singuläre Eigenschaft des Geistes. Ich weigerte mich vorerst farbenblind zu sein, musste es aber trotzdem zur Kenntnis nehmen, spätestens als ich mich für Elektronik zu interessieren begann und die Farbcodes auf den Widerständen nicht lesen konnte.
Wenn keiner erklären kann, wie rot aussieht, ist es erst recht unmöglich, sich die Wahrnehmung einer Fledermaus vorzustellen, die durch Echos von Ultraschallsignalen erzeugt wird.
Qualia, also die erlebte Qualität der durch die Sinne wahrgenommenen Phänomene, ein sattes Ultramarinblau, das Brennen einer Brennnessel auf der Haut oder eben das Raumempfinden der Fledermaus, dieses Erleben wird heute als das hard problem (D.J. Chalmers) der Bewusstseinsforschung bezeichnet. Bei anderen Funktionen des Geistes wie Erinnerung, Abstraktion oder Assoziation ist man zumindest auf gutem Wege, sie zu verstehen, sie gehören zu den easy problems.
Wir können rot objektivieren, indem wir es in der Perspektive des Beobachters als elektromagnetische Welle mit einer Wellenlänge von ~700nm beschreiben, das Erleben in der Ersten-Person Perspektive kann die Physik jedoch nicht erklären. Die Anmutung von rot entsteht erst im Gehirn und sie ist alles andere als ein 1:1 Abbild unserer Umwelt, sondern etwas völlig eigenes. Aber auch die genaueste Untersuchung der Nervenzellen und ihrer Vernetzung, der Neurotransmitter und Aktionspotentiale ergibt keinerlei Hinweis auf das Zustandekommen der Qualia.
Die Verbindung von Materie und Geist, früher als Leib-Seele-Problem bekannt, beschäftigt die Menschheit wahrscheinlich solange sie denken kann. Thomas Nagels berühmter Essay von 1974 bringt das Problem pointiert und sehr anschaulich auf den Punkt. Er ist fast 50 Jahre später, trotz oder gerade wegen der bahnbrechenden Erkenntnisse, welche die einschlägige Forschung in den letzten Jahren gewonnen hat, aktueller denn je.
Für mich war und ist das Rätsel der Beziehung zwischen Materie und Geist der eigentliche Grund, mich eingehend mit Psychologie, Philosophie, Neurobiologie und Informatik zu befassen und wahrscheinlich war die kindlich naive Erkenntnis meiner Farbenblindheit der entscheidende Auslöser dafür.
September 24, 2015
Nagel demonstrates in this succinct gedankenexperiment that there are certain types of facts and other things it is impossible for humans to ever know. He uses the experience of being a bat to illustrate his argument - essentially: to know what it is like to be a bat, you have to be a bat.
He goes on to consider in some detail the mind/body problem, and how any attempts to describe subjective experience, such as what it is like to be a bat, might proceed. While he reaches no conclusions, his clearly articulated thoughts give a good idea of some of the inherent limitations and boundaries that there are to human understanding.
This influential piece of thinking can be read in under fifteen minutes (not including the mental digressions it induces while you're reading it), but leaves you turning the arguments over in your head for much longer afterwards ...
Luke F. D. Marsden (author of Wondering, the Way is Made)
He goes on to consider in some detail the mind/body problem, and how any attempts to describe subjective experience, such as what it is like to be a bat, might proceed. While he reaches no conclusions, his clearly articulated thoughts give a good idea of some of the inherent limitations and boundaries that there are to human understanding.
This influential piece of thinking can be read in under fifteen minutes (not including the mental digressions it induces while you're reading it), but leaves you turning the arguments over in your head for much longer afterwards ...
Luke F. D. Marsden (author of Wondering, the Way is Made)
October 3, 2021
A classic for posterity. It's good to revise the oldies from time to time.
PhD. Nagel makes a good job describing qualia and the breach between ontology and epistemology. (A breach that I don't believe it's possible to solve. However with better language we could be more equipped to understand other minds.)
He doesn't set ways to solve the problem, he only postulates there is a problem and describes it.
The saying goes "the easy problem of consciousness is hard... and the hard problem of consciousness is impossible"... and so it is seems to me as well.
Hail Nagel for giving us all existential crisis and for shaking our foundations. <3
Anyways... Time to read Types of Minds. *-*
PhD. Nagel makes a good job describing qualia and the breach between ontology and epistemology. (A breach that I don't believe it's possible to solve. However with better language we could be more equipped to understand other minds.)
He doesn't set ways to solve the problem, he only postulates there is a problem and describes it.
The saying goes "the easy problem of consciousness is hard... and the hard problem of consciousness is impossible"... and so it is seems to me as well.
Hail Nagel for giving us all existential crisis and for shaking our foundations. <3
Anyways... Time to read Types of Minds. *-*
April 7, 2019
خفاش بودن چگونه چیزی است؟
سوال طرح شده در مقاله توماس نگل در شاخه فلسفه ذهن و موضوع دو گانه انگاری یا دوالیتی قابل طرح و بررسی هست که استاد ملکیان از آن تعبیر به سیرآفاقی یا آبژه وسیر انفسی یا سوژه می کنند توماس نگل به حوزه ای وارد شده که سال هاست محل منازعه بین متافیزیست ها و فیزیکالیست ها می باشد همان حوزه هوشمندی عالم که در کتاب ذهن و کیهان هم وی به نوعی با نقد فیزیکالیسم نئوداروینیست ها که هستی را به ماده صرف تقلیل داده اند بدان پرداخته است.
همیشه ما به عنوان اشرف خوانده مخلوقات این سوال در ذهن مان هست که حیوانات چه دنیایی دارند و میزان درکشان از عالم چیست ولی جواب به این سوال به همین راحتی هم نیست؟
و اما خفاش
اگرچه ردیاب صوتی خفاش به روشنی یک نوع ادراک با وضوح بسیار بالاتر از ادراک ماست اما عملکردش به هیچ یک از حواس ما شبیه نیست و به لحاظ ذهنی هیچ شباهتی به چیزی که ما تجربه می کنیم ندارد
نگل در مقاله ی خفاش که یکی از مهمترین مقالات در زمینه ی فلسفه ی ذهن است که در آن از آگاهی و رابطه ی ذهن و بدن سخن میگوید، در ابتدای این مقاله وی آگاهی را مایه ی غیرقابل حل بودن مسئله ی ذهن و بدن می داند، البته شاید درست باشد که بگویم نیگل مایه ی دشوار بودن مسئله ی ذهن و بدن می داند.
آگاهی به بیان نیگل همان کیفیت است، همان کیفیات ذهنی، منظور از کیفیات ذهنی این است که بطور مثال لذت از خوردن هر غذایی در من حسی را ایجاد میکنه که آن حس درونی یا حالت درونی کیفیت ذهنی آن غذاست، یا کیفیت درد، خارش، خواب یا هرچیز دیگر.
از نظر نیگل تمام حیوانات هم این کیفیات ذهنی را دارا هستند، البته در مورد رسته ریز حیواناتی مانند آمیب ها با قطعیت نمی توان سخن گفت ولی در مورد حیوانات دیگر از آنجا که قبول داریم کشتن آنها یا بررسی آنها به صورت آزمایشی اخلاقی نیست پس باید قبول داشته باشیم که آنها هم کیفیات ذهنی ای چون درد را تجربه میکنند!
نیگل خفاش را دارای مشترکاتی با انسان میداند و از آنجا که تجربه را همان کیفیت یا آگاهی تلقی می کند و معتقد است که حیوانات نیز تجربه دارند، پس میگوید که ما باور داریم که خفاش ها تجربه دارند، و در بسیاری حس ها با ما مشترک هستند، اما زمانی که ما بخواهیم خود را بجای یک خفاش بگذاریم تا بفهمیم خفاش بودن چه کیفیتی دارد از آنجا که بنا به تخیل تجربیات خودمان را به خفاش نسبت میدهیم و کیفیات خودمان را با خفاش خلط میکنیم بین بر این تنها چیزی که به دست می آوریم این است که بدانیم خفاش بودن برای "ما" چه کیفیتی دارد در حالیکه ما به دنبال به دریافتن این کیفیت برای خفاش بودیم، یعنی خفاش بودن برای خفاش چه کیفیتی دارد.
نیگل معتقد است ما نمیتوانیم از منظر سوم شخص به دریافت کیفیات منظر اول شخص بپردازیم و همانطور که یک مریخی که دارای کیفیاتی متفاوت از ماست نمیتواند داشتن کیفیت (آگاهی) را در ما رد کند ما نیز نمیتوانیم منکر کیفیت در خفاش شویم، بلکه تنها نمیتوانیم به درکی صحیح از آن نائل آییم.
البته نیگل دریافت کیفیت را در یک نوع ( انسانی،حیوانی) را از منظر سوم شخص به منظر اول شخص را ممکن می داند. مثلا انسان دیگری بفهمد که کیفیتی در ذهن من چگونه است.
بطور کلی نیگل در مقاله ی خفاش بودن به چه می ماند؟ یا خفاش بودن چه کیفیتی دارد؟ ابراز می دارد که هیگاه نخواهیم توانست فهمید که خفاش بودن چه کیفیت ذهنی ای داراست.
البته او امیدوار است که در آینده اگر به سوالاتی پاسخ داده شود این مسئله ی آگاهی نیز حل شود.
نقل از بلاگ فلسفه علم استاد علی جعفری*
مولوی هم در شعر مارگیر و اژدها از زبان موجودات و جمادات دیگر خطاب به انسان گفته
ما سمیعیم و بصیریم و هشیم
با شما نامحرمان ما خامشیم
مطالعه بیشتر
http://vista.ir/article/277251/%22%D8...
سوال طرح شده در مقاله توماس نگل در شاخه فلسفه ذهن و موضوع دو گانه انگاری یا دوالیتی قابل طرح و بررسی هست که استاد ملکیان از آن تعبیر به سیرآفاقی یا آبژه وسیر انفسی یا سوژه می کنند توماس نگل به حوزه ای وارد شده که سال هاست محل منازعه بین متافیزیست ها و فیزیکالیست ها می باشد همان حوزه هوشمندی عالم که در کتاب ذهن و کیهان هم وی به نوعی با نقد فیزیکالیسم نئوداروینیست ها که هستی را به ماده صرف تقلیل داده اند بدان پرداخته است.
همیشه ما به عنوان اشرف خوانده مخلوقات این سوال در ذهن مان هست که حیوانات چه دنیایی دارند و میزان درکشان از عالم چیست ولی جواب به این سوال به همین راحتی هم نیست؟
و اما خفاش
اگرچه ردیاب صوتی خفاش به روشنی یک نوع ادراک با وضوح بسیار بالاتر از ادراک ماست اما عملکردش به هیچ یک از حواس ما شبیه نیست و به لحاظ ذهنی هیچ شباهتی به چیزی که ما تجربه می کنیم ندارد
نگل در مقاله ی خفاش که یکی از مهمترین مقالات در زمینه ی فلسفه ی ذهن است که در آن از آگاهی و رابطه ی ذهن و بدن سخن میگوید، در ابتدای این مقاله وی آگاهی را مایه ی غیرقابل حل بودن مسئله ی ذهن و بدن می داند، البته شاید درست باشد که بگویم نیگل مایه ی دشوار بودن مسئله ی ذهن و بدن می داند.
آگاهی به بیان نیگل همان کیفیت است، همان کیفیات ذهنی، منظور از کیفیات ذهنی این است که بطور مثال لذت از خوردن هر غذایی در من حسی را ایجاد میکنه که آن حس درونی یا حالت درونی کیفیت ذهنی آن غذاست، یا کیفیت درد، خارش، خواب یا هرچیز دیگر.
از نظر نیگل تمام حیوانات هم این کیفیات ذهنی را دارا هستند، البته در مورد رسته ریز حیواناتی مانند آمیب ها با قطعیت نمی توان سخن گفت ولی در مورد حیوانات دیگر از آنجا که قبول داریم کشتن آنها یا بررسی آنها به صورت آزمایشی اخلاقی نیست پس باید قبول داشته باشیم که آنها هم کیفیات ذهنی ای چون درد را تجربه میکنند!
نیگل خفاش را دارای مشترکاتی با انسان میداند و از آنجا که تجربه را همان کیفیت یا آگاهی تلقی می کند و معتقد است که حیوانات نیز تجربه دارند، پس میگوید که ما باور داریم که خفاش ها تجربه دارند، و در بسیاری حس ها با ما مشترک هستند، اما زمانی که ما بخواهیم خود را بجای یک خفاش بگذاریم تا بفهمیم خفاش بودن چه کیفیتی دارد از آنجا که بنا به تخیل تجربیات خودمان را به خفاش نسبت میدهیم و کیفیات خودمان را با خفاش خلط میکنیم بین بر این تنها چیزی که به دست می آوریم این است که بدانیم خفاش بودن برای "ما" چه کیفیتی دارد در حالیکه ما به دنبال به دریافتن این کیفیت برای خفاش بودیم، یعنی خفاش بودن برای خفاش چه کیفیتی دارد.
نیگل معتقد است ما نمیتوانیم از منظر سوم شخص به دریافت کیفیات منظر اول شخص بپردازیم و همانطور که یک مریخی که دارای کیفیاتی متفاوت از ماست نمیتواند داشتن کیفیت (آگاهی) را در ما رد کند ما نیز نمیتوانیم منکر کیفیت در خفاش شویم، بلکه تنها نمیتوانیم به درکی صحیح از آن نائل آییم.
البته نیگل دریافت کیفیت را در یک نوع ( انسانی،حیوانی) را از منظر سوم شخص به منظر اول شخص را ممکن می داند. مثلا انسان دیگری بفهمد که کیفیتی در ذهن من چگونه است.
بطور کلی نیگل در مقاله ی خفاش بودن به چه می ماند؟ یا خفاش بودن چه کیفیتی دارد؟ ابراز می دارد که هیگاه نخواهیم توانست فهمید که خفاش بودن چه کیفیت ذهنی ای داراست.
البته او امیدوار است که در آینده اگر به سوالاتی پاسخ داده شود این مسئله ی آگاهی نیز حل شود.
نقل از بلاگ فلسفه علم استاد علی جعفری*
مولوی هم در شعر مارگیر و اژدها از زبان موجودات و جمادات دیگر خطاب به انسان گفته
ما سمیعیم و بصیریم و هشیم
با شما نامحرمان ما خامشیم
مطالعه بیشتر
http://vista.ir/article/277251/%22%D8...
July 22, 2025
Possibly the most famous 20th-century essay on Philosophy of mind
If you're a neuroscientist, you are sure to be told by some of your colleagues that "consciousness [always spoken in a tone of awe] is the most important problem in neuroscience". Or perhaps "the only important problem". If you hear a neuroscientist say this, then you know immediately that he/she is not an original thinker. (To my neuroscientist colleagues -- I apologize if I have wounded you. But it is best that you know the truth about yourself.) Neuroscientists are not alone in making pretentious and totally unsupported claims about consciousness. Philosophers do it, too!
I first read What is it like to be a Bat?, probably around the year 1981, in The Mind’s I: by Douglas R. Hofstadter. I was recently reminded of it by the science fiction novels Children of Time and Children of Ruin. That provoked me to pick up What is it like to be a Bat? again.
I have a recurring problem when I read philosophy. Most books by philosophers begin with the author describing the work of past philosophers and explaining what is wrong with them. This part of the book is usually very convincing. Then the author expounds his/her own views, and it all falls apart. The only thing that philosophers can do consistently and convincingly is tell you why philosophers are wrong. It is hard to avoid the impression that most philosophers are wrong most of the time.
That is exactly what it was like reading Wie ist es, eine Fledermaus zu sein?. I'm not going to go into detail about why I think almost every important thing Thomas Nagel has to say about consciousness is wrong, because Daniel Dennett has, in my view (obviously, Nagel would not agree), done an excellent job of demolishing Nagel's arguments (Consciousness Explained).
The far more interesting question is this: was Adrian Tchaikovsky inspired by Nagel and Dennett's argument? Consciousness Explained contains these words
Blog review.
If you're a neuroscientist, you are sure to be told by some of your colleagues that "consciousness [always spoken in a tone of awe] is the most important problem in neuroscience". Or perhaps "the only important problem". If you hear a neuroscientist say this, then you know immediately that he/she is not an original thinker. (To my neuroscientist colleagues -- I apologize if I have wounded you. But it is best that you know the truth about yourself.) Neuroscientists are not alone in making pretentious and totally unsupported claims about consciousness. Philosophers do it, too!
I first read What is it like to be a Bat?, probably around the year 1981, in The Mind’s I: by Douglas R. Hofstadter. I was recently reminded of it by the science fiction novels Children of Time and Children of Ruin. That provoked me to pick up What is it like to be a Bat? again.
I have a recurring problem when I read philosophy. Most books by philosophers begin with the author describing the work of past philosophers and explaining what is wrong with them. This part of the book is usually very convincing. Then the author expounds his/her own views, and it all falls apart. The only thing that philosophers can do consistently and convincingly is tell you why philosophers are wrong. It is hard to avoid the impression that most philosophers are wrong most of the time.
That is exactly what it was like reading Wie ist es, eine Fledermaus zu sein?. I'm not going to go into detail about why I think almost every important thing Thomas Nagel has to say about consciousness is wrong, because Daniel Dennett has, in my view (obviously, Nagel would not agree), done an excellent job of demolishing Nagel's arguments (Consciousness Explained).
The far more interesting question is this: was Adrian Tchaikovsky inspired by Nagel and Dennett's argument? Consciousness Explained contains these words
Nagel chose his target creatures well. Bats, as fellow mammals, are enough like us to support the conviction that of course they are conscious. (If he had written “What Is It Like to Be a Spider?” many would be inclined to wonder what made him so sure it was like anything at all.)Was Tchaikovsky's novel about intelligent spiders inspired by this?
Blog review.
October 28, 2024
Fascinating, important and quite readable (though not necessarily easy - I definitely needed to stop at some paragraphs, though that may be due to unfamiliarity. Paying attention to the footnotes is in any case recommended.) "The Psychophysical Nexus" (supplementary to the 50th Anniversary OUP edition) is somewhat elusive, but interesting in its attempt at proposing a new methodology/conceptualization in pursuit of bridging the mind-body division ('a theory of an expanded natural order'.) Although its project may be unreachable. In particular:
If consciousness proves to be, as is plausible, an emergent phenomenon, one struggles to conceptualize any type of micro-object which tells us anything about the whole. As much as this is a scathing counter-argument to the reductionist approach, I can't unsee Nagel's suggestion as implicitly trusting in the fundamental logic of reductionism. (Nagel concludes that the new theory must invariably go beyond, perhaps sideways of, our concepts of physical and mental. An unconceived-as-yet edifice may indeed surpass the problem in some unbegotten future: the trouble with it is that nothing may be said about it, in the as-yet-begotten now.)
"What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" raises several arguments which may be incidental or tangential to it main core, but which I personally find of great interest. One is of the apparent impossibility of complete understanding of another's subjective experience. Epistemic knowledge bashes up against not merely the subjectivity of bats, or of some distant inhabitor of Alpha Centauri. In interpersonal relationships and political discourse, it is common to deny the validity of one's experience of the self. A practical challenge to solving the mind-body problem may well be that often, we do not want to acknowledge other minds as such: it is tempting for the empiricism-committed technocrats to deny subjectivities, to regard dogs as unfeeling automata as Descartes (infamously, gruesomely) did, to plug monkey brains with electrodes. As Nagel himself point out, at the time "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" was first published, in the 1970s, natural scientists and broader culture was extremely reluctant to acknowledge the possibility of animals other than humans.
In a sense, the denial of the 'irreducible subjectivity of consciousness' poses not only a problem for any psycho-physical explanation which seeks to both be accurate and escape dualism, but a profound social and political problem. I can't help but think of how often my capacity for empathy the belief of unknowable, yet true inner complexity of the other. (Thorough philosophical argumentation on my side might be tricky, but I do pragmatically believe in that capacity being essential to liberal-democratic discourse, if such be possible at all. (It is certainly desirable.))
Another point of Nagel's, which is mwah 👌👌👌:
This is the most astute formulation of the trouble of incomplete natural understanding. Science divorced from empiricism, if you will, and so, stripped to the (supposed immutable) fact without the method, it becomes a fetish object. In modern popular discourse, the Enlightenment is just another Glorious Past to appeal to in argument. Memorably, in a lecture at the IWM Vienna, historian Timothy Snyder related the reoccurring attitudes of postmodernity (particularly the richest among us) as fundamentally pagan, irrational, pre-modern; we are, in his words, a society of the "digital oracle". Science™ as a mysticism is something for Nerds™ (as an auto-brand, thus conveniently commodifiable) to reach for a sense of superiority. Science™ a quack uses talk of quantum mechanics to convince of (sell) you everything from healing crystals to universalizing conspiracy theories about the reborn Thoth fathering a race of superhumans.
An analysis in terms of microscopic components, however strange and sophisticated its form, must in some way preserve these external relations of the properties of the manifest object.
If consciousness proves to be, as is plausible, an emergent phenomenon, one struggles to conceptualize any type of micro-object which tells us anything about the whole. As much as this is a scathing counter-argument to the reductionist approach, I can't unsee Nagel's suggestion as implicitly trusting in the fundamental logic of reductionism. (Nagel concludes that the new theory must invariably go beyond, perhaps sideways of, our concepts of physical and mental. An unconceived-as-yet edifice may indeed surpass the problem in some unbegotten future: the trouble with it is that nothing may be said about it, in the as-yet-begotten now.)
"What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" raises several arguments which may be incidental or tangential to it main core, but which I personally find of great interest. One is of the apparent impossibility of complete understanding of another's subjective experience. Epistemic knowledge bashes up against not merely the subjectivity of bats, or of some distant inhabitor of Alpha Centauri. In interpersonal relationships and political discourse, it is common to deny the validity of one's experience of the self. A practical challenge to solving the mind-body problem may well be that often, we do not want to acknowledge other minds as such: it is tempting for the empiricism-committed technocrats to deny subjectivities, to regard dogs as unfeeling automata as Descartes (infamously, gruesomely) did, to plug monkey brains with electrodes. As Nagel himself point out, at the time "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" was first published, in the 1970s, natural scientists and broader culture was extremely reluctant to acknowledge the possibility of animals other than humans.
In a sense, the denial of the 'irreducible subjectivity of consciousness' poses not only a problem for any psycho-physical explanation which seeks to both be accurate and escape dualism, but a profound social and political problem. I can't help but think of how often my capacity for empathy the belief of unknowable, yet true inner complexity of the other. (Thorough philosophical argumentation on my side might be tricky, but I do pragmatically believe in that capacity being essential to liberal-democratic discourse, if such be possible at all. (It is certainly desirable.))
Another point of Nagel's, which is mwah 👌👌👌:
...[T]his apparent clarity of the word "is" is deceptive. Usually, when we are told that X is Y we know how it is supposed to be true, but that depends on a conceptual or theoretical background [...] Without the framework, an air of mysticism surrounds the identification.
This explains the magical flavour of popular presentations of fundamental scientific discoveries, given out as propositions to which one must subscribe without really understanding them. For example, people are now told at an early age that all matter is really energy. But the spite that they know what "is" means, most of them never form a conception of what makes this claim true, because they lack the theoretical background.
{Emphasis in bold mine.}
This is the most astute formulation of the trouble of incomplete natural understanding. Science divorced from empiricism, if you will, and so, stripped to the (supposed immutable) fact without the method, it becomes a fetish object. In modern popular discourse, the Enlightenment is just another Glorious Past to appeal to in argument. Memorably, in a lecture at the IWM Vienna, historian Timothy Snyder related the reoccurring attitudes of postmodernity (particularly the richest among us) as fundamentally pagan, irrational, pre-modern; we are, in his words, a society of the "digital oracle". Science™ as a mysticism is something for Nerds™ (as an auto-brand, thus conveniently commodifiable) to reach for a sense of superiority. Science™ a quack uses talk of quantum mechanics to convince of (sell) you everything from healing crystals to universalizing conspiracy theories about the reborn Thoth fathering a race of superhumans.
January 28, 2018
Empathy and What It's Like to Be a Bat
You could make a meal of a moth, hang upside down and sleep, flap your arms and try to fly, and close your eyes and navigate by sound; but you will never, never really know what it’s like to be a bat.
For starters, even if you were able to choke down a moth and fall asleep while hanging upside down, I don’t think you’ll succeed in flying, and; if you navigated by sound, it would be the sound of you crashing into things. But, even if you could, you still would not know what it’s like to be a bat. The best you could do is know what it’s like for a human to be a bat. That’s not even close to the same thing.
You might think you know something about flying if you’ve ever been in an airplane; but, in reality, you didn’t fly as a bat flies, you were shot through the air by a machine while sitting in a metal tube.
You might think you know something about navigating by sound if you’re a sonar operator; but, you’re not navigating by sound, a machine is doing it for you. That’s very different than being born with the capability and doing it naturally.
What it’s like to be a bat was the subject of an important essay by philosopher, Thomas Nagel. He was interested in refuting reductionism, the philosophical position that a complex system is nothing more than the sum of its parts. We find reductionism all the time, when people say that a thought or a feeling is nothing more than a bunch of nerves firing in the brain. To the neurologist, it may be; but to the person possessing the brain, the experience of, say, smelling a flower is far greater than can be expressed in a chemical equation or a chart of the regions of the brain that had been involved.
When I read Nagel’s essay, I wasn’t so interested in bats, or in reductionism. The essay got me to thinking about empathy. I was interested in knowing what it’s like to be my last client, who wasn’t a bat.
The client was a young woman, anxious about her new job, and worried that she’d never find anyone who would love her. This person’s experience is not entirely foreign to me. I was young once, although I’m not young now. I know what it’s like to start a new job, and I’ve had my days when I thought I’d always be alone. However, I am not, nor have I ever been a woman; but I can imagine it. I’ve heard enough women talk about how things are for them, that I can put myself in their place and extrapolate what it would be like for me.
I could employ my mirror neurons while talking to this young woman. That might give me some insight into her experience. Employing mirror neurons works like this. You look at the expression on the face of the person you’re talking to and mold your own face to match that expression. Then your own face makes you feel what the other person is feeling. As strange as these operations sound, psychologists say we do it all the time, unconsciously, as a way of connecting with the emotions of others.
The term we have for all these procedures of understanding the experience of another is empathy. We counselors are instructed to use empathy in our counseling, but Nagel’s essay has got me wondering what empathy is, or if it’s even possible.
The Oxford English Dictionary defines empathy as the ability to understand and share the feelings of another. To the extent that I’m able to empathize with this young woman, it’s because I thumb through my files and pull out a version of myself that is young again, new to my job, and lonely.
That’s not enough, though. I also have to construct a version of myself that is female, according to the specifications of femininity I have heard. Even that’s not enough, for this person is a millennial, while I’m of the boomer generation. Millennials differ from boomers to a small degree in ways we scarcely know. She has a whole history that is different from mine. We had different parents, read different books, have been to different places, etc. Strictly speaking, I can never know exactly what it’s like to be her; I can only know what it would be like for me to imagine I’m her.
With her, at least, I can check out my perceptions, which I can’t do with a bat. I can say, for instance, “You must be scared about the future.” That’s how I would feel if I were her. If she says, “Yes, I’m scared,” I might think I’ve got it right, but is my scared the same experience as her scared?
Let’s say I go ahead on the assumption that she’s scared in the same way I would be scared if I were her. I might set about to try to reassure her that everything is going to be OK because that’s what I would want to hear if I were her. Well, who am I treating here, me or her? I’m treating a fictionalized version of me that’s representing her. Not only could I be not giving her what she needs, but anything I say about her, really tells you more about me.
I’m convinced that these difficulties would be present even if this client was just like me. Even if he were a clone of me, the moment our two parts were created, our inner experiences would be different, and I would have no way of knowing whether I correctly understood his inner life.
To sum it all up: true, accurate empathy is impossible. There’s no way of knowing what it’s like to be another person, much less a bat. Still, it’s better when we try to be empathetic than when we don’t try. At least that brings us closer to getting it right.
You may feel very isolated, hearing that empathy is impossible, I wouldn’t know for sure. But, I think empathy being impossible is what makes your point of view so precious. No one has another point of view just like it. It’s the reason you are deserving of respect.
Keith Wilson writes about the intersection of psychotherapy and philosophy in his blog,The Reflective Eclectic
You could make a meal of a moth, hang upside down and sleep, flap your arms and try to fly, and close your eyes and navigate by sound; but you will never, never really know what it’s like to be a bat.
For starters, even if you were able to choke down a moth and fall asleep while hanging upside down, I don’t think you’ll succeed in flying, and; if you navigated by sound, it would be the sound of you crashing into things. But, even if you could, you still would not know what it’s like to be a bat. The best you could do is know what it’s like for a human to be a bat. That’s not even close to the same thing.
You might think you know something about flying if you’ve ever been in an airplane; but, in reality, you didn’t fly as a bat flies, you were shot through the air by a machine while sitting in a metal tube.
You might think you know something about navigating by sound if you’re a sonar operator; but, you’re not navigating by sound, a machine is doing it for you. That’s very different than being born with the capability and doing it naturally.
What it’s like to be a bat was the subject of an important essay by philosopher, Thomas Nagel. He was interested in refuting reductionism, the philosophical position that a complex system is nothing more than the sum of its parts. We find reductionism all the time, when people say that a thought or a feeling is nothing more than a bunch of nerves firing in the brain. To the neurologist, it may be; but to the person possessing the brain, the experience of, say, smelling a flower is far greater than can be expressed in a chemical equation or a chart of the regions of the brain that had been involved.
When I read Nagel’s essay, I wasn’t so interested in bats, or in reductionism. The essay got me to thinking about empathy. I was interested in knowing what it’s like to be my last client, who wasn’t a bat.
The client was a young woman, anxious about her new job, and worried that she’d never find anyone who would love her. This person’s experience is not entirely foreign to me. I was young once, although I’m not young now. I know what it’s like to start a new job, and I’ve had my days when I thought I’d always be alone. However, I am not, nor have I ever been a woman; but I can imagine it. I’ve heard enough women talk about how things are for them, that I can put myself in their place and extrapolate what it would be like for me.
I could employ my mirror neurons while talking to this young woman. That might give me some insight into her experience. Employing mirror neurons works like this. You look at the expression on the face of the person you’re talking to and mold your own face to match that expression. Then your own face makes you feel what the other person is feeling. As strange as these operations sound, psychologists say we do it all the time, unconsciously, as a way of connecting with the emotions of others.
The term we have for all these procedures of understanding the experience of another is empathy. We counselors are instructed to use empathy in our counseling, but Nagel’s essay has got me wondering what empathy is, or if it’s even possible.
The Oxford English Dictionary defines empathy as the ability to understand and share the feelings of another. To the extent that I’m able to empathize with this young woman, it’s because I thumb through my files and pull out a version of myself that is young again, new to my job, and lonely.
That’s not enough, though. I also have to construct a version of myself that is female, according to the specifications of femininity I have heard. Even that’s not enough, for this person is a millennial, while I’m of the boomer generation. Millennials differ from boomers to a small degree in ways we scarcely know. She has a whole history that is different from mine. We had different parents, read different books, have been to different places, etc. Strictly speaking, I can never know exactly what it’s like to be her; I can only know what it would be like for me to imagine I’m her.
With her, at least, I can check out my perceptions, which I can’t do with a bat. I can say, for instance, “You must be scared about the future.” That’s how I would feel if I were her. If she says, “Yes, I’m scared,” I might think I’ve got it right, but is my scared the same experience as her scared?
Let’s say I go ahead on the assumption that she’s scared in the same way I would be scared if I were her. I might set about to try to reassure her that everything is going to be OK because that’s what I would want to hear if I were her. Well, who am I treating here, me or her? I’m treating a fictionalized version of me that’s representing her. Not only could I be not giving her what she needs, but anything I say about her, really tells you more about me.
I’m convinced that these difficulties would be present even if this client was just like me. Even if he were a clone of me, the moment our two parts were created, our inner experiences would be different, and I would have no way of knowing whether I correctly understood his inner life.
To sum it all up: true, accurate empathy is impossible. There’s no way of knowing what it’s like to be another person, much less a bat. Still, it’s better when we try to be empathetic than when we don’t try. At least that brings us closer to getting it right.
You may feel very isolated, hearing that empathy is impossible, I wouldn’t know for sure. But, I think empathy being impossible is what makes your point of view so precious. No one has another point of view just like it. It’s the reason you are deserving of respect.
Keith Wilson writes about the intersection of psychotherapy and philosophy in his blog,The Reflective Eclectic
May 6, 2020
On the impossibility of objectivism(at least till now).
Read
September 15, 202517 pagina's later en ik weet nog steeds niet hoe het is om een vleermuis te zijn
August 17, 2025
I'd say I understood about 40% of this (due to listening to the audiobook; no time to pause and think!) but it was fascinating and prompted some great reflections.
I also found his follow-up paper on a defense of monism very helpful as the 1974 paper reads as VERY Cartesian!
I also found his follow-up paper on a defense of monism very helpful as the 1974 paper reads as VERY Cartesian!
December 12, 2024
Questo breve saggio filosofico fa da corollario al testo "Mente e cosmo" dello stesso autore.
Nagel parte dal presupposto che ogni organismo cosciente abbia un punto di vista soggettivo unico. La domanda centrale del saggio – "Cosa si prova ad essere un pipistrello?" – viene scelta perché i pipistrelli hanno un'esperienza del mondo completamente diversa dalla nostra. Per esempio, percepiscono l'ambiente circostante tramite l'ecolocazione, un senso a noi estraneo. Nagel sostiene che, anche con tutta la conoscenza scientifica del mondo, non possiamo realmente sapere cosa si prova ad essere un pipistrello, perché questa esperienza è completamente radicata nella soggettività di quell'organismo.
Nagel distingue tra la prospettiva oggettiva (quella che può essere studiata dalla scienza) e la prospettiva soggettiva (che è accessibile solo a chi vive l’esperienza). Secondo lui, la coscienza non può essere ridotta a una serie di dati oggettivi, perché è intrinsecamente legata al punto di vista dell’individuo.
La scienza moderna cerca di spiegare la mente in termini fisici e oggettivi (fisica, biologia, chimica), ma Nagel sostiene che questo approccio non può cogliere la natura essenziale della coscienza. Per esempio, possiamo studiare i neuroni del pipistrello e comprendere come funziona l'ecolocazione, ma non possiamo mai sapere cosa si prova a usare quel sistema.
Questa intuizione mette in evidenza un limite fondamentale del riduzionismo scientifico: la coscienza non può essere pienamente spiegata dai soli dati fisici. È un’idea che risuona ancora oggi in un mondo sempre più dominato dalle neuroscienze e dall’intelligenza artificiale.
In definitiva non possiamo mai realmente provare cosa si sente a essere un altro essere vivente, perché la coscienza è intrinsecamente soggettiva. La soggettività di un'esperienza è legata al punto di vista unico e irripetibile di chi la vive, ed è qualcosa che non può essere trasferito o tradotto completamente in termini oggettivi.
Forse un giorno la scienza riuscirà a fornirci gli strumenti necessari.
Un esempio sono i "qualia" contenuti soggettivi dell'esperienza, come il "rosso" di una mela o il sapore del cioccolato. Tuttavia anche se descrivessimo scientificamente i qualia di un altro essere vivente, non potremmo mai viverli come lui. Il pipistrello, ad esempio, percepisce "eco" in modo che per noi è inconcepibile: possiamo sapere che succede, ma non come si sente.
Alcuni filosofi e scienziati immaginano che un giorno potremmo replicare esperienze altrui attraverso una sorta di "interfaccia cerebrale", trasferendo informazioni sensoriali o percettive. Tuttavia, anche in questo caso, vivremmo quell’esperienza come esseri umani che la interpretano nel loro contesto umano, non come un autentico "trasferimento" nella coscienza dell'altro.
Nagel parte dal presupposto che ogni organismo cosciente abbia un punto di vista soggettivo unico. La domanda centrale del saggio – "Cosa si prova ad essere un pipistrello?" – viene scelta perché i pipistrelli hanno un'esperienza del mondo completamente diversa dalla nostra. Per esempio, percepiscono l'ambiente circostante tramite l'ecolocazione, un senso a noi estraneo. Nagel sostiene che, anche con tutta la conoscenza scientifica del mondo, non possiamo realmente sapere cosa si prova ad essere un pipistrello, perché questa esperienza è completamente radicata nella soggettività di quell'organismo.
Anche nel caso degli altri, sapere cosa si provi ad essere loro è sempre solo parziale, e muovendosi verso specie molto distanti dalla propria, un grado sempre minore di comprensione parziale è forse comunque ancora possibile. L'immaginazione è sorprendentemente elastica. Tuttavia, il mio punto non è che non possiamo sapere cosa si provi ad essere un pipistrello. Non voglio sollevare questo problema epistemologico. Piuttosto, il problema è che anche solo per formarsi un'idea di cosa si provi ad essere un pipistrello (e a maggior ragione per sapere cosa si provi) è indispensabile assumere il punto di vista del pipistrello. Se si è in grado di assumere tale punto di vista solo approssimativamente, o parzialmente, il concetto che ne deriverà sarà anch'esso inevitabilmente approssimativo o parziale. Almeno così sembra, secondo lo stato attuale delle nostre conoscenze.
Nagel distingue tra la prospettiva oggettiva (quella che può essere studiata dalla scienza) e la prospettiva soggettiva (che è accessibile solo a chi vive l’esperienza). Secondo lui, la coscienza non può essere ridotta a una serie di dati oggettivi, perché è intrinsecamente legata al punto di vista dell’individuo.
La scienza moderna cerca di spiegare la mente in termini fisici e oggettivi (fisica, biologia, chimica), ma Nagel sostiene che questo approccio non può cogliere la natura essenziale della coscienza. Per esempio, possiamo studiare i neuroni del pipistrello e comprendere come funziona l'ecolocazione, ma non possiamo mai sapere cosa si prova a usare quel sistema.
Questa intuizione mette in evidenza un limite fondamentale del riduzionismo scientifico: la coscienza non può essere pienamente spiegata dai soli dati fisici. È un’idea che risuona ancora oggi in un mondo sempre più dominato dalle neuroscienze e dall’intelligenza artificiale.
In definitiva non possiamo mai realmente provare cosa si sente a essere un altro essere vivente, perché la coscienza è intrinsecamente soggettiva. La soggettività di un'esperienza è legata al punto di vista unico e irripetibile di chi la vive, ed è qualcosa che non può essere trasferito o tradotto completamente in termini oggettivi.
Forse un giorno la scienza riuscirà a fornirci gli strumenti necessari.
Un esempio sono i "qualia" contenuti soggettivi dell'esperienza, come il "rosso" di una mela o il sapore del cioccolato. Tuttavia anche se descrivessimo scientificamente i qualia di un altro essere vivente, non potremmo mai viverli come lui. Il pipistrello, ad esempio, percepisce "eco" in modo che per noi è inconcepibile: possiamo sapere che succede, ma non come si sente.
Alcuni filosofi e scienziati immaginano che un giorno potremmo replicare esperienze altrui attraverso una sorta di "interfaccia cerebrale", trasferendo informazioni sensoriali o percettive. Tuttavia, anche in questo caso, vivremmo quell’esperienza come esseri umani che la interpretano nel loro contesto umano, non come un autentico "trasferimento" nella coscienza dell'altro.
August 22, 2017
Un eseu scurt, dar interesant asupra subiectivitatii și a problemei minte - corp. Thomas Nagel susține ca teoriile științifice existente sunt reductioniste și nu reușesc sa explice fenomenul subiectivitatii sau "cum este sa fii ca". Neîndoielnic ca neurostiinta explica procesele fiziologice care exista în creier, însă nu acoperă o componenta importanta a conștiinței : punctele de vedere pe care îl au ființele asupra lumii. Ca de exemplu, modul cum percep oamenii lumea în opoziție cu cum îl percep liliecii. Aici, însă nu este vorba numai de percepție, ci de întregul sentiment "de a fi ca un liliac" sau a "a fi ca un om".
Personal mi s-a părut interesantă observația lui Nagel care arata ca, pentru a cunoaște lumea exterioara, e nevoie de o atitudine cât mai detașata, de a te depărta de specific și de a te apropia de general. Pe când, pentru cunoașterea subiectiva nu poți face asta, pentru ca a te detașa presupune îndepărtarea de cunoașterea subiectivitatii și nu aprofundarea ei. Ceea ce arata, într-adevăr, ca cunoașterea științifica e diferita de cunoașterea interioara. Asta ma face sa înțeleg, în plus, bazele fenomenologiei și ceea ce probabil încearcă ea să facă.
Personal mi s-a părut interesantă observația lui Nagel care arata ca, pentru a cunoaște lumea exterioara, e nevoie de o atitudine cât mai detașata, de a te depărta de specific și de a te apropia de general. Pe când, pentru cunoașterea subiectiva nu poți face asta, pentru ca a te detașa presupune îndepărtarea de cunoașterea subiectivitatii și nu aprofundarea ei. Ceea ce arata, într-adevăr, ca cunoașterea științifica e diferita de cunoașterea interioara. Asta ma face sa înțeleg, în plus, bazele fenomenologiei și ceea ce probabil încearcă ea să facă.
March 16, 2021
thought I'd actually learn what it is like to be a bat. not informative at all. disappointed! hardly any bat facts
November 7, 2022
I was stimulated to read this famous essay after reading Ed Yong's fine book "An Immense World" about animal senses and how they differ from each other and from human senses. Mr. Nagel takes the position that all animals with consciousness have a sense of what it is like to be themselves, but that this sense of what it is like to be oneself cannot be carried over from one species to another. I'm not so sure that he is right. First I'd probably dispute that consciousness is a real thing or that my having a sense of what it is like to be me has any reality. It's just a convenient evolutionary concept that natural selection has created as a way to help my genes perpetuate themselves, an illusion in the great sea of samsara. But let's put that aside and accept the assumption that there are beings with consciousness that have a sense of what it is like to be themselves. It's the Heideggerian concept of Dasein generously extended to any creature with a central nervous system. Is it true that I can't really get inside the heads of other species? I'm not so sure. On one level it is possible to pose the question in a way that makes the answer trivial. I can no more know what it is like to be Thomas Nagel than I can know what it is like to be a bat. The premise that Mr. Nagel made us assume is that we are all distinct conscious beings. If that's true, then by definition we can't ever know what it is like to be anything other than ourselves. But Mr. Nagel asserts a principle that goes beyond that. He claims that where there is sufficient similarity between observers, as in the case of two individuals of the same species, there is enough similarity of perception of the world that we can have a sense of what it is like to be each other, but he says that this doesn't work in a cross-species context or at least not when the species are as different as humans and bats. I can't hold Mr. Nagel responsible for not knowing the next 50 years of scientific discoveries after he wrote this in 1974, but I can hold him responsible for lacking imagination. Let's say I could put on a high quality VR headset that took me into the virtual world of the bat. And this display will have a haptic component that will stimulate muscles in my back to feel like flapping bat wings, and it will have electrodes that will stimulate places in my brain analogous to the places where bats process echolocation signals, and so on. It's not so far from what we can already do today. If I could spend a few nights flying about in a virtual bat world gobbling virtual bugs that I found with my simulated echolocation, I think that I'd begin to have a pretty good feel for what it is like to be a bat. The subjective experience would begin to develop out of the objective components of the simulation. Of course I'd never get to true "batness" because of all of the many years I spent as a human before donning the simulation gear and because unlike a real bat I would be going back to the world of humans once the simulation was over, but I think that with this sort of gear, I could get almost as close to knowing what it would be like to be a bat as without gear I could know what it is like to be Thomas Nagel or some other human. Mr. Nagel as a trained philosopher could probably rip my arguments apart, but he'll need to do a better job for me than he did here to convince me that it is truly epistomologically impossible to know what it is like to be a bat if I am aided by a combination of science, technology, experience over time, imagination and a good dose of empathy.
May 11, 2021
I’m still getting through some literature associated with consciousness being the state of having subjective experience so my opinions may well be subject to change as I think more on this. For now it is unclear how this work impacts some of my implicit assumptions. I’m still wrangling with the notion of perception being seperate from the experience of perception.
I fear if this is a valid definition of consciousness then what I have been referring to with that term is something else and consciousness itself isn’t all that interesting to me (I hope this is not true). When people tell me they are interested in consciousness I often ask if they are referring to the state of not being in a coma or the state of being self-aware/self-reflective and, historically, I have been biased only to take interest when they are orientated towards the latter. If there is nothing extra within human consciousness then why should I be a psychologist and not a zoologist?
N.B: I may in the future eat my words, we will see.
At face value this definition seems to be founded in and constrained by the human capacity for theory of mind. I wish Nagel had access to the term ‘theory of mind’ when he wrote this as it would have been much more succinct (this is not a criticism of the author, just a natural component of reading dated literature).
Nagel also uses what I considered to be superfluously long and numerous analogies, but again, almost 50 years has passed since this was published.
The issues he raises about the distinction between objective and subjective explanations and the methodological/explanatory limitations associated with each is something I agree with and found very prevalent my studies of religion.
I look forward to reading more on this conception of consciousness.
I fear if this is a valid definition of consciousness then what I have been referring to with that term is something else and consciousness itself isn’t all that interesting to me (I hope this is not true). When people tell me they are interested in consciousness I often ask if they are referring to the state of not being in a coma or the state of being self-aware/self-reflective and, historically, I have been biased only to take interest when they are orientated towards the latter. If there is nothing extra within human consciousness then why should I be a psychologist and not a zoologist?
N.B: I may in the future eat my words, we will see.
At face value this definition seems to be founded in and constrained by the human capacity for theory of mind. I wish Nagel had access to the term ‘theory of mind’ when he wrote this as it would have been much more succinct (this is not a criticism of the author, just a natural component of reading dated literature).
Nagel also uses what I considered to be superfluously long and numerous analogies, but again, almost 50 years has passed since this was published.
The issues he raises about the distinction between objective and subjective explanations and the methodological/explanatory limitations associated with each is something I agree with and found very prevalent my studies of religion.
I look forward to reading more on this conception of consciousness.
March 20, 2017
Ahora todo tiene más sentido en mi vida :O Chapó.
May 18, 2025
Love all of what I have read of the man so far, this is no different. Like his take on the impossibility(?) to be objective about phenomena which are subjective by default.
February 12, 2018
I 'll leave my former review for shame reasons. Now that I know more about the subject, the question I was asking seems a little stupid. There are many strains of physicalism, with some of them just denying that mental events exist. This line of thought still kind of survives with Dennett. Others accept that mental events exist but they believe that all are reducible to physical properties. What Nagel showed in this very influential paper, in an era that physicalism was dominating the field, was that explaining mental properties and consciousness in particular is a problem of its own, focusing on the subjective/objective dichotomy.
At first I thought it was outdated, but after I started reading his "A view from nowhere" I think that he either failed to make his point clearly or I failed to grasp it. He was attacking reductionism but he kept naming it physicalism and it was hard to understand if his problem was the claim that we can understand the mental properties of others or the claim that mental properties do not exist. From the other book I got that he supports a dual aspect theory so I assume that his problem is the claim that subjective viewpoints can be reduced to objective psychophysical facts and the attack on physicalism was a reaction to that era's philosophers of mind. I am still not sure though.
At first I thought it was outdated, but after I started reading his "A view from nowhere" I think that he either failed to make his point clearly or I failed to grasp it. He was attacking reductionism but he kept naming it physicalism and it was hard to understand if his problem was the claim that we can understand the mental properties of others or the claim that mental properties do not exist. From the other book I got that he supports a dual aspect theory so I assume that his problem is the claim that subjective viewpoints can be reduced to objective psychophysical facts and the attack on physicalism was a reaction to that era's philosophers of mind. I am still not sure though.
February 18, 2020
ok a wild ride of an essay that made me question the logical limits to human empathy and communication, yet taught me absolutely nothing about what it is like to be a bat. still, five stars for the existential crisis. thank you nagel.
February 16, 2022
This is an incredible article about the limits of human knowledge, the limits of the project of science, and the edges of epistemology. Subjectivity is a unique fountain of knowledge.
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February 24, 2025bro spent 17 pages to just say "idk dawg"
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May 26, 2024Embarrassing that it took until now for me to read this. God this "hard problem of consciousness" stuff is exhausting. I feel like Nagel's argument also begs the question, in that he uses intractibility of bat-ness to conclude that the hard problem exists...but the claim that we cannot understand what it is like to be a bat (sorry, spoiler) depends on the existence of the hard problem in the first place! Lowkey made me more materialist.
Jaques et al. (2018) found that when equipped with a "social influence" function, reinforcement learning agents collaborating on a sort of game-theoretical puzzle began to demonstrate patterns of movement that signaled to other agents where rewards were located, like bees and their waggle dance. This is, first of all, kind of scary, but also suggests to me that similarly complex phenomena like consciousness could plausibly be emergent properties of simple brain components, neurons or whatever, and not all that transcendental.
Jaques et al. (2018) found that when equipped with a "social influence" function, reinforcement learning agents collaborating on a sort of game-theoretical puzzle began to demonstrate patterns of movement that signaled to other agents where rewards were located, like bees and their waggle dance. This is, first of all, kind of scary, but also suggests to me that similarly complex phenomena like consciousness could plausibly be emergent properties of simple brain components, neurons or whatever, and not all that transcendental.
May 27, 2025
In What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, Thomas Nagel highlights the difficulty of bridging the gap between our subjective mental experience and the physical reality that seems to underpin it — a tension known as the mind-body problem.
One idea that stayed with me is how limited our language is when it comes to describing subjective experience. Even if we developed more sophisticated tools, Nagel argues, it may still be impossible to fully grasp what it is like to be another being — whether human or non-human. I found this persuasive, and I agree that science, while powerful, may never fully bridge that gap. A purely physicalist explanation of consciousness, then, would remain incomplete.
I would recommend this essay to anyone interested in the philosophy of mind, especially those exploring the limits of objectivity in understanding consciousness.
One idea that stayed with me is how limited our language is when it comes to describing subjective experience. Even if we developed more sophisticated tools, Nagel argues, it may still be impossible to fully grasp what it is like to be another being — whether human or non-human. I found this persuasive, and I agree that science, while powerful, may never fully bridge that gap. A purely physicalist explanation of consciousness, then, would remain incomplete.
I would recommend this essay to anyone interested in the philosophy of mind, especially those exploring the limits of objectivity in understanding consciousness.
July 8, 2021
Although the question of mind-body dichotomy is as open as it ever was, this paper - simple, and accessible to a layman - expounds why the mental problem is far from a successful reductionist explanation, i.e., the assertion that everything that goes on in the subjective realm of the mind is somehow explainable by the physical mechanisms in the brain. This gap in current understanding of Consciousness is hinted at by showing our utter incapacity to understand what it would feel like to be a bat from its (mental) point of view.
One should read it simply to gauge the unimaginable gap in our understanding of Consciousness.
One should read it simply to gauge the unimaginable gap in our understanding of Consciousness.
April 9, 2024
Lo leí para una clase de filosofía obligatoria en la universidad. No sabía quién era Nagel o el tema que desarrollaba, leí sin expectativas y quedé sorprendida, y gustosamente llena de nuevas incógnitas. Saber que la conciencia es algo que no podemos verificar que realmente existe más allá de una respuesta biológica, un estímulom preguntarse si una realmente tiene conciencia, si los demás están consientes, si una roca o un murciélago la tiene— estar cerca del mareo y el cuestionamiento constante de nuestro propio sentir. Me sentí como Neo al descubrir lo que era la Matrix.
En resumen; locura.
Me gustó, slay!!
En resumen; locura.
Me gustó, slay!!
June 27, 2024
brilliant. a genius and not ashamed to be one.
tackles huge problems, including the obvious mind-body problem and ineffable quality of qualia and mental states, but also objectivity vs subjectivity, defining phenomenology as having something it is like to be and exist in that state, and the issues with physicalist accounts of the mind.
its influence is undeniable. perhaps the greatest 20th century essay concerning the philosophy of the mind.
tackles huge problems, including the obvious mind-body problem and ineffable quality of qualia and mental states, but also objectivity vs subjectivity, defining phenomenology as having something it is like to be and exist in that state, and the issues with physicalist accounts of the mind.
its influence is undeniable. perhaps the greatest 20th century essay concerning the philosophy of the mind.
January 12, 2020
A human cannot experience like a bat. And objectively, we cannot explain the bat’s experiences. How can we objectively explain subjective mental activities? Interesting as this is, Nagel’s future can hold more answers by proposing alternatives to this sort of explanation (other than imagination and/or empathy and/or perception).
January 26, 2025
With a fascinating philosophy article, more is better. Here we have two essays by Nagel, the original and an additional thoughts piece. But without any preface or supplements to bring this work to a wider audience, the mind body problem is the least of our worries. There is a chance to have a much bigger book with commentary and interpretations and responses, but this isn't it.
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September 29, 2025j'étais fatigué j'ai pas bien saisi comment aborder la phénoménologie depuis la philosophie analytique ni les implications exactes de la critique du réductionnisme mais au moins c'était vachement rigolo j'adorerais être une chauve-souris pendant un jour ou deux
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