Great book, I recommend it VERY MUCH.
It’s a very thorough and intelligent analysis of various aspects that look bewildering in any other interpretation of the events but make perfect sense if you agree with the key idea of Виктор Суворов: that the USSR was actively preparing an aggressive war against Germany (with the ultimate purpose of the conquest of the whole Europe) and intended to strike first somewhere in the middle of 1941.
I should say that I was somewhat skeptical about Виктор Суворов after “Аквариум” (which is a half-autobiography, half-romanticized hymn to the Soviet “special forces”). However, “Ледокол” convinced me that “Аквариум” was just not the best choice for the first acquaintance with the author, and they are overall very different books in their importance and stylistically. I consider “Ледокол” a must-read for everybody who is interested in WW2 and the history of the USSR in general. It not only gives answers to a lot of questions you might have and plenty of material to think about and investigate deeper, but it is also a surprisingly very well-written book (again, contrary to “Аквариум” that sometimes seems on the verge of graphomania but, I think, mostly just reflects the lack of experience in a new author who wanted to tell his unique story to the world as impressively as possible).
“Ледокол” tells us about a whole series of facts and patterns that all gradually make a very logical picture of the active preparations of the USSR for the military aggression against Nazi Germany (while Germany was “busy” with its own aggressive war with all the democratic Europe). This aggressive war should have been conducted under the label of “liberation,” of course, and not called by the Soviets “a war” at all. Similarly to “liberation campaigns” (“освободительные походы”) of the Red Army in Poland, Finland, Baltic countries, Afghanistan, etc. You know, similarly to the current “special operation” in Ukraine.
Виктор Суворов does not conjure the idea from thin air, just because he “believes” that the USSR could have been such an aggressor (although we know perfectly that yes, the USSR was exactly such an aggressor and it dreamed about conquering Europe and transforming it into one large “Soviet Union”). No, he analyzed millions of documents that show to any “military literate” person that there were indeed very active preparations for such a war — an aggressive war, an imminent war, an unprecedentedly large-scale war, and all this was definitely NOT a preparation to possible defense against looming Germany’s aggression. From the military point of view, preparations for aggression against another country (on its territory) and preparations for defense against another country’s aggression (on your territory) are very different complexes of measures. They require different weapons, different lines of defense, different compositions and arrangements of army units, different engineering, construction, mining works, etc., etc. All this looks obvious even for the general public if you start to talk about some particular specifics. Виктор Суворов is doing exactly this: very consistently and gradually, he shows how these, and these, and these things are literally SCREAMING to our faces that the USSR planned to start an aggressive war very soon, and would have definitely done it if Germany had not stricken first (Виктор Суворов believes, by the way, that Germany wouldn’t do it, at least so soon, if Germany had not observed these preparations to the aggression towards it; Hitler just knew that his only chance was to cut it down when Stalin did not expect it and when the USSR was the most vulnerable immediately before its own attack — Hitler was just forced to strike first at this moment and stun the USSR with surprise causing the necessity to carry out “defensive” actions instead of “assaulting,” which is disastrous for a country that had no plans to defend itself on its own territory; Виктор Суворов claims that the choice of the end of June 1941 for Germany’s attack was made because Stalin most probably planned his attack on July).
The book is not only VERY convincing (to the point that you start to think in terms “these things are so obvious, I am sure that I already KNEW all this, just could not formulate them for myself comprehensively…”), but it also explains a lot of very problematic issues that no other “theory” can explain. For example, the whole picture of the disastrous first months of the war for the USSR, which was literally crushed by the German assault. No historian who “does not believe” that the USSR planned an aggressive war can explain it. Yes, Nazi Germany was a strong and high-tech aggressor, but the USSR was also a very powerful and militarily highly advanced state, and it concentrated a lot of troops and weapons near its Western borders, and it had one of the most well-developed intelligence/espionage networks in Europe. Of course, they knew what was going on. Of course, they were preparing for something. Of course, they were not naive fools who just never intended to participate in the war. However, most historians still try to follow this faulty logic: that Stalin was a fool who thought that Hitler was his “friend,” and the Soviet army was just too weak compared to Germans, or incorrectly positioned, or poorly motivated — whatever. This just does not make any sense to anybody who knows the history and Soviet ambitions about its place in the world. However, Виктор Суворов’s idea makes perfect sense: they were preparing an aggressive war themselves and saw it as the most probable (=only) scenario for the nearest future, and this means that their ability to defend their own territory was weakened day by day. They did not need such engineering constructions, such weapons, such roads, such army structure that were necessary for successful defense if they intended to be the aggressors themselves and “conquer” other countries. They would have never concentrated so many troops, and planes, and unprotected warehouses with all kinds of ammunition near the border if they had anticipated being attacked from this direction. All this eventually resulted in the most disastrous defeat of the Soviet army during the first months of Germany’s assault. Even if the Soviets had never made any preparations for war at all, the disaster would not have been so devastating compared to what they got after preparing for the aggressive war themselves. And it would have never been a disaster at all if they had indeed prepared for defense.
There are many, many very interesting arguments like this in the book, and each claim is very well substantiated — first of all, from the point of view of a professional military man. More than anything, the whole mass of all these facts and statements is fascinating and makes a very solid base for contemplations.
One of the most amazing characteristics of this book is that it was created in the 1980s based on publicly available information, mostly open Soviet publications and “censorship-approved” memoirs of Soviet officers. Not archives, not stolen state secrets, not confidential interviews. The author just analyzed the available-for-everyone facts and explained what he can see from them as a professional officer himself. Many of these facts look innocent enough until you gather them together and show how unidirectional they actually are and what an interesting pattern they reveal for somebody who understands what was going on.
Still, this book was published first in Germany and in the UK, and its Russian translation was not possible until 1992 (the peak of “freedom” in Russia). After this, it has been a permanent object of hate from Russians )).
*
I should say that after this book I now consider Виктор Суворов a perfect “marker” of historical adequacy. I mean: if somebody starts the discussion with words like “Виктор Суворов writes shit, and all this is anti-historical, and his fantasies do not cost a penny, etc.,” you can just stop discussing with this person anything )). We can criticize some of Суворов’s points or interpretations, of course, or maybe some inaccurately collected details, but no normal person who knows history cannot NOT agree with him in general. Some of his statements can be considered “speculations,” for sure (like the particular date of the planned Soviet assault, for example), although I believe that they are very well-grounded and totally justified “speculations.” However, 90% of this book is a very clear and very factual demonstration of real historical events and processes that any adequate person may interpret only similarly to what the author did himself. Contrary to “Аквариум” (where he often talks about “secret” things that nobody can reasonably confirm or discredit), “Ледокол” is a collection of well-known and publicly available information gathered from the sources approved even by the USSR itself, and the author gives the respective references to every quote or fact discussed.
In this light, it is especially funny now to see how Russians hate Виктор Суворов. His books and his name overall are traditionally showered by all the possible shit, and it is not even considered appropriate to mention his works in any “decent” historical discussion. Now I know why )). Because he proves easily and clearly through many, many, many well-known facts the most obvious things Russian “historians” try to deny for dozens of years: that the USSR was an aggressor and one of the main instigators of World War Two. Russians have written tons of books and articles about “вранье Виктора Суворова (Резуна)” (somehow they like to mention his real surname, probably believing that it sounds more disgusting) but, as I understand, nobody managed to show convincingly that “Ледокол” (or any other of his books in the series) is indeed a lie, or falsification, or manipulation, etc. They managed to make his name “scandalous,” though, so people who do not understand history much are usually under impression that Виктор Суворов should better be avoided, because too many people are “criticizing” him ))). I can claim with certainty that it’s a powerful and well-organized reputation fouling campaign, and you know perfectly that Russia and especially Russian “historians” love to do this with facts they don’t like about their history (well, they actually LIKE them, but they understand that it is a bad thing to be proud of them publicly, so they mostly just deny them).
(Should I also add that Виктор Суворов is still “sentenced to death in absentia” in modern Russia? I am sure they would love “to get” him for this…)
Lastly, I wanted to underline that I really liked how this book is written: exceptionally well-structured (every chapter tells you all the details about some specific aspect, and all the chapters consistently give you more and more information about the things you would never even thought were important) and presented in an intelligent and very interesting way, not overwhelming you but streamlining everything you already knew yourself about the same events.
So I can only recommend it, especially today, when Russia uses its status of a “victim of an assault” during World War Two as a powerful leverage for a new aggressive war and mobilization of its population “to defend our innocent and peaceful nation” and “to liberate our compatriots.” The war against Ukraine is just another war in the chain of aggressive wars Moscow waged against its neighbors for hundreds of years. The war against Ukraine is a possible beginning of a war against Europe and the whole “community of democracies” Moscow always wanted to start, and was the closest to it in 1941. If you don’t know these basic things about history, maybe then “Ледокол” would look like “a fantasy” to you. Otherwise, just read it.
*
This book is part of a series:
1. “Ледокол” — about the preparation of the USSR to its aggression against Germany.
2. “День „М“ — some additional information about the preparation and the actual beginning of the war inside the USSR via mobilization of the population into a huge army.
3. “Последняя республика” — about the ideological background of the Soviet aggression against Europe. This book is also part of a separate cycle: “Последняя республика” + “Святое дело” + “Разгром”.
4. “Очищение” — about Stalin’s “purge” of the Soviet Army before World War Two (which, Виктор Суворов believes, was not “a folly” but a very intentional operation conducted to strengthen the military and make it much more prepared for the aggressive war).
5. “Самоубийство” — about the attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR (which, Виктор Суворов believes, was mostly provoked by the fast preparations of the USSR for their attack, and therefore, was a desperate, “suicidal” attempt to strike first).
As I understand, they all have a similar structure and are subordinated to the common idea but may be read separately (although preferably in this order). I intend to read all of them, one by one.