What do you think?
Rate this book
Military Intelligence Blunders and Cover-Ups: New Revised Edition
This book is a professional military-intelligence officer's and a controversial insider's view of some of the greatest intelligence blunders of recent history. It includes the serious developments in government misuse of intelligence in the recent war with Iraq. Colonel John Hughes-Wilson analyses not just the events that conspire to cause disaster, but why crucial intelligence is so often ignored, misunderstood or spun by politicians and seasoned generals alike. This book analyses: how Hitler's intelligence staff misled him in a bid to outfox their Nazi Party rivals; the bureaucratic bungling behind Pearl Harbor; how in-fighting within American intelligence ensured they were taken off guard by the Viet Cong's 1968 Tet Offensive; how over confidence, political interference and deception facilitated Egypt and Syria's 1973 surprise attack on Israel; why a handful of marines and a London taxicab were all Britain had to defend the Falklands; the mistaken intelligence that allowed Saddam Hussein to remain in power until the second Iraq War of 2003; the truth behind the US failure to run a terrorist warning system before the 9/11 WTC bombing; and how governments are increasingly pressurising intelligence agencies to 'spin' the party-political line.
240 pages, Kindle Edition
First published July 29, 1999
53 people are currently reading
228 people want to read
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 25 of 25 reviews
June 9, 2022
This book's synopsis makes it sound way more interesting and informative than it actually is. Colonel John Hughes-Wilson of Britain's Intelligence Corps, who "admits to having assisted in a number of cover-ups of embarrassing blunders during his service in intelligence and to committing several personally," attempts to inform the readers about nine major intelligence blunders that happened in the 20th and 21st centuries. The result does not live up to expectations.
He begins with Adolf Hitler's surprise launching of his Operation Barbarossa on the Soviet Union, goes through the infamous Tet Offensive of 1968, and ends with the attack on the World Trade Center that shook America and the world on September 11, 2001.
The problem with his account is that in reality it does not focus on intelligence blunders – or at least it pays them no more attention than any Wikipedia article does. I was looking forward the most to the chapter about the Vietnamese Communist's Tet Offensive of 1968 that dramatically changed the Americans' attitude toward the Vietnam conflict. I expected Hughes-Wilson to look deeper into the flawed analysis of intelligence that allowed Hanoi to surprise the Americans with its all-out offensive or into the way intelligence was distorted and fabricated by the American government ot suit its version of events. Instead, the author offers a simple summary of the Tet Offensive and its effect on the American public and the progress of the American war effort. He contributes nothing new to the discussion of the American intelligence failures in Vietnam. I could have found the same information, more graspably and engagingly presented, in any historical account of the Tet Offensive.
The same goes for the attack on Pearl Harbor, another chapter that I had high expectations for. Hughes-Wilson aims to demonstrate "the consequences of a nation not having a proper intelligence service at all." Well, that America did not have an intelligence service until President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, concerned by the success of the Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor, established the predecessor of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Office of Strategic Services is a well-known fact. I hoped that the author would address the theory that Pearl Harbor was staged, or at least attempt to explain how it turned out so that the American government did not address the intelligence about an impending attack by Imperial Japan that it had gathered, but Hughes-Wilson does not go any deeper in his analysis than a Wikipedia article.
The only interesting and important detail that the author brings attention to is that governments suffer as much from abundance of intelligence and intelligence services as from the lack of such. As he explains, when there are several intelligence services working on the same case, they for sure will compete. The race to gather more intelligence more quickly results in inaccurate reports. For instance, as he insists, one of the reasons for the American intelligence failure in South Vietnam was that the CIA constantly tried to establish dominance over the Secret Service and the South Vietnamese intelligence services. Thus, instead of cooperating with each other and sharing whatever information they had gathered to create more detailed and accurate reports, the intelligence services concealed information from each other, which hindered the delivery of information to those who needed it, such as military commanders and government officials. This situation should serve as an important lesson for current and future intelligence agents.
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BLUNDERS AND COVER-UPS is, with rare exceptions here and there, a mediocre work. I believe that as a highly experienced specialist, with over thirty years of work in Britain's Intelligence Corps, Hughes-Wilson could have produced a more insightful analysis. I was left with the perception that his goal was to amuse the readers with his stories, not to educate them. If so, he should have stated this in the introduction, so that readers who expect a serious read would not waste their time. This book has great potential, but it has remained undeveloped.
He begins with Adolf Hitler's surprise launching of his Operation Barbarossa on the Soviet Union, goes through the infamous Tet Offensive of 1968, and ends with the attack on the World Trade Center that shook America and the world on September 11, 2001.
The problem with his account is that in reality it does not focus on intelligence blunders – or at least it pays them no more attention than any Wikipedia article does. I was looking forward the most to the chapter about the Vietnamese Communist's Tet Offensive of 1968 that dramatically changed the Americans' attitude toward the Vietnam conflict. I expected Hughes-Wilson to look deeper into the flawed analysis of intelligence that allowed Hanoi to surprise the Americans with its all-out offensive or into the way intelligence was distorted and fabricated by the American government ot suit its version of events. Instead, the author offers a simple summary of the Tet Offensive and its effect on the American public and the progress of the American war effort. He contributes nothing new to the discussion of the American intelligence failures in Vietnam. I could have found the same information, more graspably and engagingly presented, in any historical account of the Tet Offensive.
The same goes for the attack on Pearl Harbor, another chapter that I had high expectations for. Hughes-Wilson aims to demonstrate "the consequences of a nation not having a proper intelligence service at all." Well, that America did not have an intelligence service until President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, concerned by the success of the Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor, established the predecessor of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Office of Strategic Services is a well-known fact. I hoped that the author would address the theory that Pearl Harbor was staged, or at least attempt to explain how it turned out so that the American government did not address the intelligence about an impending attack by Imperial Japan that it had gathered, but Hughes-Wilson does not go any deeper in his analysis than a Wikipedia article.
The only interesting and important detail that the author brings attention to is that governments suffer as much from abundance of intelligence and intelligence services as from the lack of such. As he explains, when there are several intelligence services working on the same case, they for sure will compete. The race to gather more intelligence more quickly results in inaccurate reports. For instance, as he insists, one of the reasons for the American intelligence failure in South Vietnam was that the CIA constantly tried to establish dominance over the Secret Service and the South Vietnamese intelligence services. Thus, instead of cooperating with each other and sharing whatever information they had gathered to create more detailed and accurate reports, the intelligence services concealed information from each other, which hindered the delivery of information to those who needed it, such as military commanders and government officials. This situation should serve as an important lesson for current and future intelligence agents.
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BLUNDERS AND COVER-UPS is, with rare exceptions here and there, a mediocre work. I believe that as a highly experienced specialist, with over thirty years of work in Britain's Intelligence Corps, Hughes-Wilson could have produced a more insightful analysis. I was left with the perception that his goal was to amuse the readers with his stories, not to educate them. If so, he should have stated this in the introduction, so that readers who expect a serious read would not waste their time. This book has great potential, but it has remained undeveloped.
May 23, 2017
A very informative, easy to read book covering wars big and small, and a few sanguine observations along the way about hidden agendas. I guess that all comes with the territory when the book is coming at you from an intelligence slant. It shows that you can always learn from disasters, but there will probably never be any removing of the human element, and so new chapters to this book have probably already been written, and will continue to do so.
March 25, 2021
This book should be compulsive reading for all those lovers of "conspiracy theories". Anybody with a working brain should already know that the more factors at play, the more chances of messing things up. Just one of the many reasons why all those plans to dominate the world are unlikely to succeed.
People are messy, lazy, unreliable, and they make mistakes all the time in good and bad faith, in the present just like in the past. Covering ground from WWII to the Twin Towers we see over and again how the human factor was decisive to set in motion major disasters.
If in the past collecting intelligence might have been a problem (together with gauging the reliability of the intel) in the present times, the opposite problem is true. The infamous "information overload" is very much true.
Even the best-structured intelligence operation is drowning in data and finding it extremely hard to select the reliable one and analyze it to understand what it means and what the consequences might be. This should also reassure all the paranoids convinced the government is spying on them: unless you are a major player in some dirty business, the government has no interest in you - also because it just doesn't have the manpower to sift through all the intel about each and every citizen.
People are messy, lazy, unreliable, and they make mistakes all the time in good and bad faith, in the present just like in the past. Covering ground from WWII to the Twin Towers we see over and again how the human factor was decisive to set in motion major disasters.
If in the past collecting intelligence might have been a problem (together with gauging the reliability of the intel) in the present times, the opposite problem is true. The infamous "information overload" is very much true.
Even the best-structured intelligence operation is drowning in data and finding it extremely hard to select the reliable one and analyze it to understand what it means and what the consequences might be. This should also reassure all the paranoids convinced the government is spying on them: unless you are a major player in some dirty business, the government has no interest in you - also because it just doesn't have the manpower to sift through all the intel about each and every citizen.
November 18, 2019
FINALLY! after weeks of laborous reading, I finally end this book with understanding and knowledged.
PROS:
The book is written in simple english only that makes it available to any layman like me.
The author provide simple and detailed explanation on why intel. blunders keep on happening despite our modern age.
It provides an excellent hindsight to the sophisticated modern information age of our present time.
It keeps me turning every page since the narration read like a fiction, action filled.
It teaches you to become an intel analyst for he provided a well basis (Collection, Collation, Dissemination and etc) intel chart to analyze every blunders along our away in this book.
Love the way on how he reiterates important info.
Has indifference in choosing his chapters. He even criticize his home country LOL.
I will definitely read this book again.
CONS:
The writing keeps me tumbling from one historical date to another, but the intention is clear: the author wants to provide chronological order of subjects rather than of time.
The last chapter (Iraq) gave me an info overload since some words are slowly beginning to alienate me.
Though some chapters are too long that maw deem senseless it is somewhat understandable along the way.
Here you go, definitely recommended for military, history, politics and international relations buff like me.
PROS:
The book is written in simple english only that makes it available to any layman like me.
The author provide simple and detailed explanation on why intel. blunders keep on happening despite our modern age.
It provides an excellent hindsight to the sophisticated modern information age of our present time.
It keeps me turning every page since the narration read like a fiction, action filled.
It teaches you to become an intel analyst for he provided a well basis (Collection, Collation, Dissemination and etc) intel chart to analyze every blunders along our away in this book.
Love the way on how he reiterates important info.
Has indifference in choosing his chapters. He even criticize his home country LOL.
I will definitely read this book again.
CONS:
The writing keeps me tumbling from one historical date to another, but the intention is clear: the author wants to provide chronological order of subjects rather than of time.
The last chapter (Iraq) gave me an info overload since some words are slowly beginning to alienate me.
Though some chapters are too long that maw deem senseless it is somewhat understandable along the way.
Here you go, definitely recommended for military, history, politics and international relations buff like me.
July 25, 2021
A wonderful review of some massive military intelligence failures ranging from the fall of Singapore to the Gulf War. Clearly written with an engaging and subtle humour the author concludes that all intelliegnce agnecies are basically incompetent, more interested in bureaucratic infighting than proving intelligence, and the the biggest single problem is the user, the customer for the intelligence.
The examples he gives of the users of intelligence, illustrate this premise in graphic detail, ranging through basic stupidity, racisim, cognitive dissonance and group think. The difficulties associated with providing timely intelligence at the sharp end are highlighted and the message of the book is encapsulated in a quote from Sun Tzu, "If you know th enemy and know yourself, you need not fer a thousand battles. If you know yourself and not the enemy, for every victory you will suffer a defeat. But if you know neither yourself nor the enemy, then you are a fool and will meet defeat in every battle".
The examples he gives of the users of intelligence, illustrate this premise in graphic detail, ranging through basic stupidity, racisim, cognitive dissonance and group think. The difficulties associated with providing timely intelligence at the sharp end are highlighted and the message of the book is encapsulated in a quote from Sun Tzu, "If you know th enemy and know yourself, you need not fer a thousand battles. If you know yourself and not the enemy, for every victory you will suffer a defeat. But if you know neither yourself nor the enemy, then you are a fool and will meet defeat in every battle".
August 13, 2023
The core problem with this book to my mind was its structure. Instead of discussing intelligence matters in whatever order the author thinks best and illustrating them along the way with in-depth historical examples, the book revolves around the historical examples related in chronological order. It's putting the cart before the horse and makes the explanations feel forced. The more recent chapters, specifically those dealing with Islamic fundamentalist terror up to and including 9/11, the "Long War" in Afghanistan and Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine likely have little new information to contribute to anyone who keeps reasonably abreast of current affairs and frankly felt shallow. Furthermore, too often I felt the book lacked focus, frequently straying from intelligence into purely operational matters beyond what was required to set the scene. Not a bad book, but one I felt deserved to be much better.
July 1, 2025
การส่งมอบข่าวกรองไปยังผู้มีอำนาจตัดสินใจ ควรมีความถูกต้อง ทันเวลา และแยกแยะอย่างชัดเจนระหว่างข้อเท็จจริงกับความคิดเห็น , ที่สำคัญที่สุดคือต้อง "ซื่อสัตย์และเป็นกลางอย่างดุเดือด (brutally honest and objective)" เพราะการพูดความจริงต่อผู้มีอำนาจอาจเป็นเส้นทางอาชีพที่ไม่ดีนัก
การทำความเข้าใจความแตกต่างระหว่าง "ขีดความสามารถ" (เช่น การมีปืน แต่ไม่มีหลักฐานเจตนา) และ "เจตนา" (เช่น การตั้งใจจะแทงด้วยดินสอที่เหลาแล้ว) เป็นสิ่งสำคัญ , แม้ขีดความสามารถจะจำกัด แต่เจตนาที่ชัดเจนทำให้บุคคลนั้นอันตรายอย่างยิ่ง ในช่วงสงครามเย็น หน่วยข่าวกรองมักเน้นไปที่ "ขีดความสามารถ" (จำนวนรถถังและขีปนาวุธ) มากเกินไป จนละเลย "เจตนา"
การทำความเข้าใจความแตกต่างระหว่าง "ขีดความสามารถ" (เช่น การมีปืน แต่ไม่มีหลักฐานเจตนา) และ "เจตนา" (เช่น การตั้งใจจะแทงด้วยดินสอที่เหลาแล้ว) เป็นสิ่งสำคัญ , แม้ขีดความสามารถจะจำกัด แต่เจตนาที่ชัดเจนทำให้บุคคลนั้นอันตรายอย่างยิ่ง ในช่วงสงครามเย็น หน่วยข่าวกรองมักเน้นไปที่ "ขีดความสามารถ" (จำนวนรถถังและขีปนาวุธ) มากเกินไป จนละเลย "เจตนา"
August 23, 2025
There are a lot of wars and details of wars that I'm only vaguely aware of. I remember hearing about the Falklands war on television when I was a child, and of course I'd heard about the Tet Offensive being a pivotal event in the Vietnam war, and I sort of knew, in the back of my mind, that the Canadians hate Lord Mountbatten.
This book, starting with events in WWII, ending up with the ongoing situation in Ukraine, looks at the intelligence aspect of pivotal moments in military history. Interesting in and of itself, but also a good overview and reminder of what these events are. The WWII stuff is especially good if you've gone down the Cryptonomicon rabbit hole.
This book, starting with events in WWII, ending up with the ongoing situation in Ukraine, looks at the intelligence aspect of pivotal moments in military history. Interesting in and of itself, but also a good overview and reminder of what these events are. The WWII stuff is especially good if you've gone down the Cryptonomicon rabbit hole.
December 10, 2020
This is it, one of my top favorite books. Without you Mr. Hughes-Wilson college would have been a lot harder. They say those who forget the past are doomed to repeat it. One thing the military sadly does is cover up their mistakes. They deny their soldiers the ability to learn from the mistakes and work to improve them. Luckily for those not interested in just making sure all the after action reviews are positive we have this book to remind us of some of the more grand failures of the past.
March 11, 2024
Despite what appears to be a sensationalist title, this is a very readable and detailed book on the craft of intelligence. Despite covering indications and warnings, capability vs intent and collection planning and other books that are often presented in the most boring way possible, this book is very enjoyable and engrossing. It's presented in a series of case studies covering but not limited to Pearl Harbor, two examples in Korea, the first and second Iraq wars, the invasion of the Falkland Islands. I'm looking forward to reading another of his books, On Intelligence.
February 4, 2018
Not as good as I was expecting from the synopsis. Interesting in parts but written in a hap hazard way jumping back and to in the years in each chapter. I did learn a few interesting facts about the wars/battles written about but not enough to raise the rating.
September 29, 2021
The things you never knew, you never knew!.
November 21, 2023
This was an excellent read that I think academics and intelligence practitioners will find both engaging and entertaining.
December 23, 2023
Fascinating early chapters, less so the more recent ones.
February 11, 2024
Fascinating read!
June 24, 2024
3.5 stars.
Great read for what it is 20 y o history book that I picked up for free.
Great read for what it is 20 y o history book that I picked up for free.
October 7, 2024
A great compilation of military intelligence failures worldwide.
January 12, 2025
A must read.
December 12, 2010
Não resisto. Inteligência militar, ou falta de...? É uma velha piada, que me foi uma vez contada por um polícia, que se a inteligência fosse medida em tars o militar estaria no fundo da escala. Inteligência, aqui, não é tanto sabedoria e capacidade cognitiva como a designação abrangente dos serviços secretos.
O curioso deste livro é analisar detalhadamente diversos acontecimentos históricos, da invasão da União Soviética à guerra das Falkland e à invasão do Kuwait, em que o papel de recolha de informação dos diversos serviços dedicados às operações secretas falhou redondamente. Certamente que haveria outros episódios históricos a relatar, mas a sensação com que fiquei foi que o autor escolheu deliberadamente diferentes momentos para criar um panorama ilustrativo das diversas razões dos falhanços da recolha de informações secretas.
Para o autor, estes envolvem desde a cegueira dos responsáveis políticos, passando pela falta de cooperação entre agências de informação rivais, incapacidade de ver outras ameaças para lá das consideradas mais prementes, sobrecarga de informação e falta de meios tecnológicos que façam chegar a informação hoje recolhida pelos imensos sistemas de vigilância e reconhecimento a quem dela mais precisa, aos soldados no terreno.
Interessante do ponto de vista da história militar, é uma leitura um pouco árida para curiosos amadores da minha laia, mas ajuda a clarificar e a compor os conhecimentos sobre momentos determinantes da história do século XX.
O curioso deste livro é analisar detalhadamente diversos acontecimentos históricos, da invasão da União Soviética à guerra das Falkland e à invasão do Kuwait, em que o papel de recolha de informação dos diversos serviços dedicados às operações secretas falhou redondamente. Certamente que haveria outros episódios históricos a relatar, mas a sensação com que fiquei foi que o autor escolheu deliberadamente diferentes momentos para criar um panorama ilustrativo das diversas razões dos falhanços da recolha de informações secretas.
Para o autor, estes envolvem desde a cegueira dos responsáveis políticos, passando pela falta de cooperação entre agências de informação rivais, incapacidade de ver outras ameaças para lá das consideradas mais prementes, sobrecarga de informação e falta de meios tecnológicos que façam chegar a informação hoje recolhida pelos imensos sistemas de vigilância e reconhecimento a quem dela mais precisa, aos soldados no terreno.
Interessante do ponto de vista da história militar, é uma leitura um pouco árida para curiosos amadores da minha laia, mas ajuda a clarificar e a compor os conhecimentos sobre momentos determinantes da história do século XX.
July 19, 2024
requisite multi-shelved: True Crime, Self-help
December 3, 2016
CZ/EN
Celkem zajímavý pohled do zákulisí rozvědky a jejího fungování ve dvacátém století i s jejich pohledem na některé zásadní události daného století. Občas mi však přišlo, že se autor nechává unést emocemi a své argumenty o tom, jak a proč rozvědka selhala nepodepřel důkazy, zejména v závěrečné části knihy a nemohl jsem se zbavit pocitu, že je v tu chvíli jen pověstným generálem po bitvě. Trochu mě v tom ohledu mrzí i nevyužitý potenciál velké bibliografie uvedené na konci knihy, na kterou v textu samotném jsou jen minimální odkazy. Avšak celkově dobrá kniha o tom, že je třeba nejen mít data, ale také je umět analyzovat. Výtečné je, že často poskytuje autor pohled obou stran, pokud je již k dispozici z dobových materiálů a zprostředkovává tak dobře pochopení nakolik byly zpravodajské služby neznalé skutečnosti.
EN:
A cool book about intelligence services and their mistakes. Sometimes, especially in the later parts, it seems to me that the author writes more about his opinions instead of historical facts. Nevertheless the book manages to capture the background of some important historical events and how the lack of proper intelligence work lead to their outcomes as we know them. The argumentation style of the author seemed sometimes less factual and more emotional and sometimes the historical events lack context in order to understand why was the intelligence ignored (e.g. how many terror threats and warnings does CIA usually receive?).
Celkem zajímavý pohled do zákulisí rozvědky a jejího fungování ve dvacátém století i s jejich pohledem na některé zásadní události daného století. Občas mi však přišlo, že se autor nechává unést emocemi a své argumenty o tom, jak a proč rozvědka selhala nepodepřel důkazy, zejména v závěrečné části knihy a nemohl jsem se zbavit pocitu, že je v tu chvíli jen pověstným generálem po bitvě. Trochu mě v tom ohledu mrzí i nevyužitý potenciál velké bibliografie uvedené na konci knihy, na kterou v textu samotném jsou jen minimální odkazy. Avšak celkově dobrá kniha o tom, že je třeba nejen mít data, ale také je umět analyzovat. Výtečné je, že často poskytuje autor pohled obou stran, pokud je již k dispozici z dobových materiálů a zprostředkovává tak dobře pochopení nakolik byly zpravodajské služby neznalé skutečnosti.
EN:
A cool book about intelligence services and their mistakes. Sometimes, especially in the later parts, it seems to me that the author writes more about his opinions instead of historical facts. Nevertheless the book manages to capture the background of some important historical events and how the lack of proper intelligence work lead to their outcomes as we know them. The argumentation style of the author seemed sometimes less factual and more emotional and sometimes the historical events lack context in order to understand why was the intelligence ignored (e.g. how many terror threats and warnings does CIA usually receive?).
April 22, 2012
This is an excellent read for anyone interested in the business of intelligence and its failures. It shows how mistakes get repeated, lessons painfully learnt in battle simply forgotten and having to be learnt all over again.
It covers the realities of competing services, agencies and budgets with the inevitable adjustments made to satisfy political power. Time and again the sheer number of warnings of upcoming hostility were simply ignored as it was an inconvenient truth!
It covers the realities of competing services, agencies and budgets with the inevitable adjustments made to satisfy political power. Time and again the sheer number of warnings of upcoming hostility were simply ignored as it was an inconvenient truth!
May 19, 2017
"A great look into the murky world of Intelligence.
Highlighting the difficulty in analysing and interpretating data and then attempting to translate it for your superiors.
The book is especially prudent today in this world of internet, armchair generals and conspiracies. Where everyone feels they have the answer to terrorism and how it was easy to spot that last target."
Highlighting the difficulty in analysing and interpretating data and then attempting to translate it for your superiors.
The book is especially prudent today in this world of internet, armchair generals and conspiracies. Where everyone feels they have the answer to terrorism and how it was easy to spot that last target."
March 28, 2007
Was reading this book the night of September 10th, 2001.
June 8, 2017
All modern tales. Too much detail. Slow and boring. Poorly written. Got tired and quit reading.
Displaying 1 - 25 of 25 reviews