South African-born Israeli politician Abba Eban served as first permanent delegate of Israel to the United Nations from 1949 to 1959, as ambassador to the United States from 1950 to 1959, and as foreign minister from 1966 to 1974.
This diplomat worked as a scholar of the Arabic and Hebrew languages.
In his career, he served as affairs, education, deputy prime minister. He also served as vice president of the General Assembly of the United Nations and as president of the Weizmann institute of science.
Under appreciated at home, Abba Eban's mellifluous voice and far reaching command of the English language made him Israeli's most prestigious ambassador abroad. The book looks back to the earlier part of his career and his impressions on the role of diplomats and diplomacy in the last half of the 20th century, especially the Cold War, and his hopes for the future.
Contradiction appears to be the norm in diplomatic affairs, and Eban relates a number of delightful, often humorous, anecdotes and interesting observations. For example in 1906 the US had a mere 9 embassies abroad and a sum total of 800 persons in the foreign service, and as such was ill informed and ill prepared for the larger role that it had in the Paris 1919 peace conference. As President Wilson noted, "I never knew that there were a million Germans in Bohemia". Eban then speculates on the role of ignorance in the conduct of world affairs and argues that reliance on principles rather than realities became one of the fundamental enablers of the 2nd world war. Carrying on he notes that stated policy often contradicted actions. Wilson was for openness, much of the deliberations of 1919 were done in secret, to their advantage as private positions can be changed whereas public positions for reasons of saving face often cannot. Publicly sovereignty was championed, but policy thereafter was conducted according to the views of those such as George Kennan who advocated respecting the "spheres of influence" of the great powers, and as such human rights often get trampled. And while the 1975 Helsinki Declaration focused on the Soviet Union, Eban saw that the brutality, corruption, suppression and involvement in the arms trade of 3rd world nations should have been of equal if not greater concern.
He accurately assesses the myths about the power and relevance of the United Nations, to which he was seconded as Israeli's representative. As an assembly of amoral and immoral nations it is unreasonably granted to be a moral authority. As a policeman and monitor of the peace it is beholden to the interests of its member states to be anything but, nor does it have the requisite powers, and it is more than doubtful that it should. As to the Security Council, which supposedly is the domain of the 5 Great Powers, he notes Lyndon Johnson's astute quip: "Who are the other three?". And for all the talk of international law, nations and diplomats fear the binary nature of legal decisions where all could be lost or won on a single judgement and ultimately prefer negotiations or even war.
The unbridled optimistic tone of the last two chapters is not in keeping with the sharp analysis applied elsewhere. Eban goes horribly wrong is in his predictions for the Oslo Accords, but understandably so given the apparent breakthrough they represented at the time and the desirability of the hoped for outcome. Applying hindsight, the results were far less than the imagined possibilities.
A too brief and interesting read and Eban's last book before he died in 2002. Recommended.