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Modern War Studies
Peacekeepers and Conquerors: The Army Officer Corps on the American Frontier, 1821-1846
In Jackson's Sword, Samuel Watson showed how the U.S. Army officer corps played a crucial role in stabilizing the frontiers of a rapidly expanding nation. In this sequel volume, he chronicles how the corps' responsibilities and leadership along the young nation's borders continued to grow. In the process, he shows, officers reflected an increasing commitment to professionalism, insulation from partisanship, and deference to civilian authority-all tempered in the forge of frustrating, politically complex operations and diplomacy along the nation's frontiers.
Watson now focuses on the quarter-century between the Army's reduction in force in 1821 and the Mexican War. He examines a broad swath of military activity beginning with campaigns against southeastern Indians, notably the dispossession of the Creeks remaining in Georgia and Alabama from 1825 to 1834; the expropriation of the Cherokee between 1836 and 1838; and the Second Seminole War. He also explores peacekeeping on the Canadian border, which exploded in rebellion against British rule at the end of 1837, prompting British officials to applaud the U.S. Army for calming tensions and demonstrating its government's support for the international state system. He then follows the gradual extension of U.S. sovereignty in the Southwest through military operations west of the Missouri River and along the Louisiana-Texas border from 1821 to 1838 and through dragoon expeditions onto the central and southern Plains between 1834 and 1845.
Throughout his account, Watson shows how military professionalism did not develop independent of civilian society, nor was it simply a matter of growing expertise in the art of conventional warfare. Indeed, the government trusted career army officers to serve as federal, international, and interethnic mediators, national law enforcers, and de facto intercultural and international peacekeepers. He also explores officers' attitudes toward Britain, Oregon, Texas, and Mexico to assess their values and priorities on the eve of the first conventional war the United States had fought in more than three decades.
Watson's detailed study delves deeply into sources that reveal what officers actually thought, wrote, and did in the frontier and border regions. By examining the range of operations over the course of this quarter-century, he shows that the processes of peacekeeping, coercive diplomacy, and conquest were intricately and inextricably woven together.
Watson now focuses on the quarter-century between the Army's reduction in force in 1821 and the Mexican War. He examines a broad swath of military activity beginning with campaigns against southeastern Indians, notably the dispossession of the Creeks remaining in Georgia and Alabama from 1825 to 1834; the expropriation of the Cherokee between 1836 and 1838; and the Second Seminole War. He also explores peacekeeping on the Canadian border, which exploded in rebellion against British rule at the end of 1837, prompting British officials to applaud the U.S. Army for calming tensions and demonstrating its government's support for the international state system. He then follows the gradual extension of U.S. sovereignty in the Southwest through military operations west of the Missouri River and along the Louisiana-Texas border from 1821 to 1838 and through dragoon expeditions onto the central and southern Plains between 1834 and 1845.
Throughout his account, Watson shows how military professionalism did not develop independent of civilian society, nor was it simply a matter of growing expertise in the art of conventional warfare. Indeed, the government trusted career army officers to serve as federal, international, and interethnic mediators, national law enforcers, and de facto intercultural and international peacekeepers. He also explores officers' attitudes toward Britain, Oregon, Texas, and Mexico to assess their values and priorities on the eve of the first conventional war the United States had fought in more than three decades.
Watson's detailed study delves deeply into sources that reveal what officers actually thought, wrote, and did in the frontier and border regions. By examining the range of operations over the course of this quarter-century, he shows that the processes of peacekeeping, coercive diplomacy, and conquest were intricately and inextricably woven together.
- GenresAmerican HistoryHistory
654 pages, Hardcover
First published April 23, 2013
27 people want to read
About the author
Samuel J. Watson
7 booksSamuel J. Watson is professor of history at the U.S. Military Academy.
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
August 27, 2018
Phew! This is a scholarly book from beginning to end. Watson packs as much into each paragraph as Bennie De Voto. His main thesis is to show the development of a professional officer's corps in the United States Army. He covered the militia, rough-hewn, frontier outlook, in JACKSON'S SWORD. Its lack of professional leadership and training was applauded by Jeffersonian Democrats who feared a professional standing army. These were the same people who advocated eliminating the Military Academy at West Point. As he shows in the current book, that side did not prevail and, in fact, it was the leadership development begun at West Point that created a trained, professional leadership force that was an agent of the nation over various sectarian challenges.
By showing the actions of the army in various confrontations against Indians, filibusters, greedy speculators, and borderers, he develops and defends his position with data, letters, and history. He shows that the Regular Army was a major factor in the development of a national American identity, that made for one nation, as opposed to Spanish or French dominated segments in Cis-Appalachia. He does not dwell on the fact that West Point soldiers were later to split over the North-South sectionalism but, points out in his conclusions that the split was not as bad as other groups faced with the Civil War. He adds that it was the West Pointers who established the logistical systems that provided Taylor and Scott with sustenance in Mexico without having to resort to predatory scavenging. This same control of logistics came to bear in the Civil War as a major factor in the South's defeat.
It is a great, but demanding read and I would recommend it those interested in leadership development, military history, Civil War enthusiasts, and the cultural, political and economic development of the early republic from the Indian removals to the Halls of Montezuma.
By showing the actions of the army in various confrontations against Indians, filibusters, greedy speculators, and borderers, he develops and defends his position with data, letters, and history. He shows that the Regular Army was a major factor in the development of a national American identity, that made for one nation, as opposed to Spanish or French dominated segments in Cis-Appalachia. He does not dwell on the fact that West Point soldiers were later to split over the North-South sectionalism but, points out in his conclusions that the split was not as bad as other groups faced with the Civil War. He adds that it was the West Pointers who established the logistical systems that provided Taylor and Scott with sustenance in Mexico without having to resort to predatory scavenging. This same control of logistics came to bear in the Civil War as a major factor in the South's defeat.
It is a great, but demanding read and I would recommend it those interested in leadership development, military history, Civil War enthusiasts, and the cultural, political and economic development of the early republic from the Indian removals to the Halls of Montezuma.
August 11, 2015
The author seems to have read every piece of writing, public or private, of every US Army officer and cadet in this period (from the Cherokee removal to the outbreak of the Mexican War). Several famous Civil War generals appear as cadets, lieutenants, and captains. It's a damned fat thick square book, mainly for specialists. There is not even a summary of the course and outcome of the various Indian wars in this period--apparently the reader is assumed to be familiar with the Second Seminole War, etc. The writer is meticulous in his scholarship, sound in his judgments, and long-winded and repetitive. For those who persevere to the end, there are some interesting insights into the outlook and sentiments of the officer class in this period. The American tradition of a politically neutral military had already taken firm hold--the officers saw themselves as the servants of policy, not its makers. Professionalism grew as more and more of the officer corps came to be made up of West Point graduates rather than direct commissions from civilian life. The officers generally had sympathy with and even admiration for the tribes they fought to evict from their ancient homelands. Nevertheless, they took for granted the superiority of European civilization, and regarded the separation of populations as the only alternative to extinction for the tribes. On the other hand, they had little sympathy with the American frontiersmen, whom they found greedy, uncouth, and untrustworthy. Indeed, the US Army was often asked to clear white settlers from Indian land, and was the major force protecting Indians from attack by gangs of whites determined to dispossess them of their land.
The first major episode covered is the removal of the Cherokees. Motivated by notions of personal and national honor, Army officers found repugnant Andrew Jackson's duplicitous policy of swindling or forcing natives out of their land. Nevertheless, the idea of political neutrality was already firmly fixed and the Army carried out its orders (which only involved ensuring the departure of the tribe for Oklahoma; they did not accompany them on the Trail of Tears).
The second episode is the Second Seminole War, also disliked by Army officers, not only because of their reluctance to force natives off their native land but also because of the unhealthful climate and the impossibility of achieving decisive military results against the guerrilla Seminoles. This is the only period when there were large numbers of resignations from the Army.
The third episode was along the Canadian border in the late 1830s, a little-remembered period (at least in the US) when so-called "Patriots," would-be insurrectionists fighting the British government of Canada, started raiding from bases in the US. They had a good deal of sympathy from local Americans, but Army officers regarded them as misguided ruffians, and were determined to enforce US neutrality laws against them, while also discouraging British violation of US territory. The Army was determined to maintain friendly and respectful relationships across the international border, and to show good faith in restraining and deterring the "Patriots." In general they were quite successful. Many of the more senior officers had fought the British in the same territory during the War of 1812, and it seems they did not want to repeat the experience.
The fourth was watching the border with Mexican Texas, and after 1836 with the Republic of Texas. The American officers were not eager for annexation. They cared little for Mexico's opinion on the matter, thinking Mexico would not risk a fight and having a poor opinion of the quality of the Mexican army anyway. They just did not care for the adventures of lawless frontiersmen, and were primarily concerned with preserving law and order with and among the Indian tribes native to or recently resettled in the southern plains, and with protecting US sovereignty from Mexican or Texan incursion.
The final episode was the advance to the Rio Grande after the annexation of Texas in 1845. The officers still did not expect Mexico to fight, and disliked the idea of a long and tedious deployment in so remote and unhealthful a climate. The officer corps felt little of the jingoist excitement of the rest of the country.
The first major episode covered is the removal of the Cherokees. Motivated by notions of personal and national honor, Army officers found repugnant Andrew Jackson's duplicitous policy of swindling or forcing natives out of their land. Nevertheless, the idea of political neutrality was already firmly fixed and the Army carried out its orders (which only involved ensuring the departure of the tribe for Oklahoma; they did not accompany them on the Trail of Tears).
The second episode is the Second Seminole War, also disliked by Army officers, not only because of their reluctance to force natives off their native land but also because of the unhealthful climate and the impossibility of achieving decisive military results against the guerrilla Seminoles. This is the only period when there were large numbers of resignations from the Army.
The third episode was along the Canadian border in the late 1830s, a little-remembered period (at least in the US) when so-called "Patriots," would-be insurrectionists fighting the British government of Canada, started raiding from bases in the US. They had a good deal of sympathy from local Americans, but Army officers regarded them as misguided ruffians, and were determined to enforce US neutrality laws against them, while also discouraging British violation of US territory. The Army was determined to maintain friendly and respectful relationships across the international border, and to show good faith in restraining and deterring the "Patriots." In general they were quite successful. Many of the more senior officers had fought the British in the same territory during the War of 1812, and it seems they did not want to repeat the experience.
The fourth was watching the border with Mexican Texas, and after 1836 with the Republic of Texas. The American officers were not eager for annexation. They cared little for Mexico's opinion on the matter, thinking Mexico would not risk a fight and having a poor opinion of the quality of the Mexican army anyway. They just did not care for the adventures of lawless frontiersmen, and were primarily concerned with preserving law and order with and among the Indian tribes native to or recently resettled in the southern plains, and with protecting US sovereignty from Mexican or Texan incursion.
The final episode was the advance to the Rio Grande after the annexation of Texas in 1845. The officers still did not expect Mexico to fight, and disliked the idea of a long and tedious deployment in so remote and unhealthful a climate. The officer corps felt little of the jingoist excitement of the rest of the country.
May 8, 2013
While I don't agree with Watson on all points in this book or its predecessor volume _Jacksons's Sword_ (especially his view of the Corps of Engineers' national defense plans in this era), he has provided a detailed and deeply-researched argument that clearly demonstrates how the army's involvement in its traditional frontier constabulary roles (both in terms of the use and the restraint of violence) contributed immensely to the development of military professionalism.
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews