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反動的修辭
☹教改愈改愈爛，不如恢復聯考？
☹調漲基本工資對本國勞工沒幫助？
☹不要再打房價了，否則臺灣經濟會更差？
世界上有「作用力」，就有「反作用力」。有希望改革的聲音，就有抗拒改革的聲音。當反對改革者無法為自己的主張提出紮實基礎，他會用什麼方式迂迴進擊？
西方國家在過去三百年，締造了三類公民權利：自由權、參政權、社會權。每一次的進步潮流，都遭遇到反動的逆流。每一次的革命運動，都見證了反革命運動。我們至今仍生活在第三波反動之中；柴契爾主義和雷根經濟學開啟新自由主義全球化，也拉開反動修辭的序幕。
福利制度在老牌民主國家備受攻擊，全球工薪階級普遍面臨薪資停滯，愈來愈多人，被甩到資本主義利益分配系統的外圍，過著邊緣而窮困的生活。社會抗議、反叛、暴動、公民不服從與日俱增。人類賴以為生的許多資源，都被當成可販賣、可囤積、可牟利的商品。
本書的寫作動機，即起源於新自由主義即將席捲世界的時刻。作者分析三種反動修辭法，它們不直接反對進步價值，而是反對實踐進步價值的行動；反動修辭是用來說服大家，你不必、也不應該採取進步性的行動，因為你怎麼做都沒有用，甚至會導致反效果，或摧毀既有的改革成果。
☹調漲基本工資對本國勞工沒幫助？
☹不要再打房價了，否則臺灣經濟會更差？
世界上有「作用力」，就有「反作用力」。有希望改革的聲音，就有抗拒改革的聲音。當反對改革者無法為自己的主張提出紮實基礎，他會用什麼方式迂迴進擊？
西方國家在過去三百年，締造了三類公民權利：自由權、參政權、社會權。每一次的進步潮流，都遭遇到反動的逆流。每一次的革命運動，都見證了反革命運動。我們至今仍生活在第三波反動之中；柴契爾主義和雷根經濟學開啟新自由主義全球化，也拉開反動修辭的序幕。
福利制度在老牌民主國家備受攻擊，全球工薪階級普遍面臨薪資停滯，愈來愈多人，被甩到資本主義利益分配系統的外圍，過著邊緣而窮困的生活。社會抗議、反叛、暴動、公民不服從與日俱增。人類賴以為生的許多資源，都被當成可販賣、可囤積、可牟利的商品。
本書的寫作動機，即起源於新自由主義即將席捲世界的時刻。作者分析三種反動修辭法，它們不直接反對進步價值，而是反對實踐進步價值的行動；反動修辭是用來說服大家，你不必、也不應該採取進步性的行動，因為你怎麼做都沒有用，甚至會導致反效果，或摧毀既有的改革成果。
288 pages, Paperback
First published March 1, 1991
101 people are currently reading
2745 people want to read
About the author
Albert O. Hirschman
70 books145 followersAlbert Otto Hirschman was an economist and the author of several books on political economy and political ideology. His first major contribution was in the area of development economics. Here he emphasized the need for unbalanced growth. He argued that disequilibria should be encouraged to stimulate growth and help mobilize resources, because developing countries are short of decision making skills. Key to this was encouraging industries with many linkages to other firms.
His later work was in political economy and there he advanced two schemata. The first describes the three basic possible responses to decline in firms or polities (quitting, speaking up, staying quiet) in Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (1970). The second describes the basic arguments made by conservatives (perversity, futility and jeopardy) in The Rhetoric of Reaction (1991).
His later work was in political economy and there he advanced two schemata. The first describes the three basic possible responses to decline in firms or polities (quitting, speaking up, staying quiet) in Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (1970). The second describes the basic arguments made by conservatives (perversity, futility and jeopardy) in The Rhetoric of Reaction (1991).
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 65 reviews
September 15, 2014
A slim and extremely useful meditation on the forms that reactionary arguments--which Hirschman cleverly defines as those arguments which deny not so much the validity of an aspiration to change, but simply the practicality, safety, or governability of a recommended alteration in the status quo--routinely, almost deterministically fall into. His point here is to show that reactionary arguments are not the product of case-specific reasoning against a given social, political, or economic change, but rather revert to simplistic meta-framings often (implicitly) reliant on mythological topoi--Oedipus, Nemesis, or hubris. For all that, the study is not psychoanalytic but straightforwardly rhetorical--it bases its counterarguments on essentially prima facie readings of classic conservative texts--Burke, de Maistre, Hayek, et al.
I really enjoy the way that Hirschman proceeds through his evidence, and I find the trio of reactionary arguments (perversity, futility, or jeopardy) that Hirschman elaborates very helpful in parsing the cant that I encounter on a day-to-day basis in the media, or in listening to relatives or friends. I am surprised to find that more historians and political scientists--or journalists for that matter--do not make use of this book. Its lucidity would be a great model for many writers and its content a valuable resource in political argumentation.
I really enjoy the way that Hirschman proceeds through his evidence, and I find the trio of reactionary arguments (perversity, futility, or jeopardy) that Hirschman elaborates very helpful in parsing the cant that I encounter on a day-to-day basis in the media, or in listening to relatives or friends. I am surprised to find that more historians and political scientists--or journalists for that matter--do not make use of this book. Its lucidity would be a great model for many writers and its content a valuable resource in political argumentation.
December 14, 2020
Hirschman was a cosmopolitan, intellectually omnivorous scholar with literary tastes, and although he might best be described as an interdisciplinary social scientist (somewhere between politics, sociology and economics), he shone as a historian of ideas, which is how I would classify The Passions and the Interests and this slender book. (Earlier this year I reviewed Jeremy Adelman's Hirschman biography The Worldly Philosopher.) His goal is to categorise the rhetorical techniques of "reactionaries" (a word he wishes to use neutrally, despite its pejorative baggage) opposing movements for social change - Joseph de Maistre on the French Revolution, or Robert Lowe's attacks on Disraeli's vast expansion of suffrage in the 1867 Reform Bill. He fits many of the stock responses into one of three categories: perversity (this will achieve exactly the opposite of its intended goals), futility (this problem is part of nature and fundamentally insoluble), and jeopardy (this will endanger previous reforms). Hirschman notes that reformers can also make use of these clichés - thus futility: "opposition to this reform is pointless, since it is part of the natural laws of progress we have seen unfolding up till now". His opposition is to lazy and fundamentalist argument in all forms. His own thought converged repeatedly on a kind of sceptical optimism, a belief in incremental, experimental change, or as he titled one of his books "a bias for hope".
Always meticulous about and interested in language (and a speaker of native French and German and fluent English, Italian and Spanish), Hirschman takes pain to trace the sources of idioms and ideas, and to coin accurate names for concepts. (No doubt Exit, Voice and Loyalty would be far less known without its snappy and Anglo-Saxon name.) Yet his writing is occasionally belaboured, succumbing to the academic disease of "in the previous paragraph I have...and in the following paragraph I will..." A minor quibble.
One part that stuck out for me was his analysis of the Italian anti-democratic "elite theorists" Pareto and Gaetano Mosca. Mosca claimed that what defined a system of government was not how its leadership was selected (oligarchy, monarchy, democracy, etc.) but the composition and character of its governing class. (Somewhat similar to the organisational concept known as Conway's Law or "shipping your org chart".) Of course this argument is specious in the blunt form with which Mosca stated it (and Hirschman traces its origins in the corruption of the post-unification Mezzogiorno and how it may have contributed to the rise of fascism), but might at least be a helpful way to think about differences between countries with the same political system. As ever, Hirschman's thought highlights the futility of grand theories to explain social systems, while simultaneously believing in the power of lots of small theories (petites idées) to drive human progress.
Always meticulous about and interested in language (and a speaker of native French and German and fluent English, Italian and Spanish), Hirschman takes pain to trace the sources of idioms and ideas, and to coin accurate names for concepts. (No doubt Exit, Voice and Loyalty would be far less known without its snappy and Anglo-Saxon name.) Yet his writing is occasionally belaboured, succumbing to the academic disease of "in the previous paragraph I have...and in the following paragraph I will..." A minor quibble.
One part that stuck out for me was his analysis of the Italian anti-democratic "elite theorists" Pareto and Gaetano Mosca. Mosca claimed that what defined a system of government was not how its leadership was selected (oligarchy, monarchy, democracy, etc.) but the composition and character of its governing class. (Somewhat similar to the organisational concept known as Conway's Law or "shipping your org chart".) Of course this argument is specious in the blunt form with which Mosca stated it (and Hirschman traces its origins in the corruption of the post-unification Mezzogiorno and how it may have contributed to the rise of fascism), but might at least be a helpful way to think about differences between countries with the same political system. As ever, Hirschman's thought highlights the futility of grand theories to explain social systems, while simultaneously believing in the power of lots of small theories (petites idées) to drive human progress.
December 6, 2017
I almost do not want to give this book four stars, for Hirschman is at times too brief. His statements about the flaws in certain reactionary arguments are short and therefore lack bite. Yet, he does a fair job of exploring three common conservative arguments against reform and revolution. His most effective passage is on the perverse effect of Burke's argument in favor of slow change and minor reforms, the perverse effect being that it can spurn radical change in places where slow reform is botched and there is no history of rights and reform.
April 5, 2025
Súper interesante. Hace un repaso desde la revolución francesa hasta la creación del estado benefactor donde establece que los reaccionarios siempre se han opuesto a los avances sociales mediante 3 tesis: perversidad, futilidad y del riesgo.
September 9, 2023
I have long held that people have dangerously misunderstood Plato's derision of rhetoric such they feel it can be ignored; you would think the fact that Plato spent half his corpus on the topic of rhetoric would stave off the idea it can be ignored. As such I always find analyses such as Hirschman's here refreshing. What we have here is a deceptively simple taxonomy of three rhetorical tendencies in reactionary arguments. Yet the narrow focus peels away when you think about the ubiquity of these strategies. So you will find the futility thesis in the false insistence that climate change is not manmade, and that therefore policies to stave it off must be equally futile. You will find the jeopardy thesis in Jordan Peterson's laughable prophecy that Bill C16 would have had people thrown in jail over pronoun usage. And you will find the perversity thesis in the insistence that aid to Ukraine will only work to immiserate the Ukrainian people. Hirschman's examples run from Burke and De Maistre to Charles Murray, but iterations are everywhere. Now this is by no means exhaustive of reactionary rhetoric: for example what was effective about Peterson's demonstration was not his dumb argument, but rather the image of the lone sturdy trad standing alone surrounded by the shrill blue haired morass. But of course Hirschman does not mean to be exhaustive. If anything it is indication that more studies such as this one would be welcome.
January 31, 2022
Why do conservatives / reactionaries argue the way they do? And not just the conservatives of today but, indeed, those of the last two hundred years who have opposed, decried or critiqued social change and revolution with all their intellectual resources and rhetorical skill?
How nuanced and masterful must be the arguments marshalled and how thorough and compelling must be the evidence adduced against such diverse and transformative upheavals as the end to slavery, universal suffrage and the creation of the welfare state? Surely at least some among the roster of conservative thinkers from Burke and de Tocqueville to Hayek and Huntingdon must have developed novel, rich and diverse forms of argumentation to condemn, question or critique the social change against which they took up arms in their historic moment?
According to Hirschman's elegant taxonomy of two hundred years of conservative rhetoric, not so much.
In fact, in Hirschman's survey of actual arguments made by conservative thinkers in modern history, whether opposing the French Revolution and the extension of civic participation in the 18th Century, standing against the expansion of voting rights in the 19th Century, or condemning the deleterious effects of the welfare state in the 20th, he finds that conservatives have deployed just three rhetorical tools (with some limited variation and nuance) in support of their reaction. These he labels the perversity thesis, the futility thesis and the jeopardy thesis.
In a nutshell, the perversity thesis claims that any revolution, reform or renovation will lead inevitably to an exacerbation of the very conditions it seeks to ameliorate. Revolutions for liberty will lead to tyranny, attempts to expand democratic participation in governance will cause a breakdown of social order, and attempts to use of the power of the State to tackle poverty will, in fact, impoverish vastly more people.
The futility thesis, in stark contradiction, asserts that while the revolution or reform might, on the face of it, attempt or appear to fundamentally transform society it will, instead, further entrench the status quo. Revolutions will merely replace one set of oppressors with another. Newly enfranchised voters will be persuaded or manipulated to to endorse those who already hold social and political power. Programs to serve the poor will, by and large, be captured or diverted by the non-poor.
The jeopardy thesis claims that the unintended consequences of any major social reform (which may seem desirable in itself) will mortally endanger some pre-existing benefit or accomplishment, proving to be so negative in character and of such magnitude that it is, conveniently, always better to conserve the status quo. Universal suffrage and democratic participation by the masses threatens individual liberty. The welfare state endangers freedom through the expansion of the scope of government and/or imperils democratic governance by creating unsustainable and destabilising social programs with their associated expenditures.
Taking each thesis in turn, Hirschman examines how they have actually been deployed by conservative thinkers across three periods of revolution or reform in the last two centuries. He notes their attraction (often drawing on reservoirs of myth – such as Hubris—Nemesis or supposed commonsense insights like zero-sum) but also their flaws (particularly an all-or-nothing oversimplification present in all of the strategies– why shouldn't a reform have both positive and negative unintended consequences, and what would stop negative consequences being ameliorated? – which are often somewhat obscured by the rhetorical flair of a given reactionary. When it comes to reactionary rhetoric:
Hirschman is fair-minded and observant enough to note that the limited range and repetition of these forms of argument does not necessarily render them false, although it does render them suspect. He also briefly rehearsals liberal counterparts of the same argumentative strategies. He is not seeking to ridicule or excoriate conservatives, but to expose the reactionary theses (along with their liberal/progressive counterparts) as not so much arguments but instead as "extreme statements in a series of imaginary, highly polarized debates."
All of this, it seems to me, is a well-supported, elegantly presented summary of modes of conservative argumentation. It is only in the final, very brief, chapter, "Beyond Intransigence" that Hirschman stumbles. Having made a thorough analytical case, he briefly presents his project as a potentially constructive contribution to the work of exposing poor argument, entrenched bias, and discursive intransigence, aiming, he says, to
How nuanced and masterful must be the arguments marshalled and how thorough and compelling must be the evidence adduced against such diverse and transformative upheavals as the end to slavery, universal suffrage and the creation of the welfare state? Surely at least some among the roster of conservative thinkers from Burke and de Tocqueville to Hayek and Huntingdon must have developed novel, rich and diverse forms of argumentation to condemn, question or critique the social change against which they took up arms in their historic moment?
According to Hirschman's elegant taxonomy of two hundred years of conservative rhetoric, not so much.
In fact, in Hirschman's survey of actual arguments made by conservative thinkers in modern history, whether opposing the French Revolution and the extension of civic participation in the 18th Century, standing against the expansion of voting rights in the 19th Century, or condemning the deleterious effects of the welfare state in the 20th, he finds that conservatives have deployed just three rhetorical tools (with some limited variation and nuance) in support of their reaction. These he labels the perversity thesis, the futility thesis and the jeopardy thesis.
In a nutshell, the perversity thesis claims that any revolution, reform or renovation will lead inevitably to an exacerbation of the very conditions it seeks to ameliorate. Revolutions for liberty will lead to tyranny, attempts to expand democratic participation in governance will cause a breakdown of social order, and attempts to use of the power of the State to tackle poverty will, in fact, impoverish vastly more people.
The futility thesis, in stark contradiction, asserts that while the revolution or reform might, on the face of it, attempt or appear to fundamentally transform society it will, instead, further entrench the status quo. Revolutions will merely replace one set of oppressors with another. Newly enfranchised voters will be persuaded or manipulated to to endorse those who already hold social and political power. Programs to serve the poor will, by and large, be captured or diverted by the non-poor.
The jeopardy thesis claims that the unintended consequences of any major social reform (which may seem desirable in itself) will mortally endanger some pre-existing benefit or accomplishment, proving to be so negative in character and of such magnitude that it is, conveniently, always better to conserve the status quo. Universal suffrage and democratic participation by the masses threatens individual liberty. The welfare state endangers freedom through the expansion of the scope of government and/or imperils democratic governance by creating unsustainable and destabilising social programs with their associated expenditures.
Taking each thesis in turn, Hirschman examines how they have actually been deployed by conservative thinkers across three periods of revolution or reform in the last two centuries. He notes their attraction (often drawing on reservoirs of myth – such as Hubris—Nemesis or supposed commonsense insights like zero-sum) but also their flaws (particularly an all-or-nothing oversimplification present in all of the strategies– why shouldn't a reform have both positive and negative unintended consequences, and what would stop negative consequences being ameliorated? – which are often somewhat obscured by the rhetorical flair of a given reactionary. When it comes to reactionary rhetoric:
The three categories of perversity, futility, and jeopardy are in effect more exhaustive than meets the eye. When a public policy or "reform" is undertaken and then runs into problems or is viewed as a failure by some critics, this negative appraisal can in fact be attributed to only two basic reasons:
1) The reform is viewed as not having accomplished its mission—perversity and futility are two stylized versions of this turn of events;
2) The costs that are incurred and the consequences that are set off by the reform are considered to outweigh the benefits—a good portion of this (vast) territory is covered by the jeopardy argument...
Hirschman is fair-minded and observant enough to note that the limited range and repetition of these forms of argument does not necessarily render them false, although it does render them suspect. He also briefly rehearsals liberal counterparts of the same argumentative strategies. He is not seeking to ridicule or excoriate conservatives, but to expose the reactionary theses (along with their liberal/progressive counterparts) as not so much arguments but instead as "extreme statements in a series of imaginary, highly polarized debates."
All of this, it seems to me, is a well-supported, elegantly presented summary of modes of conservative argumentation. It is only in the final, very brief, chapter, "Beyond Intransigence" that Hirschman stumbles. Having made a thorough analytical case, he briefly presents his project as a potentially constructive contribution to the work of exposing poor argument, entrenched bias, and discursive intransigence, aiming, he says, to
move public discourse beyond extreme, instransigent postures of either kind, with the hope that in the process our debates will become more "democracy friendly".In light of recent events, this briefly sketched hope might seem merely quaint, although Hirschman does acknowledge the hard work required to make democracy work. Writing in 1991, it's easy to understand how he might have failed to predict Trump and Johnson, Fox News and YouTube, Proud Boys and Oathkeepers, the aggressive deployment of agnotology by corporations, politicians and fellow-travellers as a tool for confusion and demoralisation, and the increasingly closed, radicalised and potentially violent epistemic communities contemporary "conservatives" are becoming.
May 17, 2016
An excellent look at the arguments reactionaries make in response to various kinds of political reform, as well as, in a later chapter, arguments made by progressives. Hirschman critiques reactionary arguments and discusses why such arguments are made and why they are often accepted. Highly recommended for anyone interested in political rhetoric.
November 19, 2022
Wittgenstein is supposed to have said that "if one were to add a negation sign before the whole of [Otto Weininger's book] Sex and Character, one would have expressed an important truth."
That is how I feel about The Rhetoric of Reaction.
That is how I feel about The Rhetoric of Reaction.
August 25, 2017
Interesting framework to evaluate political debate fallacies. Especially the last chapter is a masterclass.
March 21, 2022
Μερικές φορές αργείς να έρθεις σε επαφή με το έργο κάποιων επιστημόνων, όχι για κάποιο άλλο λόγο παρά για το ότι απλά έτυχε.
Η πρώτη μου επαφή με το έργο του Hirschman μπορώ να πω πως με άφησε με τις καλύτερες εντυπώσεις. Αν και το συγκεκριμένο βιβλίο έχει πάνω από 30 χρόνια που γράφτηκε, θα μπορούσε να αποτελεί μέρος της σύγχρονης βιβλιογραφίας πολιτικών επιστημών.
Και αυτό γιατί το βιβλίο του Hirschman ναι μεν αναφέρεται σε ιστορικά γεγονότα (Γαλλική επανάσταση, αγώνες για τα πολιτικά δικαιώματα του19ου αιώνα, ίδρυση και αμφισβήτηση του κράτους πρόνοιας τον 20ο) και πως η αντιδραστική σκέψη επιχειρηματολογουσε εναντίον τους, αλλά ο αναγνώστης θα διαπιστώσει πως αυτή η επιχειρηματολογία είναι ίσως τρομακτικά επίκαιρη.
Ο Hirschman παραθέτει τρεις τύπους επιχειρημάτων που χρησιμοποιούνται: αντίστροφο αποτέλεσμα (η πρόοδος που επιθυμούμε θα κάνει τα πράγματα χειρότερα), ματαίωση (η πρόοδος δεν θα αλλάξει και πολλά γιατί έτσι είναι τα πράγματα), διακινδύνευση (η οποιαδήποτε πρόοδος θα ρισκάρει και τα ήδη κερδισμένα δικαιώματα μας). Προφανώς η ανάλυση του κυμαίνεται μεταξύ κριτική της πολιτικής θεωρίας/φιλοσοφίας που αναπτύχθηκε ενάντια στα προαναφερθέντα γεγονότα και ιστορική ανάλυση, αλλά βρήκα τις εφαρμογές του βιβλίου στο σήμερα πάρα πολύ επίκαιρες.
Μέχρι και λόγος για το πώς η αντιδραστική σκέψη έθετε τον εαυτό της στη 'σωστή πλευρά της ιστορίας' γίνεται. Οποιαδήποτε ομοιότητα με την καθημερινότητα είναι ίσως συμπτωματική.
Η πρώτη μου επαφή με το έργο του Hirschman μπορώ να πω πως με άφησε με τις καλύτερες εντυπώσεις. Αν και το συγκεκριμένο βιβλίο έχει πάνω από 30 χρόνια που γράφτηκε, θα μπορούσε να αποτελεί μέρος της σύγχρονης βιβλιογραφίας πολιτικών επιστημών.
Και αυτό γιατί το βιβλίο του Hirschman ναι μεν αναφέρεται σε ιστορικά γεγονότα (Γαλλική επανάσταση, αγώνες για τα πολιτικά δικαιώματα του19ου αιώνα, ίδρυση και αμφισβήτηση του κράτους πρόνοιας τον 20ο) και πως η αντιδραστική σκέψη επιχειρηματολογουσε εναντίον τους, αλλά ο αναγνώστης θα διαπιστώσει πως αυτή η επιχειρηματολογία είναι ίσως τρομακτικά επίκαιρη.
Ο Hirschman παραθέτει τρεις τύπους επιχειρημάτων που χρησιμοποιούνται: αντίστροφο αποτέλεσμα (η πρόοδος που επιθυμούμε θα κάνει τα πράγματα χειρότερα), ματαίωση (η πρόοδος δεν θα αλλάξει και πολλά γιατί έτσι είναι τα πράγματα), διακινδύνευση (η οποιαδήποτε πρόοδος θα ρισκάρει και τα ήδη κερδισμένα δικαιώματα μας). Προφανώς η ανάλυση του κυμαίνεται μεταξύ κριτική της πολιτικής θεωρίας/φιλοσοφίας που αναπτύχθηκε ενάντια στα προαναφερθέντα γεγονότα και ιστορική ανάλυση, αλλά βρήκα τις εφαρμογές του βιβλίου στο σήμερα πάρα πολύ επίκαιρες.
Μέχρι και λόγος για το πώς η αντιδραστική σκέψη έθετε τον εαυτό της στη 'σωστή πλευρά της ιστορίας' γίνεται. Οποιαδήποτε ομοιότητα με την καθημερινότητα είναι ίσως συμπτωματική.
September 2, 2022
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¿Llevan las personas reaccionarias (como mínimo) más de 200 años recurriendo a las tres mismas argumentaciones contra cualquier intento de reforma o progreso social? La prueba es que este libro de 1991 no podría ser más actual.
Hirschman analiza tres contextos históricos de avance progresista (la Revolución francesa, el sufragio universal y el Estado de Bienestar) y recoge tres argumentos comunes (tesis) por parte de los reaccionarios contra las reformas:
• Tesis de la perversidad: cualquier intento de cambio producirá el efecto contrario al deseado.
Las leyes de control del precio del alquiler harán que baje la oferta y suban los precios.
• Tesis de la futilidad: cualquier intento de reforma será inútil debido a estructuras profundas del sistema.
No sirve de nada gravar a la banca o eléctricas: esos impuestos siempre se acaban repercutiendo en los consumidores y no en las entidades.
• Tesis del riesgo: el cambio propuesto pone en riesgo reformas o conquistas previas.
El borrador de ley trans socava los derechos de las mujeres que tanto nos han costado conseguir.
Personalmente, a esta Trinidad Reaccionaria le añadiría una compañera, la tesis de la inoportunidad, cubriendo todas aquellas reformas deseables pero que “no es el momento de llevarlas a cabo”, ya sea por la situación económica, porque la sociedad no está preparada, o cualquier otra excusa que esconda el aborrecimiento al progresismo.
Como guinda al pastel, Hirschman incluye al final del libro una tríada de argumentos progresistas tan manidos como los reaccionarios. Un libro completo para poder tener diálogos más constructivos sin recurrir a resortes extendidos durante siglos de soliloquios a cada lado del debate.
¿Llevan las personas reaccionarias (como mínimo) más de 200 años recurriendo a las tres mismas argumentaciones contra cualquier intento de reforma o progreso social? La prueba es que este libro de 1991 no podría ser más actual.
Hirschman analiza tres contextos históricos de avance progresista (la Revolución francesa, el sufragio universal y el Estado de Bienestar) y recoge tres argumentos comunes (tesis) por parte de los reaccionarios contra las reformas:
• Tesis de la perversidad: cualquier intento de cambio producirá el efecto contrario al deseado.
Las leyes de control del precio del alquiler harán que baje la oferta y suban los precios.
• Tesis de la futilidad: cualquier intento de reforma será inútil debido a estructuras profundas del sistema.
No sirve de nada gravar a la banca o eléctricas: esos impuestos siempre se acaban repercutiendo en los consumidores y no en las entidades.
• Tesis del riesgo: el cambio propuesto pone en riesgo reformas o conquistas previas.
El borrador de ley trans socava los derechos de las mujeres que tanto nos han costado conseguir.
Personalmente, a esta Trinidad Reaccionaria le añadiría una compañera, la tesis de la inoportunidad, cubriendo todas aquellas reformas deseables pero que “no es el momento de llevarlas a cabo”, ya sea por la situación económica, porque la sociedad no está preparada, o cualquier otra excusa que esconda el aborrecimiento al progresismo.
Como guinda al pastel, Hirschman incluye al final del libro una tríada de argumentos progresistas tan manidos como los reaccionarios. Un libro completo para poder tener diálogos más constructivos sin recurrir a resortes extendidos durante siglos de soliloquios a cada lado del debate.
June 3, 2019
A retórica da intransigência
O livro é interessante e tem alguns pontos que realmente estimulam a reflexão. Mas alguns elementos precisam ser mais bem elaborados. A retórica nem sempre é uma palavra que tenha uma conotação positiva. Muitas vezes – e de maneira enganosa – a retórica é vista como uma forma de enganar as pessoas. Não é o caso aqui. A retórica é uma técnica de argumentação utilizada para o convencimento de pessoas. É, pois, um elemento fundamental em uma sociedade democrática, em que a alternância de poder se faz, é claro, por meios não-violentos.
Pois bem, Hirschman – um economista estruturalista, com bastante conhecimento de América Latina – escreveu o texto para entender os argumentos daqueles setores sociais que são contrários à mudança política. Ele encontra três argumentos principais. O primeiro é o da perversidade. O segundo é da futilidade. O terceiro é o da ameaça. O primeiro argumento trata dos efeitos colaterais negativos da mudança. O segundo é o da inutilidade da mudança, ou seja, nada se muda. O terceiro é que arrisca ganhos já existentes na sociedade.
A despeito de ser de esquerda, ele também, em um rápido capítulo, analisa os argumentos mais utilizados pela esquerda, como o da inevitabilidade da história ou da ameaça às inversas, em que não a não mudança é um risco.
Um ponto importante, pois, é que esses argumentos da intransigência não são necessariamente falsos. A mudança não traz, obviamente, mudanças necessariamente positivas. E aqui está um ponto de me incomodou: ele coloca no mesmo saco figuras tão distintas como Burke, Tocqueville, Benjamin Constant. Estão juntos conservadores, liberais, reacionários indistintamente, o que, para mim, é algo equivocado.
De qualquer modo, me parece que o livro tem, como se pode dizer, elementos que instigam a uma reflexão sobre o debate político e a recuperação da retórica como um elemento relevante da vida democrática.
O livro é interessante e tem alguns pontos que realmente estimulam a reflexão. Mas alguns elementos precisam ser mais bem elaborados. A retórica nem sempre é uma palavra que tenha uma conotação positiva. Muitas vezes – e de maneira enganosa – a retórica é vista como uma forma de enganar as pessoas. Não é o caso aqui. A retórica é uma técnica de argumentação utilizada para o convencimento de pessoas. É, pois, um elemento fundamental em uma sociedade democrática, em que a alternância de poder se faz, é claro, por meios não-violentos.
Pois bem, Hirschman – um economista estruturalista, com bastante conhecimento de América Latina – escreveu o texto para entender os argumentos daqueles setores sociais que são contrários à mudança política. Ele encontra três argumentos principais. O primeiro é o da perversidade. O segundo é da futilidade. O terceiro é o da ameaça. O primeiro argumento trata dos efeitos colaterais negativos da mudança. O segundo é o da inutilidade da mudança, ou seja, nada se muda. O terceiro é que arrisca ganhos já existentes na sociedade.
A despeito de ser de esquerda, ele também, em um rápido capítulo, analisa os argumentos mais utilizados pela esquerda, como o da inevitabilidade da história ou da ameaça às inversas, em que não a não mudança é um risco.
Um ponto importante, pois, é que esses argumentos da intransigência não são necessariamente falsos. A mudança não traz, obviamente, mudanças necessariamente positivas. E aqui está um ponto de me incomodou: ele coloca no mesmo saco figuras tão distintas como Burke, Tocqueville, Benjamin Constant. Estão juntos conservadores, liberais, reacionários indistintamente, o que, para mim, é algo equivocado.
De qualquer modo, me parece que o livro tem, como se pode dizer, elementos que instigam a uma reflexão sobre o debate político e a recuperação da retórica como um elemento relevante da vida democrática.
July 5, 2017
ALBERT HIRSCHMANN -Gericiliğin (Reaksiyonerliğin/Muhafazkarlığın) Retoriği :
*İlerici ve muhafazakarların, kesin olmayan fikirlerle anlamlı tartışmalar yaptığı dostça-demokrasi istemeliyiz (Bamberg Katedrali'ndeki Tartışan İki Peygamber figürü gibi).
*Muhafazakârlık argümanı sadece Emir Kipleri ile biçimlenegelmiştir ve reform/ devrimlere şu kategorilerinden saldırır:
-AKSİ TESİRE YOL AÇAR (Fransız Devrimi sonrasında Bonapartizm'e yani despotizme yol açmıştır),
-BOŞUNADIR (Bir şey değilmez; Pareto'nun %80-%20 kuralı hep geçerlidir: bir olayın %80 nedeninden %20 etken sorumludur; %80 para/güç %20'de toplanır)
-MEVCUDU TEHLİKEYE ATAR (1832 ve 67 Britanya Oy Hakkı Reformlarında, 'Britanya Anayasası Kültü' denilen Krallık/Aristokrasi/Demokrasi hassas dengesini tehlikeye atar gerekçesiyle liberal ve muhafazakârların birlikte davranmıştır)
*En temel saldırı eksenleri 2 gruptadır:
-YURTTAŞLIK ve GENEL OY HAKLARI (Kalitesizlik, Sürü içgüdüsüyle hareket, seçme değil seçtirme, aptal çoğunluğun yönetimi ve devletin hâkim sınıfların yağma makinesi haline getirilmesi)
-REFAH DEVLETİ (Sosyal haklar, İşsizlik Sigortası ve sigortadan vergi alınmaması, tembellik ve ahlaksızlık yaratır, alt sınıfları daha da fakirleştirir)
*Muhafazakâr savunmanın temsilcilerinden örnekler:
Burke, Schiller, Malthus, Dickens, Nietzsche, Bentham, Ricardo, Tocqueville, Pareto, Flaubert, Max Scheler, Friedman, Hayek, Huntington.
*İlerici ve muhafazakarların, kesin olmayan fikirlerle anlamlı tartışmalar yaptığı dostça-demokrasi istemeliyiz (Bamberg Katedrali'ndeki Tartışan İki Peygamber figürü gibi).
*Muhafazakârlık argümanı sadece Emir Kipleri ile biçimlenegelmiştir ve reform/ devrimlere şu kategorilerinden saldırır:
-AKSİ TESİRE YOL AÇAR (Fransız Devrimi sonrasında Bonapartizm'e yani despotizme yol açmıştır),
-BOŞUNADIR (Bir şey değilmez; Pareto'nun %80-%20 kuralı hep geçerlidir: bir olayın %80 nedeninden %20 etken sorumludur; %80 para/güç %20'de toplanır)
-MEVCUDU TEHLİKEYE ATAR (1832 ve 67 Britanya Oy Hakkı Reformlarında, 'Britanya Anayasası Kültü' denilen Krallık/Aristokrasi/Demokrasi hassas dengesini tehlikeye atar gerekçesiyle liberal ve muhafazakârların birlikte davranmıştır)
*En temel saldırı eksenleri 2 gruptadır:
-YURTTAŞLIK ve GENEL OY HAKLARI (Kalitesizlik, Sürü içgüdüsüyle hareket, seçme değil seçtirme, aptal çoğunluğun yönetimi ve devletin hâkim sınıfların yağma makinesi haline getirilmesi)
-REFAH DEVLETİ (Sosyal haklar, İşsizlik Sigortası ve sigortadan vergi alınmaması, tembellik ve ahlaksızlık yaratır, alt sınıfları daha da fakirleştirir)
*Muhafazakâr savunmanın temsilcilerinden örnekler:
Burke, Schiller, Malthus, Dickens, Nietzsche, Bentham, Ricardo, Tocqueville, Pareto, Flaubert, Max Scheler, Friedman, Hayek, Huntington.
August 2, 2009
Pretty easy read. Great analysis of political rhetoric in the modern times. The same basic arguments have been made since the French Revolution regarding trying to make political progress towards democracy, liberalism, better living/working conditions. The three types of arguments is that a specific political-economic change will make things worse (perversity), that trying to make such a change will not make things any better (futility) or that it will put all progress so far made into jeopardy. Sometimes the people trying to make these changes adopt the same rhetoric.
This isn't really a partisan book. It is easy to detect where Hirschman's sympathies lie, and what he thinks the truth about the historical record is, but he is more concerned to show that this sort of rhetoric, from either side, doesn't represent useful political discourse.
Good perspective, a great (again, fairly easy and quick) read. Unlike most historians/philosophers, Hirschman writes pretty simply and straightforwardly.
This isn't really a partisan book. It is easy to detect where Hirschman's sympathies lie, and what he thinks the truth about the historical record is, but he is more concerned to show that this sort of rhetoric, from either side, doesn't represent useful political discourse.
Good perspective, a great (again, fairly easy and quick) read. Unlike most historians/philosophers, Hirschman writes pretty simply and straightforwardly.
April 18, 2012
This is a terrific short book by the author of "Exit, Voice,Loyalty" - and like it combines some penetrating thought with historical examples of political and economic rhetoric. The point is to show how discourse that is strongly opposed to political/economic change has some standard lines of attack that can be identified acrosso a wide range of changes. The first is perversity -- that change will lead to the opposite of what those initiating change want - an unintended consequences argument. The second argument is futility- that the change cannot work and so is a great waste of time and effort. The third argument is jeopardy - namely that the costs of change will be significantly higher than the benefits and put the status quo at risk. The key takeaway is that these arguments are generic and seldom depend on the data situation at hand.
This is a very thoughtful book and a fairly quick read - for economic tracts at least.
This is a very thoughtful book and a fairly quick read - for economic tracts at least.
April 19, 2021
The Rhetoric of Reaction is a brilliant book. Although written in the early nineties, Albert Hirschman's book does an incredible job synthesizing three centuries of political debate into a concise, useful framework that is just as relevant today, if not more so. The main thesis is that most opposition to proposals for political reform and "progress"* can be sorted into three main kinds of arguments employed by reactionaries: the perversity thesis, the futility thesis, and the jeopardy thesis.
The perversity thesis argues that we cannot adequately predict the impact of reforms and that a proposed policy will, by virtue of, unintended consequences, actually worsen the problem it seeks to rectify. Relatedly, the futility thesis argues that we don't understand the complex interactions of forces behind the world we observe and therefore, our effort to improve a situation will have little impact. Finally, the jeopardy thesis argues that by implementing some new reform, the benefits of some previously adopted policy/institution/paradigm will be put at risk.
Hirschman presents examples of these reactionary theses from three major progressive movements over the last three centuries: beginning with the struggle for civil citizenship and fundamental rights characterized by the American and French Revolutions; moving on to the fight for political citizenship characterized by steps toward universal suffrage; and continuing on today in social citizenship, best seen in the battles over the welfare state and economic inequality. One quibble I have with this narrative: by framing things in this way, the implication is that because the prior instances of "progress" were in fact positive developments for society, the proposals connected to the third, ongoing movement will likewise yield similar, socially-desirable "progress".
While he is writing from more of a progressive perspective, Hirschman presents his case in a way that is refreshingly humble. Although the book could be described as a critique of conservatism, you get the sense that he is writing to understand rather than to destroy. The tone is one of exposition, not derision. I consider myself a liberally minded person (in the classical sense of concern for liberty and freedom), though I have at times identified with elements of "conservatism" insofar as it advocates for intellectual humility and the careful preservation of values that have been the engine of so much good in the world. Today, I see the conservative movement dominated by right-wing reactionaries who subscribe to dangerous zero-sum worldviews and care less about conserving pluralistic values than about "owning the libs". It's disheartening. In some ways, this book helps me make sense of that shift. But the fundamental insight is that, in biblical terms, there truly is "nothing new under the sun." While context changes, the rhetorical devices of reactionary (and progressive) thought remain relatively consistent.
Hirschman also argues that progressives employ the inverse of the three reactionary theses previously mentioned. This leads to intransigence in political discourse, a circumstance we are all to familiar with. His recommendation? In the closing chapter, he fires a salvo of advice titled "How Not to Argue in a Democracy". The insight offered is that democracy is naturally unstable because it usually formed amid a cease fire between groups who recognize they cannot exert their dominance over the others. They agree to disagree. Democracy then is the process of deliberation between groups who have agreed to disagree. Hirschman says that this deliberation is an "opinion-forming process" that sounds strikingly close to Bayesian rationalism:
The further we stray from that definition of democracy, the more unstable it becomes. Demanding conformity, enforcing compliance, or worst of all, silencing opposing views will only exasperate an already toxic paradigm. Frankly it's scary how militant we have become in our debates. In the public square, often the dominant strategy is to confidently assert your position as fact no matter what. Any attempt at intellectual humility or consideration of alternative views is seen as weakness. And you can't afford to be seen as weak. Heaven forbid if you were to actually update your prior view based on new information. Getting people to believe my answer is always more important than discovering the right answer. You need to "choose a side". After all, you are at war with "the other side".
In contrast to the title of its closing chapter, the book itself serves as an example of "How to Argue in a Democracy". There are no strawmen. No ad hominems. No prima facie dismissal of arguments Hirschman disagrees with. Just a thoughtful, well-researched critique of the reactionary playbook. I don't agree with every assumption, proposition, or conclusion the author makes, but I loved this book. It is incredibly insightful, and I have no doubt it will help me sharpen my own rhetorical skills. More importantly, I also believe that returning to a democracy of deliberation can only happen through more of the intellectual openness found in The Rhetoric of Reaction.
*Note that my use of quotation marks here, and throughout, is not intended as a "scare quote", but simply to point out that the connotation of the word progress presupposes the value of such proposals, when, in fact, that is the central debate that the book aims to address.
The perversity thesis argues that we cannot adequately predict the impact of reforms and that a proposed policy will, by virtue of, unintended consequences, actually worsen the problem it seeks to rectify. Relatedly, the futility thesis argues that we don't understand the complex interactions of forces behind the world we observe and therefore, our effort to improve a situation will have little impact. Finally, the jeopardy thesis argues that by implementing some new reform, the benefits of some previously adopted policy/institution/paradigm will be put at risk.
Hirschman presents examples of these reactionary theses from three major progressive movements over the last three centuries: beginning with the struggle for civil citizenship and fundamental rights characterized by the American and French Revolutions; moving on to the fight for political citizenship characterized by steps toward universal suffrage; and continuing on today in social citizenship, best seen in the battles over the welfare state and economic inequality. One quibble I have with this narrative: by framing things in this way, the implication is that because the prior instances of "progress" were in fact positive developments for society, the proposals connected to the third, ongoing movement will likewise yield similar, socially-desirable "progress".
While he is writing from more of a progressive perspective, Hirschman presents his case in a way that is refreshingly humble. Although the book could be described as a critique of conservatism, you get the sense that he is writing to understand rather than to destroy. The tone is one of exposition, not derision. I consider myself a liberally minded person (in the classical sense of concern for liberty and freedom), though I have at times identified with elements of "conservatism" insofar as it advocates for intellectual humility and the careful preservation of values that have been the engine of so much good in the world. Today, I see the conservative movement dominated by right-wing reactionaries who subscribe to dangerous zero-sum worldviews and care less about conserving pluralistic values than about "owning the libs". It's disheartening. In some ways, this book helps me make sense of that shift. But the fundamental insight is that, in biblical terms, there truly is "nothing new under the sun." While context changes, the rhetorical devices of reactionary (and progressive) thought remain relatively consistent.
Hirschman also argues that progressives employ the inverse of the three reactionary theses previously mentioned. This leads to intransigence in political discourse, a circumstance we are all to familiar with. His recommendation? In the closing chapter, he fires a salvo of advice titled "How Not to Argue in a Democracy". The insight offered is that democracy is naturally unstable because it usually formed amid a cease fire between groups who recognize they cannot exert their dominance over the others. They agree to disagree. Democracy then is the process of deliberation between groups who have agreed to disagree. Hirschman says that this deliberation is an "opinion-forming process" that sounds strikingly close to Bayesian rationalism:
The participants should not have fully or definitavely formed opinions at the outset; they are expcted to engage in meaningful discussion, which means that they should be ready to modify initially held opinions in the light of arguments of other particiapants and also as a result of new information which becomes available in the course of the debate.
The further we stray from that definition of democracy, the more unstable it becomes. Demanding conformity, enforcing compliance, or worst of all, silencing opposing views will only exasperate an already toxic paradigm. Frankly it's scary how militant we have become in our debates. In the public square, often the dominant strategy is to confidently assert your position as fact no matter what. Any attempt at intellectual humility or consideration of alternative views is seen as weakness. And you can't afford to be seen as weak. Heaven forbid if you were to actually update your prior view based on new information. Getting people to believe my answer is always more important than discovering the right answer. You need to "choose a side". After all, you are at war with "the other side".
In contrast to the title of its closing chapter, the book itself serves as an example of "How to Argue in a Democracy". There are no strawmen. No ad hominems. No prima facie dismissal of arguments Hirschman disagrees with. Just a thoughtful, well-researched critique of the reactionary playbook. I don't agree with every assumption, proposition, or conclusion the author makes, but I loved this book. It is incredibly insightful, and I have no doubt it will help me sharpen my own rhetorical skills. More importantly, I also believe that returning to a democracy of deliberation can only happen through more of the intellectual openness found in The Rhetoric of Reaction.
*Note that my use of quotation marks here, and throughout, is not intended as a "scare quote", but simply to point out that the connotation of the word progress presupposes the value of such proposals, when, in fact, that is the central debate that the book aims to address.
Read
May 28, 2021What a wonderful little book—probably the best introduction to Hirschman for non-economists, and an exemplar of his nimble intellectual style.
Hirschman explores how reactionary political arguments are structured, going through the intellectual history of opposition to three major reforms: the establishment of civil rights under the French Revolution; the spread of male suffrage in the 19th century; and the expansion of the welfare state in the 1960s. He finds three main patterns to reactionary rhetoric, that recur again and again regardless of time or place:
Argument from perversity: reform will have the opposite of the intended effect.
Argument from futility: reform will have no effect, particularly for those it is trying to help—or any change will just be surface-level. (This is usually because of some newly invented “iron law” of society, like Pareto’s law.)
Argument from jeopardy: reform will endanger the hard-won gains of the past.
Like many of Hirschman’s classic ideas, once you’ve internalized this classification, it’s impossible to shake loose from your head. You see it everywhere. Just to show you its utility, here’s a quick application to the recent minimum wage debate:
Perversity: Increasing the minimum wage will hurt the poor and vulnerable most of all. (https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/f...)
Futility: Increasing the minimum wage can’t help the poor, because it deviates from the Pareto-optimizing, iron laws of supply and demand. (https://www.aei.org/carpe-diem/why-ar...)
Jeopardy: Increasing the minimum wage will threaten the fragile economic recovery, and hurt society’s most vulnerable most of all. (Back to perversity.) (https://www.cato.org/commentary/econo...)
Of course, identifying recurring patterns in arguments is not the same as showing that the arguments themselves are invalid. Hirschman is careful to point this out. (He even offers, somewhat half-heartedly, three progressive zombie arguments, as mirrors of the conservative ones.) But the recurrence of the patterns suggests that what passes for reasoned objection may actually driven more by the post hoc argumentative needs of deep-rooted opposition.
Hirschman wrote this book because he was alarmed by the rise of Reagan and neoconservatism, but he ends on a note of hope—that by identifying the unthinking structure of reactionary rhetoric, he could clear space for the dialogue that makes the work of democracy possible. Unfortunately, that hope seems rather quaint now.
Hirschman explores how reactionary political arguments are structured, going through the intellectual history of opposition to three major reforms: the establishment of civil rights under the French Revolution; the spread of male suffrage in the 19th century; and the expansion of the welfare state in the 1960s. He finds three main patterns to reactionary rhetoric, that recur again and again regardless of time or place:
Argument from perversity: reform will have the opposite of the intended effect.
Argument from futility: reform will have no effect, particularly for those it is trying to help—or any change will just be surface-level. (This is usually because of some newly invented “iron law” of society, like Pareto’s law.)
Argument from jeopardy: reform will endanger the hard-won gains of the past.
Like many of Hirschman’s classic ideas, once you’ve internalized this classification, it’s impossible to shake loose from your head. You see it everywhere. Just to show you its utility, here’s a quick application to the recent minimum wage debate:
Perversity: Increasing the minimum wage will hurt the poor and vulnerable most of all. (https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/f...)
Futility: Increasing the minimum wage can’t help the poor, because it deviates from the Pareto-optimizing, iron laws of supply and demand. (https://www.aei.org/carpe-diem/why-ar...)
Jeopardy: Increasing the minimum wage will threaten the fragile economic recovery, and hurt society’s most vulnerable most of all. (Back to perversity.) (https://www.cato.org/commentary/econo...)
Of course, identifying recurring patterns in arguments is not the same as showing that the arguments themselves are invalid. Hirschman is careful to point this out. (He even offers, somewhat half-heartedly, three progressive zombie arguments, as mirrors of the conservative ones.) But the recurrence of the patterns suggests that what passes for reasoned objection may actually driven more by the post hoc argumentative needs of deep-rooted opposition.
Hirschman wrote this book because he was alarmed by the rise of Reagan and neoconservatism, but he ends on a note of hope—that by identifying the unthinking structure of reactionary rhetoric, he could clear space for the dialogue that makes the work of democracy possible. Unfortunately, that hope seems rather quaint now.
July 2, 2025
Disclaimer: I've only read about 30% of the book, Chapters 1 and 2 (*)
First, the title should have been "The Rhetoric of Conservative Reaction". That's clear from the description, but not from the title. In any case, in that sense the book clearly takes a political side. For me that is generally a negative sign (no matter the side), but it can definitely be done well and in an engaging way (e.g., The Shock Doctrine). This was definitely not engaging for me. It's easy to understand, but it's boring. Chapter 2 starts with a long (and I mean long!) list of examples of the perversity argument (which, btw, I think is bad name; "the argument to the inverse" or something would be much better). That list was just hard to get through (but I did it because again, I don't put a book down until I've read at least 30%). Even the author admits it at exactly the next subsection, on his reflections on this argument (and he argues that he intentionally added that repetition to show how common this argument has been). I expected then that at least his reflections would be more interesting, and they were indeed slightly more interesting, but I didn't find anything deep.
In short, it's not a bad book, but it's not a great book, and there are many great books I want to get through before settling for "just ok" or "good".
(*) I have a rule that if the book doesn't seem to be worth it up to the first 30%, then I put it away.
First, the title should have been "The Rhetoric of Conservative Reaction". That's clear from the description, but not from the title. In any case, in that sense the book clearly takes a political side. For me that is generally a negative sign (no matter the side), but it can definitely be done well and in an engaging way (e.g., The Shock Doctrine). This was definitely not engaging for me. It's easy to understand, but it's boring. Chapter 2 starts with a long (and I mean long!) list of examples of the perversity argument (which, btw, I think is bad name; "the argument to the inverse" or something would be much better). That list was just hard to get through (but I did it because again, I don't put a book down until I've read at least 30%). Even the author admits it at exactly the next subsection, on his reflections on this argument (and he argues that he intentionally added that repetition to show how common this argument has been). I expected then that at least his reflections would be more interesting, and they were indeed slightly more interesting, but I didn't find anything deep.
In short, it's not a bad book, but it's not a great book, and there are many great books I want to get through before settling for "just ok" or "good".
(*) I have a rule that if the book doesn't seem to be worth it up to the first 30%, then I put it away.
February 8, 2021
I read Hirschman first in my undergraduate course in economics. At that time, I was interested on inequality, growth and development. Little attention to how to get there, that is about politics. In this short essay, the author bring us with an analysis about three waves of political and economic change: French Revolution, universal suffrage (democracy) and Welfare State. He presents an analysis of how the reactionary use some rhetoric apparatus to discredit them. Invoking Burke, Tocqueville, Hayek, Tullock, Pareto, Mosca as source to discuss how the public sphere are framed by ideas and debates. Nowadays, when Democracy deals with economic crises, inequality, conspiracy theories, fake news, the author remember us how to deal with them in the public debate. The change can be very painful, you just need to chose for how long it will last and if worth it.
February 14, 2016
A short, useful, and insightful book about political rhetoric. Hirschman's "The Rhetoric of Reaction" was published in 1991, a time when those on the left and center-left were trying to understand the conservative turn in politics of the past decade. Hirschman focuses not on the conservatives themselves (the psychoanalyzing of political ideology that one can often see), but on their arguments. To do this, he analyzes the responses from reactionaries to three different waves of progress: (1) the wave that produced civil rights, or the rise of individual liberties, starting with the French Revolution, (2) the wave that led to political rights, namely, democracy/universal suffrage, and (3) the wave that led to social rights, i.e., the welfare state.
In examining the arguments used to oppose each wave of progress, he comes up with another triad: perversity, futility, and jeopardy. And he presents examples from each period, noting as well how the arguments can work together (or coexist despite seeming incompatibility).
The perversity thesis is that the contemplated action will have disastrous consequences--it will, in fact, move in the opposite direction of what its proponents claim. One of the most notable examples of this is Burke's writings on the French Revolution. But this was seen as well in how reactionaries claimed that democracy would lead to bureaucratic tyranny or that the welfare state would corrupt its beneficiaries or that a minimum wage increase leaves workers worse off. The perversity thesis presents a volatile world in which providence shatters any good intentions humans may have.
The futility thesis is that the contemplated action will run up against permanent structural characteristics ("laws") of the social order and, thus, end up ineffective. With this focus on "laws," the futility thesis often has a social scientific bent to it. Examples include Alexis de Tocqueville's writings on the French Revolution (in which he claimed that the positive advances were already happening in the first place), Mosca and Pareto's writings of democracy (which argued that divides between the rulers and the ruled or between the elite and the non-elite would resurface regardless of political form), and the writings of conservative economists who claim that money allocated to help the poor will just end up in the hands of the middle class.
The jeopardy thesis argues that the contemplated action, even if desirable in itself, involves unacceptable costs or consequences of one sort or another. We can see this in how opponents of universal suffrage claimed that democracy would be a threat to political liberty and how people like Samuel Huntington and Friedrich Hayek claimed that the welfare state was a threat to democracy.
Although Hirschman starts the book with a focus on reactionary arguments, he spends some time toward the end analyzing simplistic and common arguments used in favor of progressive change. They function as inverses of the reactionary arguments. Rather than arguing that taking action will have disastrous consequences, progressives say that inaction will have disastrous consequences (“imminent danger”). Rather than arguing that social laws render changes futile, progressives say that social laws make change inevitable (“history is on our side”). Rather than arguing that a change will risk past advances, progressives argue for a relationship of mutual support between new and old advances (“synergy illusion”). And the progressive mentality itself is the antipode of the perversity thesis-in viewing the possibility of rebuilding society according to the dictates of reason.
It's a handy framework for analyzing political rhetoric (especially amidst an election season like now) and an encouragement to strengthen (and add nuance to) one's own lines of argumentation.
4.5 stars
In examining the arguments used to oppose each wave of progress, he comes up with another triad: perversity, futility, and jeopardy. And he presents examples from each period, noting as well how the arguments can work together (or coexist despite seeming incompatibility).
The perversity thesis is that the contemplated action will have disastrous consequences--it will, in fact, move in the opposite direction of what its proponents claim. One of the most notable examples of this is Burke's writings on the French Revolution. But this was seen as well in how reactionaries claimed that democracy would lead to bureaucratic tyranny or that the welfare state would corrupt its beneficiaries or that a minimum wage increase leaves workers worse off. The perversity thesis presents a volatile world in which providence shatters any good intentions humans may have.
The futility thesis is that the contemplated action will run up against permanent structural characteristics ("laws") of the social order and, thus, end up ineffective. With this focus on "laws," the futility thesis often has a social scientific bent to it. Examples include Alexis de Tocqueville's writings on the French Revolution (in which he claimed that the positive advances were already happening in the first place), Mosca and Pareto's writings of democracy (which argued that divides between the rulers and the ruled or between the elite and the non-elite would resurface regardless of political form), and the writings of conservative economists who claim that money allocated to help the poor will just end up in the hands of the middle class.
The jeopardy thesis argues that the contemplated action, even if desirable in itself, involves unacceptable costs or consequences of one sort or another. We can see this in how opponents of universal suffrage claimed that democracy would be a threat to political liberty and how people like Samuel Huntington and Friedrich Hayek claimed that the welfare state was a threat to democracy.
Although Hirschman starts the book with a focus on reactionary arguments, he spends some time toward the end analyzing simplistic and common arguments used in favor of progressive change. They function as inverses of the reactionary arguments. Rather than arguing that taking action will have disastrous consequences, progressives say that inaction will have disastrous consequences (“imminent danger”). Rather than arguing that social laws render changes futile, progressives say that social laws make change inevitable (“history is on our side”). Rather than arguing that a change will risk past advances, progressives argue for a relationship of mutual support between new and old advances (“synergy illusion”). And the progressive mentality itself is the antipode of the perversity thesis-in viewing the possibility of rebuilding society according to the dictates of reason.
It's a handy framework for analyzing political rhetoric (especially amidst an election season like now) and an encouragement to strengthen (and add nuance to) one's own lines of argumentation.
4.5 stars
December 5, 2017
I am not sure that I'm fully convinced by Hirschman's attempt to expose "the simplicity of reactionary rhetoric" -I guess I could find some really powerful argumentation among them, even if I am much more inclined to side with progressives in most cases. Hirschman is too brief on individual thinkers. But I liked the book (in the idea that there are identifiable-similar-recurring structures of rhetorics in political thought) and think it is an important text in intellectual history.
July 1, 2012
Awesome. You will think of this book whenever you spot obstructionist drivel, which you will get very good at.
December 25, 2021
I'm in love
February 26, 2024
The Rhetoric of Reaction was illuminating, witty, and thought provoking. The author draws on such a vast compendium of texts and references such a breadth of historical events that I have only a few useful comments. I try to avoid facile comparisons and the urge to interpret history through a modern lens, but most of my thinking about Hirschman’s work centered on how to apply his framework to current day issues.
Hirschman writes that the futility argument was wielded against the anti-poverty reforms of Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society, “...when the charge was often heard that many of the newer social welfare programs served primarily to provide jobs to a large group of administrators, social workers, and sundry professionals who were pictured as power-hungry bureaucrats wholly dedicated to expanding their bureaus and perquisites.” (p. 62-63) I hear this frequently now about DEI initiatives, especially in education.
In Chapter 4 the author discusses the “Cult of the English Constitution” that arose in the 18th century and gained strength after the French Revolution, explaining that“...it was argued that precisely because the [English] “Constitution” had not been created by human intellect it must not be questioned or tampered with by humans or else the privileges of liberty enjoyed uniquely by the English people would likely wither and die.” (p. 91) This brings to mind the deification of America’s founders and constitution.
Contemporary reactions to the 19th century Reform Laws in England, which proposed to extend the voting franchise, included the fear that new voters would support protectionist trade policies over free trade- a parallel to the modern American situation with NAFTA and the intense opposition to it among the working class.. Arguments also included the supposition that new voters would be against all manner of scientific progress, such as vaccinations. That one is still remarkably relevant. But today the group pursuing more overtly non-democratic government is the right, and they’re also now the anti-science cohort.
This book was concise, eloquent and surprisingly clever and funny at times. If you are like me and you don’t usually read books on political theory and economics, you may be a bit overwhelmed or intimidated by Hirschman’s enormous scope, but it’s definitely still a worthwhile read. 4/5 stars.
Hirschman writes that the futility argument was wielded against the anti-poverty reforms of Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society, “...when the charge was often heard that many of the newer social welfare programs served primarily to provide jobs to a large group of administrators, social workers, and sundry professionals who were pictured as power-hungry bureaucrats wholly dedicated to expanding their bureaus and perquisites.” (p. 62-63) I hear this frequently now about DEI initiatives, especially in education.
In Chapter 4 the author discusses the “Cult of the English Constitution” that arose in the 18th century and gained strength after the French Revolution, explaining that“...it was argued that precisely because the [English] “Constitution” had not been created by human intellect it must not be questioned or tampered with by humans or else the privileges of liberty enjoyed uniquely by the English people would likely wither and die.” (p. 91) This brings to mind the deification of America’s founders and constitution.
Contemporary reactions to the 19th century Reform Laws in England, which proposed to extend the voting franchise, included the fear that new voters would support protectionist trade policies over free trade- a parallel to the modern American situation with NAFTA and the intense opposition to it among the working class.. Arguments also included the supposition that new voters would be against all manner of scientific progress, such as vaccinations. That one is still remarkably relevant. But today the group pursuing more overtly non-democratic government is the right, and they’re also now the anti-science cohort.
This book was concise, eloquent and surprisingly clever and funny at times. If you are like me and you don’t usually read books on political theory and economics, you may be a bit overwhelmed or intimidated by Hirschman’s enormous scope, but it’s definitely still a worthwhile read. 4/5 stars.
July 26, 2019
I remember reading Albert Hirschman a long time ago, in college, when I was studying the debt crisis in Latin America during the 1990s... So, against my recollection of Hirschman as a Latin America specialist, this book comes as a big and positive surprise because it goes way beyond economics, while still benefiting from it. This book is essential manifold: for once, it rigorously put the arguments that are typically used against change into a crystal-clear and efficient analytical framework, which Hirschman ended up acknowledging to be useful for conservatives and progressists alike. Although Hirschman does not hide his political inclinations, he is extremely fair when dealing with divergent ideas and explore these themes with genuine and philosophical curiosity. As such, this book ends up as a study about intransigence, as Hirschman himself admits it in the last chapter. It goes beyond conservative rhetoric and expands into all kinds of arguments against "the different, the other": the other is perverse, because it does exactly the opposite he or she says to be done; the other is futile, because he or she can't change how things are supposed to be: or the other is dangerous, because he or she threatens to destroy something we praise and value. Originally written in 1991, this book couldn't be more pertinent to the problems of our time...
March 21, 2020
For a text that reads like a peer-reviewed dissertation, an often wordy and high-minded study of reactionary political arguments, there is much to take away and process for anyone willing to concede, on either side of partisanship, that the means to our successful and peaceful human co-existence demands a better, more realistic approach to conversation and debate. Hirschman suggests that all political reactions to new endeavors are rooted in one of three points of view, either that such new actions, as progressive as they usually are, will make things worse, that they will accomplish nothing at all, or that they will create a series of other unintended and more dire consequences, brought about by the naivety of the actor(s).
But in presenting these arguments, Hirschman also notes their flaws of impossibly arrogant foresight, as if every argument against every idea were capable of guaranteeing, without question, the failed ends of whatever well-intentioned means were considered. And in the end, we are left to ask conservative reactionaries whether, in the core of their objections, they truly wish to discourage any and every proactive effort or idea within humankind, whether there is ever an idea that they would concede was worth a shot, whether it came from the mind of a progressive or anyone else.
But in presenting these arguments, Hirschman also notes their flaws of impossibly arrogant foresight, as if every argument against every idea were capable of guaranteeing, without question, the failed ends of whatever well-intentioned means were considered. And in the end, we are left to ask conservative reactionaries whether, in the core of their objections, they truly wish to discourage any and every proactive effort or idea within humankind, whether there is ever an idea that they would concede was worth a shot, whether it came from the mind of a progressive or anyone else.
September 18, 2022
The attempt in the final chapter to frame the book as a guide to improving democratic dialogue is unconvincingly naïve; it reads more like a self-conscious attempt to give import to what Hirschman admits a couple of times is largely a cathartic self-indulgent exercise. Personally, I don't think there's any shame in producing a book-length version of affecting a stupid-guy voice and saying "that's seriously what you guys have sounded like for the past 200 years."
Nevertheless, a valuable and easy read that already has me recognizing the three theses in the discourse of today's centrist pundits, politicians, and even sports media. The focus of the book is on the rhetoric of publicly influential opponents of the three waves of Western progressive movements as identified by the sociologist TH Marshall: the rise of individual liberties associated with the French Revolution, the spread of suffrage beyond the aristocratic class, and the 20th-century establishment of welfare programs. A thought I kept returning to throughout was that there is an article or book to be written similarly identifying the inherently status-quo-preserving qualities of modern economics. In my mind, this would entail categorizing biases inherent in dominant methodological and theoretical paradigms into his three neat theses.
Hirschman would be great at Twitter. I'd follow him.
Nevertheless, a valuable and easy read that already has me recognizing the three theses in the discourse of today's centrist pundits, politicians, and even sports media. The focus of the book is on the rhetoric of publicly influential opponents of the three waves of Western progressive movements as identified by the sociologist TH Marshall: the rise of individual liberties associated with the French Revolution, the spread of suffrage beyond the aristocratic class, and the 20th-century establishment of welfare programs. A thought I kept returning to throughout was that there is an article or book to be written similarly identifying the inherently status-quo-preserving qualities of modern economics. In my mind, this would entail categorizing biases inherent in dominant methodological and theoretical paradigms into his three neat theses.
Hirschman would be great at Twitter. I'd follow him.
November 27, 2021
A surprisingly less popular work of Hirschman that is just as important today as the day it was published. Creating a framework to analyze the common rhetorical tropes conservatives have used for the past 400 years, Hirschman explicates in detail the Perversity thesis, Futility thesis , and Jeopardy thesis.
Anyone not living in a cave for the last 15 year (or 15 days!) would recognize all three of these being employed ad nauseum from the right. These three rhetorical techniques have truly been supercharged and weaponized with the advent of 24 hours news and the bifurcation of information streams with the rise of social media.
In the last section of this book, Hirschman shows how progressives use the inverse of these rhetorical techniques, to less of a successful effect. As Hirschman said “Progressives have remained mired in earnestness. Most of them have been long on moral indignation and short on irony.” Previously stating that conservatives have effectively used the potent weapon of irony with a clear advantage over progressives in this decisive department. I will however admit his points were very illuminating and showed some of my own biases, which I appreciated.
Anyone not living in a cave for the last 15 year (or 15 days!) would recognize all three of these being employed ad nauseum from the right. These three rhetorical techniques have truly been supercharged and weaponized with the advent of 24 hours news and the bifurcation of information streams with the rise of social media.
In the last section of this book, Hirschman shows how progressives use the inverse of these rhetorical techniques, to less of a successful effect. As Hirschman said “Progressives have remained mired in earnestness. Most of them have been long on moral indignation and short on irony.” Previously stating that conservatives have effectively used the potent weapon of irony with a clear advantage over progressives in this decisive department. I will however admit his points were very illuminating and showed some of my own biases, which I appreciated.
September 19, 2023
Precioso, nunca había leído nada de Hirschman y la verdad que es una hermosa puerta de entrada este libro en la edición de Capital Intelectual, el estudio introductorio sirve para conocer mejor a este gran economista.
El libro es un agudo análisis de los más recurrentes argumentos reaccionarios en contra de distintos avances sociales, mostrando cómo estos se repiten a lo largo del tiempo y remiten a esquemas básicos muy arraigados en la argumentación humana, que se remontan a los mitos y a ciertos refranes muy repetidos. Termina volviéndose un alegato bien fundado contra el dogmatismo ideológico, ya que Hirschman descubre que estos argumentos reaccionarios también anidan en ciertos discursos aparentemente progresistas, que caen en una visión esquemática de los procesos sociales.
La verdad la pluma de Hirschman es extraordinaria, aguda y culta, sin pretensiones de imponer un relato totalizador, se vuelve muy convincente al lector por ello mismo, porque es humilde pero a la vez muy certera, termina convenciendo por eso mismo, porque es una invitación al debate, a la apertura de las ideas.
El libro es un agudo análisis de los más recurrentes argumentos reaccionarios en contra de distintos avances sociales, mostrando cómo estos se repiten a lo largo del tiempo y remiten a esquemas básicos muy arraigados en la argumentación humana, que se remontan a los mitos y a ciertos refranes muy repetidos. Termina volviéndose un alegato bien fundado contra el dogmatismo ideológico, ya que Hirschman descubre que estos argumentos reaccionarios también anidan en ciertos discursos aparentemente progresistas, que caen en una visión esquemática de los procesos sociales.
La verdad la pluma de Hirschman es extraordinaria, aguda y culta, sin pretensiones de imponer un relato totalizador, se vuelve muy convincente al lector por ello mismo, porque es humilde pero a la vez muy certera, termina convenciendo por eso mismo, porque es una invitación al debate, a la apertura de las ideas.
December 1, 2021
Hirschmann , centriste libéral affirmé , nous présente à travers 3 évènements historique , 3 thèse réactionnaires autant à gauche qu’à droite. L’inanité , l’effet pervers et la mise en péril sont les 3 rhétorique réactionnaire qui reviennent dans l’histoire. Évalué selon 3 événements historiques qui sont : le révolution française , le suffrage universel et l’état providence. Donc c’est à travers le schéma marshallien que l’auteur effectue sont analyse : droits civils , droits politique et droits socio-économiques. Bonne lecture , bien monté , super facile à lire quant à sa forme et sa structure. J’ai reconnu beaucoup de réaction de plusieurs personnes dans mon entourage et dans ma famille immédiate. Bon outil pour certains débat avec des camarades. L’événement du suffrage universel est révélateur historiquement de la peur des élites envers les classes laborieuses , vraiment un des aspects qui m’a le plus interpellé.
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