The Blood Telegram: Nixon, Kissinger, and a Forgotten Genocide

by Gary J. Bass

A riveting history—the first full account—of the involvement of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger in the 1971 atrocities in Bangladesh that led to war between India and Pakistan, shaped the fate of Asia, and left in their wake a host of major strategic consequences for the world today.

Giving an astonishing inside view of how the White House really works in a crisis, The Blood Telegram is an unprecedented chronicle of a pivotal but little-known chapter of the Cold War. Gary J. Bass shows how Nixon and Kissinger supported Pakistan’s military dictatorship as it brutally quashed the results of a historic free election. The Pakistani army launched a crackdown on what was then East Pakistan (today an independent Bangladesh), killing hundreds of thousands of people and sending ten million refugees fleeing to India—one of the worst humanitarian crises of the twentieth century.

Nixon and Kissinger, unswayed by detailed warnings of genocide from American diplomats witnessing the bloodshed, stood behind Pakistan’s military rulers. Driven not just by Cold War realpolitik but by a bitter personal dislike of India and its leader Indira Gandhi, Nixon and Kissinger actively helped the Pakistani government even as it careened toward a devastating war against India. They silenced American officials who dared to speak up, secretly encouraged China to mass troops on the Indian border, and illegally supplied weapons to the Pakistani military—an overlooked scandal that presages Watergate.

Drawing on previously unheard White House tapes, recently declassified documents, and extensive interviews with White House staffers and Indian military leaders, The Blood Telegram tells this thrilling, shadowy story in full. Bringing us into the drama of a crisis exploding into war, Bass follows reporters, consuls, and guerrilla warriors on the ground—from the desperate refugee camps to the most secretive conversations in the Oval Office.

Bass makes clear how the United States’ embrace of the military dictatorship in Islamabad would mold Asia’s destiny for decades, and confronts for the first time Nixon and Kissinger’s hidden role in a tragedy that was far bloodier than Bosnia. This is a revelatory, compulsively readable work of politics, personalities, military confrontation, and Cold War brinksmanship. 

Genres: History, Nonfiction, Politics, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, War

500 pages, Hardcover

First published September 24, 2013

About the author

Gary Bass, a professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University, is the author of The Blood Telegram: Nixon, Kissinger, and a Forgotten Genocide (Knopf); Freedom's Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention (Knopf); and Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals (Princeton).

The Blood Telegram was a Pulitzer Prize finalist in general nonfiction and won the Council on Foreign Relations' Arthur Ross Book Award, the Lionel Gelber Prize, the Asia Society's Bernard Schwartz Book Award, the Cundill Prize in Historical Literature, the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations' Robert H. Ferrell Book Prize, and the Ramnath Goenka Award in India. It was also a New York Times and Washington Post notable book of the year, and a best book of the year in The Economist, Financial Times, The New Republic, and Kirkus Reviews. Freedom's Battle was a New York Times notable book of the year and a Washington Post best book of the year.

Bass has written articles for International Security, Philosophy & Public Affairs, The Yale Journal of International Law, The Michigan Law Review, Daedalus, NOMOS, and other journals, as well as numerous book chapters in edited volumes. A former reporter for The Economist, Bass has written often for The New York Times, as well as writing for The New Yorker, The Washington Post, The Los Angeles Times, The New Republic, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, and other publications.

Reviews

[Raghu Nathan · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book brings back vivid memories for me as I lived through the 1970-71 East Pakistan crisis as a young man in India. The author shows us a picture of the events leading to the creation of an independent Bangladesh from the vantage points of the US consulate in Dacca and the White House. To a lesser extent, there is also the view from New Delhi, both from the Indian govt and the US embassy. To say the least, I was shocked to read about the visceral hatred that Kissinger, Nixon and Zhou-en-Lai had for India and Indians and the impunity with which Nixon flouted US law in conducting foreign policy. In fact, one can see that Watergate, which happened some 12 months later, was only a matter of time because Nixon had such disregard for the law of his own land.

One is used to foreign policy being conducted by most nations in a dispassionate manner, with their own nations' interests being the prime focus. But here, we see emotions and prejudice and sheer hatred dominating the thinking of both Nixon and Kissinger. Their private oval office conversations border on the extreme with Nixon saying in one place that what India needs is a mass famine and asking why India does not shoot the refugees if they find the millions an unbearable burden. The book says that Nixon was inclined to like the Pak military men because he was treated effusively when he visited them whereas Indian leaders were aloof and proud during his meetings with them in the 1950s. It seems a feudal mindset to make foreign policy decisions based on such flimsy reasons. For his part, Henry Kissinger also comes off as reckless and maniacal as he tries to goad China into threatening India, thereby risking a widening of the conflict into a direct clash between the USSR and the US.

Even though Kissinger himself admits that they would have supported Pakistan whether the 'China opening in 1971' was there or not, the idea has gained currency that the indebtedness to Md.Yahya Khan for enabling the 'China opening' was a major reason for the bizarre hostility of the US towards India and its indifference to the massacre of Bengalis. However, If one looks at history, one can see that the US has constantly been in debt to the Pak military. In the 1950s, the US needed to launch U2 flights over the USSR from Peshawar and so they had to keep Pak in good humor. In 1970-71, it was the 'China opening'. In the 80s, it was because the Reagan administration needed them to bleed the USSR in Afghanistan. The 90s looked as though the indebtedness would be over but then 9/11 happened and the US, in the 21st century, again needed the Pak military to carry on the action in Afghanistan. From India, it looks as though the US view of Geo-politics is such that it will always need to cosy up with the military dictators in Pakistan for some reason or other.

However, it is all not negative news on the US front in 1971. The story won't be complete without the gallant, humane and honest officers in the State Dept, Sen.Ted Kennedy and journalists like Sydney Schanberg of NYT. Archer Blood, the Consul General in Dacca, and his deputies put up a tremendous struggle against the policy conducted by Nixon. In the process, many of them jeopardised their careers for good. Kenneth Keating, the US ambassador to India, was another sterling personality, fighting his own govt's indifference to genocide. Ted Kennedy visited India and toured the refugee centers and fought for the Bengalis in Capitol Hill. In a lighter vein, it so happened that while the massive blood letting and killings were going on in East Pakistan, the three officers in the Dacca Consulate who fought for justice for the Bengalis, were named Blood, Butcher and Killgore!

For me as a person of Indian origin, it was a surprise to read that 90% of all those 10 million refugees from East Bengal were Hindus. This information was never highlighted in the Indian media in 1970-71. I think it was good that they did not because otherwise, we might have had to deal with sectarian groups in India which would have tried to convert the crisis into a crisis for Muslims in India. The other point is that India, for all its proclamations of non-alignment and third-world solidarity, found itself completely without friends from the world at large and was censured in the UN General Assembly. India had to depend on the USSR mostly for diplomatic support and had to fund the refugee relief mainly from its own impoverished masses. India's 'friends' in the Islamic world, like Jordan, Turkey, Iran and Egypt, transferred fighter aircrafts to bolster their Islamic brethern in Pak, even though India had more Muslims than Pakistan in 1971! It shows the deep failure of India's conduct of foreign policy in the early years after independence. The Indian edition of the book has the strange title 'India's Secret war in East Pakistan'. Even for ordinary citizens like me in India in 1971, there was nothing secretive about India's involvement in East Pakistan as early as March 1971. We used to habitually joke that it was probably the Bengal regiment of the Indian army that is euphemistically called Mukti Bahini! Finally, it is a matter of pride for India's pluralist society that the three Generals who conducted and won the war were a Sikh (J.S.Aurora), a Parsi (Sam Manekshaw) and a Sephardic Jew(Rafael-Jacob).

This review won't be complete without a prescient observation from the Indian Muslim scholar, Maulana Azad in 1946, prior to the partition of the sub-continent on religious lines. He said, " The moment the creative warmth of Pakistan cools down, the contradictions will emerge and will acquire assertive overtones. These will be fuelled by the clash of interests of international powers and consequently both wings will separate...After the separation of East Pakistan, whenever it happens, West Pakistan will become the battleground of regional contradictions and disputes within itself".

This book demolishes the carefully choreographed attempts of Nixon and Kissinger in later years to project themselves as great foreign policy wizards. Nixon didn't survive to read this book but Kissinger is still alive and strutting the world as an elder statesman, with eminent journalists fawning over him. I wonder what he would say for himself. The book is extensively researched using new archival material from India and the US and declassified White house tapes. It makes for fast-paced reading and makes important points to ponder for Indians, Americans, Pakistanis and anyone else interested in this chapter of the sub-continent's history.

[Mal Warwick · Rating 5 out of 5]

When Americans today think of Richard Nixon, four or five episodes in his public life usually come to mind: Watergate, the Cambodia invasion, the opening to China, his TV debates with John F. Kennedy, and, perhaps, his kitchen confrontation with Nikita Khrushchev when still Dwight Eisenhower’s vice president. Nixon’s frantic efforts to sanitize his record — including ten books he wrote after resigning from the presidency — and the cult of secrecy that envelops the US government have obscured another history-changing episode: his and Henry Kissinger’s inexcusable collaboration in murdering hundreds of thousands of people in 1971 in what today is Bangladesh.

Nixon and Kissinger complicity in that genocidal event has finally come to light in Gary J. Bass’ outstanding work of modern history, The Blood Telegram. Bass, a professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University, makes effective use of newly opened secret archives and other primary sources as well as interviews with many of the surviving players in the drama.

Acting out of spite toward Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi (whom they loathed) and disdain for all Indians in general (whom they dismissed as liars) as well as inexplicable regard for Pakistan’s brutal (and reportedly stupid) military dictator Yahya Kahn, Nixon and Kissinger forced the US government into taking sides between the two bitter enemies. They actively supported the Pakistani military’s genocidal campaign in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) to suppress the popular democratic movement that had won a huge election majority there.

Despite continuing resistance from the Foreign Service, the State Department hierarchy, and sometimes the Pentagon and the White House staff as well, the two men shipped arms and ammunition to the Pakistani army again and again as it marched throughout East Pakistan, murdering at least 300,000 Bengalis (most of them Hindus) and forcing ten million of them across the border into India as refugees.

Their support for Yahya was so single-minded that Nixon and Kissinger revealed highly classified information to the Chinese leadership in hopes of persuading them to move troops to the Indian border to disrupt Indian plans to halt the genocide. Even worse, considering the Soviet Union to be India’s faithful ally, they warned the USSR to back off, running a real risk of nuclear confrontation. The whole sad business finally ended only when India attacked and trounced the Pakistani army, freeing the East Bengals to establish an independent Bangladesh.

If Bangladesh to you is merely a faraway place where thousands die in collapsing garment factories, you may need a brief lesson in the geopolitics of 1971 to understand just how important these actions were. Anti-communist rhetoric was still the order of the day in Washington, especially under Richard Nixon, who’d made his career on the backs of liberals he accused of softness on Communism. In Moscow, Leonid Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin called the shots, and Mao Tse-Tung was still very much in control of China, his Cultural Revolution engulfing the country.

Partly out of his own instincts and partly under the tutelage of Henry Kissinger, then the head of his National Security Council, Nixon looked on the world cold-bloodedly through the lens of the 19th century concept of the “balance of power.” Since the USSR and China were then at odds, having fought a series of border skirmishes, it behooved the USA to drive an even deeper wedge between them. Hence, Nixon’s opening to China, still a closely-held secret while the events in East Pakistan began to unfold. Similarly, since India relied on the Soviet Union for arms — the US would sell her none — then it was convenient for Nixon and Kissinger to support any move by Pakistan. In any case they liked its dictator far more on a personal level than the elected prime minister of the world’s largest democracy. A contributing factor was Yahya Kahn’s personal role in facilitating the now-famous dialogue involving Nixon, Kissinger, Mao, and Chinese Foreign Secretary Chou En-Lai, serving as their go-between.

Geopolitics aside, what is most troubling about this episode is the extent to which Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger’s mean-spirited personalities dominated their policies — dismissing out of hand as Indian propaganda repeated warnings from their own Foreign Service about the use of American arms in Pakistan’s genocidal campaign, trash-talking about every Indian leader involved in the events, and shrugging off warnings from the State Department, the Pentagon, and even their own White House that they were breaking US law.

[Savi · Rating 4 out of 5]

I have always loved non fiction over fiction. And then I discovered the world of political histories. My grandfather migrated from Bangladesh to India in 1947, right before Independence. So technically he wasn't termed as an Bangladeshi immigrant, the tag given to Bengali Hindus who were displaced during the creation of Bangladesh. However, the angst and sense of displacement remained forever with my father. I could never understand why and how he could feel so connected to the land of Bangladesh, which in my mind was just another nuisance creating nation across the border. While reading this book, I realized some of it. The almost neutral tone, factual details and apolitical insight into the actual incidents once again amplify the fact that it is not people who want war, it's power lust individuals who feed into violence to sustain themselves. And the story is no different in any civilization. This book is an intriguing read into the psychology of leaders of three completely different nations, who unfortunately forgot to consider the price of human lives lost in this battle. And for the first time and the only time, Indira Gandhi took a step that wasn't driven by despotism and autocracy.

[Amit · Rating 5 out of 5]

5.0 ⭐️

GENRE - NON FICTION / POLITICAL HISTORY

Archer Kent Blood an American Diplomat who served as the last Consul General to Dacca, East Pakistan present day Bangladesh. The book revolves around a telegram Archer Blood sent to the State department condemning the American support of Pakistan who lightly took the Pakistani Military actions against its Bengali speaking east Pakistani subjects, According to blood the mass murdering of Civilians mostly Bengali Hindus men, women and Children and Raping of over 2 million women by the Pakistan Military was shameful and America was supporting the wrong party because eventually East Pakistan will separate from West Pakistan to become Bangladesh. Post this telegram Archer Blood was side lined from the American Foreign Service for showing decent and eventually retired in 1982 out of frustration. Archer Blood was some one who could not sell his soul to Please his Bosses back in America “Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and President Richard Nixon”

The book is also based on the White House tapes of the conversations of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger with Americans and Indians who witnessed and participated in the events of those times.

According to the book the Americans knew what West Pakistan was doing in East Pakistan surprisingly I also got to know through this book that :-

1) About 80% of massacred Bengali people were Hindus systematically done my West Pakistan by the Weapons provided by the US.

2) The US asked China to attack India, brought its 7th fleet into the Bay of Bengal, ordered Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iran to provide War planes and ammunition to Pakistan.

3) Indira Gandhi was an Iron Lady who stood firmly in front Kissinger and Richard Nixon who hated her and called her a “BITCH”, if it wasn’t for her I don’t think anyone at that time had the courage to go to war with the US backed Pakistan.

4) Americans very well knew Indian Armed Forces would finish Pakistan within a week if not 10 days!

5) India was never considered an ally for the near future and China was highly looked upon by the Americans and considering today’s US China relationship this was a shocker to me!!!

A very well written and documented book by Gary J. Bass kept me engaged and interested right till the end I haven read a better Political History book that has been interesting and well compiled so far in my life.

HIGHLY RECOMMENDED!!!!

Thank You 🙏 🙂👍

[Steven Z. · Rating 5 out of 5]

When one considers the foreign policy pursued by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger decisions related to Southeast Asia and relations with the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union come to mind. In discussing Southeast Asia, the strategy pursued to end the war in Vietnam is front and center resulting in revisiting the “supposed” plan to end the war known as “Vietnamization” that emerged during the 1968 presidential campaign. This promise to end the war was nothing more than the withdrawal of American troops and replacing them on the front lines with South Vietnamese soldiers and increasing American bombing. As we know this policy also led to the illegal bombing of Cambodia and the “search” for North Vietnam’s headquarters in that war torn country. The Nixon/Kissinger strategy resulted in prolonging the war in Vietnam and the facilitation of the rise of the murderous Pol Pot regime in Pnom Penh and the genocide of the Cambodian people. Along with the foreign policy issues it resulted in domestic unrest symbolized by the deaths at Kent State, and illegal actions taken by Kissinger against his own staff to plug information leaks. This was not the finest hour for American diplomacy, however once we turn to the 1971 opening with the People’s Republic of China and the Shanghai Communique of 1972, and the pursuit of linkage and Détente with the Soviet Union the Nixon/Kissinger realpolitik takes on a different hue.

When analyzing the Nixon/Kissinger approach to foreign affairs many seem to forget events in Southwest Asia, in particular, March 25, 1971 when the Pakistan army began its ruthless crackdown on Bengalis throughout East Pakistan in what today is called Bangladesh, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of thousands and ten million refugees. Some would argue that the Nixon administration were following their Cold War calculations in arming the Pakistani army as the president and his national security advisor held India, a Soviet ally at the time in great disdain. With Pakistan’s military dictator, General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan helping to set up the opening with China the Nixon administration was not about to criticize Pakistan’s crackdown in Dacca, East Pakistan. What resulted was an onslaught that lasted months rivaling other genocides like Rwanda and Bosnia. While the United States was not involved directly in these two examples, in East Pakistan American culpability was high as it was supporting the murderous Pakistani regime with weapons and equipment. Estimates range up to 500,000 deaths and reflects the moral bankruptcy of the Nixon administration. Fortunately, Gary Bass has written THE BLOOD TELEGRAM: NIXON, KISSINGER AND A FORGOTTEN GENOCIDE to remind us of what transpired.

Archer Blood was the United States’ counsel general in Dacca and he and his staff witnessed one of the worst atrocities of the Cold War and documented its horrific detail by informing the higher-ups at the State Department. Despite the on the scene reporting of events, officials led by Nixon and Kissinger chose to ignore what was occurring and did little to ameliorate the situation. What Bass has written is a detailed account of events and Archer Blood’s attempt to raise the consciousness of an administration that in many cases had none. In his review of Bass’ book in The Wall Street Journal on September 20, 2013, a former chairman of Dow Jones and Company, Peter R. Kann argued that the atrocities that resulted from Pakistani actions in East Pakistan were unacceptable, but necessary because the Islamabad government headed by Agha Muhammad Yahya Kahn was the conduit between the United States and Communist China that would culminate in President Nixon’s historic visit to Beijing in 1972. For Kann and his ilk, it seemed it was acceptable to sacrifice the Bengali people in the hundreds of thousands to proffer an agreement that theoretically helped extricate the United States from Vietnam, deal a diplomatic blow to the Soviet Union, and undo twenty two years of American non-recognition of Communist China.

After reading Gary Bass’ excellent account of events this is an analysis that is hard to accept. Bass lays out the lack of ethnic and religious viability that resulted from the 1947 partition of India that created East and West Pakistan and their Muslim and Hindu populations. He explores the events that led to the West Pakistani invasion of the East in March, 1971 as elections brought the victory of the Bengali Awami League under the leadership of Sheik Mujib-ur-Rahman, who incidentally were very favorable to the United States. Since it appeared that Mujib, a Bengali Hindu might form a government and replace Yahya, the Pakistani military could not sit back. When the Islamabad government backed away from the election results Bengali nationalists and the Awami League began to demonstrate and it appeared that East Bengal might secede from Pakistan. Negotiations failed and on March 25, 1971, the Pakistani military under Yahya’s orders launched an attack against the 75,000,000 Pakistani citizens in the East. The results were horrific. By September over five million refugees poured into India and thousands of Hindus were killed, many were targeted and tortured and it appeared the disaster that resulted from the 1947 partition was repeating itself.

Bass’ narrative is an indictment of the conduct of foreign policy pursued by Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon. Archer Blood and his cohorts in the American consulate in Dacca reported accurate description of the mass killings by West Pakistani troops in the east, particularly Hindus, who made up only 16-17% of the population, but were 90% of the refugees. Blood’s “selective genocide” telegram spoke of the genocide against the Hindu population and recommended that the United States pressure Yahya’s forces to disengage from the killings and atrocities and use American economic aid and weapons as a wedge to gain compliance. Blood and Scott Butcher his junior political officer couldn’t believe the “silence” that emanated from Washington to their reports. For Kissinger and Nixon, Blood and Butcher represented the “bleeding heart liberals” who inhabited the State Department. Bass describes in detail, using White House tapes and other documentation to provide the reader with a window into the Kissinger/Nixon mindset. For Kissinger, Blood was a “maniac” who would destroy his plans to open relations with China. Nixon refused to pressure Yahya since he was relaying correspondence between Chinese Premier Zhou En-Lai that would lead to an invitation for Nixon to visit China. Archer’s continued correspondence and support within the State Department angered Kissinger and Secretary of State William Rogers and led to Archer’s departure from Dacca and the ruining of his diplomatic career.

The crux of the issue was that the United States was supplying the weaponry that the Pakistani government was using to crush any Bengali opposition in East Pakistan. American F86 Sabre jet fighters, M-24 Chaffee tanks and jeeps mounted with machine guns were the weapons of choice for the Islamabad dictatorship. In fact 50-80% of Pakistani military equipment was supplied by the United States. The American response to the carnage was a resounding “no” to pressuring Yahya. American intelligence and State Department analysis led by Harold Saunders and others predicted that there was no way that Yahya’s forces could prevent a Bengali victory in the emerging civil war and that the country would break apart in creating the new country of Bangladesh. This evidence fell on deaf ears at the White House.

Bass does a commendable job exploring the role of India and its Prime Minister Indira Gandhi throughout the crisis which would eventually result in war. Gandhi tried to couch events in terms of the humanitarian needs of the Bengali people. However, Bass assiduous exploration of Indian documents reflects Indian plans for war against Pakistan early on in the crisis. Bass quotes the leading figures in Gandhi’s national security establishment in reaching his conclusions. Though India was the world’s largest democracy, Kissinger and Nixon despised Gandhi and held a marked antipathy toward India that bordered on racism. They both held a high opinion of Yahya, so any rapprochement with Gandhi was a non-starter. Gandhi’s opinion of Nixon was in kind and there meetings where stilted at best.

Bass’ descriptions of the atrocities committed by both sides is heart rendering. His portraits of the leading historical figures and reporters provides background information that enhance the readers understanding of events. Bass’ discussion of the split within the State Department is fascinating as the American Ambassador to Islamabad James Farland castigated Archer, while Kenneth Keating, the American Ambassador to India supported the American consul. Everyone stationed in Dacca supported Archer, but those in Washington were pressured to toe the Kissinger line.

As Bass correctly points out the world’s response to events was also enlightening. India, a country with its own issues of poverty and disease was ill equipped to deal with the influx of millions of refugees. The outbreak of cholera killed 6000 people each day and the response of the United Nations and the world community was weak at best. One must remember that events were occurring in the midst of the Cold War where the Soviet Union was a supporter of India, Communist China and the United States stood behind Pakistan, and India and Pakistan saw each other as the devil incarnate. One must also remember that Pakistan and India had fought a war in 1965, and China and the Soviet Union had fought a nasty border skirmish in 1969. Any diplomatic or military moves that might have been taken must be seen in this context. In addition, India found itself supporting the secession of what would become Bangladesh from Pakistan, at the same time it was crushing its own Kashmiri secessionist movement in Kashmir. History makes for some interesting dilemmas! According to Bass, as the refugee crisis deepened by September, 1971 war between India and Pakistan became inevitable.

The Kissinger-Nixon strategy of denial of what was occurring in East Pakistan is a fantasy as a September, 1971 CIA report argued that over 200,000 had been killed and that an ongoing “ethnic campaign” showed that almost 90% of the almost 10 million refugees flooding into India were Hindus. These figures were also verified by a Pakistani general so the administrations “supposed” ignorance was a fabrication. As the situation became dire, Indira Gandhi had already decided on war, but postponed a final decision until winter arrived which would block any intervention by China. Bass does an exceptional job describing the diplomatic maneuvering between the Soviet Union as it signed a Treaty of Friendship with India, the Nixon administrations belated attempts to get Yahya to control his military, and to its credit Nixon did increase economic aid for the refugees to the tune of almost $250 million.

The most fascinating aspect to the crisis as war approached was the dialogue between India and the United States. Nixon was obsessed that a war between India and Pakistan could ruin his opening to China. In fact, Kissinger suggested that the United States ask China to move troops to the Indian border to send a strong message not to attack Pakistan. The meetings between Gandhi and Nixon in Washington in November, 1971 reflected the disdain the two leaders felt for each other. The Nixon tapes highlight the President’s characterization of Gandhi as that “old bitch,” and the Indian Prime Minister’s view of the Nixon was reciprocated.

Bass describes the Pakistani attack on December 3, 1971 (India had planned to attack the next day), the conduct of the war, and the resulting diplomacy and what is clear from the book and its impeccable sources is that if the Nixon administration had handled Yahya differently, the crisis that resulted in the creation of Bangladesh might have evolved differently. War may have ultimately ensued, but did 250-500,000 people have to die, along with the creation of over 10,000,000 refugees before full scale combat ensued?

This episode in American diplomacy seems to have been forgotten, but Gary Bass’ fine book brings it to light and forces one to question the cavalier attitude Kissinger and Nixon felt for the people of southwest Asia typified by the president’s characterization of Pakistan as “they’re just a bunch of brown goddamn Moslems.” (216) The tactics employed by Kissinger and Nixon to try and bend India’s will to US interests during the war were appalling as Nixon gave the Soviet Union deadlines, encouraged the Chinese to scare India, and dispatching the USS Enterprise task force into the Gulf of Bengal. When Pakistani forces suffered the loss of equipment in large quantities, Nixon answered Yahya’s request for arms by gaining the support of the Shah of Iran and King Hussein of Jordan to transfer US equipment to Pakistan. With shades of the future Iran-Contra travesty over Nicaragua, the US promised to replace the equipment once the war ended despite the fact that it was illegal. As the war was finally brought to a conclusion, the vindictive Nixon reemerged as he wanted to punish India, liberals domestically, and anyone who had opposed his policies during the previous ten months. Once a ceasefire was a foregone conclusion, Nixon said, “I’d like to do it in a certain way that pisses on the Indians.” (319) Bass’ book is based on exemplary primary research and should be considered the most complete work on the events in southwest Asia in 1971, and should attract anyone interested in a largely forgotten topic that has not gotten its due.

[Aaron Million · Rating 5 out of 5]

By no means am I any kind of an expert on Richard Nixon or Henry Kissinger. However, after having read many books both by and about both men, I must say that the more I do read about them, their actions, and their vulgar words, the less highly I think of each of them. That feeling is reinforced after reading Gary Bass' outstanding work depicting the India-Pakistan war of 1971. While I am aware of this war just based on previous readings, in particular Kissinger's White House Years, my knowledge was superficial and quite limited, in addition to relying greatly on Kissinger's self-serving view in his memoirs. Thanks to Bass, we now have a much clearer picture of just what Nixon and Kissinger were doing and saying in Washington, and how immoral both men were on this subject.

Yahya Kahn was a personal friend of Nixon's dating back to the 1950s, when Nixon was Vice-President. He was also a dictator who, angry with the election results in early 1971 concerning East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), decided to commit genocide against his own people, in effect trying to cleanse it of all of the Hindus in Bengali. At the time Pakistan was divided into East and West portions, with the giant, enemy country of India in between. East Pakistan, if not wanting to totally separate, at a minimum wanted Bengal to be an autonomous province. Yahya sent in the military to crack down on what he considered to be Hindu dissidents, with the result being a horrendous loss of life, brutal repression, and thousands of Bengali refugees fleeing across the border into India, itself in a state of poverty.

While India was no saint here, and had its own selfish reasons and calculations for many things, it did what it could to try to help the refugees, and it did not want or ask for this crisis on its border. Yet, instead of coming out and denouncing Pakistan's actions, cutting off all aid to Yahya, and publicly displaying a show of friendship towards India, Nixon went in the opposite direction. He and Kissinger kept referring to Nixon's “special relationship” with Yahya. In part, this is because Yahya treated Nixon well in the past, especially when Nixon was out of office for most of the 1960s. But a bigger factor here was that Nixon and Kissinger were using Yahya to help set up their world-shocking summit with China in 1972. He was the intermediary between the two countries, which had not had any communication since 1949. However, as Bass shows, they easily could have tried to approach China through some alternate means, and Bass in fact names a few other channels that Kissinger had open for this reason. Yet he and Nixon chose to stick with Yahya.

Combine that misguided thinking with Nixon's endearing hatred of India and you have the infamous “tilt” towards Pakistan. Kissinger fueled the flames of Nixon's fire by constantly deprecating and criticizing the Indians. He did this for two reasons. One, he was a sycophant, repeatedly kissing up to Nixon, reinforcing Nixon's pettiness and hatreds, and being against whoever Nixon did not like. And the second reason is that Kissinger, while brilliant, was an expert on European diplomacy and the nuclear arms race. He knew extremely little about South Asia, and what he did know was primarily negative: he was prejudiced against the Indians just as much as Nixon was, and did not miss any opportunity to pile on the opprobrium when Nixon would rant and rave in the Oval Office.

So, the end result is that there was no U.S. criticism of or pressure put on Pakistan to stop its ethnic cleansing. In fact, Nixon and Kissinger kept sending military aid! Incredibly, U.S. weapons were being used in this barbarous exercise. And while the U.S. did provide humanitarian aid to India to try to assist the refugees, this was pitifully small in comparison to what was needed, with Nixon on grudgingly providing the minimum amount of aid that he could get away with. Overall, Pakistan's atrocities were met with a telling silence from the White House.

The title of the book stems from a dissent telegram sent in by Archer Blood, who was the U.S. Consul in Dacca, Pakistan, which is where Yahya's spiteful actions began. Blood and his consulate, while professional, were extremely disturbed at the Nixon Administration's lack of concern about what was occurring in Pakistan, and with all of their cables going unanswered or being brushed off by the State Department, they finally sent a rare cable stating a strong dissent with U.S. policy. This infuriated Nixon and Kissinger, both of whom hated the State Department (ironic in that Kissinger became Secretary of State two years later). Blood was reprimanded by being recalled to Washington and shoved behind a desk, and many of the other lower level officials went elsewhere also. Nixon, always a vengeful man, was at his worst when it came to dealing with the State Department. If he and Kissinger could ruin peoples' careers there, they did with gusto.

Another shocking revelation from Bass' book is just how far Nixon and Kissinger were willing to go to start a major war over the India-Pakistan conflict. They both allowed their hatred of India to color their judgment, which – history has proven – has been exceedingly bad in many cases. Add this to their favoritism for Pakistan and their constant obsession over the Cold War, and you have a volatile mix of unhinged emotions dictating U.S. policy and moves such as redirecting the Pacific Fleet to the area. Nixon and Kissinger viewed every conflict around the world through the colored lens of U.S.-Soviet Union competition. Even though Russia was minimally involved here (signing a friendship treaty with India and reluctantly supplying some military aid), Nixon and Kissinger thought that part of this war was due to the Russians' attempt to enlarge their own footprint in South Asia, using India as a proxy. While not completely out of the realm of possibility, the Russians really did not want to be involved in this at all. That Nixon and Kissinger thought otherwise, with no real evidence to support their opinions, speaks to their obsession with Cold War diplomacy and inability to accept the fact that other countries in the world had their own conflicts that had little or nothing to do with the U.S. or the U.S.S.R.

The most damning evidence that Bass puts forward are Nixon's and Kissinger's own words, courtesy of Nixon's secretive White House taping system (installed, ironically enough, because Nixon distrusted Kissinger and wanted to make sure he could hold Kissinger's words against him). A few passages from Bass are in order to get a flavor of just how coarse, callous, devious, and mean-spirited these two men were. From page 216, with Nixon complaining to his Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman about getting pressure to lean on Pakistan: “nobody...gives a shit about Europe..... But you know, I think Biafra stirred people up more than Pakistan, because Pakistan they're just a bunch of brown goddamn Moslems.” From page 255, here is Nixon speaking of Indian's own devious and frosty Prime Minister Indira Ghandi: “We really slobbered over the old witch.” Kissinger in response: “Mr. President, even though she was a bitch....” And there are plenty of other examples of this type of rough, crude talk occurring in the Oval Office.

There was another American political leader whose behavior was disappointing to read about. While minor compared to Nixon and Kissinger in scope, Ambassador to the UN George H.W. Bush comes across as a puppy dog trying to please its masters. Bush clearly had personal qualms about what Nixon and Kissinger were doing, but he did not dare voice those concerns openly to them or anyone else in a position to do anything about them. And he devotedly parroted the Administration's anti-Indian and pro-Pakistani line in his work at the UN. I personally consider Bush to be one of the most decent and human men to ever be President, so this episode is quite unfortunate. Yet, given the context, I am sure it was not as cut-and-dried as it seems all of these decades later. Still, I would have liked to have read about him having the guts to confront if not Nixon, at least Kissinger – who he owed absolutely nothing – over their incendiary and dangerous actions.

Bass concludes with clear Epilogue about how this war affected all three countries, none of them coming out for the better. He also analyzes Nixon's and Kissinger's successful attempts to bury this large moral stain and whitewash it out of their own lengthy and self-serving memoirs. Having read those books myself, Bass is absolutely on target here: any references to Pakistan have to do with how much of an ally they considered Yahya to be. There was no mention, nor was there any concern for, the thousands and thousands of Bengalis who died. Despite the sadness of the story, this is told so well and documented so expertly that it is an excellent read. Anyone interested in any of the three countries involved, Nixon, or Kissinger will find this worthwhile. And honestly, even if you aren't interested in any of the above, it is still a book that needs to be read if for no other reason than to realize how awful things can go with the wrong people in charge.

Grade: A

[Abhinav Agarwal · Rating 4 out of 5]

A bikini of a book. Lays bare an ugly passage in American diplomacy, but conceals the true horrors of a genocide.

The forced exodus of ten million Bangladeshis in 1971 - ninety percent of whom were Hindu, the genocide of an estimated three million Bangladeshis, and the rape of close to half a million women - were all small prices that Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon willingly paid in exchange of opening bilateral ties with China, and in the process getting their names enshrined as statesmen. Henry Kissinger would go on to win a Nobel Peace Prize - a more damning indictment of the farce that is the Nobel Prize would be hard to find. Archer Blood, consul general and the "ranking diplomat of the United States in East Pakistan", would protest in the strongest possible diplomatic terms the atrocities perpetrated by the Pakistan army on the citizenry of East Pakistan. He would be ordered to "request home leave and transfer back to the State Department - in other words, unceremoniously sacked" - just one step short of being fired - spend the next decade in a desk job - hiding from an omnipotent Kissinger, his career finished for all practical purposes.

Gary Bass' book, "The Blood Telegram", lays out in threadbare detail the machinations that went on in the White House during those crucial months in 1971. The language of the conversations between Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger would at times make a drunken street gang brawl look gentlemanly by comparison. India's embrace of a so-called Non-Aligned Movement - championed by her first Prime Minister, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, and sustained by his daughter Smt Indira Gandhi, would come a complete cropper when India beseeched these countries for support - material or otherwise. Lessons that could have been learned in that fateful year of 1971 were not learned.

Where this splendid book - deeply researched, methodically organized, and lucidly written - fails however is when it leaves out the true horror of the genocide that took place in Bangladesh (then East Pakistan). While it can be argued that it is not this book's place or purpose to document it, a true perspective of the tragedy that unfolded that fateful year cannot be fully comprehended without forcing oneself to confront the horror of that genocide and ethnic cleansing.

However, for an understanding into the variables - human, diplomatic, political, personal - that went into the making of the United States' foreign policy towards the Indian subcontinent in 1971, this book is an invaluable aid.

[Rakesh · Rating 4 out of 5]

An American diplomat in what was East Pakistan attempts to alert the American government to the mass murders and genocide by the Pakistani military against Pakistani citizens. Nixon and Kissinger don't seem to think it's a big deal. They don't care about people being murdered. They don't care about 10 million refugees. All they care about is their "friend" the government of Pakistan.

“On March 1, 1973, in the Oval Office, Nixon and Kissinger were talking about Soviet Jews. Kissinger, who had at least thirteen close relatives murdered in the Holocaust, showed his lack of interest in the starkest possible terms: ‘if they put Jews into gas chambers in the Soviet Union, it is not an American concern. Maybe a humanitarian concern.’ Nixon agreed: ‘I know. We can’t blow up the world because of it.’”

[Tony · Rating 4 out of 5]

In 1971, I was a raw, fairly self-absorbed teenager. So, to me, then, Bangladesh was just a pretty good live album. I'm a better student now.

At the start of the year I read Judgment at Tokyo by Gary J. Bass and loved it. It's still my book-of-the-year, nine months later. So, I naturally checked what he had written before and found this.

The eponymous Blood of the Blood Telegram was Archer Blood, who was the United States consul general in Dacca. He had the temerity to let Nixon and Kissinger know - in writing - what was happening in East Pakistan. What was happening (a primer):

Back then, after Partition, there was a West and an East Pakistan on either side of India. Pakistan was ruled by a dictator, General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan (Yahya). The author writes: Yahya drank early and often. "He starts with cognac for breakfast and continues drinking throughout the day; night often finding him in a sodden state." Kissinger, however, found him "tough, direct, and with a good sense of humor." And Nixon, who liked very few people, liked Yahya very much.

In response to the usual rumblings, Yahya called for a general election, comfortable that he and his slate would win. But he lost in both West and East Pakistan. Instead of certifying the election results*, Yahya started a series of reprisals, most violently in East Pakistan, and directed specifically at the Hindu population. It's genocide, Archer Blood dutifully reported. Well. Blood was removed for his impertinence.

The atrocities are covered here, at times in horrific detail.

But Yahya was Nixon's friend. And, not only that: the Pakistanis were chummy with the Chinese, and Nixon wanted to go to China. (It was the Pakistanis who flew Kissinger, and provided cover for him, when he went on the Chinese meet-up preliminarily). So, conveniently, Nixon blamed the Indians, whom he loathed.

But eight million refugees from East Pakistan (Bangladesh) fled to India, which was unable to absorb them all. And this, as Nixon and Kissinger intentionally violated American law in order to send military equipment to Pakistan.

And, as we know, Nixon taped everything. So this is not just some opinion piece. Here's some choice excerpts:

- Nixon bitterly said, "The Indians need--what they need really is a--" Kissinger interjected, "They're such bastards." Nixon finished his thought" "A mass famine."

- In the Oval Office, Nixon explained to Haldeman that they told "the Iranians we're going to provide arms through third countries and so forth and so on." He casually added, "We're trying to do something where's it's a violation of the law and all that."

- Later, Kissinger grew sufficiently nervous about this illegality that he had Alexander Haig, his deputy, gather evidence fixing blame on Nixon. Haig wrote to Kissinger, "Here are thee telcons [telephone conversations] all of which confirm the President's knowledge of, approval for and, if you will, directive to provide aircraft to Iran and Jordan."

- Kissinger--in a tirade against liberals, intellectuals, and Democrats--angrily told Nixon, ". . . Why would we give a damn about Bangladesh?" "We don't," agreed Nixon.

And my favorite:

At one point, Nixon and Kissinger were discussing how to get Jordan and Iran to send U.S. fighter planes to Pakistan in clear, knowing violation of U.S. law. Attorney General John Mitchell, the chief law enforcement officer in America was in the room. Mitchell waited patiently through the meeting, occasionally jumping into the conversation to disparage "the goddamn Indians" and to slam Ted Kennedy as "stupid."

The president said, "All right, that's an order. You're goddamn right." In front of the attorney general, Nixon asked, "Is it really so much against our law?" Kissinger admitted that it was. Referring to the Iranians and the Jordanians, he explained again, "What's against our law is not what they do, but our giving them permission." Nixon said, "Henry, we give the permission privately." "That's right," agreed Kissinger. "Hell," said the president," we've done worse.'

_______
*That couldn't happen here. Uh, could it?

[Vishal Kale · Rating 4 out of 5]

Why is anyone from the West totally unable to write a clean book on Indian matters, one that does not raise hackles, and is balanced? This book, like others I have read, also manages to raise my hackles due to its treatment of Indian Affairs. While it is easily one of the most unbiased works on India to come out of the West, it still leaves a lot to be desired for. The author has made a genuine effort to be unbiased and truthful in his approach; and is reasonably comprehensive in coverage of the subject matter. Having said that, there are clear instances where he could have done much better, and presented a more balanced view.

The repeated comparisons of Bangladesh to Kashmir and Mizoram and Nagaland are offensive, to say the least, as is the contention of Indian hypocrisy in handling Bangladesh when looked at in the light of the flashpoints above. First of all, in Kashmir we were the ones to offer article 372- wherein Kashmiris got near autonomy, within Indian nationality right at the outset. There was, and is, no suppression in Kashmir; far from it – as current events have proven, with the blatant challenges issued by Omar Abdullah, as well as repeated elections. And Mizo and Naga problems are localized issues. How can anyone compare these with the Bangladeshi Genocide? And how can anyone state that we are wrong?

Next, the comparison of terrorism to Mukti Bahini support from Indian side is untenable. Further, the unsaid contention that India taught Pakistan Guerilla tactics is downright false – as Operation Gibraltar 1965 and the attacks in 1948 by Pakistan backed irregulars prove beyond any doubt. It was Pakistan that taught us Guerilla Tactics; not vice versa! Also, the contention that 1971 was the only War we won is also unacceptable: 1965 was also a clear victory for India, as was 1948. The coverage of the war also leaves a lot to be desired for in terms of balance. There are many, many other such glaring inconsistencies in the book that will raise Indian hackles.

On the positives, the book is a powerfully put together investigation, and is focused primarily on the US handling of the entire matter, and the totally amoral and brinkmanship game played by USA. It targets the president of the day: Nixon, and the celebrated Kissinger – both of whom are literally ripped apart ruthlessly. You get a ringside seat as the two gentlemen above systematically set about undermining India and Indian efforts, supporting Yahya Khan – even illegally – and ignoring the relentless build-up of evidence of Genocide. The motives of the the two are systematically dissected and exposed, very skillfully, leaving no loopholes that I could detect. A very thorough investigation indeed – one that I had not expected from an American.

The depth of the investigation is awesome, as historical archival documents, tape recordings, meeting minutes etc are examined; intelligence agents and diplomats from the day interviewed, news reports etc collated and examined. The effort shows through, as well as the laudable attempt at being unbiased – at which, quite frankly, despite the glaring problems above, the author has succeeded. I say this not because American hypocrisy and amorality has been ripped apart , which it has – but because of the strength of the investigation, and blunt statement of facts, and the entire presentation as coming from authorized documented sources.

The biggest positive from an Indian viewpoint is that it helps us understand just how deep the chasm between our two nations is in reality. The major defense of the USA for Pakistan is an eerie reminder to the current tone it takes: that only Pakistan that sort this matter out. This is despite the clear knowledge of the fact of the crimes it has itself committed. Cut to today, and you can spot a perfect parallel: Terrorism, a scourge almost single handedly created by Pakistan. And yet again, the USA is siding with Pakistan with the logic that its support is needed. And India? Let alone anti-terror help, it does not even get intelligence information from the USA on terror matters! Nothing has changed even today - and we still dream of a strategic partnership! It can be seen that the US tactic towards Pakistan and India is still the same; nothing has changed, Don’t expect it to change- regardless of how many Indian-Amercans make it to their government.

Despite clear evidence of genocide & the presence of nearly 9 Million refugees (80% plus Hindus) as well as the knowledge that India does not have the resources to feed them, no one on Earth came forward to help. In the face of 1 Billion Dollars, we got something like 100 Million. And, everyone – 104 nations – opposed the war without suggesting any alternative to India, or to the refugees. Critically, not one single nation said anything to Pakistan excepting Russia. The learning is that humanity has no place in front of politics and international intrigue. These sequence of events leave a deep and bitter memory in your mind, as you realize that it is acceptable for people to accept genocide, so long as their own self-interests are protected. Yet again, judging from the World response to threats to India, we can see that this mindset has not changed. This was also proved by the events in Iraq… disgusting, if you ask me.

And most critically, in the concluding part, you find an apology to the Bangladeshis, defence of Pakistanis and their problems, castigation of US evils – and no mention of any apology to India, to what it suffered. That speaks volumes – sure, Bangladeshis deserve an apology; they went through hell. But, instead of paying back-handed compliments to India, cannot an apology be thought of for India, and that fact it faced the ire, and the cost of the war? It is fine to refer to building Pakistan from the rubble and offering defense for its tactic of guerilla warfare as taking a page from India’s own strategy; but when you are doing so, don’t you think a more wholesome analysis - that mentions how Pakistan pioneered this tactic in 1948 and 1965 – be made? And why make oblique hints at Indian plans in West Pakistan during the war, when there is no shred of evidence?

[E.T. · Rating 3 out of 5]

First things first - change the subtitle to “American sponsored Holocaust”.
The book is subtitled “India’s Secret War in East Pakistan” quite bafflingly. Because the entire focus is on US President Nixon and Kissinger and their conversations and thoughts. I was aghast to see how the Pakistani genocide of 1 million Hindus (and 90% of refugees too were Hindus from an overwhelmingly Muslim-majority East Pakistan) was casually brushed aside again and again by the duo.
The book is well-written but the subtitle shows how supposedly sympathetic authors cant write without the same smug superiority of Nixon & Kissinger. And how everything must be about America.
I am also aghast at how actions of authoritarian regimes and societies like Pakistan are normalised. And as the author says - “the moral high ground was with India as it was a democracy”. Treat ppl/countries the same. Dont justify your intellectual cowardice and hypocrisy with woke BS.

[Ed · Rating 5 out of 5]

This isn’t really a tale of genocide or of the civil war that created Bangladesh from what had been East Pakistan but of how deliberate actions and inaction on the part of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger facilitated the mass slaughter of Bengalis and the forced relocation of millions while the United States destroyed any chance of long term influence in South Asia. The narrative centers on Archer Blood, the last U.S. consul general in Dhaka when it was still the capital of East Pakistan, and the cable he sent through the official State Department “dissent channel”, a telegram that described the actions of the Pakistani army as genocide against the Bengali people including targeting intellectuals, political leaders and students. Official Washington was able to ignore Blood’s message simply by declaring that a bloodbath carried out by an American ally using arms supplied from this country and with tacit encouragement by the Richard Nixon himself was an internal matter to be dealt with by Pakistan.

The diplomats on the scene (28 State Department officers signed the telegram in addition to Archer Blood) reported that the systematic destruction of Bengali society fit the terms of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide all too well. Unfortunately for those in East Pakistan, Henry Kissinger was cultivating the military ruler of Pakistan, General Yahya Khan as a conduit to the rulers of the People’s Republic of China so Khan’s forces were given a free pass to do their worst—and they did. The United States had significant leverage with Khan and could have forced him to put an end to the atrocities committed by his army using U.S. weapons but chose to wash their hands of it.

Gary J. Bass has a definite point of view; not to put too fine a point on things he has real contempt for both Nixon and Kissinger. But it is hard to fault his approach—he knows the sources cold and makes excellent use of recently declassified documents, unused White House tapes and hours of interviews with U.S. officials in who had served in Dhaka and Washington as well as Indian Army officers. A former reporter for “The Economist”, now an academic historian, Bass knows how to frame a story that has been too little known in this country.

[Alan · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is an important but flawed work of history covering the shameful behavior of Kissinger and Nixon after Pakistan began slaughtering Hindus in East Pakistan in 1971 leading to a brief war between India and Pakistan and the independence of Bangladesh. The eponymous Blood Telegram describing the genocide being committed with US weapons and support, was sent by Arthur Blood – US Consul General in Dacca, by page 67 of this 360-page book. When it became public, Kissinger and Nixon were apoplectic. What follows over the next 200 pages is a repetitious almost day by day account of the secretive scheming by Kissinger and Nixon to aid Pakistan and undermine India until the brief war between those bitter enemies breaks out by page 260. Of course, access to Nixon’s White House tapes is the rich trove here but good editing would have made this account more readable. Still, it’s a searing indictment of Kissinger and Nixon's scandalous behavior. There is a very worthwhile read here sandwiched around 200 pages of tedium. Also, a personal nit — I’m an admirer of George Harrison and remember well his Concert for Bangladesh in August 1971 — the first rock event for humanitarian relief. The author describes George thusly:” Under bright spotlights in a cream suit with a hideous orange shirt … with all the attendant sincerity, vapidity and showy self-righteousness.” I protest.

[Emily · Rating 4 out of 5]

What a horrifying story. There was a lot here for me to absorb, because I didn't really know this story at all. I was most fascinated by the behind-the-scenes look at Kissinger's conversations with Nixon about Bangladesh--Kissinger, that shonda for the goyim, comes across as even nuttier and more repulsive than Nixon, not at all the wily and brilliant statesman. The contempt for genocide is breathtaking: I guess if you take the thirty thousand foot view you can ignore all those inconvenient people you can't really see anyway.

Fun fact: there was an Indian general named Jacob-Farj-Rafael Jacob. Who was Jewish.

[Ajay · Rating 4 out of 5]

I will say not a suitable title but read this book to know how many countries play politics behind the scene of war. Every Indian should read this book to know how systematically Pakistani genocided the Hindus of Bangladesh. Everyone should know it and amongst us many Indians are genocide denier. Such a shame.

[Yognik1789 · Rating 5 out of 5]

Quite comprehensive work. An excellent story of how USA deteriorated a still containable and harmless situation into a mess, continued to deny engagement and accept guilt or even take prudential steps to control the damage, lived in their fools paradise shamelessly riding upon the power of their dollars and guns, flouted laws and in the end nonchalantly walk past the graves of millions of dead civillians.

The book's American cover has this tag line: Nixon, Kissinger, and a forgotten genocide.
Bass has argued his case that the 1971 Bangladesh war of independence has largely been ignored over the years and he even quotes some statistics in the Epilogue to stress his point. Pakistani citizens themselves are unaware of the brutalities that were committed on East Pakistanis back in '71. This being his motivation to write the book, Bass has researched with a giant team on the recently declassified documents and tapes from USA and India and has produced this comprehensive eye-opening account of what happened then.

The book's main protagonists are Indira Gandhi, Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger, Yahya Khan, Mujibur Rahman, P.N.Haskar, D.P.Dhar, Sam Manekshaw and R.N.Kao. Anybody with an interest into the lives and incidens surrounding these people must read this book.

A brief synopsis
Nixon during the height of his Foreign Policy career was engaged in Vietnam back in '71. This was also a very crucial point of time in the cold war. His interests were not so deep in South Asia except his closeness and deep friendship with Yahya Khan, Pakistan's Military dictator. Kissinger served as his NSA but virtually held massive sway over him and thus held enormous power. The kingmaker he was.

I refrain from using USA in my review because the story is actually about personal hatreds, egos and perverse ambitions of Nixon and Kissinger. The book is full with Nixon's and Kissinger's antagonist remarks on Indira Gandhi and Indians, in general.

The story is simple, Nixon, the shameless pokerfaced self-appointed custodian of free world hates USSR at one hand and on the other hand wants to open relationship with closed Communist China. This is the whole start of the conflict. The primary matter and all that followed was secondary cannon fodder. Bass rightly says - millions of innocent Bangladeshis died were just collateral damage for Nixon's ambitious China project.

To reach to China, Nixon approaches his close friend Yahya Khan, the then military dictator of Pakistan. Yahya who is close to Zhou Enlai, China's PM, agrees to be the conduit between 2 friends. The defining argument against USA was Nixon's Military aid being given to Yahya even after an embargo put on US exports to Pak by the previous Eisenhower goverment.

Yahya on the other hand is the not so clever, emotionally charged Military dictator who like many belonging to West Pakistan harbored several derogatory prejudices against people of East Pakistan. That the later being Bingos and people of non-martial ethnicity unfit for military and whatnot. After East Pakistan's popular party - Awami League's leader Muji Rahman wins the national election by a huge margin, so much so that he deserves to become the next Pakistan PM, a fact unacceptable even in dreams for West Pakistani political clout and military, Yahya ignores the election results and dismisses the National Assembly.

This leads to demonstrations by East Pakistanis, who having been fed up by being treated as a much ignored colony within their own country, which end in a brutal crackdown by West Pakistani Military.
What follows is a civil war between West Pak army and rebel guerrillas. A heavy influx of refugees in Indian border states of WB, Assam and Tripura compounded with worldwide ignorance of India's incapacity to accommodate them and selective genocide of Hindus leads to critical situations.

India subsequently plans to winter to come and get's into a state of war with Pakistan in November '71.

Nixon's argument was, why should India interfere into the internal matters of Pakistan. And not just interfere, reply with an army by escalating the issue into a state of war. Gandhi's argument was, the influx of more than 1 crore refugees in Indian border states was no more an internal problem of Pakistan. She argued what was the main issue (refugees) for USA was just a symptom of a larger disease that was continuous US supply of weapons to Pakistan. She argued USA should have leveraged Yahya long back to resist using military suppression and as a damage control must have stopped the aid at least. Nixon on the other hand compared Yahya to Lincoln and was of the opinion that if the former wanted to use military to keep the country united then so be it. India has no right to divide Pakistan.

This can go on and on... It's very interesting. Read the book, till I give a new well structured review soon.

[Simon Mee · Rating 4 out of 5]

"Hell," said the president, "we've done worse."

Of course you can do a polemic. They're fun. It's probably what I would write.  The 1971 genocide in (now) Bangladesh would be a good subject to polemicize against (or for, I am not sure which is which).

But The Blood Telegram chooses not to be a polemic.  It chooses to contextualise. It chooses to justify. It even humanises, within reason.

Yahya did manage to convince Kissinger that he was an idiot.

In 1971, what was East Pakistan was trending towards independence. West Pakistan (now just Pakistan) dominated the military and upper echelons of government, which often meant the same names. The latter clamped down by murdering at least thousands of Hindus (and a fair few Muslims too), causing up to 10 million East Pakistanis to flee to India, which had its own subversive and separatist movements to deal with.

"Yahya hasn't had such fun since the last Hindu massacre!"

But of course it's 1971, so events were warped by the lens of the Cold War, further twisted by Nixon's pending rapprochement with China, an event he saw as one of the greatest foreign policy achievements ever.

For reasons better set out in the book, the U.S. backs the West Pakistani suppression and the latter's resistance against Indian intervention by: supplying parts; transferring weapons illegally by way of allies; moving a carrier battlegroup; and encouraging Chinese intimidation, thanks to the dark geniuses of Nixon and Kissinger.

Poignantly, both men were evidently unaware that the Beatles had broken up.

The Blood Telegram pitches these two against institutional resistance within the State Department (including the principled stand of Archie Blood) and the flawed hero of Indira Gandhi.  Where this book exceeds itself is the balanced treatment of all parties and the pressures they operated under, while passing clear judgement against those that let the genocide happen. There is a respectful tone towards Nixon and Kissinger, even when damning Kissinger's sophomoric language. An interesting epilogue is that the U.S.'s choices gained it nothing, even when it whipped up a lopsided vote against India in the United Nations.

It's not the flashiest read, burdened by cables, notes and, well, a telegram or two.  However, it is still an excellent case study of mustering the evidence for both sides without falling into "both-siderism".

[Nikunj · Rating 3 out of 5]

The book is divided into two parts-

Part one- Here the reason for the title is given, describing the man who stood up against the giants of the white house, who were being a blind eye to the genocide in East Pakistan.

Part two-Here one gets the reasons for the following things-
1. India`s admiration and closeness with the Soviet Union till date.
2. Indian`s deep mistrust of USA.
3. Pakistan`s malignant agendas against India.
4. Why the chances of any betterment of relations between India and Pakistan remain bleak in the face of history.
5. Why the Chinese angle always remain a mystery for Indians.
6. Proof of how sometimes unchecked adulation gets the best of people, blinding them against taking tough and ethical decisions as it did in the case of Nixon against Yahya.

Though the current scenario in the international atmosphere is changing. The future of India`s international relations looks very promising.

[Anirban · Rating 5 out of 5]

“Once again we demonstrated to the world that the Bengalis are a fighting martial race”

The Blood Telegram, was a document I had heard about, but never could I have imagined a book as informative as this could be written in such a fast fluid way on the tragedy of the Bangladeshi genocide by the Pakistani Govt. Wonderfully researched and written, this book digs in deep into the fallacy of the Nixon-Kissinger duo. Their apparent denial of the massacre, their love for Yahya Khan, their secret three way tactic to put pressure on India. Every detail, which was earlier unknown to me, gets laid down in this book in the most elaborate yet, riveting way.

A book which should be read, and the facts should be taken in slowly. Anyone who loves history, and has a special interest in the Bangladeshi Mukti Juddho will feel enriched after reading this book.

[Bigsna · Rating 5 out of 5]

The Blood Telegram may possibly be one of the most important and well written books I’ve read on modern Indian history so far, and I'm surprised to see that only under a thousand people have read it on GR.

As someone who is almost always incurious, indifferent and unenthusiastic about politics (national and world) in general, reading this book has been a revelation on international diplomacy as well as a completely new perspective on the maneuverings that take place in the highest offices of the world, and the decisions that set in motion a series of incidents that alter the future of generations to come.

I’ve read this book like the history student I never was, completely absorbed in the details, wanting to take down notes, watching simultaneous interviews on YouTube (bringing to life the pages of the book) and constantly resisting the urge to underline complete paragraphs on nearly every page in the book. In the end, I had to make an exception to my ‘no markings in books’ rule – to highlight passages that I knew I was going to want to refer to again.

The one thing this book would not have been possible without, is the Nixon White House Tapes. Another fact that was news to me. I find it hard to believe that in the era of the Cold War, when secrecy and confidentiality were paramount, a US President would decide to have his office bugged and all his conversations and confidential meetings recorded. A tradition that continues to be practiced even today. In the Indian context, I can totally picture the author and his researchers diving into archival records and microfilms at the Nehru Memorial Library - a place I think is frozen in time from the 70s... and one I have spent several blissful days doing my own historical research in. Oh what a pleasure it would have been to be a part of the research team for this book.

Gary J Bass' research is detailed and expansive, and while there is always the danger of the author's opinion coloring the inferences in the narrative, I think he dealt with every aspect as objectively and un-biasedly as is possible, basing all his interpretations and conjectures on hard facts. This is one of the reasons I am so taken by the book, because every fact literally comes from the horse's mouth.

The book has been an important lesson for me on not just the 1971 war and the history of the birth of Bangladesh, but also as a learning on world politics, the Cold War context, foreign policy and the hidden motives that define the realms and repercussions of international conflict.

In the end, we are ruled by our personalities, our temperaments, identities and insecurities - and I think what hit me most from the book was the interface it provided with Nixon and Kissinger in their revealing closed door conversations. Ultimately, it was their convictions, preferences and personal opinions that largely affected the outcome of the events in 1971, which despite numerous warnings and evident indications did not waver - setting the stage for a continuing conflict between India and Pakistan.

#HighlyRecommended #MustRead

[Mansoor Azam · Rating 2 out of 5]

The first of it's kind. Full marks to the title, it literally caught my eye. Even before I knew the ABC of it I was sort of lured by the book. And honestly it didn't disappoint my appetite for knowledge about 1971 Indo Pak war and the crisis in then East Pakistan.
But for some one with scant knowledge or no base in the history of this affair this book is not recommended as a first read on the subject. Rather than leaving you with balanced view on this, I fear, it ll make u prejudiced.
The book covers the events surrounding the charge de affair of US Mission a certain Mr Blood in the politically divided n charged up east Pakistan back in 1970. It covers the relationship of then Pakistani dictator Gen Yahya Khan with Nixon and then secretary of State Kissinger. A US president bent upon supporting the Pakistani dictator against all laws and rationale. The stupidity of a state in deciding to force it's will upon it's own people through barrel of a gun and the resultant mayhem and carnage. It throws light on Indian designs on east Pakistan and is sometimes a classical analysis of the politico strategical scenario that developed in south Asia in 1971 and how the minor and major players triumphed and follied in playing against each other.
The writer claimed that the whole book is result of research on now publicly disclosed US archives, which it certainly shows and builds on. But the greatest let down for me started not long after when the author started chipping in with political commentaries and seemed like making ones opinion basing on his own interpretations of events, which may be tilted or biased as they were heavily leaning one side..
That's the reason I won't suggest this one as a first one on the subject. Still a great one if one knows how to see through.
The hero remains Mr Blood who defied all odds and bosses and kept telling truth, or too much of it, from Dhaka, against the wishes of his bosses with the penultimate folly of signing a telegram if dissent from his post which was then taken as a rebellion within ranks by Washington. He was made to pay for it later on as he lost a career which was on high path. To me this was the highmark of this effort. History has not forgotten Blood and the spine and character he showed at a time where lesser men would willingly present the spinlessness to end richer and seemingly bigger. Men like Blood are the true and forgotten heroes. And to write of him out of the Ashes of history, hats off to the author

[Raunak Ritesh · Rating 5 out of 5]

Made me remember Ghost Wars by Steve Coll when it comes to South Asia. How the USA has somehow always managed to break things up, in their short-sightedness.

The book starts with a telegram by Archer Blood, who in the midst of this war, will have to heavily pay for his career all because of Kissinger's and Nixon's ignorance.

Moving on, it's truly revealing about the China opening, how the USA finally managed to build up a rapport with China at the expense of Pakistan, and that's why the USA couldn't see where it's whole support of Pakistan/Yahya Khan will lead up to. It took me time to figure out why the USA was downplaying Yahya's actions and it's presented in quite a thrilling tone in the book, how Kissinger got the China opening.

Yahya Khan, who sent General Tikka to control B'desh was really the tipping point when the refugee crisis seriously started settling in.

Meanwhile in India, it was Indira Gandhi, PN Haksar, General Rafael Jacob who saw this opportunity to break Pakistan, but with a sense of humanity, and it is commendable how India managed to oversee this in a mere 11-day war while trying to make sure that its intention all along isn't misread as if she's going through this ordeal to break West Pakistan. Bangladesh's government though freed under Mujeeb, didn't last long, but Sheikh Hasina, his daughter seems to have finally broken some miracles.

The book is mostly comprised of conversations between Kissinger and Nixon, American perspectives and all that went wrong in the White House in the year 71. But the Indian and Pakistan supplements is really informative as well. A must-read to understand the political dynamics South Asia went through, in terms of ideologies, territories, and governments.

It also serves as a presage to Indira's downfall, how 71 war and elections lead to her cult, reaching new heights of political fan-fare, even earning herself the name "Durga", which lead her to profound insecurities.

[Joe · Rating 2 out of 5]

This is a very detailed account of the 1971 war between Pakistan and India that resulted in the formation of Bangladesh, however it is more of a deliberate attack on the morals, diplomacy, and character of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger. This is not an unbiased account and does not provide the full picture. There seems to be a lot of dependence on the testimony and account of a NYT reporter, who is admittedly biased towards India. There is a noticeable lack of knowledge in the text about the way that U.S. security cooperation actually works, which cast doubt for me on the credibility of the message Bass is trying to send. I appreciated the detail and research into the war, and the insight into some of the conversations among key leaders from all sides (although much was provided without appropriate unbiased context). It is a good book for gaining a deeper understanding of the 1971 war, but not for someone who is new to the subject and only for someone who can look past the propaganda from the author.

[Avinash Singh · Rating 5 out of 5]

An amazing book based on the first hand accounts of Consul Archer Blood who witnessed the the 1971 Indo-Pak war play out in front of him. The book is a detailed account of the atrocities committed by the punjabi muslim army on Bengali speaking bangladeshis who had called for an agitation for their language. Alongwith the authoritarian crackdown on protesters it also lays out the details of the gory massacres of Hindus who were singled out from the rest of crowds. The book is a must read for anyone interested to know the truth about the 1971 Indo-Pak war.

[Ashley · Rating 5 out of 5]

As a history major in college, and someone who reads history books fairly regularly, I'm ashamed that I knew nothing about this. Nixon and Kissinger are racist, vile, and positively evil human beings.

[Eric Hollen · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book recounts the history of West Pakistan's genocide and mass murder of its fellow citizens, especially its Hindu minority, in East Pakistan in the early 1970's. Pretty much, the dictator of Pakistan, Yayha Khan, decides to hold elections, thinking he can win, but, unsuprisingly to anyone who's paying attention, especially given Yayha's dismal response to a massive monsoon season in EastPakistan right before the election, he loses. And badly (I think the opposing party wins all but two seats). Rather than secede power, he instead, after some poor negotiations with the winning party, sends in the military, enforces martial law, and begins what starts as first a political, and then an ethnic, cleansing, killing some several hundred thousand EastPakistan/Bengali citizens. Because of this, and especially when the nationalistic fervor leads to persecuting Hindus, many West Pakistanis and Bengalis flee into neighboring India, who, to their credit, welcomes them in. That section of India (I believe it was also called East Bengali) has strong ties to East Pakistan. And, because of the influx of migrants, and the lack of humanitarian aid that would have been necessary to care for them, Indira Ghandi's government in India begins first a covert campaign against the West Pakistan military in East Pakistan, arming the insurgents, followed by an all-out war which, foolishly, Yayha decides to instigate after India invades what will eventually become known as Bangladesh. (I should also mention that Pakistan and India were bitter rivals, having fought wars and border skirmishes before). India eventually kicks Pakistan out of Bangladesh, and orders a cease fire in the war against West Pakistan, claiming that they do not have any territorial ambitions.

The book is an accounting of this "forgotten" or "whitewashed "genocide, as well as the U.S.'s, mostly Nixon and Kissinger's, stunning hand in it. The book argues that Nixon and Kissinger could have done more to lean more heavily on Yayha to stop the genocide, especially given the fact that a lot of the arms that Yayha was using to commit said genocide was provided by the U.S. There are a lot of reasons why Nixon and Kissinger doesn't, including both of their mutual dislike of India (who, interestingly enough as a democracy, ends up being backed by the Soviet Union), cold war politics, racism, and Nixon's personal liking of Yayha (who treated him courteously when he was just a V.P. touring the world under Eisenhower). And, especially, Yayha's hand in being a middleman in opening conversations with Mao's China, which until then had been frigid with the U.S. The book provides, in stunning detail (sometimes too much) the crassness of both Nixon and Kissinger, and how, despite Congress forbidding them to provide weapons to Pakistan, knowingly continued to do so, breaking the law (the senior Bush was privy to this also). As for its namesake, the book talks about Archer Blood, the ambassador to East Pakistan, and his consul's telegram (the "blood telegram") recounting the atrocities commited by West Pakistan in East Pakistan (which, surprise surprise, mostly goes ignored). For this, Blood eventually gets his career stalled, though I think the book does a fine job of cementing his legacy as someone who spoke up, despite the risk of losing his career, for what he felt was the right thing to do.

Overall, 4 stars. I think it combines a good amount of "general reading" and history, but it felt cluttered on the backend, mostly because, I think, the author wasn't just relaying information but was evidencing his claims given newly released information, which gives it an "archival bent" that nicely evidences it but, for this reader, may have provided an overabundance of detail (I was skimming over the last fifty pages or so).

[Colleen Browne · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book tells the full story of the genocide in Bangladesh and the complicity that Nixon and Kissinger had in it. Based on tapes and information only recently released to the public, this book shows the criminality of the Nixon Administration. According to Bass, it is entirely possible that the genocide could have been prevented only for the two criminal clowns making the decisions in the White House. In fact, when weapons from the U.S. were delivered to the Pakistanis, Nixon made it clear to them that they could be handy for domestic problems as well as international ones. After losing an election, the dictator of Pakistan, using weapons supplied by the U.S. attacked a select group of people. Nixon and Kissinger knew from the start what was happening in Pakistan where the Bengalis were being targeted- more specifically, Hindu Bengalis were killed, raped, tortured, burned out of their homes and driven out of their country because they were in a majority and had won the election by a huge margin. Genocide was the word used by Archer Blood, the chief American diplomat in Dacca. Hindus were targeted and 80-90% of the nearly 800,000 victims were Hindu.

Those who stood up for the people being targeted found themselves without jobs- except for the ambassador to Pakistan, Kenneth Keating whose dismissal would have created too much heat for Nixon. Archer Blood, gave up a lucrative career to object to what was happening.

This well-written, exhaustively researched book by the Princeton professor should be required
reading for anyone who has any doubt about what kind of people Nixon and Kissinger were and for anyone interested in this period of history. The book provides a good education about how both Nixon and Kissinger viewed their jobs, the country, and the world in general. They knowingly broke the law and apparently thought nothing of it- and they weren't alone. Other so called respected members of the government like Bush Sr. and Alexander Haig were in on what was happening. While on a visit to India, Kissinger was asked to visit the refugee camps where so many people were suffering from the abuse they had suffered in Pakistan, from starvation, disease and lack of medical care. Kissinger showed no interest in visiting and didn't even want to discuss the matter. According to the Nixon Administration, what happens in any country is no ones business outside that country. Kissinger actually said this on several occasions. For anyone not familiar with Kissinger's background, he is a Jew who escaped Nazi Germany where many of his relations were killed by the Nazis. One wonders if he thinks that no one should have intervened there. Nixon would have justified his actions based on the his end game which was the visit to China. Pakistans dictator was the path used to set up the meeting but there were several other paths that could have been taken including Romania and Paris. Just when I thought I knew the worst there was to know about Nixon, it got worse.

[victor harris · Rating 5 out of 5]

The story behind the independence movement in Bangla Desh which created a chain reaction of diplomatic maneuvers as Pakistan tried to suppress those aspirations. Heavy-handed dealings by the Pakistan government and military when they refused to recognize legitimately elected leaders in East Pakistan served as the catalyst for the aggressive separation advocates. Central to the narrative, hence the Blood Telegram, is the refusal of Kissinger and Nixon to heed the advice of their diplomats in South Asia. Despite the brutality, atrocities, and even genocidal actions of Pakistan, the Nixon administration remained firmly committed to Pakistan. This included the usual duplicity and the illegal funneling via third parties to supply Pakistan. Because of its proximity, India was drawn into the crisis as it absorbed refugees, supported guerrillas, and ultimately engaged in full-scale combat with Pakistan.
Because Kissinger was using Pakistan as a conduit to launch its " Opening" with China, there were multiple layers of backroom dealing, including Kissinger trying to broaden the conflict by having China invade India. A proposition China sensibly declined. The loathing both Kissinger and Nixon felt for India and Indira Gandhi escalated the tensions and drove India closer to the Soviet camp. This is a classic study in how policy decisions trigger the law of unintended consequences and left the U.S. aligning itself with dictatorships against a democracy - India, and democratic movements in Bangla Desh.

[Philip Girvan · Rating 4 out of 5]

An extremely well researched book that sheds new light on depths of Henry Kissinger`s duplicity & depravity.

While not a comprehensive account of the mass killings initiated by the Pakistan Army upon its Bengali citizens in what was to become Bangladesh, the book does provide an excellent account of Nixon's and Kissinger's utter disdain for humanity with particular emphasis on their contempt for the peoples of the Indian Sub-Continent. Bass has made excellent use of the Nixon White House tapes to relay that contempt using Nixon and Kissinger's very own words. Other official government documents (US, Indian, Pakistani, Chinese, Soviet) and first-person accounts allow Bass to create a powerful narrative.

There are few heroes in the book. One of the few is Archer Blood, Consul General to the United States in Dacca, who was the official sender of the telegram that categorized the killings in East Pakistan, made possible with US manufactured weapons sold to Pakistan, despite an official embargo, and which continued to be sold even during the height of what Blood categorized as the Pakistan Army's 'genocide' in an official telegram to the State Department.

The book is an important chapter in the wider history of the Cold War. It powerfully portrays the criminality of the Nixon White House. It also provides a window into the complicated, generally acrimonious, relationships between India-Pakistan-China-USA-USSR and how the murders of hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, could be justified as a means toward containing the Soviet Union. Powerful stuff.

[David · Rating 5 out of 5]

4.5 stars rounded up to 5.

This book does a tremendous job of explaining the Cold War strategies and alliances of the U.S. in 1971. Why the U.S. was cozy with dictators who trampled on the rights of their people and why the U.S. had such a cool relationship with the largest democracy in the world (India). As the Cold War has slipped into distant memory this book informs us that the events it describes in 1971 are still felt today.

Tricky Dick Nixon and Henry Kissinger come into clear focus through the author’s exhaustive research. Nixon’s extreme loyalty to the people that were good to him pre-presidency gives him a humanizing touch (not an easy thing to do) and helps explain some of his motivations. Otherwise he and Kissinger come across terribly (probably an easy thing to do). While it’s easy to question why Nixon and Kissinger allowed a close ally to commit genocide the book does an excellent job of showing that it amounted to more than just loyalty to an old dictator friend. The geopolitical situations are very well explained here.

My only quibble is that the writing occasionally sounded too academic. I would have enjoyed the book more if it had been written by a journalist. But that’s a minor complaint.

"All the President’s Men” and “The Final Days” are great companions to this book.