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Amateurs, to Arms!: A Military History of the War of 1812
Begun in ignorance of the military reality, the War of 1812 was our "most unmilitary war," fought catch-as-catch-can with raw troops, incompetent officers, and appallingly inadequate logistics. American soil was invaded along three frontiers, thte nation's capital was occupied and burned, and the secession of the New England states loomed as a possibility. In Amateurs, to Arms! distinguished military historian Colonel John R. Elting shows how the young republic fought and almost lost its "Second War for Independence," and how it was saved by the handful of amateur soldiers and sailors who survived, masters their deadly new professions, and somehow battled Great Britain to a standstill along our wilderness borders and on the high seas.
Hardcover
First published September 1, 1991
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About the author
John R. Elting
52 books13 followersJohn Robert Elting was a soldier for thirty-five years (1933-1968), with a couple of civilian interludes as a high school instructor. His first commission had been from the Reserve Officer Training Corps at Stanford University in 1932. He combined this with summer duty in Company H (machine-guns), 163rd Infantry Regiment, Montana National Guard, and then as an officer in the Civilian Conservation Corps.
In 1940 Elting became an ROTC instructor at Oregon State College. From then on he was continually in service until 1947 (71st Armored Field Artillery Battalion, the Tactics Department of the Armored School at Fort Knox, Combat Command B, 8th Armored Division in the Rhineland, Ardennes, Alsace, and Central Europe campaigns, 24th Field Artillery Battalion of the Philippine Scouts). In 1948 he was recalled, after a short civilian interlude as a teacher, and was assigned to the Armed Forces Information School and, from there, to the Military Academy, West Point.
In 1954 John Elting's turn for overseas duty came up and he was posted to the J-2 (Intelligence) Division of the Far East Command, returning to West Point in 1957. There he began researching and writing the Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, with Colonel Esposito acting as overall editor and advisor.
Between 1965 and 1968, Colonel Elting served as G-2 of the Washington Military District, before retiring in 1968.
After his retirement, Elting turned his attention to writing and research (in his own modest words, he "tried to be a historian"). He was the author, co-author or editor of sixteen books, including The Battles of Saratoga, American Army Life, A Dictionary of Soldier Talk, A Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, Swords Around a Throne and Napoleonic Uniforms. He took particular delight in the history of Napoleon's Army - and the French emperor's campaigns - and in the study of the American Revolution, but was a considerable authority on all aspects of military history. His knowledge was deep, and he gave generously of it, and for many he served as an inspiration. He also served as a historical consultant on the Time-Life World War II book series and authored "Battles for Scandinavia" in the series.
In 1940 Elting became an ROTC instructor at Oregon State College. From then on he was continually in service until 1947 (71st Armored Field Artillery Battalion, the Tactics Department of the Armored School at Fort Knox, Combat Command B, 8th Armored Division in the Rhineland, Ardennes, Alsace, and Central Europe campaigns, 24th Field Artillery Battalion of the Philippine Scouts). In 1948 he was recalled, after a short civilian interlude as a teacher, and was assigned to the Armed Forces Information School and, from there, to the Military Academy, West Point.
In 1954 John Elting's turn for overseas duty came up and he was posted to the J-2 (Intelligence) Division of the Far East Command, returning to West Point in 1957. There he began researching and writing the Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, with Colonel Esposito acting as overall editor and advisor.
Between 1965 and 1968, Colonel Elting served as G-2 of the Washington Military District, before retiring in 1968.
After his retirement, Elting turned his attention to writing and research (in his own modest words, he "tried to be a historian"). He was the author, co-author or editor of sixteen books, including The Battles of Saratoga, American Army Life, A Dictionary of Soldier Talk, A Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, Swords Around a Throne and Napoleonic Uniforms. He took particular delight in the history of Napoleon's Army - and the French emperor's campaigns - and in the study of the American Revolution, but was a considerable authority on all aspects of military history. His knowledge was deep, and he gave generously of it, and for many he served as an inspiration. He also served as a historical consultant on the Time-Life World War II book series and authored "Battles for Scandinavia" in the series.
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Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews
November 17, 2021
John R. Elting's Amateurs, to Arms! could be retitled The Cynic's Guide to the War of 1812. Elting, a veteran military historian (mostly on the Napoleonic Wars), makes no bones about his contempt for America's inept military and political leadership during this most disastrous of wars. From James Madison, who allowed the United States to be dragged into a war with a major power on flimsy pretexts, to incompetent generals like William Hull (who surrendered Detroit almost without a fight) and James Wilkinson (a habitual failure who was also on the Spanish government's payroll), to the generally poor state of America's militia and near-nonexistent standing army, it's little wonder that the War proved a colossal misadventure. Elting colorfully recounts American defeats along the Canadian frontier, occasionally leavened by British ineptitude, Native American indecision and surprising naval victories. Few come off all well in this account, certainly not Madison, not even Andrew Jackson, who is portrayed as an Indian killer and strategic bungler who blunders into victory at New Orleans...after peace has always been negotiated. Hardly an objective account, with an acerbic tone that might put off some readers, but the present writer found it engaging and even funny.
March 12, 2021
John Elting’s Amateurs, to Arms! is the single most sarcastic book of military history that I’ve ever read. Most historians, when viewing premodern warfare, cut early generals some slack for not knowing anything about war as a science. Elting does not. In Amateurs, to Arms! he gives the military men the Eye of Sauron. The book is filled with many quotable lines, which I’ll get to in a moment.
The War the 1812 had four main theaters. 1) The Great Lakes/St. Lawrence waterway, 2) The eastern seaboard of Washington and Baltimore, 3) Florida (think Andrew Jackson and the Redsticks-Jackson won, which is pretty much all you need to know), and 4) New Orleans (Jackson again).
The Great Lakes/St. Lawrence waterway battles were not modern battles, but more like the Scottish border raids of earlier times. Armies were small—often no more than a few hundred men on each side—and the fighting seesawed indecisively between wins and losses. What’s more, fighting with the American militia was like fighting with a herd of deer. They startled and ran away at the slightest provocation. Their generals were mostly incompetent, cowardly position seekers with political connections who had not the slightest idea of a battle plan, tactics, strategy, staffing, or logistics. The only thing that saved the Americans in this theater was that the best British generals were in Europe battling Napoleon, and the ones in the US were the B team. The navy functioned somewhat better because they pretty much ignored Washington’s orders and ran their own war, but they too were weighed down by a large percentage of incompetents. When the occasional general like Winfield Scott appears, trying to inject some real science into his plans, it’s a relief to see it.
As for the eastern seaboard, Washington burned and Baltimore didn’t, mainly because Baltimore organized its own defense and didn’t depend on officials in Washington to save them. Washington’s chief general William Winder, did not understand that 1) It’s better to fight an enemy at a bridge rather than in an open field behind the bridge, and 2) It’s even better to burn the bridge so your enemy can’t cross it. Instead, the frightened and rattled Winder positioned his forces further back and just let the British stroll across the bridge to meet them at the Battle of Bladensburg. Winder did, however, have the sense to put his men under cover, only to have his dispositions ruined by soon-to-be President James Monroe, who insisted on pulling the men out from their bushwacking cover and having them fight standing in the open (presumably because this is what European armies did—Europeans put much emphasis on elan, or scaring the pants off your enemy with a flashy show of force), and Elting even blames Francis Scott Key for shifting troops from good positions into bad. Washington did not have much of a chance, but when the politicians and lawyers from the city arrived at the battlefield, they made things worse.
As Elting points out, men like Jefferson and Madison, though patriots, were not soldiers. Jefferson, as governor of Virginia, was chased out of his state by the British during the Revolutionary War, and his military ideas had not improved during his term as President. Both Jefferson and Madison were more concerned with picking officers from their own political party than with their competence (Lincoln would make this mistake during the Civil War, and like Lincoln, they received a long, messy war as a result.) Winfield Scott called the officers of his day, “Swaggers, dependents, and decayed gentlemen unfit for any military purpose whatever.” One of the generals, James Wilkinson, was a con artist and an honest-to-God spy in the pay of the Spanish. Scott had said in 1810 that serving under Wilkinson was like being married to a prostitute. The next concern of Jefferson and Madison was to save a penny because the US had a big war debt from the last notable punch-up, so they shrank the army and supplied it feebly. Equally notable, three-quarters of all the food supplied to the British troops in the St. Lawrence area was sold to them by enterprising Americans, and nobody tried to stop it.
When war was declared, the first US Secretary of War, William Eustis, “For reasons only known to his mouse-skinning mind,” sent the notice by regular mail to the troops near Detroit. When the Cleveland postmaster received the message, he was so shocked that he immediately hired a special courier to hurry the declaration to the troops at emergency speed.
Elting’s book contains passages like this: “Smyth summoned all his field grade officers to a council of war as to whether to continue the crossing. The council, doubtlessly studying the general out of the corners of their eyes, decided against it. By way of salvaging his battered ego, Smyth then sent Lieutenant Colonel Bisshopp, the commander at Fort Erie, a demand that he surrender immediately to ‘spare the effusion of blood’--and marched his own men back to camp, probably leaving Bisshopp more than a little bewildered.”
“Winchester’s report to the secretary of war remains an outstanding example of uncomprehending asininity: he conceded that his defeat was regrettable, but he was ‘flattered by the belief that no material error is chargeable upon myself.’”
“Secretary of State Monroe rode off toward Benedict to count the enemy’s ships and men. By no means a daring scout, he tried to do his counting at three miles’ distance and found he had forgotten to fetch a telescope. After two days of cautious sneak-and-peeping he somehow concluded that Ross must have 6,000 men, and proceeded to inflict this, and other misinformation on Madison, Winder, and anyone else he could catch.”
John Armstrong, the Secretary of War who replaced Eustis, eventually managed to get rid of James Wilkinson and promoted men like Winfield Scott and Andrew Jackson, but too late in the war to save his own career after a long series of disasters.
As for Andrew Jackson at New Orleans, Elting blames him for having an almost non-existent intelligence network, and gives Jackson’s chief engineer Major Latour much credit for designing very good fortifications that the British decided they could not take, so they went home. Latour, says Elting, was a mysterious character with much war experience who may have been in the pay of Napoleon. (If so, it was the second great French contribution to American independence after French help during the Revolutionary War.)
The only flaw I can find in Elting’s narrative is that he covers so many engagements, especially the fights on the St. Lawrence, that they start to blur together a bit. However, the book is recommended if you want to get an idea of how the War of 1812 was really fought. I would also suggest further reading about individual battles if you want greater detail.
Available at Open Library:
https://openlibrary.org/works/OL29159...
The War the 1812 had four main theaters. 1) The Great Lakes/St. Lawrence waterway, 2) The eastern seaboard of Washington and Baltimore, 3) Florida (think Andrew Jackson and the Redsticks-Jackson won, which is pretty much all you need to know), and 4) New Orleans (Jackson again).
The Great Lakes/St. Lawrence waterway battles were not modern battles, but more like the Scottish border raids of earlier times. Armies were small—often no more than a few hundred men on each side—and the fighting seesawed indecisively between wins and losses. What’s more, fighting with the American militia was like fighting with a herd of deer. They startled and ran away at the slightest provocation. Their generals were mostly incompetent, cowardly position seekers with political connections who had not the slightest idea of a battle plan, tactics, strategy, staffing, or logistics. The only thing that saved the Americans in this theater was that the best British generals were in Europe battling Napoleon, and the ones in the US were the B team. The navy functioned somewhat better because they pretty much ignored Washington’s orders and ran their own war, but they too were weighed down by a large percentage of incompetents. When the occasional general like Winfield Scott appears, trying to inject some real science into his plans, it’s a relief to see it.
As for the eastern seaboard, Washington burned and Baltimore didn’t, mainly because Baltimore organized its own defense and didn’t depend on officials in Washington to save them. Washington’s chief general William Winder, did not understand that 1) It’s better to fight an enemy at a bridge rather than in an open field behind the bridge, and 2) It’s even better to burn the bridge so your enemy can’t cross it. Instead, the frightened and rattled Winder positioned his forces further back and just let the British stroll across the bridge to meet them at the Battle of Bladensburg. Winder did, however, have the sense to put his men under cover, only to have his dispositions ruined by soon-to-be President James Monroe, who insisted on pulling the men out from their bushwacking cover and having them fight standing in the open (presumably because this is what European armies did—Europeans put much emphasis on elan, or scaring the pants off your enemy with a flashy show of force), and Elting even blames Francis Scott Key for shifting troops from good positions into bad. Washington did not have much of a chance, but when the politicians and lawyers from the city arrived at the battlefield, they made things worse.
As Elting points out, men like Jefferson and Madison, though patriots, were not soldiers. Jefferson, as governor of Virginia, was chased out of his state by the British during the Revolutionary War, and his military ideas had not improved during his term as President. Both Jefferson and Madison were more concerned with picking officers from their own political party than with their competence (Lincoln would make this mistake during the Civil War, and like Lincoln, they received a long, messy war as a result.) Winfield Scott called the officers of his day, “Swaggers, dependents, and decayed gentlemen unfit for any military purpose whatever.” One of the generals, James Wilkinson, was a con artist and an honest-to-God spy in the pay of the Spanish. Scott had said in 1810 that serving under Wilkinson was like being married to a prostitute. The next concern of Jefferson and Madison was to save a penny because the US had a big war debt from the last notable punch-up, so they shrank the army and supplied it feebly. Equally notable, three-quarters of all the food supplied to the British troops in the St. Lawrence area was sold to them by enterprising Americans, and nobody tried to stop it.
When war was declared, the first US Secretary of War, William Eustis, “For reasons only known to his mouse-skinning mind,” sent the notice by regular mail to the troops near Detroit. When the Cleveland postmaster received the message, he was so shocked that he immediately hired a special courier to hurry the declaration to the troops at emergency speed.
Elting’s book contains passages like this: “Smyth summoned all his field grade officers to a council of war as to whether to continue the crossing. The council, doubtlessly studying the general out of the corners of their eyes, decided against it. By way of salvaging his battered ego, Smyth then sent Lieutenant Colonel Bisshopp, the commander at Fort Erie, a demand that he surrender immediately to ‘spare the effusion of blood’--and marched his own men back to camp, probably leaving Bisshopp more than a little bewildered.”
“Winchester’s report to the secretary of war remains an outstanding example of uncomprehending asininity: he conceded that his defeat was regrettable, but he was ‘flattered by the belief that no material error is chargeable upon myself.’”
“Secretary of State Monroe rode off toward Benedict to count the enemy’s ships and men. By no means a daring scout, he tried to do his counting at three miles’ distance and found he had forgotten to fetch a telescope. After two days of cautious sneak-and-peeping he somehow concluded that Ross must have 6,000 men, and proceeded to inflict this, and other misinformation on Madison, Winder, and anyone else he could catch.”
John Armstrong, the Secretary of War who replaced Eustis, eventually managed to get rid of James Wilkinson and promoted men like Winfield Scott and Andrew Jackson, but too late in the war to save his own career after a long series of disasters.
As for Andrew Jackson at New Orleans, Elting blames him for having an almost non-existent intelligence network, and gives Jackson’s chief engineer Major Latour much credit for designing very good fortifications that the British decided they could not take, so they went home. Latour, says Elting, was a mysterious character with much war experience who may have been in the pay of Napoleon. (If so, it was the second great French contribution to American independence after French help during the Revolutionary War.)
The only flaw I can find in Elting’s narrative is that he covers so many engagements, especially the fights on the St. Lawrence, that they start to blur together a bit. However, the book is recommended if you want to get an idea of how the War of 1812 was really fought. I would also suggest further reading about individual battles if you want greater detail.
Available at Open Library:
https://openlibrary.org/works/OL29159...
January 7, 2016
In this history, Elting argues that the War of 1812 was the war Americans were least prepared for in their entire history; as the title suggests, Elting emphasizes the amateurishness of US forces and argues that tactical victories made the difference in the end, although, of course, nobody really won the war.
The book is almost entirely a military history, as the title indicates. There is little discussion of policy or politics, except to the extent that their incompetence affected military operations, especially in regards to the selection of commanders on the American side. Elting tells the story from both sides, and the narrative is pretty vivid, especially the Washington-Baltimore campaign and the battle of New Orleans. Elting also writes with wit, such as when he describes the duel between American officers Alexander Smyth and Peter Porter (“unfortunately, both missed”).
Interesting, vivid, and fairly well written, despite some generalizations here and there.
The book is almost entirely a military history, as the title indicates. There is little discussion of policy or politics, except to the extent that their incompetence affected military operations, especially in regards to the selection of commanders on the American side. Elting tells the story from both sides, and the narrative is pretty vivid, especially the Washington-Baltimore campaign and the battle of New Orleans. Elting also writes with wit, such as when he describes the duel between American officers Alexander Smyth and Peter Porter (“unfortunately, both missed”).
Interesting, vivid, and fairly well written, despite some generalizations here and there.
July 19, 2016
This is an OK book. While there are plenty of maps they don't mesh well with the history and at times they are not too useful. The word spelling of a couple of names is different from other sources I've seen. It covers the war in its entirety. One criticism is that it focuses a bit too much on the military campaign but almost nothing at all about the morale in the U.S, England and Canada, the economic impact and costs of the war and most importantly, how the treaty of Ghent ending the war came to be signed. The writer's style was a bit dry and there were too many parts in the footnotes where he indicates more research needed to be done. Specific figures are hard to come by being that records were destroyed when Washington was burned and proper record keeping was a difficulty even prior to the burning.
Overall, I'm glad I read the book.
Overall, I'm glad I read the book.
February 19, 2016
John Elting's ""Amateurs, To Arms!"" is a solid history of the near-debacle that was the War of 1812. Elting does a fine job of recounting the various campaigns of the war, and doesn't flinch from calling out the less-than-stellar performance of the American side. This was my first book on the War of 1812, and for the most part it gives a clear narrative of the course of the fighting. My only issue is that the political and diplomatic sides of the war are not discussed; but, since this book is subtitled a ""military history"" that is to be expected, so for that part of the story, look elsewhere. Overall, a good read about a bad war.
May 23, 2008
This books discusses how unprepared the United States was for this War. Battles and leaders are discussed in great detail. A complete overview of the politics related to this War is provided. This is a well-written book of one America’s long-forgotten but important Wars.
April 7, 2008
A unnecessarily dry read about a war we arrogantly started and almost lost.
Never would declare war on someone who could invade us again.
Never would declare war on someone who could invade us again.
August 14, 2016
I liked it. It nicely complemented my other 1812 books.
November 17, 2017
President Madison was wrong to get us into war with England.
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January 20, 2019Some good Old Hickory stuff in this...
Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews